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2024 DIGILAW 1928 (ALL)

Mukul Srivastava v. State of U. P.

2024-08-23

ANISH KUMAR GUPTA

body2024
JUDGMENT : (Anish Kumar Gupta, J.) Heard Sri Himanshu Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri Pankaj Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking quashing of the charge-sheet dated 29.9.2018 as well as the impugned summoning order dated 14.11.2018 in Case No. 4016229 of 2018 (State of U.P. v. Mukul and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 259 of 2018 under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506, I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S.-Mahila Thana, District-Ghaziabad, pending in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. 3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the applicant No. 1, Mukesh Srivastava, is the husband of the opposite party No. 2, Aprajita Srivastava. The marriage of the applicant No. 1 with the opposite party No. 2 was solemnized on 2.12.2010. The applicants are permanent resident of Allahabad and the opposite party No. 2, is the permanent resident of Sahibabad, District-Ghaziabad and the marriage was solemnized at Allahabad. Out of the said wedlock a girl child, namely Kumari Bhavya was born on 19.2.2012 in the matrimonial home at Allahabad. Learned counsel for the applicants submits since the opposite party No. 2 is the eldest girl child of her parent and there was no male child in the family of the opposite party No. 2, therefore, after the marriage, the opposite party No. 2 wanted the applicant No. 1 to live at her parent's house and this was the bone of contention between the parties and in view thereof, the opposite party No. 2 has once left the matrimonial home and started residing with her parents. However, after much persuasions the applicant and the opposite party No. 2 started living separately on a rented accommodation at Noida. It is further pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant that initially the applicant No. 1 herein was working as a Clerk in Karur Vaishya Bank at New Delhi and subsequently, he was transferred in March, 2013 to Lucknow, where also the opposite party No. 2 and the applicant No. 1 were residing separately from the family in a rented accommodation at Lucknow. However, in May, 2013, the opposite party No. 2 deserted the applicant No. 1 herein, without any reasonable excuse. However, in May, 2013, the opposite party No. 2 deserted the applicant No. 1 herein, without any reasonable excuse. Therefore, the applicant No. 1 herein has filed a Suit No. 1558 of 2014 (Mukul v. Aprajita) under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, before Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad on 20.11.2014. After filing of the suit, the opposite party No. 2 again joined the applicant No. 1 in April, 2015 and thereupon, the aforesaid suit under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, was dismissed as not pressed and since thereafter they were residing at Lucknow, alongwith their daughter. Finally, again on 5.4.2017, the opposite party No. 2 deserted the applicant and started living with her parents at Sahibabad and despite repeated efforts on the part of the applicant No. 1 herein, when the opposite party No. 2 did not turn up, he filed a Suit No. 879 of 2018 (Mukul v. Aprajita) before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Prayagraj under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 19.5.2018, wherein notices were issued to the opposite party No. 2 on 31.5.2018. Learned Counsel submits that as a counterblast to the aforesaid suit filed by the applicant No. 1 herein, the opposite party No. 2 filed three cases on 11.6.2018, one being Complaint Case No. 1138 of 2018 under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred as 'the D.V. Act'), which is pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 5, Ghaziabad. Another being Application No. 451 of 2018 under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance, which is pending before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ghaziabad. Another being Application No. 451 of 2018 under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance, which is pending before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ghaziabad. On the same date she has also filed a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. being the Application No. 1447 of 2018 before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ghaziabad, in pursuance whereof the instant F.I.R. was registered against the applicants herein under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506, 420, 383 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the D.P. Act, P.S.-Mahila Thana, Ghaziabad, being Case Crime No. 259 of 2018 dated 30.8.2018 and in the instant case the opposite party No. 2 has implicated all the family members of the applicant No. 1 despite the fact that the applicant No. 1 and the opposite party No. 2 were residing separately from the other family members, previously at Noida and then at Lucknow, therefore, the allegation against the other family members were uncalled for. During the investigation the Investigation Officer(IO) has exonerated the two accused persons, namely Mithun Srivastava, who is the younger brother of the applicant No. 1 and Om Prakash Srivastava, who was the elder brother of the applicant No. 2. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the entire allegations made in the instant F.I.R. were based on a concocted story and have been made only for the purpose of harassment of the applicant No. 1 and his family members without there being any basis therefor. 4. Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that from the plain reading of the entire F.I.R. it would be crystal clear that all the allegations are general and vague against all the applicants herein without their being any specific averments against the applicants herein. 5. From the F.I.R. itself it is apparent that the allegations for demand of dowry are baseless and without any substance therein and in the F.I.R. itself it is alleged that the applicant No. 1 had some relations with his classmate prior to the marriage with the opposite party No. 2 for which there was some dispute between them and most probably due to some previous relationship of the applicant No. 1 with his classmate prior to the marriage for which the opposite party No. 2 used to quarrel with the applicant No. 1 herein. Previously also the opposite party No. 2 has left the matrimonial house when application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed on behalf of the applicant No. 1 and she has joined back to the applicant/husband. The marriage was of 2010 and for more than 7 years she was there with the applicant and was residing separate from the other family members. Therefore, there is no question of any harassment by the other family members of the applicant No. 1 herein. The story of demand of dowry made only for the purpose of registration of the F.I.R. which too is of general in nature and vague in its totality. Rather, as per her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that no contact was made by the applicant No. 1 nor any amount was paid for maintenance, therefore, the entire story with regard to the instant case for demand of dowry etc., is totally false and baseless. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants has relied upon the judgement of Apex Court in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC 741 , as well as Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 759. 7. Relying upon the judgements of the Geeta Mehrotra (supra) and Achin Gupta (supra), learned counsel for the applicants submits that criminal proceedings initiated by the opposite party No. 2 is nothing but a malicious prosecution for wrecking vengeance towards the entire family members due to her personal grudge against the applicant/husband, due to some previous relationship of the applicant with his classmate prior to the marriage, therefore, the same deserves to be quashed. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 submits that there are categorical allegations with regard to the demand of dowry by the applicant No. 1 and the other family members and she was being tortured again and again for demand of Rs. 10,00,000/- and a luxury car, which could not be fulfilled by the parents of the opposite party No. 2. 10,00,000/- and a luxury car, which could not be fulfilled by the parents of the opposite party No. 2. Therefore, she has been brought by the applicant No. 1 to her parental house and thereafter the applicants did not take care of the opposite party No. 2 for want of the fulfilment of the demand of dowry, therefore, a categorical case has been made out against the applicants and the police during the investigation has also found a prima facie case against the applicants, thereupon, a charge-sheet was filed against them after due investigation and the trial Court after perusing the entire record of the case has found a prima facie case, thereupon, the applicants have been summoned. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 submits that since a prima facie case has been made out against the applicants, therefore, no interference is called for while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as has been laid down by the judgements of Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, therefore, the instant case deserves to be dismissed. 9. Learned A.G.A. for the State supports the submission made by learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2. 10. Having considered the rivals submissions made by learned counsels for the parties, this Court has carefully perused the record of the case. From the records it is admitted that the parties were married on 2.12.2010 and the marriage was solemnized at Allahabad as per the Hindu ritual and customs. Various narrations have been made in the instant F.I.R. with regard to the expenditure made by the parents of the opposite party No. 2 in the marriage. However, from the scrutiny thereof, the same would not amount to any demand of dowry on the part of the applicants herein. Further, narrations with regard to the demand of a luxury car and Rs. 10,00,000/- are general and vague in nature. No date, time or the manner and by whom it was demanded, has not been specified in the instant complaint at all. The general and vague allegations have been made with regard to the demand of Luxury Car and Rs. 10,00,000/-. 10,00,000/- are general and vague in nature. No date, time or the manner and by whom it was demanded, has not been specified in the instant complaint at all. The general and vague allegations have been made with regard to the demand of Luxury Car and Rs. 10,00,000/-. Further, in the F.I.R. itself the opposite party No. 2 has categorically admitted that after the marriage, she was residing at Noida, Saket, Delhi and Lucknow alongwith her husband. Therefore, separate living of the other family members is categorically established. The narration with regard to the applicant No. 1 staying outside the Delhi till date and was not making the payment towards the household expenditure and used to quarrel with the opposite party No. 2 are the normal wear and tear of life between the husband and wife, which has no relation with regard to the demand of dowry. It is further stated in the F.I.R. that after the applicant No. 1 was transferred from Lucknow to Delhi, he has brought the opposite party No. 2 at her parental house at Sahibabad, as there was no place of residence for the applicant No. 1 himself after the transfer, for which it has been alleged in the F.I.R. that he has dropped the opposite party No. 2 at Sahibabad, at the incitement on the part of other co-accused persons. It is further alleged that thereafter when she contacted with her in-laws, then, they said that you have not fulfilled the demand of dowry, therefore, you should give divorce to the applicant No. 1. However, from the entire allegations it is not clear that from whom she has contacted and who has specifically asked her to give divorce or give dowry. From the aforesaid averments made in the F.I.R., it is crystal clear the same are general and vague allegations without there being any specification, whatsoever. 11. Before proceeding further it would be relevant to note the provisions of Section 498A I.P.C., which are reproduced as under: Section 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, ''cruelty means''- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.]'' 12. The aforesaid provisions under Section 498A I.P.C. has been interpreted by the Apex Court in State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582 , and observed as under: ''16. In order to appreciate the rival stands, it would be useful to notice the statutory provisions. Section 498-A IPC makes ''cruelty'' by husband or his relatives a punishable offence. The word ''cruelty'' is defined in the Explanation appended to the said section. Section 498-A IPC with Explanation reads thus: ''498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty' means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.'' 17. Thus, providing a new dimension to the concept of ''cruelty'', clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498-A IPC postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute ''cruelty''. Such wilful conduct, which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman would also amount to ''cruelty''. Clause (b) of the Explanation provides that harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand, would also constitute ''cruelty'' for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC. 18. It is plain that as per clause (b) of the Explanation, which, according to learned counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to ''cruelty'' within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC, harassment simpliciter is not ''cruelty'' and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property, etc. that it amounts to ''cruelty'' punishable under Section 498-A IPC. 25. Furthermore, though the trial Court records that in the evidence there are no specific instances of harassment, yet it has proceeded to presume that the long course of conduct of the respondent is indicative of the fact that the allegation of harassment is not totally baseless. Even the deposit of initial amount of Rs 1,50,000 by the respondent for the purchase of a lorry in the name of the complainant has been doubted by the trial Court. 30. Time and again, the object and importance of prompt lodging of the First Information Report has been highlighted. Delay in lodging the First Information Report, more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. 30. Time and again, the object and importance of prompt lodging of the First Information Report has been highlighted. Delay in lodging the First Information Report, more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A delayed report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of a coloured version, an exaggerated account of the incident or a concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on its veracity. Therefore, it is essential that the delay in lodging the report should be satisfactorily explained.'' (Emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the aforesaid categorical observations made by the Apex Court, to constitute offence under Section 498A I.P.C. the cruelty must be of such a nature as it is likely to try to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life. However, from the entire allegation made in the F.I.R., this Court does not find any such allegation so as to enable this Court to arrive at the conclusion that the applicants herein prima facie can be said to have committed such an offence. From the facts of the case as discussed above, it is crystal clear that the applicant No. 1 and the opposite party No. 2 were residing separately on most of the time while the other family members were residing at Allahabad. Therefore, there was no occasion for the other family members to interfere with the day-to-day living of the applicant No. 1 and the opposite party No. 2. Further, from the allegations as made in the F.I.R. it is crystal clear that the same are general and vague allegations without their being any specification. 14. In Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica, (2009) 10 SCC 604 , the Apex Court has observed as under: 27. Parliament by Act 46 of 1983 with a view to combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment of woman at the hands of her husband or his relatives introduced Section 498-A and Section 304-B in IPC. 14. In Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica, (2009) 10 SCC 604 , the Apex Court has observed as under: 27. Parliament by Act 46 of 1983 with a view to combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment of woman at the hands of her husband or his relatives introduced Section 498-A and Section 304-B in IPC. Section 498-A reads as under: ''498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.'' 29. Thus, the essential ingredients of Section 498-A are: 1. A woman must be married. 2. She must be subjected to cruelty. 3. Cruelty must be of the nature of: (i) any wilful conduct as was likely to drive such woman: a. to commit suicide; b. cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb, either mental or physical; (ii) harassment of such woman, (1) with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security, (2) or on account of failure of such woman or by any of her relation to meet the unlawful demand; (iii) woman was subjected to such cruelty by: (1) husband of that woman, or (2) any relative of the husband. For constitution of an offence under Section 498-A IPC, therefore, the ingredients thereof must be held to be existing. 30. For proving the offence under Section 498-A IPC, the complainant must make allegation of harassment to the extent so as to coerce her to meet any unlawful demand of dowry, or any wilful conduct on the part of the accused of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. We do not find any such allegation has been made or otherwise can be found out so as to enable us to arrive at an opinion that the appellants prima facie have committed such an offence. The complaint petition must also be read with several other documents which form part of the complaint petition. The children from the first wife of Vikas were with Monica. Vikas affirmed an affidavit so as to enable Monica to apply for their passports. The complaint petition must also be read with several other documents which form part of the complaint petition. The children from the first wife of Vikas were with Monica. Vikas affirmed an affidavit so as to enable Monica to apply for their passports. Vikas, therefore, wanted to have children with them. (Emphasis supplied) 15. In case of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), this Apex Court has observed as under : ''19. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR is perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names who have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding. 20. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter of G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 , wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that: ''there has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a Court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their young days in chasing their cases in different Courts.'' The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the Courts would not encourage such disputes. 21. In yet another case in the matter of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 : AIR 2003 SC 1386 , it was observed that there is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Penal Code, 1860 was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punish the husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. But if the proceedings are initiated by the wife under Section 498A against the husband and his relatives and subsequently she has settled her disputes with her husband and his relatives and the wife and husband agreed for mutual divorce, refusal to exercise inherent powers by the High Court would not be proper as it would prevent woman from settling earlier. Thus for the purpose of securing the ends of justice quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr. P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It would however be a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not to exercise such a power.'' (Emphasis supplied) 16. In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (supra) the Apex Court has observed as under: 10. P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It would however be a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not to exercise such a power.'' (Emphasis supplied) 16. In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (supra) the Apex Court has observed as under: 10. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions made by the appellants and respondents, in our considered opinion, the foremost issue which requires determination in the instant case is whether allegations made against the appellant in-laws are in the nature of general omnibus allegations and therefore liable to be quashed? 15. In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. [Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC 741 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 212 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 120] it was observed : (SCC p. 749, para 21) ''21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that : (SCC p. 698, para 12) '12. … There has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a Court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their ''young'' days in chasing their cases in different Courts. 16. Recently, in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana [K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 605], it was also observed that : (SCC p. 454, para 6) ''6. … The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.'' 17. The abovementioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498-AIPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long-term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this Court by way of its judgments has warned the Courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them. 18. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the appellants. The complainant alleged that ''all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy''. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants herein i.e. none of the appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can at best be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes. Insofar as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order of the High Court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations made against him. However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution. 21. Insofar as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order of the High Court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations made against him. However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution. 21. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the appellant-accused, it would be unjust if the appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial i.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this Court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged. (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Achin Gupta (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under: ''25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but abuse of the process of the Court. The Court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute.'' (Emphasis supplied) 18. In Umesh @ Banti and others v. State of U.P. and another, 2012(11) ADJ 35 , this Court has observed as under: 12. The conjoint reading of the act clearly contemplates that where a woman is subjected to harassment with an intent to coerce her to meet any unlawful demand, which is not met by the woman or her relatives, would constitute cruelty. The consequence of such a harassment must necessarily lead to mental or physical pain. Where a physical pain is contemplated, the same has to be reflected by a supportive evidence in the shape of a medical report. However, where the pain is only mental, it has to co-relate to constant pressure being built on the woman. It all depends upon the sensitivity of the person to bear such pressure. Where a physical pain is contemplated, the same has to be reflected by a supportive evidence in the shape of a medical report. However, where the pain is only mental, it has to co-relate to constant pressure being built on the woman. It all depends upon the sensitivity of the person to bear such pressure. One act of harassment may not necessarily cause mental agony but it is constant pressure put on the woman that puts strain on her sensitivity. The act should be spread over a period of time. (Emphasis supplied) 19. Therefore, in view of the judgement of the Apex Court in Geeta Mehrotra (supra), Achin Gupta (supra), Kahkashan Kausar, (2022) 6 SCC 599 , as noted herein above, the instant F.I.R. is nothing but a malicious prosecution on the part of the opposite party No. 2 due to her matrimonial discord with the applicant No. 1 and to satisfy her grudge the entire family members of the applicants No. 1 have been implicated in the instant case with mala fide intentions on the basis of the concocted story of demand of dowry whereas the facts narrated in the F.I.R. are different. It is also to be noted here that the FIR has been lodged by the opposite party No. 2 against her husband and his entire family members for the reason other than demand of dowry. 20. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the instant case is nothing but a malicious prosecution on the part of the opposite party No. 2 only to harass the applicant No. 1 and his family members. Therefore, the instant application deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed and the entire proceedings of Case No. 4016229 of 2018 (State of U.P. v. Mukul and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 259 of 2018 under Section 498-A, 323, 504 and 506, I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S.-Mahila Thana, District-Ghaziabad, pending in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, charge-sheet dated 29.9.2018 as well as impugned summoning order dated 14.11.2018 are hereby quashed against all the applicants.