JUDGMENT : M. K. Thakker, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent. 2. With the consent of both the parties heard finally. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ahmedabad dated 14.02.2020 in Reference T.No.1202 of 2003 whereby, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court has allowed the reference partly by declaring the termination of the respondent-workman is illegal and directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent-workman with 30% back wages with continuity of services. 4. The gist of the petition is as under: 4.1. The respondent workman has initially appointed as floorboy by Gujarat State Handicrafts Development Corporation Ltd. from 26.06.1992 to 25.06.1993. He was appointed on contractual bases for the period of 2 years from 01.03.1994 in Gurjari Emporium at Madras by contractual appointment order dated 18.02.1994. The said store is for development of handloom and handicraft products. On completion of the above contractual period again the respondent-workman by contractual appointment order dated 22.04.1996 appointed as respondent-workman for the period of 1 year on contractual basis. Gurjari Emporium, Madras communicated to its Gandhinagar office vide communication dated 28.08.1996 that respondent-workman who is appointed on contractual basis is not coming to the office from 26.08.1996 and informed further that he has left to his native place without informing the office and without having sanctioned of any leave. The Personal Manager by letter dated 15-18.10.1996 informed to the Manager, Gurjari Emporium, Madras to clarify that whether the respondent-workman joined his duty after leave on 26.08.1996 to 07.09.1996 and to inform whether he is on duty or not. It was further requested to send monthly record of contractual staff of Gurjari Emporium, Madras. The workman did not report to its duty since 19.10 1996 therefore, vide communication dated 15 – 17.02.1997 the respondent-workman was asked to give his explanation. Thereafter, the contractual appointment was renewed for the period of 1 year from 01.03.1997 vide order dated 26– 29.03.1997. On 18.04.1997 the Gurjari Emporium, Madras informed that though contractual appointment has been renewed but they did not receive any information from the workman about joining the office. The respondent-workman was informed vide letter dated 02.05.1997 that in spite of renewal of his contractual appointment he did not join his service due to which the office would be compelled to cancel his contractual appointment order. The respondent-workman was informed vide letter dated 02.05.1997 that in spite of renewal of his contractual appointment he did not join his service due to which the office would be compelled to cancel his contractual appointment order. Thereafter, Gurjari Emporium, Madras by communication dated 26.05.1997 informed that the respondent workman has submitted joining report on 19.05.1997 and subsequently, Zonal Manager, Chennai vide letter dated 08.11.1998 informed that respondent-workman goes on long leaves and there was no productivity from him in the office and his services are not required. Considering the above communication by office order dated 3.12.1998 respondent workman was transferred from Gurjari Emporium, Madras to Ahmedabad, Gujarat and posted at Vatva store. Vide office order dated 13.04.2000 the workman was asked to work at Vadaj store for administrative convenience and effective control. Thereafter on 12.07.2000 the respondent-workman was informed to give an application for his renewal of contractual appointment if he is interested. No application was received from the respondent-workman and therefore, higher office was informed accordingly. On 31.07.2000 Deputy Manager was instructed not to take respondent-workman on work till he makes an application in writing. It was informed personally to the respondent-workman that if he is interested in working then he must submit an application but it was stated by the respondent-workman that he will submit the same later on. As no application was preferred for continuation of contractual appointment therefore, he was not offered an appointment. Thereafter, being aggrieved by the same respondent-workman has filed reference before the learned labour court Ahmedabad against the termination dated 01.08.2000. Learned Presiding Officer was pleased to allow the same partly by holding that termination of the respondent-workman from 01.08.2000 is illegal and therefore, he is required to be reinstated with 30% back wages and continuity of service which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 5. Heard learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi for the respondent. 5.1. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that as the respondent-workman has remained continuously absent for certain periods therefore he was asked to give an application for extension of contractual appointment and that fact was admitted by him during his crossexamination before learned Court though he had informed that it would be submitted later on, on non filing of the application his contractual appointment would put an end to. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that though he was alleged to have been terminated in the year 2000, for four years he did not prefer any reference or made any complaint before any Officer. After delay of 4 years, the reference was preferred before the learned court which was partly allowed in his favour. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that his appointment was on contractual basis and the same was continued for the period of 6 years and as contract was not extended therefore, he cannot claim reinstatement as the matter of right. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that terms containing the contract is that he would be relieved on maturity of the contract. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that it is true that after last contractual appointment order dated 29.03.1997 which was given for 1 year he worked upto 2000 as earlier he was at Madras therefore, on resuming the duty at Gujarat he was asked to file an application for renewal of the contract. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that even previously when he went on leave without informing higher officers he was inform vide communication dated 02.05.1997 to resume the duty within 10 days on receipt of the letter or the authority would be compelled to cancel the contractual appointment order. There was further communication on 18.11.1998 informing the Managing Director at Gandhinagar that there is no productivity from him to Gurjari Emporium, Madras as the respondent-workman goes on frequent long leaves and therefore his services are not required and it was request to shift him from Madras to elsewhere, so that expenditure towards his salary can be reduced. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that on considering the same he was transferred from Gurjari Emporium, Madras to Vatva Store with immediate effect on 03.12.1998 and thereafter, he was further transferred from Vatva Stores to Vadaj store with immediate effect 30.04.2000. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi has referred the communication dated 12.07.2000 and submitted that though it was informed on 12.07.2000 to give an application for extension of contractual appointment and there noting is made by the officer that respondent workman is absent from 12.07.2000 and therefore, he was again informed vide communication dated 31.07.2000 and their noting is made that though it was informed to given an application he has conveyed that it would be subsequently tendered. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that though no absenteeism is taken into consideration for not renewing the contract however, as he did not furnish any application for renewal of the contractual services were put an end to. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi submits that in view of non renewal of the contract the respondent cannot said to have been retrenched from the service as per section 2(oo) wherein, it is provided that termination of the workman as a result of non renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on his expiry or such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained thereof would not include in the definition of section 2oovv of retrenchment. 5.2. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi has relied on the decision rendered by the Apex court in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board Vs Darbara Singh reported in (2006) 1 SCC 121 and submitted that when the appointment being a conditional and for specific period on completion of that period section 2(oo) and section 25 will be inapplicable. Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi has further relied on the decision in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Vs Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri reported in 2013 SCC (14) SCC 456 and submitted that termination of service after expiry of contract, disengagement of servic does not amount to retrenchment and consequently workmen cannot be reinstated under section 25(h) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By submitting the same learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi has prayed to set aside the award passed by the learned labour Court directing to reinstate the respondent-workmen with 30% back wages. 5.3. This petition was vehemently opposed by learned advocate Mr. Aakash Modi who submitted in his submission that contractual appointment was not given for any particular purpose or for specific period. Lastly, when contractual appointment were extended on 26.03.1997 for the period of one year he undisputedly worked up to 31.07.2000. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that though he worked from 1992 continuously with the petitioner corporation and his contract was extended from time to time but on none of the occasions the demand of application was raised by the petitioner corporation. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that as the petition is filed by the respondent-workman praying for regularization on 24.08.2000 and notice was issued by this Court on 24.08.2000, he was terminated form the service keeping grudge in the mind. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that as the petition is filed by the respondent-workman praying for regularization on 24.08.2000 and notice was issued by this Court on 24.08.2000, he was terminated form the service keeping grudge in the mind. 5.4. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that his service was not terminated because of non renewal of the contract as though contract was completed on 26.03.1998, he continuously worked up to 01.08.2000. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that there was no delay in preferring the petition as he was before the High Court in the petition praying for regularization of service up to 2002 and on 20.09.2003 he preferred an application to the Conciliation Officers. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a delay in preferring the petition before the Tribunal. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that during the crossexamination of the employer it was admitted by him that in the Corporation before the year 2000, hundred workers were working and it is admitted by the employer in evidence below Exh.56 that the work which was done by the workman is of permanent in nature. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi has drawn the attention of this Court with regard to the reasons assigned by the learned labour court wherein, it is observed that on the said post other workers are working and before other workers are engaged in the post of respondent-workman no notice was issued to the respondent-workman offering the employment. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that action of petitioner-Corporation would fall under the definition of unfair labour practice and the same is specified in the Vth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi has relied on section 25(t) and submitted that under the Industrial Disputes Act there is prohibition of unfair labour practice. 5.5. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi submits that action of petitioner-Corporation would fall under the definition of unfair labour practice and the same is specified in the Vth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi has relied on section 25(t) and submitted that under the Industrial Disputes Act there is prohibition of unfair labour practice. 5.5. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Modi has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad Vs Employer I/r to To Mangmt Of Fci reported in 2014 (7) SCC 190 and the decision rendered by the Apex court in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs Hindalco Industries Limited reported in 2014 (11) SCC 85 and submitted that when the grievance was raised by the appellant to regularizing the service and at that point of time his service were terminated by projecting non renewal of the contract and the same would amount to unfair labour practice and therefore, learned labour court has rightly passed award in favour of respondent-workman and directed to reinstate the respondent workman with 30% back wages. 6. Considering the submissions of the learned advocates for the respective parties and taking note of the judgment which was relied the issue which is required to be decided in the present petition is that whether termination of service of the respondent was illegal or not. 6.1. Certain facts are undisputed that respondent was working on contract basis on the post of floor boy since 26.06.1992. Initially the appointment was given to Gurjari Emporium, Madras however, vide communication dated 28.08.1996 he was transferred to Ahmedabad. On 09.02.2000 the petition was filed being SCA No. 1442 of 2000 seeking regularization wherein the notice was issued and thereafter the petitioner- Corporation sought time through learned advocate which was reflected in the order dated 24.08.2000. Though last contract was ended in the year 1998 the respondent-workman was disengaged from the service from 31.07.2000. The reasons given for the disengagement is that though the respondent-workman was informed on 12.07.2000 to give an application for his contractual appointment, the same was not given. It is the claim of the respondent-workman that though similarly situated person were regularized after filing the petition before High Court of Andhra Pradesh with oblique motive to deprive him from the benefits of regularization, his service came to be terminated. It is the claim of the respondent-workman that though similarly situated person were regularized after filing the petition before High Court of Andhra Pradesh with oblique motive to deprive him from the benefits of regularization, his service came to be terminated. During the cross-examination of the respondent-workman it comes on record that he was getting monthly salary of Rs.1500/- and the yearly increment was given over Rs.25/-. His recruitment was pursuant to the advertisement published in the daily newspaper and time to time his contract was extended. Though it is claimed by the petitioner-Corporation that he remained unauthorizedly absent, however, absenteeism was not taken into consideration for disengaging the workman from his services. 6.2. It further comes on record that the respondent-workman has written a letter which was produced below Exh.13/5 on 30.03.2000 praying to regularize his service, however, it was informed to the workman that it is under consideration before State Authority. There was no dispute with regard to the completion of 240 days by the respondent-workman in the preceding years from the date of termination. From the cross-examination of the sole witness of Corporation who was examined below Exh.48 it comes on record that work which was done by the respondent-workman was with regard to cleaning and delivering the goods that was permanent in nature. There are hundred other employees working in the different branches situated in the entire country and one P.C.Rathod was regularized who was serving at Hyderabad by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and though the contract came to be ended on 25.03.1998 he worked up to 31.07.2000. 7. At this stage, reliance which was placed by the learned advocate for the respondent-workman on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Junagadh Municipal Corporation Vs Deepakbhai Pratapbhai Karamata is required to be referred, which is reproduced hereinbelow: “8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order. 8.1 It is settled position of law that the High Court can interfere with an award passed by the Labour Court only on the procedure level and in cases where the decision of the Labour Court has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. 8.1 It is settled position of law that the High Court can interfere with an award passed by the Labour Court only on the procedure level and in cases where the decision of the Labour Court has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court may be justified to interfere with the factual aspects placed before the Labour Court only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting the evidence illegally or has made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary reliefs under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India may amount to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. The learned Single Judge rightly kept this position of law in mind while deciding the main matter. 8.2 We have gone through the written statement filed by the appellant herein before the Labour Court. No plea was made by the appellant in its written statement filed before the Labour Court with regard to the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, 1947. Nonetheless this legal ground without any factual foundation was pressed into operation before the learned Single Judge. The same has been addressed by the learned single Judge by rejecting the said contention by assigning its own cogent reasons. 8.3 As Mr. Munshaw has laid much emphasis on Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, 1947, we propose to say something in this regard. The same has been addressed by the learned single Judge by rejecting the said contention by assigning its own cogent reasons. 8.3 As Mr. Munshaw has laid much emphasis on Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, 1947, we propose to say something in this regard. Section 2(oo) of the Act, 1947 read with clause (bb) thereto reads as under: `2 (oo) `retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include – (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf or; (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; '(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; 8.4 The Apex Court in a catena of decisions had interpreted this provision to mean that the termination of service of an employer for any reason whatsoever which was covered by any of the exclusion clauses [(a), (b) and (c)] in the aforesaid definition would amount to `retrenchment'. The path breaking decision of the Supreme Court on this point is rendered in the matter of the State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, reported in 1976 AIR 1111. Interpreting Section 2 (oo) as it stood prior to 18th August, 1984 in the light of its relevant exclusion clauses, late Justice Krishna Iyer speaking for the Bench in the aforesaid decision has made the following pertinent observations in para-8 of the report. "For any reason whatsoever very vide and almost admitting of no exemption ... to retrench is to cut down. You cannot retrench without trenching or cutting. Section 2 (oo) is the master of the situation and the Court cannot truncate its amplitude." 8.5 In paragraph 9, it has been observed that, "A break-down of Section 2(oo) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. 'Termination... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is-has the employee's service been terminated? 'Termination... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is-has the employee's service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced." 8.6 The aforesaid decision in the case of State Bank of India (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in many of its later decisions. We may refer to some of those decisions here. [i] Hindustal Steel v. Labour Court AIR (1977) SC 31; [ii] Santosh Gupta v. S.B of Patiala AIR (1980) SC 1219; [iii] Management of K.S.R.T.C v. M. Borsinha AIR (1988) SC 1320 [iv] Mohanlal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd AIR (1981) SC 1253. 8.7 In view of this constant trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the then existing provisions of the term `retrenchment' as found in Section 2 (oo), the legislature intervened by enacting further exclusive clause, in the form of clause (bb). It, therefore, becomes obvious that the Legislature wanted to remedy the difficulty which was found in the then existing exclusion of Clause (a), (b) and (c) in Section 2 (oo) and that is precisely the reason why the substantive provision excluding from the operation of the term `retrenchment' those occasions which were covered by clause (bb) was enacted. 9. The definition of 'retrenchment' under Section 2(oo) and exception provided under Section 2(oo)(bb) came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in M. Venugopal v. L.I.C. of India, A. P. and Anr. [(1994)1-LLJ-597], and the Supreme Court has stated the legal position, thus in para 9, which reads as under at p. 600 of LLJ: "9. ... This Court from time to time held, that the definition of "retrenchment" being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit, termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by - way of disciplinary action. The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of "retrenchment". The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of "retrenchment". State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala. Now with introduction of one more exception to Section 2(oo), under Clause (bb) the Legislature has excluded from the purview of "retrenchment"; (i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry; (ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) .…" 9.1 A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in its judgment reported in Shailendra Nath Shukla and Ors. v. Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad University and Ors., 1987 L.I.C. 1607 examined the position as to in what cases, Section 2(oo)(bb) can be applied and stated the legal position as under in para. 5: "5. ... Terminations which are included in it are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation, the nature of employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate the claim of employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on anvil of fairness and bona fide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Clause (bb). Because if it is left to employer not to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstance then the protection afforded to a workman by treating every termination of service as retrenchment shall be rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide. It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That would be unfair labour practice. (See: H.D.Singh v. Reserve Bank of India.)" 9.2 In another Division Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court, reported in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport Company Limited v. Ramesh Chandra Gouda and Anr. 1994-II-LLJ- 1127, where again, while interpreting Section 2(oo), the Division Bench has stated as under in para 3 at p. 1129: "3.... It is hence the general intention of the Legislature that all types of termination of services are to be covered by 'retrenchment' except the events excepted in Subclauses (a) to (c). It is well known that exceptions to a general provision are to receive a rigorous interpretation and only govern specifically the situations covered by them and no further. An exception cannot be permitted to frustrate the general provisions of the Act in this case to treat any termination of services are retrenchment except what is strictly excepted.…" 9.3 In another Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Bhikku Ram v. Presiding Officer Industrialcum- Labour Court, Rohtak, 1996-III-LLJ (Suppl)-1126, the Division Bench has explained the legal position as under at p. 1143: "35. ... If the employer resists the claim of the workman and invokes Section 2(oo)(bb), burden lies on the employer to show that though the employee has worked for 240 days in twelve months prior to termination of his service, such termination of service cannot be treated as retrenchment because it is in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment or on account of non- renewal of the contract of employment... only a bona fide exercise of right by an employer to terminate the service in terms of the contract of employment or for non- renewal of the contract will be covered by Clause (bb). If the Court finds that the exercise of rights by the employer is not bona fide or the employer has adopted the methodology of fixed term employment as a conduct or mechanism to frustrate the rights of the workman, the termination of the service will not be covered by the exception contained in Clause (bb). Instead the action of the employer will have to be treated as an act of unfair labour practice, as specified in the Fifth Schedule of the Act. In all other cases, termination of service will be treated as retrenchment unless they are covered by other exceptions I set out hereinabove." 9.4 In yet another Division Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court, reported in Chakradhar Tripathy v. State of Orissa and Ors., 1992 L.I.C. 1813 in a concurring judgment, the Hon'ble Chief Justice B.L. Hansaria as he then was, has stated the position as under in paras. 19 and 20: "19. It has been stated in the leading judgment that by taking resort to 'colourable' contracts, the protection of Section 25-F cannot be allowed to be frustrated. I think this statement of law takes care of the apprehension of Shri Nanda.…" "20. There may be other cases also, these cannot be categories as observed by my learned Sister. All that I would like to emphasise is that the Courts would remove the veil in such cases and see the reality of the matter.…" 9.5 A learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in his judgment reported in Madhya Pradesh Bank Karmachari Sangh (M.P.) v. Syndicate Bank and Anr., 1997-III-LLJ (Suppl)-536 after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, has concluded as under in para. 18 at p. 543: "18. 18 at p. 543: "18. From the decisions noted above, it becomes apparent: [i] that the provisions of section 2(oo)(bb) are to be construed benevolently in favour of the workman; [ii] that if the workman is allowed to continue in service by making periodic appointments from time to time, then it can be said that the case would not fall under Section 2(oo)(bb); [iii] that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are not to be interpreted in the manner which may stifle the main provision; [iv] that if the workman continues in service, the non renewal of the contract can be deemed as mala fide and it may amount to be a fraud on statute; [v] that there would be wrong presumption of non- applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) where the work is of continuous nature and there is nothing on record that the work for which a workman has been appointed had come to an end." 9.6 His Lordship Mr. Justice Srikrishna, as he then was, has interpreted Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) in the following words, in the judgment reported in Alexander Yesudas Maikel v. Perfect Coil Seals and I.R.P. and Ors., 1996-I-LLJ-533 (Bom) at p. 535: "5. .... In any event, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Clause (bb) has itself been restrictively interpreted and judicial consensus appears to be that, if the post 4 continues and the work continues, Clause (bb) cannot be said to operate as a charter for unscrupulous employers to jettison their workmen. …" 9.7 In another judgment reported in Deputy Director of Health Services, Nashik v. Lalabai Rajdhar Paturkar 1996-III-LLJ (Suppl)-602 (Bom) the very same learned Judge has explained the position as under in para. 8, at p. 606: "8. ...It will at once be seen that, just as there are no words of limitation in the main body of the definition, equally, there are no words of limitation in the exception Clause (bb). As long as either of the two contingencies contemplated by the clause is fulfilled, the situation would not amount to 'retrenchment' within the main body of the definition in Section 2(oo). As long as either of the two contingencies contemplated by the clause is fulfilled, the situation would not amount to 'retrenchment' within the main body of the definition in Section 2(oo). However, by a series of judgments of our High Court and of other High Courts import of the words used and the amplitude of this have been whittled down and the judicial consensus on the construction of this clause appears to be that the sweep of Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee work is also satisfactory, and yet periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employee, where the circumstances indicate that the letter of appointment is a camouflage to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the benefit of permanency on workers who have worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days." 9.8 The Supreme Court in S.M.Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka [(2003)2-LLJ-359], has set out the necessary ingredients to be satisfied for the application of Section 2(oo)(bb) in the following words in para 13 at p. 364 of LLJ: "13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: [i] that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration; [ii] the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily- wager simpliciter which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; [iii] the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and [iv] the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment." 9.9 Further in para 14, the Supreme Court made it clear that at p. 364 of LLJ: "14.... To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of Subclause (bb) abovesaid.…" 9.10 In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Surat Mahila Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. Mamtaben Mahendrabhai Joshi [ (2001)2 GLR 1248 ]. The relevant observations read thus: "18. Considering the view of the Apex Court and the various High Courts, Section 2 (oo)(bb) cannot be resorted to when employer has exercised power in a malafide, arbitrary and abused/misused the power with a view to see that the workman may not be entitled to the benefit and protection available under Sec. 25-F of the I.D Act. However, merely because employer has a right to terminate the service of an employee by satisfying the three conditions enunciated under Sec. 25-F of the Act the same cannot give him an unrestricted right. It is the duty of the employer to establish the fact that such termination is justified in the circumstances of the case. So, without justification of such termination, even in case of complying the provisions of Sec. 25_F such termination is bad, malafide, arbitrary and amounts to unfair labour practice. It is clear that Sec. 25-F has given no positive and unregulated right of retrenchment to the employer. They impose condition precedent before making retrenchment. It is noteworthy that the language of section 25-F is couched in a negative form. The section does not expressly provide that on compliance of the three conditions referred to in the section, the employer shall have an unrestricted right to retrench the workman. The unjustified retrenchment seems to have been effected more in furtherance of a plan to get good reduance of elements deemed undesirable .. .. .. The language of this Sec. 25-F is significant. The termination of service in colourable exercise of power or a result of victimization or unfair labour practice or caprice should be prevented as otherwise some of the fundamental rights and principles which have been noticed above would be violated. Arbitrary conduct or unnecessary harshness on the part of the employer, judged by the normal standard of a reasonable man may be cogent evidence of victimization or unfair labour practice. Arbitrary conduct or unnecessary harshness on the part of the employer, judged by the normal standard of a reasonable man may be cogent evidence of victimization or unfair labour practice. It is open for the employee to question the `retrenchment' even in case of compliance of Sec. 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground of want of benefit or victimization or unfair labour practice or caprice or unnecessary harshness of the employer. Therefore, in such circumstances, the employer shall have to satisfy the Court that there is a compliance of Sec. 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 and also to satisfy that there is no malafide, arbitrariness, unnecessary harshness, unfair labour practice or victimization while terminating the service of the workman, and in such cases, the Labour Court shall have to consider these aspects also, while adjudicating the Industrial dispute against the termination of workman. Mere compliance of Sec. 25-F cannot prove or held that termination is bona fide and genuine. Now, in view of the above observations, the facts of the present case are required to be considered." 9.10 The above referred to decisions on the interpretation of Section 2(oo)(bb) explain the legal position to the effect that a claim of an employer on a term based employee providing for automatic termination whether within the terms fixed or on expiry of the said term, cannot be taken for granted to sustain the order 2 of termination. On a plain reading of Section 2(oo)(bb), it is quite clear that such term based employment would fall outside the scope of 'retrenchment' so long as the requirement of such fixed period of employment was bona flde required by the employer. It was therefore, repeatedly pointed out that such excepted categories required a rigorous test rather than accepting the plea of employer on its face value or otherwise it would cause serious prejudice to an employee, who can be taken for a ride by unscrupulous employers by contending that the term of employment was for specific period though as a matter of fact such period of employment lasted quite for a long spell. In other words even though the requirement of employment was perennial by adopting the methodology of employing a person for a specific period as many a times, an unscrupulous employer can always resort to abusing the provision contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) to thwart the other statutory protection available to an employee under Section 2(oo), namely, in the case of a 'retrenchment' vis-a-vis the consequential" benefits contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, when such extraordinary circumstances are brought out in the matter of employment and termination is resorted to by taking umbrage under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the interest of justice, we are of the view that a close scrutiny of the real position will have to be necessarily made to rule out the possibility of any injustice being caused to an employee. It cannot be lost sight of that Section 2(oo)(bb) is specifically meant to cover only such employment which would be needed for an employer for a specific period alone and beyond which the requirement will not be there and even on such occasions, the employer should not be put into an unnecessary predicament of facing the other consequences that would normally occur while resorting to retrenchment. The benefit of the said exception will have to be strictly restricted to such specific situations alone and the same cannot be allowed to be misused or abused by the employers even in regard to cases where the nature and requirement of employment is perennial.” 8. The decision of the supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal reported in (2014) 7 SCC 177 wherein the Apex Court has held that: “33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or malafide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or malafide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34.Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization (See: State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 ), Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35.We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied." 9. Considering the above decision this Court is of the view that disengagement of the respondent-workman on the ground of non renewal of the contract particularly when the petition is filed before this Court for regularization would amount to unfair labour practice defined under section 2(oo)(bb) and therefore, no ground is made out to interfere with the judgment of the learned labor court. 10. However, at this stage, judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad Vs Employer I/r to To Mangmt Of FCI reported in 2014 (7) SCC 190 is required to be referred which is reproduced hereinbelow: “Taking note of the judgments referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs and also few more cases in other portion of the said judgment, the legal position was summed up in the following manner: “It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or malafide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization (See: State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 ). Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied”. 18. We make it clear that reference to Uma Devi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, appellant No.1 would not be entitled to reinstatement. 18. We make it clear that reference to Uma Devi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, appellant No.1 would not be entitled to reinstatement. This could be the position in respect of appellant No.2 as well. Though the factual matrix in his case is slightly different, that by itself would not have made much of a difference. However, the matter does not end here. In the present case, the reference of dispute to the CGIT was not limited to the validity of termination. The terms of reference also contained the claim made by the appellants for their regularization of service. 19. We have already pointed out that the two aspects viz. that of reinstatement and regularization are intermixed and overlapping in the present case. If the appellants were entitled to get their services regularized, in that case it would have been axiomatic to grant the relief of reinstatement as a natural corollary. Therefore, it becomes necessary, at this stage, to examine as to whether the order of CGIT, as affirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court directing regularization of their service, was justified or the approach of the Division Bench of the High Court in denying that relief is correct.” 11. Considering the above decisions, this Court is of the view that instead of granting relief of reinstatement to his original post which was for contractual appointment, considering his length of service i.e eight years and the time gap that is of 24 years granting monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. 12. Resultantly, the judgment and order of reinstatement is modified. The award of reinstatement along with back wages is altered and the petitioner-Authority is directed to pay monetary compensation of Rs.4,00,000/- to the respondent-workman within a period of three months from the date of this order. 13. The order is modified to the above extent. 14. The petition is disposed of accordingly.