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2024 DIGILAW 1924 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Mohanbhai Galabhai Chauhan

2024-10-16

BIREN VAISHNAV, MAULIK J.SHELAT

body2024
JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgement and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Palanpur, acquitting the respondents in Sessions Case No.62 of 1996 on 13.06.1997. The respondent was accused for the offenses punishable under Sections 376, 342, 323, 427, 201 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Brief case of the prosecution case is as under: 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that on 02/02/1996 the prosecutrix would take divorce from the respondent accused person, had gone to the house of the respondent accused i.e. her ex-husband for taking her belongings and at that relevant point of time, the accused person had assaulted the prosecutrix, torn her clothes after removing the same and committed the offence of rape on her by saying that though the respondent accused had given divorce to the prosecutrix, however, still there are husband and wife. After committing the offence of rape, the clothes of the prosecutrix were burnt by the respondent accused person and the prosecutrix was kept in room by locking the room and she was threatened that if she conveys this to anybody, she'll have to face dire consequences. It is the say of the prosecutrix that on 04/02/1996, she somehow got free from the said room and thereafter she had filed the complaint and accordingly the same was registered as FIR. And thereby, the respondent accused committed alleged offence. 2.2 Details of investigation are that in pursuance of the above allegation of the first informant, First Information Report was lodged with the Palanpur Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 342, 323, 427, 201 & 506 (2) of Indian Penal Code, 1860, vide I-CR No. 0 of 1996. Investigating Agency during the course of investigation recorded statements of the witnesses, drawn various panchnamas, the prosecutrix was taken for medical examination for the purpose of proving of the offence. After having found sufficient material against the Respondents - Accused, charge sheet came to be filed in the Court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tharad. It is to be noted that initially the complaint was filed at patentable station 0" Number and thereafter the same was sent for competent jurisdiction and politician i.e. Tharad police station for the purpose of investigation. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tharad. It is to be noted that initially the complaint was filed at patentable station 0" Number and thereafter the same was sent for competent jurisdiction and politician i.e. Tharad police station for the purpose of investigation. As the said Court, lacks jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged offences being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, it committed the case to the Sessions Court, Palanpur, as provided under Section 209 of the Code, which was numbered as Sessions Case No.62 of 1996. 2.3 Details of Trial Proceedings suggests that upon committal of the case to the Hon'ble Sessions Court, Palanpur, the Ld. Sessions Judge, framed charges vide Exh.3 against the Respondents Accused for the aforesaid offences. The Respondents - Accused pleaded not guilty and claim to be tried. They were tried for the said offences and in order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 14 prosecution witnesses and also produced various documentary evidence before the Ld. Trial Court. The details of the evidence led by the prosecution are reproduced in the tabular form hereunder: Oral Evidence Sr No. Exh. No. Name of witness Nature of witness Remarks 1. 6 Dipakbhai Pranami Examined the prosecutrix Page 27 2. 9 Ishwar Tuslidas Panch witness to injuries of the prosecutrix Hostile 3. 10 Sukhiyaben Surajsingh Panch witness to injuries of the prosecutrix Hostile 4. 11 Arunkumar Acharya Medical Officer who had examined the accused Page 40 5. 18 Hiralal Prahladji Panch witness of place of offence Hostile 6. 19 Aestarben Manilal Mekvan Prosecutrix / Complainant 48 7. 26 Sushilaben Simonbhai Khristi Mother of prosecutrix Page 71 8. 27 Jospin Manilal Mekvan Sister of prosecutrix 9. 28 Hirabhai Ramjibhai Bhati Panch witness of Body/Cloth Panchnama of accused Hostile 10. 29 Shankarji Kehraji Panch witness of Body/cloth Panchnama of accused Hostile 11. 30 Ambuji Masotji PSO, Tharad 12. 32 Kanubhai Maganbhai Bhoi PSI, Investigating Officer 13. 39 Chandubhai Rupaki Kotad Incharge P.I. 14. 42 Kasanbhai Jivanbhai Jadav Subsequent Investigation Officer Documentary Evidences Sr No. Exh. No. Name of witness Remarks 1. 7 Medical Certificate of Prosecutrix / Complainant 2. 14 Case papers of accused from C.H.C., Vav 3. 15 Performa of sexual offences 4. 17 Letter by C.H.C., Vav addressed to F.S.L 5. 20 Divorce Form 6. 21 Complaint 7. 23,24 Medical papers of Prosecutrix /Complainant from Civil Hospital, Palanpur. 8. 31 Order of Investigation. 9. 7 Medical Certificate of Prosecutrix / Complainant 2. 14 Case papers of accused from C.H.C., Vav 3. 15 Performa of sexual offences 4. 17 Letter by C.H.C., Vav addressed to F.S.L 5. 20 Divorce Form 6. 21 Complaint 7. 23,24 Medical papers of Prosecutrix /Complainant from Civil Hospital, Palanpur. 8. 31 Order of Investigation. 9. 33 Panchnama of accused’s body. 10. 34 Office copy of the report from F.S.L. Mobile Van, Gandhinagar. 11. 35&43 Ravangi Note 12. 37,38 Paper chit with signature of Panchas 13. 36 Panchnama of Place of Incident 14. 40 Panchnama of Prosecutrix /Complainant’s body condition 15. 41 F.I.R in Palanpur City Police Station Offence Registered No.0/96 16. 44 F.S.L. Report 17. 49 Xerox Copy of Deed of Divorce 3. The prosecution has examined the Medical Officer Dipak Pranami who had examined the prosecutrix as witness no.1 at Exh.6. Reading the medical evidence would suggest that when he was on duty on 05.02.1996 at the Civil Hospital, Palanpur, at 8.50 p.m. Esterben Manilal Makwana-the prosecutrix has been brought for medical examination. He collected the samples. He found that there was no presence of blood or semen on the outer parts of the body or on clothes. That there were certain injuries on the shoulder and the back. That the private parts had no presence of semen or stains thereof nor were there any signs of injury. He identified the certificate issued during the course of medical examination which was produced at Exh.7. In the crossexamination, he would submit that the results which appear on obtaining vaginal swab and the vaginal smear are same. He would submit that in the facts of the case the slide which had the sperms were not present as, after 72 hours, the sperm would not survive. He would submit that in case of a rape, when the women resists, there would be signs on injuries on the male. He has said that he has not examined the male accused. 4. The another important witness that the prosecution examined was PW-4 i.e. Arunkumar Acharya at Exh.11. Reading of the evidence would indicate that on 06.02.1996 he was discharging his duties at CHC, Vav. Pursuant to a yadi the accused- Mohanbhai Galabhai Chauhan was brought for medical examination. He was mentally alert that he had bathed and was wearing a fresh set of clothes. Reading of the evidence would indicate that on 06.02.1996 he was discharging his duties at CHC, Vav. Pursuant to a yadi the accused- Mohanbhai Galabhai Chauhan was brought for medical examination. He was mentally alert that he had bathed and was wearing a fresh set of clothes. On being questioned, it was found that he has no marks of injuries on his body or on his private parts. There was no smegma present on his private parts. He would further submit that he has not taken samples of any blood or any other tissue from the body of the accused. He would further in his cross-examination admit that if a person has engaged in sexual intercourse, his pubic hair would get matted. He has found no signs of injury on the body of the accused and it appeared that the accused had not therefore carried out any act which would be said to be rape. 5. The prosecution had examined the prosecutrix as PW-6 at Exh.19. She would submit that they were four sisters. Her younger sister’s name was Jospinben. The mother’s name was Sushilaben. That she was serving as a nurse and was first posted at Danta Jodhsar Sub-Center. That the accused became an acquaintance while she was working at Jodhsar. He was then working as a police constable at the Danta Police Station. After marrying the accused, she went to stay with the accused at the police quarters at Danta. In her deposition she had stated that after 10 days of her marriage, she was beaten up and the accused had inflicted a blow on her right leg with a sword. That she had not lodged any complaint. That on his being transferred to Tharad also, he continued to beat her and once on 16.12.1995 he had fractured her jaw. That, on 31.01.1996 they had obtained a divorce. At the time when the divorce was obtained, she had left her belongings in the police quarters and had told the accused that she would come back and take her belongings after four-five days. With this purpose in mind on 02.02.1996, according to the prosecutrix, she went to the quarter and finding it locked in the afternoon, she sat outside waiting for the accused where the accused turned up at five p.m. He opened the lock and went inside the quarter. She followed him inside. With this purpose in mind on 02.02.1996, according to the prosecutrix, she went to the quarter and finding it locked in the afternoon, she sat outside waiting for the accused where the accused turned up at five p.m. He opened the lock and went inside the quarter. She followed him inside. It is her case that while she was inside the room collecting her belongings, the accused insisted that they were husband and wife, they should engage in a physical relation. He then removed her Sari and her blouse and entered into a forcible sexual intercourse. This episode continued repeatedly on the 02.02.1996 till the 04.02.1996. According to her, on 04.02.1996, after having entered into a sexual intercourse multiple times, she was pushed out of her house . She left the house after wearing her old clothes that were lying in the quarter as the accused had burnt the clothes removed by pouring kerosene. It is the case of the prosecutrix that she boarded a bus from Tharad bus stand to Palanpur. From Palanpur she went to Danta. At Danta she met her friend Manglaben where she spent a night. On the next date, she again went to Palanpur where she met her sister Jospinben and explained to her what she had undergone. With her sister, she then went to her mother who then took her to the Palanpur DSP’s office and narrated the incident. On a wireless message being sent to the City Police Station, a public complaint was registered. It was so registered on 05.02.1996. Her statement was recorded on 06.02.1996. In her cross-examination, she admitted that along with a quarter of the accused where she was saying in all there were six quarters in line. That there were similarly six other quarters across the road. In other words, in all 60 families were staying in the police quarters. While going to the police quarters, she would had to pass through the police station and the office of the Judicial Magistrate was situated opposite to the police station. The office of the Dy.S.P. also was nearby. That there was a referral hospital at a certain distance from the quarters. In her cross-examination, it has come on record that she was not mixing with any of the residents of the quarters. The office of the Dy.S.P. also was nearby. That there was a referral hospital at a certain distance from the quarters. In her cross-examination, it has come on record that she was not mixing with any of the residents of the quarters. She would admit that prior to the marriage that the accused had entered into with her, the accused had one son Hitesh. Hitesh was staying with them while they were at Danta. He was aged about 7 years. Reading of her crossexamination would further indicate that when she traveled to Palanpur, the bus was fully occupied. 6. The prosecution has examined PW-7 at Exh.26, who is the mother-Sushilaben. In her deposition, she has supported the prosecution case. She would submit that the prosecutrix had narrated the incident that had occurred from 02.02.1996 to 04.02.1996 and thereafter she having left the house of the accused on 04.02.1996. 7. The prosecution has examined PW-12 at Exh.32. He is the police station in-charge of Tharad Police Station. He was entrusted with the investigation. He would submit that the prosecutrix’s panchnama as to the body and the clothes of the accused were shown to him and it was pointed out that the investigation was carried out. FSL certificate of the clothes etc. were obtained. The witness had deposed that he had followed the procedure of investigation. 8. Based on these set of evidences, the Sessions Judge had acquitted the accused. 9. Mr.Hardik Soni learned Additional Public Prosecutor would make the following submissions: 9.1 It is submitted that despite there being it clear evidence by the prosecutrix that the offence of rape was committed on her by the respondent accused and the said offence was committed after taking divorce, and the said offence was committed against the wish and will of the prosecutrix and forcefully offence of rape was committed by the respondent accused. Even there are injuries on the body parts of the prosecutrix and those injuries have been supported by the medical examination and hence to discard such evidence, no cogent reasons have been assigned by the learned trial court and the respondent accused person ought to have been convicted for the offences punishable under section 376 IPC and others. 9.2 It is submitted that findings of acquittal are contrary to law in evidence on record in the findings recorded are erroneous and based on irrelevant material. 9.2 It is submitted that findings of acquittal are contrary to law in evidence on record in the findings recorded are erroneous and based on irrelevant material. It is further contended that Ld. Trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the Respondents and not properly appreciated the evidence produced on record though the prosecution had proved case against the Accused. It is further contended that Ld. Trial Court has given weightage to the minor omission and contradiction in the witnesses though there was no any material omission and contradiction in the evidence of the witnesses. The Ld. Trial Court has relied on minor contradiction and discarded the evidence of the witnesses, thus, the reasons assigned by the Ld. Trial Court while acquitting the accused are unjust, improper, perverse and unwarranted to the facts of the prosecution case and thereby, has committed an error in acquitting the accused. It is further submitted that the prosecution has established the guilt of all the accused and Ld. Trial Court has committed an error both on law and facts. Thus, the Ld. Trial Court has wrongly recorded the order of acquittal, which deserves to be quashed and appropriate sentences for the offences be passed against all the accused. On the aforesaid contentions, it is submitted that present appeal may kindly be allowed has prayed for. 10. Perusal of the order of the Trial Court would indicate that the Trial Court mainly acquitted the accused on three grounds. Firstly, the evidence of other interested witnesses was not trustworthy. Secondly, the evidence of the prosecutrix and the injuries were not supported by the medical evidence. Thirdly, even the medical officers were not supporting the case of the prosecution witness and the prosecutrix. 11. Perusal of the evidence of the prosecutrix would indicate that it is her case that she went to the quarter on 02.02.1996. The quarter was then locked. She had apparently gone to collect her gold ornaments. The version further indicates that on the arrival of the accused who opened the door, both went in and while she was collecting her belongings, the act of alleged rape occurred. After the incident, the accused burnt the blouse and the petticoat removed from the body of the prosecutrix. The version that she was subjected to rape over four to five time on 02.02.1996 is not recorded in the complaint. After the incident, the accused burnt the blouse and the petticoat removed from the body of the prosecutrix. The version that she was subjected to rape over four to five time on 02.02.1996 is not recorded in the complaint. According to her, she was confined to the room from 02.02.1996 to 04.02.1996. After having moved out from the house on 04.02.1996, the version of the prosecutrix creates a doubt inasmuch as, she traveled by bus from Tharad to Palanpur, from Palanpur to Danta, where she was staying for a night with her friend Manglaben and then she returned to Palanpur to be with her sister Josmin. Nothing has come on record or there is no evidence to suggest that the episode that she had undergone was narrated by her to Manglaben and it was only after she went to Palanpur on next day i.e. 05.02.1996 that she confided of the incident to her sister. There is no version in the complaint as to why did she not immediately disclose the incident before 05.02.1996. What also is culled out from the cross-examination of the prosecutrix is that the accused had son Hitesh aged six years who was staying with him in the quarter. There is no denial to the fact that if the presence of the son Hitesh was found to be established at the residence, the incident would not have occurred. That Hitesh was staying at the residence and that he was not absent was not denied by the prosecutrix which indicates that there was an intention of purposely hiding the presence of the son at the quarter during her visit. 12. From the evidence on record it has also come to the notice that from the narrative of the quarter’s plan, there were four rooms in line. All the four rooms had windows without curtains. There were six quarters in the same line and six other across the road. There is no reason to believe the version of the prosecutrix that if she had been retained wrongfully and repeatedly raped for over two days, the occupants and the neighborhood which approximately had 60 families residing would not have noticed the occurrence of such an incident. There were six quarters in the same line and six other across the road. There is no reason to believe the version of the prosecutrix that if she had been retained wrongfully and repeatedly raped for over two days, the occupants and the neighborhood which approximately had 60 families residing would not have noticed the occurrence of such an incident. From the evidence of this witness, it has also come on record that before going to the quarter, she had to pass through a police station, the Magistrate’s Court was across the road and so as the Dy.S.P. office. If the prosecutrix was raped was she professes, there was no reasonable cause for her to wait till the fourth day after 02.02.1996 and immediately lodged complaint at the first available time and place i.e. the police station near the quarter which was the place of the incident. From the Panchnama of the place of the incident also the location of the rooms and the situation as narrated by the prosecutrix stands proved. 13. PW-12 PSI Kanubhai Maganbhai Bhoi has been examined who also would in his cross-examination admits that with the situation of the doors and windows in the quarter, it was impossible for the neighborhood and the outsiders not to notice such a dastardly act if in fact it was so undertaken. No behavior which a normal victim would do was exhibited by the prosecutrix. 14. From the medical evidence of D.B.Pranami, it is found that though it was the case of the prosecutrix that she had suffered a fracture of the jaws and there was a maniacal wiring, it was not that she could not speak and therefore the evidence in defense that the prosecutrix could not reflect or react to this act and could not shout so as to draw the attention of the neighborhood leads to one more conclusion that the entire base for framing the accused on the allegation of rape cannot be believed. Even the medical evidence in connection with the vaginal smear and the vaginal swab would indicate that there was discrepancy. The evidence of the Medical Officer also indicated that the injuries on the private parts would indicate that the injury could be caused by being hit by a blunt and a hard substance. No examination of an expert such as a gynecologist has been brought on record. The evidence of the Medical Officer also indicated that the injuries on the private parts would indicate that the injury could be caused by being hit by a blunt and a hard substance. No examination of an expert such as a gynecologist has been brought on record. On the question whether the prosecutrix was actually raped, the medical evidence through the testimony of Dr. Arunkumar Harjibhai Acharya would indicate that Mohanbhai Dalabhai Chauhan-the accused was brought for medical examination on 06.02.1996. There were no stains found on his clothes and no marks of injury on his body which normally would be found on an accused who would commit rape because of the resistance from a woman. The pubic were not matted. 15. On appreciation of evidence therefore, the Sessions Judge found that the version of the prosecutrix that she was raped was not proved beyond doubt. The fact that her version indicated that for over two days she was detained, is also without any basis as there is no evidence to prove this. 16. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: "27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the noninterference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 8. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 17. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 18. Scope of appeal against acquittal is well laid down in case of Chandrappa and ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it was observed: “42. 18. Scope of appeal against acquittal is well laid down in case of Chandrappa and ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it was observed: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, ’substantial and compelling reasons’, ’good and sufficient grounds’, ’very strong circumstances’, ’distorted conclusions’, ’glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ’flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 19. Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] has held as under: “39. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below:- "29. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below:- "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [ Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 40. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 40. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:- "8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:- 41.1 That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2That the same is based on a misreading/ omission to consider material evidence on record; 41.3That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 42. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 20. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the appeal and confirm the acquittal. Resultantly, impugned judgement and order of the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the appeal and confirm the acquittal. Resultantly, impugned judgement and order of the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R & P, if called for, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.