Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 1937 (ALL)

Ajay Kumar Gupta v. Mohan Chand Tiwari

2024-08-27

SARAL SRIVASTAVA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Saral Srivastava, J. 1. Heard Sri Pankaj Agarwal, learned counsel for the revisionist/ tenant, Sri C.K. Parekh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri H.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents/landlord. 2. The revisionist-tenant has assailed the judgment and order dated 30.3.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 15, Ghaziabad in S.C.C. Suit No. 34 of 2012 (Mohan Chand Tiwari Vs. Ajay Kumar Gupta), whereby the Trial Court has decreed the suit of the respondents/ landlord for eviction of the revisionist/tenant. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the respondents/landlord instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 34 of 2012 for eviction of the revisionist/tenant. The suit has been instituted on the ground that the respondent/landlord is the owner of House No. 194/10 situated at Model Town, Ghaziabad. The house described above was purchased by Smt. Raj Kumari from one Suresh Chandra Sharma by a registered sale deed dated 22.7.1996. After the death of Smt. Raj Kumari, the respondent/landlord became the owner of the aforesaid house. The respondents/landlord rented out three rooms on the first floor (hereinafter referred to as 'suit property') of house No. 194/10 at the rate of Rs.6,000/- per month from 1.1.2011. In this respect, a rent deed was also executed on 22.1.2011 for 11 months. The revisionist/tenant paid Rs.5,000/- as surety money. According to the plaint case, the tenancy of the revisionist/tenant used to begin on the 1st day of every month and end on the 30th day of every month. 4. It is further pleaded that the respondents/landlord and revisionist/tenant entered into an agreement to sell on 25.7.2011 in respect to the suit property for a sum of Rs.56,00,000/- (Rs. Fifty Six Lacs). Under the aforesaid agreement, the revisionist/tenant paid Rs. 51,000/- by cash and Rs. 49,000/- by cheque to respondent no.1 as earnest money and the balance sale consideration was to be paid by 7.9.2011 or within one month. However, on further negotiations, the period of payment of the balance sale consideration was extended up till 5.12.2011. It was also agreed between them that in case the balance sale consideration was not paid by 5.12.2011, the alleged agreement to sell would stand cancelled. It is further stated that the revisionist/tenant did not pay the balance sale consideration till 5.12.2011, consequently, the agreement to sell dated 25.7.2011 stood cancelled. 5. It was also agreed between them that in case the balance sale consideration was not paid by 5.12.2011, the alleged agreement to sell would stand cancelled. It is further stated that the revisionist/tenant did not pay the balance sale consideration till 5.12.2011, consequently, the agreement to sell dated 25.7.2011 stood cancelled. 5. Further plaint case is that the revisionist/tenant instituted Original Suit No. 149 of 2012 against the respondents/landlord. It is pleaded in the plaint that it was also agreed between the parties that until the sale deed is executed with respect to the suit property, the revisionist/tenant shall continue to pay the rent of the suit property. It is further stated that since there was default in the payment of rent, therefore, the tenancy of the revisionist/tenant was terminated by a notice dated 8.6.2012. 6. The aforesaid suit was contested by the revisionist/tenant by filing the written statement contending, inter alia, that since admittedly in the present case, an agreement to sell had been executed between the parties, therefore, the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist. Thus, the revisionist/tenant ceased to be the tenant of the suit property. Therefore, the suit for eviction before the Small Causes Court would not be maintainable. 7. The respondents/landlord filed replication 21-Ga to the written statement denying the fact that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist, inasmuch it was agreed between the parties that the revisionist/tenant shall continue to pay the rent of the suit property till the execution of the sale-deed. 8. The Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings framed as many as six issues, which read as under: 9. On issue nos. 1 and 2, the Trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record recorded a finding that the revisionist/tenant failed to prove that the balance sale consideration had been paid by him. The Trial Court further considered the testimony of D.W.-1 and D.W.-2, wherein they admitted that they were the tenant of the suit property, and the rent of the suit property was Rs. 6,000/- per month. The Trial Court noted that the respondents/landlord had stated that it was agreed between the parties that the rent of the suit property would continue to be paid by the revisionist/tenant till the sale deed is executed. 6,000/- per month. The Trial Court noted that the respondents/landlord had stated that it was agreed between the parties that the rent of the suit property would continue to be paid by the revisionist/tenant till the sale deed is executed. The Trial Court held that the revisionist/tenant failed to prove that he paid the entire sale consideration and became the owner of the suit property. It also held that since it was agreed between the parties that the revisionist/tenant would continue to pay the rent till the execution of the sale-deed, therefore, the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties did not cease to exist. 10. Challenging the judgment and order dated 30.3.2016, Sri Pankaj Agarwal, the counsel for the petitioner has raised the sole contention that it is admitted between the parties as is evident from the pleadings in the plaint that the parties had entered into an agreement to sell on 25.7.2011 and in pursuance thereof, the revisionist/tenant had paid earnest money and had also paid the balance sale consideration, therefore, as per the own case of the respondents/landlord the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist. It is contended that non- payment of the balance sale consideration by revisionist because of which the agreement to sell stood cancelled is not relevant for the reason that once the jural relationship of landlord and tenant ceased to exist, it could not revive, therefore, the suit before the Small Causes Court was not maintainable, and the only remedy for the respondents/landlord is to institute a suit for eviction and possession before the Civil Court. In this regard, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of R. Kanthimathi and others Vs. Mrs. Beatrice Xavier AIR 2003 Supreme Court 4149. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Salam Qureshi @ Islam (Since Deceased) Vs. VIIIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut and others 2008(2) ADJ 392 . 11. He has further submitted that even if the agreement to sell was not a registered document, it could always be looked into for collateral purposes in view of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, and thus the agreement to sell can be considered to determine as to whether the parties intended to end the jural relationship of tenant and landlord. In this respect, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram and others Vs. Lakshman and others 2013 (6) ADJ 348 . 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/landlord would contend that admittedly the agreement to sell was an unregistered document, whereas after insertion of Section 17(1A) in the Indian Registration Act, the agreement to sell should be registered, and since the agreement to sell admittedly was an unregistered document, therefore, it could not be looked into for any purpose. It is contended that the Trial Court after considering the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 and appreciating the case of the respondents/landlord returned a finding that it was agreed between the parties that the revisionist/tenant shall continue to pay the rent of the suit property to the respondents/landlord till the sale-deed is executed. Thus, it is contended that it was proved on record that the parties never intended to end the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between them and, therefore, the contention advanced by counsel for the revisionist/tenant is not sustainable in law. In this respect, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Ltd. Through Director Vs. State of Haryana and another 2009 (7) SCC 363 . 13. He has further contended that issue no.3 was framed by the Trial Court about the jurisdiction of the Court, but the revisionist/tenant did not press the said issue, therefore, it is not open to the revisionist/tenant to challenge the issue of jurisdiction at this stage. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist/tenant and the learned counsel for the respondents/landlord. 15. The S.C.C. Suit No.34 of 2012 was instituted by the respondents/landlord on the ground that the revisionist was the tenant of the suit property at the rate of Rs.6,000/- per month since 1.1.2011. An agreement to sell was executed on 25.7.2011 between the parties under which the revisionist/tenant paid Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs. One lac) as earnest money and it was agreed between the parties that the balance sale consideration would be paid within one month. Thereafter, some negotiations took place between the parties, and the parties agreed that the balance sale consideration should be paid by 5.12.2011, and on payment of the balance sale consideration, the sale deed would be executed. One lac) as earnest money and it was agreed between the parties that the balance sale consideration would be paid within one month. Thereafter, some negotiations took place between the parties, and the parties agreed that the balance sale consideration should be paid by 5.12.2011, and on payment of the balance sale consideration, the sale deed would be executed. It was also agreed that in case the balance sale consideration was not paid, the agreement to sell would stand cancelled automatically. 16. The case of the respondents/landlord further is that it was also agreed between the parties that the revisionist/tenant would continue to pay the rent of the suit property till the sale-deed is executed, and since the revisionist/tenant was in arrears of rent, therefore, a notice dated 8.6.2012 was given by the respondents/landlord terminating the tenancy of the revisionist/tenant. 17. According to the revisionist/tenant, the jural relationship of landlord and tenant terminated with the execution of the agreement to sell, and since the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist, therefore, the suit before Small Causes Court was not maintainable, and the remedy to the respondents/landlord was to approach the Civil Court for eviction of the revisionist/tenant and possession of the suit property. 18. To appreciate the respective contentions of the counsel for the parties, it would be apposite to reproduce paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of the plaint on which the emphasis has been laid by the counsel for the revisionist/tenant: 19. In the context of the present case, paragraph 11 of the plaint is also relevant. Accordingly the same is also reproduced below: 20. It would also be appropriate to reproduce the alleged agreement to sell entered into between the parties on 25.7.2011: 21. Perusal of the agreement to sell reveals that it does not contain any terms and conditions except the stipulation that the balance sale consideration be paid by 5.12.2011. In pursuance of the alleged agreement to sell extracted above, Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. One lac) had been paid as earnest money. Perusal of the agreement to sell reveals that it does not contain any terms and conditions except the stipulation that the balance sale consideration be paid by 5.12.2011. In pursuance of the alleged agreement to sell extracted above, Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. One lac) had been paid as earnest money. So far as the balance sale consideration is concerned, though the revisionist/tenant alleged that he paid the balance sale consideration, the respondents/landlord asserts that the balance sale consideration was not paid, and in this regard they filed Bank statement and also produced the Clerk of the Bank as P.W.-3 and P.W.-4 to prove that no cheque as alleged by the revisionist/tenant was given to the respondents/landlord and was encashed. The revisionist/tenant did not lead any evidence in rebuttal to establish that the balance sale consideration was paid. 22. The Trial Court on appreciation of evidence on record returned a finding that the balance sale consideration was not paid. The said finding has not been assailed by the counsel for the revisionist/tenant in the present case. 23. Now, in the light of the aforesaid fact, the Court proceeds to consider the contention advanced by counsel for the respective parties. 24. Counsel for the revisionist/tenant has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex in the case of R. Kanthimathi (supra). Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow: “5. Submission for the tenant is after entering into the agreement, the landlady accepted Rs.20,000/- confirming delivery of possession in this context which clearly constitute clear intend of the landlady of entering into new relationship with the tenant under it. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the words "already been surrendered" therein, only refer to the existing possession of the tenant and nothing more. So far this submission for the respondent we have no hesitation to reject the same. The reference of the words "already been surrendered" has been incorporated with consciousness. This is to be construed in the background of landlady having received major amount of sale consideration and as normally, if substantial sum is received by the seller, the purchaser is put in possession of the property hence to fall in the same lines the said words were used to confirm of this possession in this context. There could be no other reason to record therein as such. There could be no other reason to record therein as such. Even if it be said to refer to the possession's as a tenant the reassertion in the agreement of sale is only for the purpose of denoting possession given in pursuance to this agreement of sale. 6. Any jural relationship between two persons could be created through agreement and similarly could be changed through agreement subject to the limitations under the law. Earlier when appellants were inducted into tenancy it only means both agreed that their relations is to be that of a landlord and tenant. Later when landlord decides to sell this property to the tenant and tenant agreed by entering into agreement they by their positive act changed their relationship as purchaser and seller. When seller-landlord accepts sum he actually acts under this agreement. This acceptance preceded by agreement of sale changes their relationship. This is how they intended. Once accepting such a change then their relationship of landlord tenant ceases.” 25. Counsel for the revisionist/tenant has also placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Salam Qureshi (supra). Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow: “13. Accordingly, in my opinion in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court authorities Abdul Salam did not remain tenant of 1st floor after execution of the Thekanama and agreement for sale and nature of his possession changed from tenant to possessor in part performance of agreement for sale. In respect of ground floor which was in tenancy occupation of two other tenants possession was delivered Abdul Salam in part performance of agreement for sale. 14. Revisional Court has also mentioned that original Thekanama was filed but original agreement for sale was not filed. Agreement for sale was not denied by Jagdish Prasad. That agreement was not directly in issue in the suit. It was relevant only for interpretation of Thekanama of the same date hence filing of the original agreement was not necessary. Jagdish Prasad never disputed the fact that such an agreement had been executed by him.” 26. At this stage, it would also be apt to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Suraj Lamp (supra) in which it has explained the purpose of registration of a document. Paragraphs 15 to 18 of the said judgment are reproduced below: “15. At this stage, it would also be apt to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Suraj Lamp (supra) in which it has explained the purpose of registration of a document. Paragraphs 15 to 18 of the said judgment are reproduced below: “15. The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration. 16. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future "any right, title or interest" whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property. 17. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. 18. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s) presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified." 27. Now, before appreciating the applicability of the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the revisionist/tenant in the present case, it would also be appropriate to consider what the expression 'Collateral Purpose' implies, inasmuch as it has been contended by counsel for the revisionist/tenant that even though the so-called agreement to sell was an unregistered document, it can be read for collateral purpose. For this purpose, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram (supra). Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said judgment are reproduced below: “21. In Ram Kishore v. Ambika Prasad, AIR 1966 All 515 , question up for consideration was, whether kirayanama, an unregistered document, could have been relied in a suit for recovery of rent since it did not result in creating a valid lease. It was argued that such a document is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose whatsoever. Following an earlier decision in Fateh Chand v. Mst. Radha Rani, 1956 All. LJ 625, this Court held that an unregistered lease is admissible for collateral purpose, as provided in Section 49 of Registration Act. The Court further quoted with approval as to what constitute collateral purpose and said: “What a collateral purpose is cannot be precisely defined. It must vary with the circumstances of each case. Leases which were not registered but were required to be registered and were, therefore, inadmissible for a purpose other than a collateral one have been looked at in reported cases in order to ascertain the nature of the possession of the tenant, the data from which the tenancy began and for determining the period of tenancy, and for finding out what the rent reserved was. In the present case the kirayanama can be consulted for the nature of the defendant's possession and, if it is held that he is in occupation as a tenant, for finding out the rent payable by him.” 22. This Court has also considered Section 49 recently in Writ Petition No. 12809 of 2003 (Mishri Lal Karak v. Sri Dinesh Chandra Agarwal and others) decided on 1.10.2013 and in para 30 of the judgment, it has been said: “This Court finds that permitting document to be received in evidence for limited purpose as such would not have the effect of influencing the rights of the parties vis a vis the immovable property concerned. The general legislative policy u/s 49 of Act, 1908 is contained in three clauses i.e. (a), (b) and (c) and proviso carves out an exception in respect to clause (c) only and not (a) and (b) thereof. The inevitable conclusion vis a vis the immovable property concerned is that, an unregistered document shall not result in affecting the right etc. over the immovable property in any manner and also shall not confer any power to adopt it. To the extent the proviso operates, it permits that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be given in evidence i.e. where a document remains unregistered and title does not pass, the agreement between the parties which preceded the ineffective document shall remain and may be received in evidence to look into the terms thereof. This by itself would not confer any right since no such right has been conferred under the substantive law. Receiving in evidence does not mean conferment of substantive right. The rule of evidence cannot enlarge or alter the provisions of substantive law. It cannot confer rights, if there are none under the substantive law. In other words, such a document could be used only for the purpose permissible under proviso to Section 49 of Act, 1908 so as to establish part-performance u/s 53A of Act, 1882 but cannot be admitted in evidence to show nature of possession, if the possession was continuing from some date prior to the execution Ahmad of unregistered deed. Here I find support from Apex Court decision in Kripal Kaur v. Bachan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 199 .” 28. The collateral purpose has been succinctly explained by this Court in the case of Zariq Ahmad Vs. Here I find support from Apex Court decision in Kripal Kaur v. Bachan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 199 .” 28. The collateral purpose has been succinctly explained by this Court in the case of Zariq Ahmad Vs. Satish Kumar and another AIR 1983 All 164 . In the case of Zariq Ahmad (supra), two questions were referred to by the Bench of a learned Single Judge which are reproduced below: “1. Whether any term of a lease deed required under Section 107 of the Transfer of property Act to be registered, could be pressed into service for a collateral purpose within the meaning of the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act ? 2. Whether in the instant case, the relationship of landlord and tenant, the rate of rent and the period for which the original lease has been granted could be looked into as a collateral purpose under the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act?" 29. The aforesaid two questions have been answered by the Bench in paragraphs 17, 18, and 19, which are reproduced below: “17. For what we have said above, it follows that an unregistered lease deed cannot be admitted to prove the terms and conditions of the lease. 18. Accordingly, it cannot be seen either for the purposes of the period of lease or the rate of rent at which the premises had been let out. A collateral purpose is any purpose other than of creating, assigning, extinguishing a right to immovable property. 19. We, accordingly, answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative.” 30. The Apex Court in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited Vs. Development Consultant Limited 2008 (8) SCC 564 has also explained the ‘Collateral Purpose’ in paragraphs 34 and 35, which are reproduced hereinbelow: “34. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that :- 1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. 2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. 5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose. 35. In our view, the particular clause in the lease agreement in question cannot be called a collateral purpose. As noted earlier, it is the case of the appellant that the suit premises was let out only for the particular named officer of the respondent and accordingly, after the same was vacated by the said officer, the respondent was not entitled to allot it to any other employee and was therefore, liable to be evicted which, in our view, was an important term forming part of the lease agreement. Therefore, such a clause, namely, Clause 9 of the lease agreement in this case, cannot be looked into even for collateral purposes to come to a conclusion that the respondent was liable to be evicted because of violation of Clause 9 of the lease agreement. That being the position, we are unable to hold that Clause 9 of the lease agreement, which is admittedly unregistered, can be looked into for the purpose of evicting the respondent from the suit premises only because the respondent was not entitled to induct any other person other than the named officer in the same.” 31. Thus, a collateral purpose is any use of a document that is not for its original purpose or is not directly related to the main transaction. In other words, the expression 'Collateral Purpose' implies that the content of such a document can be used for purpose other than for which it has been executed or entered into between the parties or for a purpose remote to the main transaction. 32. In other words, the expression 'Collateral Purpose' implies that the content of such a document can be used for purpose other than for which it has been executed or entered into between the parties or for a purpose remote to the main transaction. 32. Now, the Court proceeds to consider the contention of the counsel for the revisionist/tenant that the agreement to sell can be appreciated to determine the cessation of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties on the execution of the agreement to sell. 33. In the present case, from the agreement to sell extracted above, it is evident that there is no stipulation in the alleged agreement disclosing the intention of the parties to cease the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The agreement is silent about terminating the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents/landlord and the revisionist/tenant, therefore, the agreement is of no help to the revisionist/tenant. 34. It has been emphatically submitted by counsel for the revisionist/tenant that the fact that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant ceased to exist between the parties has been admitted by the respondents/landlord in the plaint by acknowledging that the agreement to sell had been executed and it is immaterial that the balance sale consideration was not paid. The submission is devoid of merit since the law is settled that the substance of the transaction has to be determined with reference to the terms of the document, but not on the basis of pleading set up by the party. 35. It is also pertinent to note that an unregistered agreement to sell can be read in evidence for collateral purposes, but it cannot be considered to determine the question about the cessation of the jural relationship between landlord and tenant, inasmuch as determination of such an issue on the basis of unregistered agreement to sell influences the substantive right of respondents/landlord to institute the suit for eviction before Small Causes Court which in the opinion of the Court is not a collateral purpose. Therefore, in the present case using the unregistered agreement to sell to prove the fact of termination of the jural relationship between respondents/landlord and revisionist/tenant would not be using it as a collateral purpose. 36. Therefore, in the present case using the unregistered agreement to sell to prove the fact of termination of the jural relationship between respondents/landlord and revisionist/tenant would not be using it as a collateral purpose. 36. It is worth noticing that the respondent/landlord in paragraph 11 of the plaint, extracted above, has categorically stated that it was agreed between the parties that the revisionist/tenant would continue to pay the rent of the suit property till the execution of the sale-deed. Assertions made in paragraph 11 of the plaint has been reiterated by respondent no.1 in his affidavit in paragraph 12, which is reproduced hereinbelow: 37. The Court has perused the cross-examination of the P.W.-1, i.e. respondent no.1, who in his cross-examination has categorically stated that even after the execution of the alleged agreement to sell, the revisionist was his tenant and the tenancy continued till November 2011. The revisionist/tenant did not lead any evidence in rebuttal to the testimony of P.W.1. 38. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the respondent/landlord has proved that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant continued to exist between the parties even after execution of the agreement to sell. 39. The Trial Court has also considered the said fact while returning the finding on issue nos. 1 and 2. 40. It has also been urged by the revisionist's counsel that with the execution of the agreement to sell the nature of possession of the revisionist/tenant has changed and his possession was that of the owner and not of the tenant, and the agreement to sell can be relied upon to determine the nature of possession, and change in nature of possession implies the end of the jural relationship between the revisionist/tenant and respondents/landlord. In the opinion of the Court, such submission also lacks substance, inasmuch as what a collateral purpose is cannot be precisely defined, and it must vary with the circumstances of each case. In the opinion of the Court, such submission also lacks substance, inasmuch as what a collateral purpose is cannot be precisely defined, and it must vary with the circumstances of each case. In a given case, the nature of possession can be adjudicated on the basis of an unregistered document though compulsorily registrable like in a suit for partition, but when adjudication of change in nature of possession based upon an unregistered document influences the rights of the party to get a decree for eviction from the Court of Small Causes, the unregistered document cannot be relied upon to ascertain nature of possession to determine the issue of cessation of jural relationship between revisionist/tenant and respondents/landlord. Thus, to admit the unregistered agreement to sell in evidence for the purpose sought would amount to circumventing the statutory bar imposed by Section 49 of the Registration Act. 41. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MST. Kirpal Kaur Vs. Bachan Singh & Others 1957 SCC OnLine SC 61 : AIR 1958 SC 199 , where the High Court held that the unregistered agreement of 6.2.1932 was admissible to prove the nature of possession. The Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and held that to admit the unregistered agreement of 6.2.1932 though requiring registration for determination of possession would amount to getting around the statutory bar imposed by Section 49 of the Registration Act. Paragraph 14 of the said judgment is reproduced below: “14. It is then said that the agreement of 6.2.1932, showed that since its date her possession was permissive. The High Court has held that the agreement was admissible to prove the nature of her possession. In Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, (1918) 46 IA 285, it was held that a document which should have been registered but was not, was admissible to explain the nature of the possession of a person. What had happened there was that two widows who were in possession of a property in equal shares, presented a petition to the Collector on 10.10.1895, whereby after reciting that they had on 8.10.1895, given away the property as stridhan to one Duraisani, they prayed that orders might be passed for transferring the villages into her name. What had happened there was that two widows who were in possession of a property in equal shares, presented a petition to the Collector on 10.10.1895, whereby after reciting that they had on 8.10.1895, given away the property as stridhan to one Duraisani, they prayed that orders might be passed for transferring the villages into her name. On this petition the property was registered in the name of Duraisani and she was put in possession and thereafter continued in possession till her death in 1911. The question was whether Duraisani had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. It was held that though the petition in the absence of registration could not be admitted to prove a gift, it might be referred to for showing that the subsequent possession of Duraisani was as a donee and owner of the land and not as trustee or manager for the two donors and therefore to show that the nature of such possession was adverse to them. We cannot agree that on the authority of Paratha Pillai case (supra) the agreement of 6.2.1932, can be admitted in evidence in the case in hand to show the nature of Harnam Kaur's possession of the lands subsequent to its date. In Varatha Pillai case (supra) Duraisani had got into possession only after the petition and claimed to retain possession only under the gift mentioned in it. The petition was therefore admissible in evidence to show the nature of her possession. In the present case Harnam Kaur had been in possession before the date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession and, therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it which admittedly cannot be done for want of registration. To admit it in evidence for the purpose sought would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by Section 49 of the Registration Act.” 42. Even, in paragraph 22 of the case of Shiv Ram (supra), relied upon by the counsel for the revisionist/tenant, this court observed “that an unregistered document shall not result in affecting the right etc. Even, in paragraph 22 of the case of Shiv Ram (supra), relied upon by the counsel for the revisionist/tenant, this court observed “that an unregistered document shall not result in affecting the right etc. over the immovable property in any manner and also shall not confer any power to adopt it”. Therefore, the unregistered agreement to sell in the present case cannot be relied upon to determine the nature of possession so to adjudicate whether jural relationship of tenant and landlord ceased to exist between the parties. Therefore, for the reasons given above, the aforesaid judgment is also of no help to the revisionist/tenant. 43. The two judgments R. Kanthimathi (supra) and Abdul Salam Qureshi (supra) of this Court are also of no help to the revisionist/tenant for the reason delineated below. The Apex Court in the case of H.K. Sharma Vs. Ram Lal 2019 (4) SCC 153 distinguished the judgment of R. Kanthimathi (supra) and held that an agreement to sell shall contain a stipulation to the effect that the parties intend to end the relationship of the lessor and lessee. 44. In this respect, paragraphs 22 to 31 of the judgment of H.K. Sharma (supra) are reproduced below: “22. The question, which arises for consideration in these appeals, is when the lessor and the lessee enters into an agreement for sale/purchase of the tenanted premises where the lessor agrees to sell the tenanted premises to his lessee for consideration on certain conditions, whether, as a result of entering into such agreement, the Jural relationship of lessor and the lessee in relation to the leased property comes to an end and, if so, whether it results in determination of the lease. 23. In other words, the question that arises for consideration is when the lessor enters into an agreement to sell the tenanted property to his lessee during the subsistence of the lease, whether execution of such agreement would ipso facto result in determination of the lease and severe the relationship of lessor and the lessee in relation to the leased property. 24. 24. In our considered opinion, the aforementioned question has to be decided keeping in view the provisions of Section 111 of the TP Act and the intention of the parties to the lease whether the parties intended to surrender the lease on execution of such agreement in relation to the tenanted premises or they intended to keep the lease subsisting notwithstanding the execution of such agreement. 25. Chapter V of the TP Act deals with the leases of Immovable property. This chapter consists of Section 105 to Section 117. 26. A lease of an immoveable property is a contract between the lessor and the lessee. Their rights are governed by Section 105 to 117 of TP Act read with the respective State Rent Laws enacted by the State. Section 111 of the TP Act deals with the determination of lease. Clauses (a) to (h) set out the grounds on which a lease of an immoveable property can be determined. Clauses (e) and (f) with which we are concerned here provide that a lease can be determined by an express surrender; in case, the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between them whereas Clause (f) provides that the lease can be determined by implied surrender. 27. This Court in Shah Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. vs. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage considered the scope of clauses (e) and (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act and laid down the following principle in Para 19 as under: (SCC p. 665) “19. A surrender under clauses (e) and (f) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is an yielding up of the term of the lessee's interest to him who has the immediate reversion or the lessor's interest. It takes effect like a contract by mutual consent on the lessor's acceptance of the act of the lessee. The lessee cannot, therefore, surrender unless the term is vested in him; and the surrender must be to a person in whom the immediate reversion expectant on the term is vested. Implied surrender by operation of law occurs by the creation of a new relationship, or by relinquishment of possession. If the lessee accepts a new lease that in itself is a surrender. Implied surrender by operation of law occurs by the creation of a new relationship, or by relinquishment of possession. If the lessee accepts a new lease that in itself is a surrender. Surrender can also be implied from the consent of the parties or from such facts as the relinquishment of possession by the lessee and taking over possession by the lessor. Relinquishment of possession operates as an implied surrender. There must be a taking of possession, not necessarily a physical taking, but something amounting to a virtual taking of possession. Whether this has occurred is a question of fact. 28. It is in the light of the aforementioned legal principle, the question involved in this case has to be examined. 29. Perusal of agreement to sell dated 13.05.1993 (Annexure P 1) shows that though the agreement contains 9 conditions but none of the conditions provides much less in specific terms as to what will be the fate of the tenancy. In other words, none of the conditions set out in the agreement dated 13.05.1993 can be construed for holding that the parties intended to surrender the tenancy rights. 30. A fortiori, the parties did not intend to surrender the tenancy rights despite entering into an agreement of sale of the tenanted property. In other words, if the parties really intended to surrender their tenancy rights as contemplated in clauses (e) or (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act while entering into an agreement to sell the suit house, it would have made necessary provision to that effect by providing a specific clause in the agreement. It was, however, not done. On the other hand, we find that the conditions set out in the agreement do not make out a case of express surrender under clause (e) or implied surrender under clause (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act. 31. It is for this reason, the law laid down by this Court in R. Kanthimathi has no application to the facts of this case and is, therefore, distinguishable on facts. Indeed, it will be clear from mere perusal of para 4 of the said decision quoted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 341) “4. As aforesaid, the question for consideration is, whether the status of tenant as such changes on the execution of an agreement of sale with the landlord. Indeed, it will be clear from mere perusal of para 4 of the said decision quoted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 341) “4. As aforesaid, the question for consideration is, whether the status of tenant as such changes on the execution of an agreement of sale with the landlord. It is relevant at this junction first to examine the terms of the agreement of sale. The relevant portions of the agreement of sale record the following: “I the aforesaid Mrs. Beatrice Xavier hereby agree out my own free will, to sell, convey and transfer the property to you Mrs. R. Kanthimathi wife of Mr. S. Ramaswami, 435 Trichy Road, Coimbatore for a mutually agreed sale consideration of Rs.25,000/. I shall be proceeding to Coimbatore and shall execute the sale deed and present the same for admission and registration before the Registering Authority, accepting and acknowledge payment of the balance of consideration of Rs. 5000/ (Rupees five thousand only) at the time of registration and shall complete the transaction of sale and conveyance as the property demised has already been surrendered to your possession. (Emphasis in Original)” 45. Since, in the present case, the alleged agreement to sell does not contain any stipulation disclosing the intention of the parties to cease the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, the judgment of R. Kanthimathi (supra) is of no help to the revisionist/tenant. For the same reason, the judgement of this Court in the case of Abdul Salam Qureshi (supra) is also of no help to the revisionist/tenant. 46. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the revision lacks merits and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.