JUDGMENT : Sanjay Prasad, J. This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging the order of punishment dated 31.01.2016, by which the petitioner has been dismissed from service on account of his absence (Annexure-2), the Appellate Order as contained in Memo No 829 dated 23.09.2016 (Annexure-5) affirming the order of punishment and the Revisional Order as contained in Memo No. 274 dated 28.11.2017 (Annexure-7) affirming the appellate order. 2. Heard Mr. A.K. Sahni, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Abhinay Kumar, learned A.C. to G.A.I. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders, i.e. Order of punishment dated 31.01.2016, Appellate Order dated 23.09.2016 and the Revisional Order dated 28.11.2017, contained in Annexures 2, Annexure 5 and Annexure 7 respectively are illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that before passing the order of dismissal neither the enquiry report has been served nor second show-cause has been issued upon the petitioner. It is submitted that even the evidence of witnesses, who were examined in the Departmental Proceeding, was not served upon the petitioner and as such Memo No. 600 dated 31.01.2016 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad is liable to be set aside. It is submitted that the Appellate Authority, i.e. the D.I.G., Coal Region, Bokaro has also not considered this fact while dismissing the departmental appeal vide order dated 23.09.2016 as contained in Annexure 5. It is further submitted that the revisional order contained in Memo No. 274 dated 28.11.2017 passed by the D.G.P. (Annexure-7) was passed in violation of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors. reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 , which has been followed in the case of Ram Pravesh Sharma Versus State of Jharkhand reported in 2020 (4) JLJR 433 , passed by a Bench of this Court. It is further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority, i.e. Respondent No.4, Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad and the Enquiry Officer have failed to prove that the absence of the petitioner is willful. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of KRUSHNAKANT B. PARMAR Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 . In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of KRUSHNAKANT B. PARMAR Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 . It is further submitted that even the disciplinary authority had passed the order of termination beyond the charges framed against the petitioner as the charges were framed for absence of the petitioner for 149 days, whereas the order of dismissal shows that while passing the said order, the disciplinary authority took into consideration the absence of 624 days and as such the impugned orders may be set aside and this writ petition may be allowed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the impugned orders, i.e. Order of punishment dated 31.01.2016, Appellate Order dated 23.09.2016 and the Revisional Order dated 28.11.2017, contained in Annexures-2, Annexure-5 and Annexure-7 respectively are fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that the petitioner was a habitual offender and he had willfully neglected his duties. It is submitted that the petitioner had taken compensatory leave for 12 days, but he remained willfully absent for a period of 149 days, which is evident from the chargesheet as contained in Annexure-1. It is further submitted that both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have taken into consideration the fact the petitioner remained absent for a period of around 624 days and It is further submitted that the even the petitioner failed to submit his reply with respect to charge of willful absence against him, hence the authorities were left with no option but to pass the impugned orders, hence there is no illegality in the impugned orders and as such the writ petition may be dismissed. 5. Perused the records of this case and considered the submission of both the parties. 6. From perusal of pleading of the parties, it transpires that the chargesheet was issued upon the petitioner vide Memo No. 20.08.2015 for the absence of 149 days from 23.07.2014 to 19.12.2014 and the Departmental Proceeding was initiated against him by the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad. 7. 6. From perusal of pleading of the parties, it transpires that the chargesheet was issued upon the petitioner vide Memo No. 20.08.2015 for the absence of 149 days from 23.07.2014 to 19.12.2014 and the Departmental Proceeding was initiated against him by the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad. 7. It transpires that the Respondent No. 4, vide Order dated 31.01.2016, i.e. Annexure-2, has dismissed the petitioner from his services on account of being absconder and indisciplined on account of the charge that he not only remained absent for 149 days, but he had remained absent for altogether 624 days on various earlier occasions. Several punishments were imposed upon him earlier, but he had not improved. 8. It transpires that the petitioner has preferred Departmental Appeal before the D.I.G. on 24.02.2016 and has taken a plea that his wife was ill and he was not given proper opportunity to defend his case and evidence of witnesses have not been served upon him. However, Respondent No. 3, i.e. the Appellate Authority had dismissed the appeal vide Memo No. 829 dated 23.09.2016 by endorsing the finding of the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, i.e. the Disciplinary Authority. 9. It transpires that the petitioner has preferred Revision before the Respondent No.2, i.e. the D.G.P., however, the said Revision was also dismissed on 28.11.2017. 10. It transpires that the petitioner has taken specific plea that the copy of the enquiry report and the second show-cause notice and evidence of witnesses have not been served upon him and the same has not been replied on behalf of the Department, thus, the allegation of the petitioner has not been denied by the respondent-State. 11. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 , at Para 61, 62 and 63 as follows : “Para 61:-It is now settled law that the proceedings must be just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that the principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. It is well-settled law that the principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report along with the final order is like a post-mortem certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice. The contention on behalf of the Government/management that the report is not evidence adduced during such inquiry envisaged under proviso to Article 311(2) is also devoid of substance. It is settled law that the Evidence Act has no application to the inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceedings. The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with the Indian Evidence Act, though the essential principles of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are applicable. What was meant by ‘evidence’ in the proviso to Article 311(2) is the totality of the material collected during the inquiry including the report of the enquiry officer forming part of that material. Therefore, when reliance is sought to be placed by the disciplinary authority, on the report of the enquiry officer for proof of the charge or for imposition of the penalty, then it is incumbent that the copy thereof should be supplied before reaching any conclusion either on proof of the charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed on the proved charge or on both. Para 62:-Shri P.P. Rao obviously realising this effect, contended that the enquiry officer being a delegate of the disciplinary authority is not bound by the delegatee's recommendations and it is not a material unless it is used by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the need for its supply does not arise and the principles of natural justice need not be extended to that stage as the officer/workman had opportunity at the inquiry. Therefore, the need for its supply does not arise and the principles of natural justice need not be extended to that stage as the officer/workman had opportunity at the inquiry. In support thereof he placed strong reliance on Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [ (1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198 ] ; Shadi Lal Gupta v. State of Punjab [ (1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637 ] ; Hira Nath Misra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi [ (1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260 ] ; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India [ (1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555 ] ; Secretary, Central Board of Excise & Customs v. K.S. Mahalingam [ (1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131]. I am unable to agree with his contentions. Doubtless that the enquiry officer is a delegate of the disciplinary authority, he conducts the inquiry into the misconduct and submits his report, but his findings or conclusions on the proof of charges and his recommendations on the penalty would create formidable impressions almost to be believed and acceptable unless they are controverted vehemently by the delinquent officer. At this stage non-supply of the copy of the report to the delinquent would cause him grave prejudice. S.K. George case [ (1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198 ] renders no assistance. It is only an inquiry against malpractice at an examination conducted by the University under executive instruction. Therein the students were given an opportunity of hearing and they were supplied with all the material, the foundation for the report. The observations of the Bench of two Judges with regard to the theory of two stages in the Inquiry under Article 311 also bears little importance for the foregoing consideration in this case. It is already seen that this Court held that the inquiry from the stage of charge-sheet till the stage of punishment is a continuous one and cannot be split into two. The reliance in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1973) 1 SCC 380 : (1973) 3 SCR 22 ] is also of no avail. It is already seen that this Court held that the inquiry from the stage of charge-sheet till the stage of punishment is a continuous one and cannot be split into two. The reliance in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1973) 1 SCC 380 : (1973) 3 SCR 22 ] is also of no avail. Therein it was pointed out that under Section 18-A of the I.D.R. Act there was no scope of enquiry at two stages and the omission to supply enquiry report, before taking the action, did not vitiate the ultimate decision taken. In Shadi Lal case [ (1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637 ] Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules did not provide for the supply of copy of the report of an inquiry conducted by the fact finding authority before inquiry. It was held that the delinquent officer was supplied with all the materials and was given opportunity to make representation and the same was considered. The report did not indicate anything in addition to what was already supplied to him. Under those circumstances it was held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into an iron cast or a strait-jacket formula. Each case has to be considered and the principles applied in the light of the facts in each case. The effect of the violation of the principles of natural justice on the facts of the case on hand needs to be considered and visualised. The effect of Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio was considered by my brother Sawant, J. and it needs no reiteration. The reliance on S.K. George case [ (1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198 ] in Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio renders no assistance in the light of the above discussion. Since Mahalingam case [ (1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] which was after the Forty-second Amendment Act, the need to supply second show-cause notice was dispensed with, regarding punishment and therefore, that ratio renders no assistance to the case. Since Mahalingam case [ (1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] which was after the Forty-second Amendment Act, the need to supply second show-cause notice was dispensed with, regarding punishment and therefore, that ratio renders no assistance to the case. Hira Nath Misra case [ (1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260 ] also is of no avail since the inquiry was conducted relating to misbehaviour with the girl students by the erring boys. The security of the girls was of paramount consideration and therefore, the disclosure of the names of the girl students given in the report or their evidence would jeopardise their safety and so was withheld. Accordingly this Court on the fact situation upheld the action of the Medical College. Satyavir Singh [ (1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555 ] ratio also is of no assistance as the action was taken under proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 199 of the CCA Rules. The inquiry into insubordination by police force was dispensed with as the offending acts of the police force would generate deleterious effect on the discipline of the service. Asthana case [ (1988) 3 SCC 600 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 869] was considered by my brother Sawant, J. in which the report was not supplied and it was upheld. It should, thus be concluded that the supply of the copy of the enquiry report is an integral part of the penultimate stage of the inquiry before the disciplinary authority considers the material and the report on the proof of the charge and the nature of the punishment to be imposed. Non-compliance is denial of reasonable opportunity, violating Article 311(2) and unfair, unjust and illegal procedure offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. Para 63: The emerging effect of our holding that the delinquent is entitled to the supply of the copy of the report would generate yearning for hearing before deciding on proof of charge or penalty which Forty-second Amendment Act had advisedly avoided. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. Prior to the Forty-second Amendment Act the delinquent had no right of hearing before disciplinary authority either on proof of charge or penalty. So after Forty-second Amendment Act it would not be put on higher pedestal. The Gujarat High Court's decision is, therefore, not good law. However, the disciplinary authority has an objective duty and adjudicatory responsibility to consider and impose proper penalty consistent with the magnitude or the gravity of the misconduct. The statute or statutory rules gave graded power and authority to the disciplinary authority to impose either of the penalties enumerated in the relevant provisions. It is not necessarily the maximum or the minimum. Based on the facts, circumstances, the nature of imputation, the gravity of misconduct, the indelible effect or impact on the discipline or morale of the employees, the previous record or conduct of the delinquent and the severity to which the delinquent will be subjected to, may be some of the factors to be considered. They cannot be eulogised but could be visualised. Each case must be considered in the light of its own scenario. Therefore, a duty and responsibility has been cast on the disciplinary authority to weigh the pros and cons, consider the case and impose appropriate punishment. In a given case if the penalty was proved to be disproportionate or there is no case even to find the charges proved or the charges are based on no evidence, that would be for the court/the tribunal to consider on merits, not as court of appeal, but within its parameters of supervisory jurisdiction and to give appropriate relief. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J. in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him.” 12. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J. in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him.” 12. It has been held in the case of Ram Pravesh Sharma Versus State of Jharkhand reported in (2020) 4 JLJR 433 , at Para 10, 11, 14 and 15 as follows:- “Para 10:-As regards the issue as to whether the delinquent is entitled for copy of the enquiry report, the said issue fell for consideration before the Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. 28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 29. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows: (i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. (ii) Since the denial of the report of the enquiry officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject: “(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.” Thus the article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded and when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the enquiry officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. (iii) Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him. (iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. (v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.” Para 11:-The contention of learned counsel for the respondents is also not well founded as in para-15 of the counter-affidavit it has been specifically stated that copy of enquiry report has already been received by the petitioner. It appears that learned counsel for the respondents tried its level best to misguide the Court. It appears that learned counsel for the respondents tried its level best to misguide the Court. Admittedly, the enquiry report has been received/furnished to the delinquent on 19.08.2016, whereas, the order of punishment was passed on 01.08.2016 itself and the appellate authority affirmed the punishment order on 11.08.2016. Both the orders were based on the enquiry report, which was dated 26.07.2016. Perhaps the authorities were well aware of the settled law that delinquent is entitled for a copy of the enquiry report along with second show-cause notice before passing the order of punishment and as such, the copy of enquiry report was served to the petitioner after the appellate authority affirmed the order of punishment, to save their skin. As per the settled law, the delinquent was entitled for the copy of enquiry report along with 2nd show-cause notice after submission of enquiry report and before the disciplinary authority passed the order and not after the appellate order is passed. On this count, let it be made clear that the authorities have acted with malafide intention by serving the copy of the enquiry report after passing of the appellate order. It appears that entire disciplinary proceeding is full of irregularities and fallacy. Para 14:-Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. K.K. Verma, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 494 , considering all the judgments on the point of supply of enquiry report to the delinquent before passing the punishment order and also after the 42nd amendment, has observed as under: “32. Thus the right to represent against the findings in the inquiry report to prove one’s innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty. It is only the second right to represent against the proposed penalty which is taken away by the 42nd Amendment. The right to represent against the findings in the report is not disturbed in any way. In fact, any denial thereof will make the final order vulnerable.” Para 15:-It appears that the order of punishment is in the nature of major punishment in terms of Rule 828 read with Rule 852 of Jharkhand Police Manual and, therefore, the requirement of issuance of second show-cause notice enclosing the copy of the enquiry report is also a sine qua non, as held by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Md. Ramzan Khan, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 , which has been constantly followed thereafter by the Courts. In view of the legal propositions enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, it can confortably be said that the order of punishment has been passed without following the aforesaid procedure, which is in complete violation of the settled legal position in conduct of departmental proceeding in respect of a public servant as required under Article 311 of the Constitution of India.” 13. On the question of declaring the petitioner willfully absent, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in KRUSHNAKANT B. PARMAR Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 at Para 18 and 19 as follows:- “Para 18:-In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorized absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. Para 19:-In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unau thorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty.” 14. From perusal of Annexure 2, i.e. the punishment order dated 31.01.2016, it is apparent that the disciplinary authority has failed to discuss whether the absence of the petitioner was willful although, they have stated that he had remained absent for a period of altogether 624 days by taking into consideration about his past conduct apart from the present conduct of remaining absent for 149 days. 15. No doubt the police department may not bear the persons like the petitioner, who remained absent for a long period without showing proper documents, but in the present case the department has also not complied with the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and this High Court. 16. 15. No doubt the police department may not bear the persons like the petitioner, who remained absent for a long period without showing proper documents, but in the present case the department has also not complied with the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and this High Court. 16. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in view of the discussions made above and in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this High Court, order of punishment dated 31.01.2016, by which the petitioner was dismissed from service on account of his absence (Annexure-2), the appellate Order as contained in Memo No 829 dated 23.09.2016 (Annexure-5) affirming the order of punishment and the Revisional Order as contained in Memo No. 274 dated 28.11.2017 (Annexure-7) affirming the appellate order are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority, i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad and it is directed that the petitioner be served the copy of the Enquiry Report and second show cause notice and evidence of the witnesses and the enquiry shall proceed and the Disciplinary Authority, at the first instance, may pass any other order, except the order of suspension, removal or dismissal. 17. It is expected that the respondents may decide the case within six weeks from the date of the receipt/production of a copy of this order. 18. This writ application is allowed with the aforesaid observation and direction.