JUDGMENT : (Delivered by: Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.) 1. In a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge-sheet, after rejection of anticipatory bail application, learned Single Judge of this Court referred the following questions for determination by a Larger Bench:- “(1) Whether an anticipatory bail application in a matter where a charge sheet has already been filed is declined, can this Court exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash proceedings on an Application under Section 482 of the Code, subsequently made, or one that subsequently comes up for hearing? and (2) If it can, is it open to the Court, seized of the Application u/s 482 of the Code, to pass an interim order of stay of proceedings, the effect whereof would be to relieve the applicant of his obligation to surrender and seek bail, though anticipatory bail has been declined on his application, earlier made for the purpose? This difficulty may arise in jurisdictions/Courts where there is a practice of filing applications seeking a 'rolled up relief', invoking simultaneously jurisdiction of the Court, under Section 482/438/439 of the Code.” 2. The petition for quashing of charge-sheet came to be filed on the premise that the offence alleged against the applicant was in fact a civil dispute, relating to payment of proceeds for the transfer of shares by the complainant of his Company i.e. Radius Infratail Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s. Viresh Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., for a consideration of Rs.12 crores. For the purpose of transfer of these shares, four cheques were issued, all of which got dishonoured. Four separate complaints have been filed in respect of dishonour of cheques by the complainant at the Courts at Delhi. The proceedings in respect thereof are pending. The applicants therefore contend that in respect of self-same cause initiation of criminal proceedings at Gautam Budh Nagar is purposive and is an abuse of process of law. 3. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been admitted on the strength of submissions made by the applicant that no cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the concerned Magistrate at Gautam Budh Nagar; that jurisdiction has been artificially created by the complainant for the purpose; dispute raised is commercial/civil in nature and proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are otherwise pending before the competent court at Delhi. The applicants have also sought appropriate interim protection against coercive steps initiated in the matter. 4. Admittedly, before filing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant sought protection against his arrest by seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. The two Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Applications Nos. 7498 of 2020 and 7568 of 2020 came to be dismissed by this Court vide following orders:- “8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of material brought on record as well as complicity of accused and also judgement of the Apex Court in the case of P. Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2019 SC 4198 , this Court does not finds any exceptional ground to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C.” 5. While declining relief of anticipatory bail in the above noted anticipatory bail applications, this Court issued following further directions:- “9. However, in view of the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed, that in case the applicant appears and surrenders before the court below within 30 days from today and applies for bail, his prayer for bail shall be considered and decided as per the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgement passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P 10. Till then no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant. 11. However, in case, the applicant does not appears before the court below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against him. 12. It is made clear that the applicant will not be granted any further time by this court for surrendering before the court below as directed above.” 6. It is in the above factual backdrop that the prayer for interim relief in the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came to be opposed by the complainant, on the ground that grant of any interim relief in the matter would go contrary to the directions issued by this Court while declining anticipatory bails in the matter, inasmuch as the applicant had not surrendered before the court notwithstanding the orders passed by this Court while rejecting the anticipatory bail application. 7. 7. The complainant/respondent therefore urged that grant of any interim relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would abnegate and virtually review the orders passed by coordinate Bench of this Court in criminal misc. anticipatory bail applications. Reliance was placed upon Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose. Submission of the respondents thus was that the statute (Section 362 Cr.P.C.) forbids the criminal Court from reviewing its order, except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. It was further argued that this restraint would extend to various jurisdictions of this Court under the Code. It shall prohibit passing of any order in exercise of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which has the effect of reviewing or modifying a final order, already passed by this Court earlier in exercise of a different criminal jurisdiction i.e. anticipatory bail, under the Code. 8. Upon consideration of the rival submissions as also the analysis of judgments cited at the bar, learned Single Judge observed following anomaly:- “24. By contrast, the remedy of an anticipatory bail granted after a charge sheet is filed has the limited purpose of securing for the accused his liberty on a peremptory basis, without the requirement of surrender to custody 'actually' and then seeking regular bail. The scope of the two remedies, in the opinion of this Court, are quite different. However, in a case where the Court seized of the anticipatory bail, declines to grant relief and directs the applicants to surrender and secure regular bail with protection for a limited period of time, a conflict in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code may arise, if an order of stay of proceedings is passed at a stage where the accused has not yet surrendered and secured bail. In that position, the effect of granting an interim order might precisely be that what the Bench seized of the anticipatory bail refused, the Bench hearing the Application u/s 482 of the Code grants. In the opinion of this Court, though technically not a review, it would certainly be an anomalous exercise of jurisdiction and against the principle of comity, in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the Court. This Court, however, does think that since this kind of a situation can arise often, this question is required to be authoritatively settled.” 9. In the opinion of this Court, though technically not a review, it would certainly be an anomalous exercise of jurisdiction and against the principle of comity, in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the Court. This Court, however, does think that since this kind of a situation can arise often, this question is required to be authoritatively settled.” 9. Learned Single Judge took note of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal and others vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2020) 5 SCC 1 , as well as a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Shivam vs. State of U.P. and another, 2021 SCC OnLine All 264 for its opinion. In the context of the statutory scheme, as interpreted in Shivam (supra), learned Single Judge observed as under:- “25. There is a further dimension to the matter, which cannot be ignored. The question, what could be 'appropriate cases' where this Court may grant anticipatory bail to an accused, even after a police report had been filed, bearing in mind the law laid down in Sushila Aggarwal (supra), came to be considered in Shivam vs. State of U.P. and another, 2021 SCC OnLine All 264. This decision was rendered a day before the present matter was heard. Therefore, none of the learned Counsel referred to it during the course of their submissions. This decision, however, has a dimension of seminal importance to the exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, the grant of interim relief by the Court, seized of an Application u/s 482 of the Code, in a case where another Bench had declined to grant anticipatory bail. After an extensive review of authorities in Shivam (supra), Hon'ble Mr. Justice Siddharth has identified, what would be 'appropriate cases', where anticipatory bail can be granted, despite a charge sheet being filed in Court. In Shivam (supra), it has been held: "42. After consideration of the above legal provisions with regard to investigation and submission of charge-sheet and also the judgements of the Apex Court in this regard, this Court finds that the "appropriate cases" wherein anticipatory bail can be granted are those cases where charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer and process issued by the Court after taking cognizance under Section 204 Cr.P.C. can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and also some more cases. Therefore, non-grant of anticipatory bail to an accused only on the ground that charge-sheet has been submitted by the Investigating Officer or cognizance has been taken by the Court against him u/s 204 Cr.P.C. without considering the prima facie veracity of the same, will not be in the larger interest of justice. 43. The following can be considered as "appropriate cases" for grant of anticipatory bail to an accused apprehending arrest, even after submission of charge-sheet against the accused by the Investigating Officer of the police/after taking cognizance of offence against accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C. by the Court:-- 1) Where the charge-sheet has been submitted by the Investigating Officer/cognizance has been taken by the Court, but the merits of the F.I.R/complaint that has been lodged by the informant/complainant are such that it cannot be proved against the accused in the Court; 2) Where there exists a civil remedy and resort has been made to criminal remedy. This has been done because either the civil remedy has become barred by law of limitation or involves time-consuming procedural formalities or involves payment of heavy court fee, like in recovery suits. The distinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong is quite distinct and the courts should not permit a person to be harassed by surrendering and obtaining bail when no case for taking cognizance of the alleged offences has been made out against him since wrong alleged is a civil wrong only. When the allegations make out a civil and criminal wrong both against an accused, the remedy of anticipatory bail should be considered favourably, in case the implication in civil wrong provides for opportunity of hearing before being implicated and punished/penalized.The criminal remedy, in most of the cases, entails curtailment of right to liberty without any opportunity of hearing after lodging of complaint and F.I.R under the provisions of Cr.P.C. which is pre-independence law and disregards Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in such cases where civil and criminal remedy both were available to the informant/complainant, and he has chosen criminal remedy only, anticipatory bail should be favourably considered in such cases. 3) When the F.I.R/complaint has clearly been lodged by way of counterblast to an earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant/complainant in near proximity of time. Therefore, in such cases where civil and criminal remedy both were available to the informant/complainant, and he has chosen criminal remedy only, anticipatory bail should be favourably considered in such cases. 3) When the F.I.R/complaint has clearly been lodged by way of counterblast to an earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant/complainant in near proximity of time. The motive of lodging the false F.I.R/complaint is apparent and from the material collected by the Investigating Officer or from the statements of witnesses in complaint case, there is no consideration of the earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant/complainant; 4) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R/complaint or in the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused or the F.I.R/complaint does not discloses the essential ingredients of the offences alleged; 5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R/complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; 6) Where charge-sheet has been submitted on the basis of evidence or materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; 7) Where charge-sheet has been submitted/complaint has been filed but on account of some legal defect, like want of sanction, filing of complaint/F.I.R by legally incompetent authority, it cannot proceed; 8) Where the allegation in the F.I.R/complaint do not consitute cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence and investigation has been done by police without order of Magistrate u/s 155(2) Cr.P.C; 9) Where the part of charge in the charge-sheet regarding major offence alleged is not found to be proved and only minor offence has been found to be proved by the Investigating Officer, from the material collected by him during the investigation, the Court can consider granting anticipatory bail to an accused. Since after investigation and submission of charge-sheet the prosecution allegations in the F.I.R have not been found to be fully correct by the Investigating Officer and only part of the charges are found to be proved; 10) Where the investigation has been conducted by the Investigating Officer but the statement of the accused persons have not been recorded by the Investigating Officer and charge-sheet has been submitted only by relying upon the witnesses of the prosecution side. Such a charge-sheet cannot be considered to be in accordance with law since the Investigating Officer is required to consider the case of both sides before submitting charge-sheet before the Court. Therefore, in such cases, anticipatory bail can be granted to an accused provided the accused has cooperated with the investigation. However this cannot be an inflexible rule since in most of the cases the accused do not cooperate with the investigation and it is not easy for Investigating Officer to record their statements. Therefore, what prejudice has been caused to an accused by non-recording of his version in the case diary of the police has to be demonstrated before the Court. Merely on the technical ground of omission on the part of the Investigating Officer to record the statement of the accused would not constitute a ground for grant of anticipatory bail; and 11) Where there is statutory bar regarding filing of F.I.R and only complaint can be filed, charge-sheet submitted against an accused in such cases would entitle him to apply for anticipatory bail after submission of charge-sheet by the Investigating Officer. 44. The above instances are not exhaustive and in more "appropriate cases", the Court can consider grant of anticipatory bail to an accused after considering the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case and the material collected by the Investigating Officer/statement of witnesses recorded in support of complaint case." (Emphasis by Court) 26. His Lordship has also delineated those cases where anticipatory bail can be granted to an accused after submission of a charge sheet. Those cases may not be of much relevance here and, therefore, are not being referred to. A reading of the principle in Shivam indicates that the principle to exercise jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code, in a case where a police report/charge sheet has been filed, is that these are cases where the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, can quash proceedings, post cognizance, and some more cases.The specific cases, that have been given as an illustrative list where jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail may be exercised under Section 438 of the Code, are same as those where this Court exercises powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash proceedings of a case post cognizance. The questions, therefore, that arise here are : (1) Whether an anticipatory bail application in a matter where a charge sheet has already been filed is declined, can this Court exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash proceedings on an Application under Section 482 of the Code, subsequently made, or one that subsequently comes up for hearing? and (2) If it can, is it open to the Court, seized of the Application u/s 482 of the Code, to pass an interim order of stay of proceedings, the effect whereof would be to relieve the applicant of his obligation to surrender and seek bail, though anticipatory bail has been declined on his application, earlier made for the purpose? This difficulty may arise in jurisdictions/Courts where there is a practice of filing applications seeking a 'rolled up relief', invoking simultaneously jurisdiction of the Court, under Section 482/438/439 of the Code.” It is in the context of cataloguing of cases for grant of anticipatory bail where charge-sheet is filed that the learned Single Judge has referred the questions, noticed above, for its consideration by a larger Bench. 10. We have heard Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned counsel assisted by Sri Shashank Pandey for the applicants, Sri. G.S. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Apoorva Pandey and Ms. Somya Chaturvedi, learned Advocates for the opposite party no.2 and learned AGA for the State and have perused the materials on record. Sri Sushil Shukla, Sri Ravitendra Pratap Singh Chandel, Sri Aditya Prakash Singh, learned Advocates have also assisted the Court in view of the importance of the issue raised in the present matter. 11. Before proceeding to analyse the issues referred for consideration in this matter, it would be necessary to notice the preliminary submission of Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, Advocate and Sri Sushil Shukla, Advocate that the terms of reference formulated by learned Single Judge, in the present case, requires re-formulation. Learned counsel argues that the necessity to refer the issue had arisen on account of the observations made by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Shivam (supra). Submission of Sri Shukla is that the law laid down in Shivam (supra) omits to consider the Constitutional Bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs. Learned counsel argues that the necessity to refer the issue had arisen on account of the observations made by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Shivam (supra). Submission of Sri Shukla is that the law laid down in Shivam (supra) omits to consider the Constitutional Bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 & Sushila Aggarwal (supra) as well as the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Anticipatory Bail Application No.1094 of 2020 Ankit Bharti vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1949 which prohibits curtailment of judicial discretion in the matter of grant of anticipatory bail by the process of judicial construction when the legislature itself has left it to the discretion of the High Court and the Court of Sessions and not circumscribed the Court’s discretion. 12. In order to effectively consider the submissions raised at the bar regarding the reference sent to us, it would be necessary to examine the broad contours of this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C. viz-a-viz Section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as the judicial authority elaborating their respective scope. 13. Section 438 Cr.P.C., as it exists in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is reproduced hereinafter:- “438. (1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely:— i) the nature and gravity of the accusation; ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested; either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant, the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended hi such application. (2) Where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session,' considers it expedient to issue an interim order to grant anticipatory bail under subsection (1), the Court shall indicate therein the date, on which the application for grant of anticipatory bail shall be finally heard for passing an order thereon, as the Court may. deem fit, and if the Court passes any order granting anticipatory bail, such order shall include inter alia the following conditions, namely:— (i) that the applicant shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; (ii) that the applicant shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) that the applicant shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; and (iv) such other Conditions as may be imposed under subsection (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. Explanation:—The final order made on an application for direction under sub-section (1); shall not be construed as an interlocutory order for the purpose of this Code. (3) Where the Court grants an interim order under subsection (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court. (4) On the date indicated in the interim order under subsection (2), the Court shall hear the Public Prosecutor and the applicant and after due consideration of their contentions, it may either confirm, modify or cancel the interim order. (5) The High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, shall finally dispose of an application for grant of anticipatory bail under sub-section (1), within thirty days of the date of such application. (6) Provisions of this section shall not be applicable,— (a) to the offences arising out of,-- (i) the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; (ii) the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; (iii) the Official SecretAct,1923; (iv) the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention)Act,1986. (6) Provisions of this section shall not be applicable,— (a) to the offences arising out of,-- (i) the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; (ii) the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; (iii) the Official SecretAct,1923; (iv) the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention)Act,1986. (b) in the offences, in which death sentence can be awarded. (7) If an application under this section has been made by any, person to the High Court, no application by the same person shall be entertained by the Court of Session.” 14. Historical background in which Section 438 came to be introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure would be of help in understanding its true scope. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 there existed no provision of anticipatory bail. It was only after the arrest of an accused that he could be released on bail. The Law Commission of India in its 41st report dated 24.9.1969 highlighted the necessity of introducing a provision in the Code enabling the High Court and the Court of Sessions to grant anticipatory bail. The Commission was of the view that apart from false cases, in other cases also where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail. The suggestion of the Law Commission was accepted, in principle, by the Central Government which ultimately paved the way for insertion of Section 438 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 15. The scope of Section 438 Cr.P.C. fell for consideration before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra). What is meant by anticipatory bail is explained in para 7 of the report in Sibbia (supra), which is reproduced:- “7. The facility which Section 438 affords is generally referred to as ‘anticipatory bail’, an expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st Report. What is meant by anticipatory bail is explained in para 7 of the report in Sibbia (supra), which is reproduced:- “7. The facility which Section 438 affords is generally referred to as ‘anticipatory bail’, an expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st Report. Neither the section nor its marginal note so describes it but, the expression ‘anticipatory bail’ is a convenient mode of conveying that it is possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest.Any order of bail can, of course, be effective only from the time of arrest because, to grant bail, as stated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, is to ‘set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance’. Thus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly, release from the custody of the police.The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial. Personal recognisance, suretyship bonds and such other modalities are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself at the trial of offence or offences of which he is charged and for which he was arrested. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest. Police custody is an inevitable concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences. An order of anticipatory bail constitutes, so to say, an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is issued. In other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. In other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making the arrest, the police officer or other person making the arrest“shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action”. A direction under Section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from this ‘touch’ or confinement.” 16. The controversy before Supreme Court in Sibbia (supra) arose on account of a judgment of Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, wherein attempt was made to catalogue the exigencies wherein alone anticipatory bail could be granted to the accused. The High Court had rejected the argument of the petitioners that in matters of deprivation of personal liberty the Courts should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438 Cr.P.C. The argument advanced before the High Court, in Sibbia (supra) has been noticed in para 10 of the report which is reproduced:- “10. Shri V.M. Tarkunde, appearing on behalf of some of the appellants, while supporting the contentions of the other appellants, said that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, courts should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, when no such restrictions are imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. The learned Counsel added a new dimension to the argument by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution.He urged that Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who has not been convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail and who must therefore be presumed to be innocent. The validity of that section must accordingly be examined by the test of fairness and reasonableness which is implicit in Article 21. If the legislature itself were to impose an unreasonable restriction on the grant of anticipatory bail, such a restriction could have been struck down as being violative of Article 21. The validity of that section must accordingly be examined by the test of fairness and reasonableness which is implicit in Article 21. If the legislature itself were to impose an unreasonable restriction on the grant of anticipatory bail, such a restriction could have been struck down as being violative of Article 21. Therefore, while determining the scope of Section 438, the court should not impose any unfair or unreasonable limitation on the individual's right to obtain an order of anticipatory bail. Imposition of an unfair or unreasonable limitation, according to the learned Counsel, would be violative of Article 21, irrespective of whether it is imposed by legislation or by judicial decision.” 17. The Constitution Bench, however, emphatically held against any curtailment of the discretion vested in the Higher Courts to grant anticipatory bail. The Court held that clause 1 of Section 438 is couched in terms, broad and unqualified. The Court held that by any known canon of construction, words of width and amplitude ought not generally to be cut down so as to read into the language of the statute restrains and conditions which the legislature itself did not think it proper or necessary to impose. 18. Referring to the provision of regular bail in the Code the Court observed as under in Sibbia (supra):- “………...The legislature conferred a wide discretion on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail because it evidently felt, firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipatory bail should or should not be granted and secondly, because the intention was to allow the higher courts in the echelon a somewhat free hand in the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. That is why, departing from the terms of Sections 437 and 439, Section 438(1) uses the language that the High Court or the Court of Session “may, if it thinks fit” direct that the applicant be released on bail. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer manifestation of the same legislative intent to confer a wide discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer manifestation of the same legislative intent to confer a wide discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. It provides that the High Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a direction for the grant of anticipatory bail, “may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit”, including the conditions which are set out in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (2). The proof of legislative intent can best be found in the language which the legislature uses…...” 19. The legislative intent having been delineated by the Court it (the Court) emphatically ruled against placing of any restrictions on the scope of Court’s discretion (High Court and the Court of Sessions) to grant anticipatory bail in following words:- “Our answer, clearly and emphatically, is in the negative. The High Court and the Court of Session to whom the application for anticipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit so to do on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and on such conditions as the case may warrant. Similarly, they must be left free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant, on considerations similar to those mentioned in Section 437 or which are generally considered to be relevant under Section 439 of the Code. ” In para 14 the Court held as under:- “14. Generalisations on matters which rest on discretion and the attempt to discover formulae of universal application when facts are bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion. No two cases are alike on facts and therefore, courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory bail because, firstly, these are higher courts manned by experienced persons, secondly, their orders are not final but are open to appellate or revisional scrutiny and above all because, discretion has always to be exercised by courts judicially and not according to whim, caprice or fancy. On the other hand, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges. While dealing with the necessity for preserving judicial discretion unhampered by rules of general application Earl Loreburn, L.C. said in Hyman v. Rose [1912 AC 623] : “I desire in the first instance to point out that the discretion given by the section is very wide. . . . Now it seems to me that when the Act is so expressed to provide a wide discretion, .. . . it is not advisable to lay down any rigid rules for guiding that discretion. I do not doubt that the rules enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in the present case are useful maxims in general, and that in general they reflect the point of view from which judges would regard an application for relief. But I think it ought to be distinctly understood that there may be cases in which any or all of them may be disregarded. If it were otherwise, the free discretion given by the statute would be fettered by limitations which have nowhere been enacted. It is one thing to decide what is the true meaning of the language contained in an Act of Parliament.It is quite a different thing to place conditions upon a free discretion entrusted by statute to the court where the conditions are not based upon statutory enactment at all. It is not safe, I think, to say that the court must and will always insist upon certain things when the Act does not require them, and the facts of some unforeseen case may make the court wish it had kept a free hand.” 20. The Constitution Bench opined that it would be difficult to anticipate unforeseen situations which may arise in a case and, therefore, it would be prudent and consistent with the applicable provision to leave it to the discretion of the Courts (High Court and Session Courts) whether or not to grant anticipatory bail. The Court summed up the issue in following words:- "26. The Court summed up the issue in following words:- "26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ], that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not to be found therein. 33. We would, therefore, prefer to leave the High Court and the Court of Session to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion which, by their long training and experience, they are ideally suited to do. The ends of justice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. The ends of justice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. It is customary, almost chronic, to take a statute as one finds it on the ground that, after all, “the legislature in its wisdom” has thought it fit to use a particular expression. A convention may usefully grow whereby the High Court and the Court of Session may be trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to their care by the legislature in its wisdom. If they err, they are liable to be corrected.” 21. Moreover, the Court clarified the common misgivings on the scope of Court’s power to grant anticipatory bail by stating that the applicant must show that he has reason to believe that he may be arrested, and it is not just a vague apprehension in that regard; the Court while considering the application for anticipatory bail must apply its mind and determine that a case is made out for granting such relief; lodging of an FIR is not a sine-qua-non for grant of anticipatory bail and that it (anticipatory bail) can be granted even before or after lodging of FIR so long as applicant is not arrested; a blanket order of anticipatory bail should generally not be granted; though the application for anticipatory bail need not be drawn with meticulousness of a pleading in a civil court but specific events and facts must be disclosed for the Court to judge the reasonableness of the applicant’s belief of his impending arrest. 22. The judgment in Sibbia (supra) by now is regarded as a locusclassicuson the subject. It has been followed consistently. Its principles have been reiterated by the subsequent Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). The primary consideration in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) was the question as to whether an order of anticipatory bail granted in the matter would continue only till filing of charge-sheet or would continue till conclusion of trial. The Court held that unless provided otherwise such order would continue till conclusion of trial. The primary consideration in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) was the question as to whether an order of anticipatory bail granted in the matter would continue only till filing of charge-sheet or would continue till conclusion of trial. The Court held that unless provided otherwise such order would continue till conclusion of trial. The Bench also recognized the power with the Court while granting anticipatory bail to put such conditions as are found expedient in the facts and circumstances of a case. 23. A Full Bench of five Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Ankit Bharti (supra) while reiterating an earlier decision of Full Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Vinod Kumar vs. State of U.P. & Anr., 2019 (12) ADJ 495 reiterated the principles in Sibbia (supra) and Sushila Aggarwal (supra) and held as under:- “9. More recently, a Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal v. State [NCT of Delhi], 2019 (12) ADJ 495 was called upon to consider whether protection accorded under Section 438 should be limited for a fixed period and whether the life of such an order should end at the time when the accused is summoned by the Court. While dealing with those questions, the Constitution Bench reiterated the conclusions entered in Sibbia, which clearly has come to be regarded as the locus classicus on the subject. Delivering his concurring opinion in Sushila Aggrawal, Ravindra Bhat J. observed thus:— 84. The accused is not obliged to make out a special case for grant of anticipatory bail; reading an otherwise wide power would fetter the court's discretion. Whenever an application (for relief under Section 438) is moved, discretion has to be always exercised judiciously, and with caution, having regard to the facts of every case. (Para 21, Sibbia). 85. While the power of granting anticipatory bail is not ordinary, at the same time, its use is not confined to exceptional cases (Para 22, Sibbia). 86. It is not justified to require courts to only grant anticipatory bail in special cases made out by accused, since the power is extraordinary, or that several considerations -spelt out in Section 437-or other considerations, are to be kept in mind. (Para 24-25, Sibbia). 87. 86. It is not justified to require courts to only grant anticipatory bail in special cases made out by accused, since the power is extraordinary, or that several considerations -spelt out in Section 437-or other considerations, are to be kept in mind. (Para 24-25, Sibbia). 87. Overgenerous introduction (or reading into) of constraints on the power to grant anticipatory bail would render it Constitutionally vulnerable.Since fair procedure is part of Article 21, the court should not throw the provision (i.e. Section 438) open to challenge “by reading words in it which are not to be found therein.” (Para 26). 10. Dealing then with the nature of the foundation that must be laid in an application for anticipatory bail, the learned Judge held:— “133. Having regard to the above discussion, it is clarified that the court should keep the following points as guiding principles, in dealing with applications under Section 438, Cr. P.C.: (a) As held in Sibbia, when a person apprehends arrest and approaches a court for anticipatory bail, his apprehension (of arrest), has to be based on concrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable a specific offence or particular of offences. Applications for anticipatory bail should contain clear and essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends his or her arrest, as well as his version of the facts. These are important for the court which considering the application, to extent and reasonableness of the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not a necessary condition that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.” 11. While framing “FINAL CONCLUSIONS” and on the aspect noted above, the Constitution Bench observed:— “140. This court, in the light of the above discussion in the two judgments, and in the light of the answers to the reference, hereby clarifies that the following need to be kept in mind by courts, dealing with applications under Section 438, Cr. While framing “FINAL CONCLUSIONS” and on the aspect noted above, the Constitution Bench observed:— “140. This court, in the light of the above discussion in the two judgments, and in the light of the answers to the reference, hereby clarifies that the following need to be kept in mind by courts, dealing with applications under Section 438, Cr. P.C.: (1) Consistent with the judgment in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, when a person complains of apprehension of arrest and approaches for order, the application should be based on concrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to one or other specific offence. The application seeking anticipatory bail should contain bare essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends arrest, as well as his side of the story. These are essential for the court which should consider his application, to evaluate the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not essential that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.” 12. We have noted these conclusions recorded by the Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal for they shall be of some import for reasons, which follow. 13. Reverting however to the principal issue, we are of the considered view that Vinod Kumar rightly desisted from either postulating or particularizing the various circumstances in which an individual may be recognized as entitled to move the High Court directly and left it to the judicious discretion of the Court to be exercised bearing in mind the facts and exigencies of each particular case. The words of caution and circumspection as entered in Sibbia and Sushila Agarwal in the context of the power conferred by Section 438 apply with equal force while understanding the nature and extent of the concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court. Regard must be had to the fact that it is well nigh impossible to predict upon imponderables such as the immanency of the threat, issues of access to justice and redress and the exigencies of a particular situation. It would not only be unwise but injudicious to frame what was dubbed in Sibbia to be “formulae of universal application”. Regard must be had to the fact that it is well nigh impossible to predict upon imponderables such as the immanency of the threat, issues of access to justice and redress and the exigencies of a particular situation. It would not only be unwise but injudicious to frame what was dubbed in Sibbia to be “formulae of universal application”. The Court would be well advised to leave it to a judicious exercise of discretion in the facts of each cause brought before it. 14. It may also be noted that undisputedly the jurisdiction as conferred on the High Court and the Court of Sessions by Section 438 is concurrent. As was held by the earlier Full Bench of the Court in Onkar Nath Agrawal that discretion and the power of the High Court to entertain an application directly is one which is liable to be exercised according to the facts and circumstances of the each case. The Full Bench there had observed in paragraph 8 as follows:— “8. It may, however, be mentioned that inasmuch as Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 gives a discretionary power to grant bail, this discretion is to be exercised according to the facts and circumstances of each case. There may be cases in which it may be considered by the High Court to be proper to entertain an application without the applicant having moved the Court of Sessions initially. Similarly there may be cases in which the Court may feel justified in asking the applicant to move the Sessions Court or to refer the matter to that Court. In any case all depends upon the discretion of the Judge hearing the case.” 24. It is in the above backdrop that we are required to consider the submission of Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla and Sri Sushil Shukla that the judgment of this Court in Shivam (supra) categorising the cases as appropriate cases for grant of anticipatory bail in cases where charge-sheet is filed requires consideration. 25. In Shivam (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court relied upon Hislordship’s earlier order passed in Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application No.8285 of 2020 Adil Vs. State of U.P. to hold that anticipatory bail can be granted in appropriate cases even after filing of charge-sheet against an accused. 25. In Shivam (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court relied upon Hislordship’s earlier order passed in Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application No.8285 of 2020 Adil Vs. State of U.P. to hold that anticipatory bail can be granted in appropriate cases even after filing of charge-sheet against an accused. By necessary inference, grant of anticipatory bail in cases where charge-sheet is filed is treated as a case distinct from other cases of anticipatory bail and it is for such category of cases that cataloguing is done in Shivam (supra). 26. Section 438 Cr.P.C. makes no distinction with regard to the stage at which application is moved for grant of anticipatory bail. The only limitation provided in the Section is that the accused has not been arrested, inasmuch as after arrest only a regular bail can be moved. This position has been clarified by the Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) also. 27. The question as to whether an application for anticipatory bail would be maintainable after filing of charge-sheet in the Court came up for consideration before a Full Bench of Uttarakhand High Court in Saubhagya Bhagat Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Utt 917. Various judgments of the Supreme Court have been referred to and relied upon by the Uttarakhand High Court to hold that anticipatory bail would be maintainable even after filing of charge-sheet. For holding so, Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J. speaking for the Full Bench relied upon the language of Section 438 of the Code which puts no restriction on the stage at which anticipatory bail is filed. Such relief can be granted till the accused is arrested. 28. In Sushila Aggarwal (supra) the Constitution Bench has held as under:- “We are of the opinion that the conditions can be imposed by the court concerned while granting pre-arrest bail order including limiting the operation of the order in relation to a period of time if the circumstances so warrant, more particularly the stage at which the “anticipatory bail” application is moved, namely, whether the same is at the stage before the FIR is filed or at the stage when the FIR is filed and the investigation is in progress or at the stage when the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed.” (emphasis supplied) 29. In Saubhgya Bhagat (supra) the Uttarakhand High Court has extensively examined other judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue and observed as under:- “37. Thus, law is well settled that filing of charge sheet does not affect continuance of anticipatory bail, if granted, as can be gathered from sub-Section (3) of Section 438 CrPC also. In such view of the matter, application for anticipatory bail cannot be held to be not maintainable merely because charge sheet is filed against the accused person. This would amount to doing violence with the language of Section 438, a provision meant to protect the personal liberty of people, which has to be construed in a manner which subserves its purpose and it would not be proper for this Court to read some restriction/condition in the said provision which was not put by the legislature. 38. The question whether anticipatory bail can be granted when cognizance is taken or the charge sheet is filed was considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, reported as (2003) 8 SCC 77 , and it was held that object of Section 438 CrPC is to prevent undue harassment of an accused by pre-trial arrest and detention and further that merely because a court has taken cognizance on a complaint or the investigating agency has filed charge sheet, would not by itself prevent the courts concerned to grant anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. Para 7 of the said judgment is reproduced below: “7. From the perusal of this part of Section 438 of CrPC, we find no restriction in regard to exercise of this power in a suitable case either by the Court of Session, High Court or this Court even when cognizance is taken or a charge-sheet is filed. The object of Section 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a charge-sheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the courts concerned from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The object of Section 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a charge-sheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the courts concerned from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important factor to be taken into consideration while granting such anticipatory bail so also the need for custodial interrogation, but these are only factors that must be borne in mind by the courts concerned while entertaining a petition for grant of anticipatory bail and the fact of taking cognizance or filing of a charge-sheet cannot by itself be construed as a prohibition against the grant of anticipatory bail. In our opinion, the courts i.e. the Court of Session, High Court or this Court has the necessary power vested in them to grant anticipatory bail in non-bailable offences under Section 438 of CrPC even when cognizance is taken or a charge-sheet is filed provided the facts of the case require the court to do so.” 39. Similarly, in the case of Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan, reported as (2010) 1 SCC 684 , Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining validity of the order passed by the High Court rejecting application for anticipatory bail on the ground that challan has been presented. Para 7 and 8 of the said judgment are reproduced below: “7. We are of the considered opinion that the approach adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. The application for anticipatory bail has been rejected without considering the case of the appellant solely on the ground that the challan has now been presented. 8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to the grant of anticipatory bail was introduced on the recommendations of the Law Commission of India in its Forty-first Report dated 24-9-1969. The recommendations were considered by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab. Upon consideration of the entire issue this Court laid down certain salutary principles to be followed in exercise of the power under Section 438 CrPC by the Sessions Court and the High Court. It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested. Upon consideration of the entire issue this Court laid down certain salutary principles to be followed in exercise of the power under Section 438 CrPC by the Sessions Court and the High Court. It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested. When the application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind on the question and decide when the case is made out for granting such relief.” 40. In the case of Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, reported as (2016) 1 SCC 152 , Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering validity of an order of anticipatory bail granted to the accused after filing of charge sheet held as under: “19. In a matter like this where allegations of rape pertain to the period which is almost 17 years ago and when no charge was framed under Section 376 IPC in the year 2001, and even the prosecutrix did not take any steps for almost 9 years and the charge under Section 376 IPC is added only in the year 2014, we see no reason why the appellant should not be given the benefit of anticipatory bail. Merely because the charge under Section 376 IPC, which is a serious charge, is now added, the benefit of anticipatory bail cannot be denied when such a charge is added after a long period of time and inaction of the prosecutrix is also a contributory factor. 26. Having regard to the facts of this case which have already been highlighted above, we feel that no purpose would be served in compelling the appellant to go behind bars, as an undertrial, by refusing the anticipatory bail in respect of alleged incident which is 17 years old and for which the charge is framed only in the year 2014.The investigation is complete and there is no allegation that the appellant may flee the course of justice. The FIR was registered and the trial commenced in the year 2001; albeit with the charge framed under Section 506 Part II IPC, and during all these periods, the appellant has participated in the proceedings. There is no allegation that during this period he had tried to influence the witnesses. The FIR was registered and the trial commenced in the year 2001; albeit with the charge framed under Section 506 Part II IPC, and during all these periods, the appellant has participated in the proceedings. There is no allegation that during this period he had tried to influence the witnesses. In the aforesaid circumstances, even when there is a serious charge levelled against the appellant, that by itself should not be the reason to deny anticipatory bail when the matter is examined keeping in view other factors enumerated above.” 41. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri v. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 272-273 of 2021) relied upon the observation made in para 77.3 of the judgment rendered in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) and held that the High Court erred in holding that the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant by the trial court had come to an end with the filing of charge sheet. 42. Similarly, in the case of Vinod Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P., reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3225, Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the accused persons were granted anticipatory bail with the observation that after filing of charge sheet it shall be open to them to surrender and apply for regular bail before the competent authority. After filing of charge sheet, the accused persons applied for regular bail, which was rejected based on the observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court while granting anticipatory bail to the accused persons. Hon'ble Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to the accused persons. The observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 3 of the said judgment is extracted below: “3. Merely because it was kept open for the petitioners to surrender and apply for Regular Bail after filing of the charge sheet, the same does not preclude the petitioners to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. after filing of the charge sheet. It also cannot be said, that same is a second application for grant of anticipatory bail as pleaded by learned counsel appearing for respondents, on the same cause of action.” 44. Similarly, in the case of Md. It also cannot be said, that same is a second application for grant of anticipatory bail as pleaded by learned counsel appearing for respondents, on the same cause of action.” 44. Similarly, in the case of Md. Asfak Alam v. State of Jharkhand, reported as 2023 SCC OnLine SC 892, where accused was apprehending arrest in connection with an FIR lodged on 2.4.2022 under Section 498A/323/504/506 IPC and Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Court of Sessions dismissed his application for anticipatory bail on 28.6.2022; accused then approached High Court seeking anticipatory bail on 5.7.2022; no protection was granted till 7.8.2022, however, on 8.8.2022, High Court granted interim protection to the accused pending his anticipatory bail application; meanwhile, charge sheet was filed and cognizance was also taken on 1.10.2022; thereafter when pending anticipatory bail application was heard by High Court on 18.1.2023, it rejected the said application directing the accused to surrender before the competent court and seek regular bail; considering these factors and also highlighting the fact that the accused cooperated with the investigation both before 8.8.2022, when no protection was granted to him and after 8.8.2022, when he enjoyed protection till the filing of the charge sheet and the cognizance thereof on 1.10.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, in para 14, that the High Court interpreted these factors in an entirely different light and that there was no startling features or elements that stand out or any exceptional fact disentitling the accused to the grant of anticipatory bail and before setting aside the impugned order of High Court, further observed as under: “…Thus, once the chargesheet was filed and there was no impediment, at least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have granted the bail as a matter of course. However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the Trial Court. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach.” (emphasis supplied) 45. However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the Trial Court. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach.” (emphasis supplied) 45. In the case of Siddharth v. State of U.P., reported as (2022) 1 SCC 676 , Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 has taken note of the practice of issuing non-bailable warrants for production of accused, who had cooperated with the investigation throughout, premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court. 46. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, reported as (2022) 10 SCC 51 , the view taken in the case of Siddharth v. State of U.P.(supra) was reiterated and it was observed that at the stage of sending an accused to the Magistrate under Section 170 of CrPC, where the prosecution does not require the custody of the accused, there is no need for an arrest and there is not even a need for filing a bail application, as the accused is merely forwarded to the court for framing of charges and issuance of process for trial and it was observed that there may be a situation where the remand may be required, it is only in such cases that the accused will have to be heard. 49. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported as (2021) 10 SCC 773 , has nowhere held that provision for anticipatory bail made in Section 438 CrPC would not be applicable to persons against whom charge sheet is filed and cognizance is taken for offences under category ‘A’, although necessary guidelines were issued to protect the personal liberty of such persons.” 30. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Uttarakhand High Court in Saubhgya Bhagat (supra) that in the absence of any embargo under the statute the right to apply for anticipatory bail would subsist, till the accused gets arrested. Such right would not come to an end on filing of charge-sheet. 31. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Uttarakhand High Court in Saubhgya Bhagat (supra) that in the absence of any embargo under the statute the right to apply for anticipatory bail would subsist, till the accused gets arrested. Such right would not come to an end on filing of charge-sheet. 31. Once the position in law stands crystallized that an application for anticipatory bail can be filed even after filing of the charge-sheet, the application for anticipatory bail as and when is filed will have to be considered on the parameters laid down in the statute as is interpreted Sibbia (supra) and Sushila Aggarwal (supra). No distinction or categorization would be required with reference to the stage at which the application itself is filed. The question therefore arises whether any categorization is actually required of the cases wherein anticipatory bail is moved after filing of charge-sheet? 32. Learned counsels urge that once the Supreme Court in Sibbia (supra), Sushila Aggarwal (supra) and the Full Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar (supra) and Ankit Bharti (supra) have held that it is not necessary to exhaustively enumerate the situations where anticipatory bail could be granted it would not be prudent/permissible to resort to cataloguing of situations for grant of anticipatory bail just because charge-sheet is filed in the matter. 33. We find substance in the above submission. In view of the law settled by the Supreme Court in Sibbia (supra) and Sushila Aggarwal (supra) we have no doubt that any attempt to catalogue the cases where anticipatory bail could be granted would be an exercise in overreach. The discretion having been vested in the High Court and the Court of Sessions to grant anticipatory bail it would be undesirable to specify the categories of cases for grant of anticipatory bail by a judicial fiat and thereby restrict its reach. 34. Contours within which an order of anticipatory bail can be passed stands specified in the statute and delineated extensively by the Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). Mere fact that anticipatory bail is moved after filing of charge-sheet would thus not affect the scope and amplitude of the powers under Section 438 Cr.P.C and it remains the same irrespective of the stage at which it is moved i.e. before filing the FIR or after filing of FIR and subsistence of investigation or after filing of charge-sheet. Mere fact that anticipatory bail is moved after filing of charge-sheet would thus not affect the scope and amplitude of the powers under Section 438 Cr.P.C and it remains the same irrespective of the stage at which it is moved i.e. before filing the FIR or after filing of FIR and subsistence of investigation or after filing of charge-sheet. The criteria and considerations for its grant remains the same. Only the conditions to be imposed for grant of anticipatory bail may vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case or the stage of the proceedings. 35. While reiterating and clarifying the law on the grant of anticipatory bail, as above, we do not deem it necessary to say any further, inasmuch as the judgment in Shivam (supra) does not restrict the consideration for grant of anticipatory bail to the situations specified therein, alone. The discretion recognized in the Court for grant of anticipatory bail would thus not be impeded by the observation made in Shivam (supra). The Courts shall remain free to consider the application for grant of anticipatory bail on the touchstone of the law settled in Sibbia (supra) and Sushila Aggarwal (supra) as reiterated by Full Bench of this Court in Ankit Bharti (supra). 36. This is more so as the learned Single Judge in Shivam (supra) has already observed that the categories indicated therein as “appropriate cases” for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C. are only illustrative and not exhaustive. It cannot be construed as putting any fetters upon the powers of the Court to grant anticipatory bail in an appropriate matter. 37. In such circumstances we would rest our discussion on Shivam (supra) by holding that the application for grant of anticipatory bail would have to be dealt with in accordance with the law, considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case, keeping in view the observations of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia (supra) and Sushila Aggarwal (supra). No new strings would get attached to it only because anticipatory bail is moved after filing of charge-sheet. 38. In view of the deliberations made on the submissions raised at the bar, regarding Shivam (supra), we do not consider it necessary to reformulate the terms of reference nor is it found necessary to refer to the judgments cited in that regard. 39. 38. In view of the deliberations made on the submissions raised at the bar, regarding Shivam (supra), we do not consider it necessary to reformulate the terms of reference nor is it found necessary to refer to the judgments cited in that regard. 39. The necessity to make reference in this case has arisen only because the court while dismissing the anticipatory bail application of the applicant granted conditional protection from arrest, for a fixed period, on the condition that applicant would surrender and apply for regular bail, which has not been complied with by the applicant. Grant of any relief in the 482 petition, against arrest, has thus been construed as an anomalous exercise of jurisdiction and against the principle of comity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the court. 40. Answer to the present reference would require correct understanding of the scope of court’s power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. viz-a-viz the scope of inherent powers of the court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. But before we proceed to do so, we intend to explain yet another aspect of exercise of jurisdiction by the court while dealing with the application filed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. 41. This aspect is the grant of protection by the anticipatory bail Court from arrest, even after dismissal of the anticipatory bail application on merits. 42. The proviso to Section 438 Cr.P.C. provides that where the court has not passed any interim order of anticipatory bail or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail it shall be open to the officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person, without warrant, on the basis of apprehended accusation. 43. The statute therefore does not contemplate a situation where the court considering anticipatory bail may reject the application on merits yet, protection is granted from arrest for a specified period. Whether such an order can be passed, however, is not res-integra, as would be clear from the discussion held hereinafter. 44. The object of passing such orders primarily is to protect the applicant from arrest in order to facilitate grant of regular bail without surrendering or going to jail. If that be the intent, in the facts of a case, there is no reason why application for anticipatory bail itself cannot be considered by the court. 45. 44. The object of passing such orders primarily is to protect the applicant from arrest in order to facilitate grant of regular bail without surrendering or going to jail. If that be the intent, in the facts of a case, there is no reason why application for anticipatory bail itself cannot be considered by the court. 45. The primary difference between an anticipatory bail and a regular bail is that the applicant is granted protection from arrest, in anticipation, in case of anticipatory bail while the applicant is required to surrender and be taken in custody in the case of a regular bail. 46. Recently, in an appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Afzal & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6740 of 2022) against grant of similar fixed period protection from arrest, while dismissing the anticipatory bail application, the Supreme Court observed as under:- “9. The learned Single Judge of the High Court while rejecting an application for anticipatory bail, in the same breath granted them protection for a period of two months. He directed that no coercive steps be taken against the respondent(s) for a period of two months. 10. It is, thus, clear that self-contradictory orders have been passed by the High Court. On the one hand, the application for anticipatory bail is rejected and, on the other hand, the interim protection is granted for a period of two months. 11. In that view of the matter, we are inclined to allow this appeal. The second part of the order directing that no coercive steps shall be taken against the respondents for a period of two months is quashed and set aside.” 47. In Nathu Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 64 , the Supreme Court was ceased of a similar issue relating to grant of protection against arrest where the anticipatory bail application is rejected on merits. The scope of powers under Section 438 Cr.P.C. was viewed in the context of the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual. The dictum of Article 21 of the Constitution of India was pressed into service while exercising powers for grant of anticipatory bail. The scope of powers under Section 438 Cr.P.C. was viewed in the context of the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual. The dictum of Article 21 of the Constitution of India was pressed into service while exercising powers for grant of anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court referred to the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to pass orders staying arrest of an individual despite dismissal of anticipatory bail application, on merits. Following observations of the Supreme Court in Nathu Singh (supra) are self explanatory and are reproduced hereinafter:- “20. When the proviso to Section 438(1) CrPC is analysed in line with the above dictum, it is clear that the proviso does not create any rights or restrictions. Rather, the sole purpose of the proviso appears to be clarificatory in nature. It only restates, inter alia, the obvious proposition that unless an individual has obtained some protection from the court, the police may arrest them. In line with the ruling in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465], the proviso cannot be read as constituting a bar on the power of the Court. 21. If the proviso to Section 438(1) CrPC does not act as a bar to the grant of additional protection to the applicant, the question still remains as to under what provision of law the court may issue relief to an applicant after dismissing their anticipatory bail application. 22. Without going into the question of whether Section 438 CrPC itself allows for such a power, as it is not necessary to undertake such an exercise in the present case, it is clear that when it comes to the High Court, such a power does exist. Section 482 CrPC explicitly recognises the High Court's inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. This provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly account for the complexities of life, and the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future. 23. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that courts are faced with day in and day out, while dealing with anticipatory bail applications. This provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly account for the complexities of life, and the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future. 23. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that courts are faced with day in and day out, while dealing with anticipatory bail applications. Even when the court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be circumstances where the High Court is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the person apprehending arrest for some time, due to exceptional circumstances, until they surrender before the trial court. For example, the applicant may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary caregiver or breadwinner of his/her family members, and needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant of anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It needs no mentioning, but this Court may also exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an order. 24. However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised in an untrammelled manner. The court must take into account the statutory scheme under Section 438 CrPC, particularly, the proviso to Section 438(1) CrPC, and balance the concerns of the investigating agency, the complainant and the society at large with the concerns/interest of the applicant. Therefore, such an order must necessarily be narrowly tailored to protect the interests of the applicant while taking into consideration the concerns of the investigating authority. Such an order must be a reasoned one. 25.The impugned orders [Ravi Kumar v.State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 406], [Satendra v.State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 405] passed by the High Court, in the present appeals, do not meet any of the standards as laid out above. We say so for the following reasons: firstly, after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of the nature and gravity of the offence, the High Court has granted the impugned relief to the respondents without assigning any reasons. We say so for the following reasons: firstly, after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of the nature and gravity of the offence, the High Court has granted the impugned relief to the respondents without assigning any reasons. Secondly, in granting the relief for a period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the concerns of the investigating agency, the complainant or the proviso under Section 438(1) CrPC, which necessitates that the court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A period of 90 days, or three months, cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in the present facts and circumstances.” 48. Observations by the Supreme Court in Nathu Singh (supra) admits of peculiar situations which may arise before a court of law while ceased of the jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail. The principle of ex-debito justice has been read into the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 49. In the normal circumstances, however, once an application for anticipatory bail is dismissed on merits the consequences of such rejection, recognized in the proviso to Section 438 Cr.P.C., would have to follow making it permissible to arrest the accused. Routine orders cannot be passed staying arrest of an individual despite dismissal of anticipatory bail application. Even where such protection is required to be given in the extraordinary circumstances, the Court concerned will have to spell out reasons for doing so or else the part of order, granting such protection, would become bad in law. 50. The precise issue before us is as to whether failure on part of the accused to surrender, in terms of the order granting protection from arrest for a specified period, while rejecting the anticipatory bail application, restricts the grant of similar protection from arrest in a petition instituted subsequently under Section 482 Cr.P.C.? 51. The above question would require examination of the ambit and scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 52. Recently, a Full Bench of this Court in Chandrapal Singh Vs. 51. The above question would require examination of the ambit and scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 52. Recently, a Full Bench of this Court in Chandrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine All 2443 had the occasion to elaborately examine the scope of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hon’ble Ajay Bhanot, J. in hislordship’s well researched judgment has referred to catena of judgments highlighting the scope of inherent powers of the High Court to pass such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the code of criminal procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In para 106 to 151 of the judgment in Chandrapal (supra) reference is made to large number of cases on the point. We would refer to some of those decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to in Chandrapal (supra), for correct understanding of High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:- “106. After tracing the origins of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to the inception of High Courts, the Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Asstt. Collector of Custom43, expounded the purpose of the said powers: "9. Now the question is whether the inherent power of the High Court is conferred by or has the sanction of enacted law. From its very inception the High Court has possessed and enjoyed its inherent powers including the power to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court within its jurisdiction and to secure the ends of justice. These powers inhere in the High Court and spring from its very nature and constitution as a court of superior jurisdiction. All the existing powers of the High Courts were preserved and continued by legislation from time to time. (emphasis supplied) 10. Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code declared that "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order passed under this Code, or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". The section was inserted in the Code by Act 18 of 1923 to obviate any doubt that these inherent powers have been taken away by the Code. In terms, this section did not confer any power, it only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of the High Court, see King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [LR 61 IA 203, 213].Then came other enactments which were framed differently. Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided: (emphasis supplied) "Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, to the provisions of any Order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act." The Section enacted that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice "shall be" the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Act. The statute confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers. Then came the Constitution. Article 225 of the Constitution provides: "225. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction, of and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution." The proviso to the article is not material and need not be read. The Article enacts that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to administration of justice "shall be" the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Constitution confirmed and re-vested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its power to make rules. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court which previously existed, that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted "law"within the meaning of Article 21 as explained in A.K. Gopalan case. The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by "law" within the meaning of Article 21. The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution. The rules previously in force were continued in force by Article 372 of the Constitution. The order of the High Court cancelling the bail and depriving the appellant of his personal liberty is according to procedure established by law and is not violative of Article 21." (emphasis supplied) 107. Some instances of exercise of inherent powers by the High Court for quashing criminal cases as illustrated by the Supreme Court in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab are as under: "6. ….. . It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings… .." 108. The Supreme Court examined the concept of doctrine of abuse of the process of court and remedy of refusal to allow the trial by relying on judgments of English Courts as well as Courts in India in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, by holding: "32. Before we embark upon dealing with the issue posed before us, we would like to discuss the principles laid down by various courts as to when continuance of criminal proceeding will amount to abuse of the process of the court. 33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is well-established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be abuse of process of court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. …. A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. …. A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice." In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process"as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: "It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable." 38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94 : 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: "The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94 : 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: "The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried." What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case." 109. ……….. 110. The purpose of vesting inherent powers in the High Court from their inception to act ex debito justitiae was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar50, while determining the ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C.: "19. The section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice." (emphasis supplied) 111. ……….. 112. ……….. 113. While describing the plenitude of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the need to observe caution in exercise of such powers and the importance of jealously preserving the said powers was underscored by the Supreme Court after citing authorities of our courts as well as international authorities in point in Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P.: "12. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts'powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. (emphasis supplied) Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. (emphasis supplied) Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. 13. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions[1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [ 1977 AC 1 : (1976) 2 WLR 857 : (1976) 2 All ER 497 (HL)] stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the courts' power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved." (emphasis supplied) 114. ……… 115. The scope and the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was discussed at length by the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab55, wherein need to consider the facts and circumstances of a case to determine whether the inherent jurisdiction can be exercised was restated: "53. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, "nothing in this Code" which means that the provision is an overriding provision. It begins with the words, "nothing in this Code" which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on the High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. (emphasis supplied) 54. In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non. 55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection. (emphasis supplied) 56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided." (emphasis supplied) 116. ……….. 117. ……….. 118. ………… 119. ……….. 120. ……….. 121. ……….. 122. ………… 123. The extraordinary powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were put on a similar footing since the two were created for the same elevated purpose i.e. ex debito justitiae but the Supreme Court did not lay down any cast iron rule for exercise of such powers in Varala Bharath Kumar v. State of Telangana by holding: "6. It is by now well settled that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is by now well settled that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where allegations made in the first information report/the complaint or the outcome of investigation as found in the charge-sheet, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case against the accused; where the allegations do not disclose the ingredients of the offence alleged; where the uncontroverted allegations made in the first information report or complaint and the material collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of offence alleged and make out a case against the accused; where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised. (emphasis supplied) 7. While exercising power under Section 482 or under Article 226 in such matters, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down under Section 482 itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone courts exist. The court must be careful and see that its decision in exercise of its power is based on sound principles. The inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage." (emphasis supplied) 124 ……… 125. ……… 126. ……… 127. ……… 128. The inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage." (emphasis supplied) 124 ……… 125. ……… 126. ……… 127. ……… 128. The Supreme Court provided some categories of cases by way of illustration where extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised by the High Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal by expounding the law as under: "108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 109. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." (emphasis supplied) 129. A more categorical pronouncement acknowledging the overlap in the extraordinary jurisdictions under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was made by the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others. In Pepsi Foods (supra) the nomenclature of the petition was held not relevant, as the said powers are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it: "22. Special Judicial Magistrate and others. In Pepsi Foods (supra) the nomenclature of the petition was held not relevant, as the said powers are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it: "22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : JT (1990) 4 SC 650] this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. 26. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. 26. Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, the court can certainly treat the petition as one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code. It may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in the Code of revision and appeal but some time for immediate relief Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate courts. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution.(emphasis supplied) 30. It is no comfortable thought for the appellants to be told that they could appear before the court which is at a far off place in Ghazipur in the State of Uttar Pradesh, seek their release on bail and then to either move an application under Section 245(2) of the Code or to face trial when the complaint and the preliminary evidence recorded makes out no case against them. It is certainly one of those cases where there is an abuse of the process of the law and the courts and the High Court should not have shied away in exercising their jurisdiction. Provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In our view the High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial review is discretionary but this was a case where the High Court should have exercised it." (emphasis supplied) 130. In our view the High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial review is discretionary but this was a case where the High Court should have exercised it." (emphasis supplied) 130. Advancement of justice and prevention of abuse of the process of court were outlined as the existential purposes of courts in State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo and use of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were set forth as under: "8. …. . While exercising the powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." (emphasis supplied) 131. ……… 132. ……… 133. Criminal proceedings arising out of certain offences were terminated in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab after identifying certain categories of cases and the fact that the parties had arrived at a compromise by holding: "61. ….. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. ….. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." (emphasis supplied) 134. ……… 135. …….. 136. …….. 137. ……… 138. ……… 139. The Supreme Court in R. Nagender Yadav v. State of Telangana laid down that the purpose of inherent jurisdiction was to prevent abuse of the process of court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice: “19. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC, the High Court has to be conscious that this power is to be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of prevention of abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not, depends upon the nature of the act alleged thereunder. Whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not, has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transaction may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether the dispute which is in substance of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence. In such a situation, if civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, as has happened in the case on hand, the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding to prevent abuse of process of court." 140. ……… 141. …….. 142. ……… 143. There is something so right and obvious about the inherent powers of superior courts that they are traced by ancient authorities as those plenary powers which were vested when the superior courts came into existence. Inherent powers exist because the superior courts are there. 144. Cases in point also advert to the fact that Section 482 Cr.P.C. did not infact confer any power but only recognised that such powers inhered in superior courts. 145. Inherent powers exist because the superior courts are there. 144. Cases in point also advert to the fact that Section 482 Cr.P.C. did not infact confer any power but only recognised that such powers inhered in superior courts. 145. Article 225 saved the aforesaid power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which inhered in the High Courts prior to the Constitution. 146. The nature and ambit of these powers has been settled by long line of consistent cases in point. The powers are exercised ex debito justitiae, and to prevent miscarriage of justice for which alone the courts exist. The power is also used to thwart abuse of process of court at the very inception. 147. Inherent powers are plenary in scope. By their very nature inherent powers elude specific definitions and are incapable of being cast into rigid formulae. Courts have never attempted to limit or to catalogue such powers, but simultaneously advocated caution and self restraint in its exercise. Cases in point have left it to the Courts to decide the manner of use of these powers in the facts and circumstances of a case.The grant of interim orders to serve the ends of justice has also been traced to inherent powers. 148. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the jurisdictions of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India may be distinct in some ways but also have many commonalities of purpose and overlap in usage. In many instances, the same relief can be sought in either of the jurisdictions. Institution of separate proceedings under these jurisdictions is only a rule of self restraint and convenience in orderly judicial procedure. 149. Nomenclature of the jurisdiction be it an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C or an application under Articles 226 and 227 may not matter if the powers are being used to fulfill the crowning purpose of acting ex debito justitiae and to prevent abuse of process of court. 150. The preceding discussion highlights that the plenary powers under inherent jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) and extraordinary jurisdictions (under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India) provide the High Courts with the capacity of administration of justice, while the exercise of these jurisdictions prove the quality of administration of justice. 151. 150. The preceding discussion highlights that the plenary powers under inherent jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) and extraordinary jurisdictions (under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India) provide the High Courts with the capacity of administration of justice, while the exercise of these jurisdictions prove the quality of administration of justice. 151. More importantly the narrative also provides an insight into the consequences of curtailment of powers under Article 226, Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 Cr.P.C. which the legislature has not restricted and the Constitutional Courts never downsized.” 53. The Full Bench judgment of this Court in Chandrapal (supra) not only highlights the importance of inherent powers in the Higher Constitutional courts to do justice but cautions against any attempt to restrict or curtail its scope. All restrictions on such inherent powers are otherwise self-imposed. 54. Power to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. confers wide powers on the higher courts to protect the liberty of an individual. However, when contrasted with the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. it (Section 438) has a much narrower scope. 55. The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to act ex-debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is equally settled that such power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the provision itself. Any abuse of the process leading to injustice can be remedied by having resort to inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 56. In contrast, Section 438 Cr.P.C. limits the power in the court to grant anticipatory bail alone. In exercise of such powers the court can pass an order to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. It is protection against police custody, following upon arrest, for offence in respect of which anticipatory bail is granted. It merely provides that in case of arrest of accused he shall be released on bail. 57. In exercise of such powers the court can pass an order to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. It is protection against police custody, following upon arrest, for offence in respect of which anticipatory bail is granted. It merely provides that in case of arrest of accused he shall be released on bail. 57. Section 46(1) Cr.P.C. empowers the police officer or other person making the arrest to actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested unless there be a submission to the custody by the word or action. An order of anticipatory bail is construed in Sibbia (supra) as an order conferring conditional immunity from this ‘touch’ or ‘confinement’. 58. By its very nature, the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is intended to serve a much larger objective and, therefore, merely because anticipatory bail application of an accused is rejected it would not mean that the inherent power of the court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would stand curtailed in any manner. 59. So far as filing of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. after submission of charge-sheet in Court is concerned, we find no legal embargo on it. This issue has been dealt with by the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Application U/S 482 No. 3044 of 2017 Shueb Mahmood Kidwai Vs. State of U.P. The question before the Division Bench was as to whether after framing of charge and where substantial part of prosecution evidence has been adduced, an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing entire proceedings of that Session Trial on the behest of the accused would be maintainable? 60. The Division Bench speaking through Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J. answered the reference in following terms : “18. The exercise of inherent powers is hedged by certain self imposed restrictions as has been noticed in the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted hereinabove. Whether in the facts of a particular case such power is to be exercised or not is a discretion to be exercised by the High Court in the light of the law discussed hereinabove. 19. The applicant cannot as a matter of right, seek quashing of the proceedings, if there are good reasons on which the High Court could decline to exercise its inherent powers. 19. The applicant cannot as a matter of right, seek quashing of the proceedings, if there are good reasons on which the High Court could decline to exercise its inherent powers. In the given facts of a case where the High Court finds that the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. has itself been moved to abuse the process of the Court and delay the trial or there are otherwise malafides on the part of the applicant, or considering his conduct or that he had an occasion to approach the Court earlier but had been sitting over the matter, then these aspects can be looked into based on the particular facts of a case and appropriate decision can be taken accordingly, as per law. 20. Even after framing of charge under Section 228 by the Sessions Court, an application under Section 482 can lie in the facts of a case if there is a cause which has arisen and it is not possible to hold as a general preposition that no such application under Section 482 will lie after framing of charge. It all depends upon facts of the case and whether the parameters required in Section 482 are attracted or not. Likewise it cannot be said that in no circumstances such an application under Section 482 will lie if substantial evidence has been adduced by the prosecution, in view of Section 232. 21. Section 232 Cr. P.C. provides that if, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal. No doubt at the stage of Section 232 Cr. P.C. the court would have an opportunity to acquit the accused but only after the evidence has been taken for the prosecution, but this provision would not give opportunity to the accused to seek quashing of the proceedings prior to the eventualities mentioned in Section 232 being satisfied i.e. prior to the evidence having been led by the prosecution etc. P.C. the court would have an opportunity to acquit the accused but only after the evidence has been taken for the prosecution, but this provision would not give opportunity to the accused to seek quashing of the proceedings prior to the eventualities mentioned in Section 232 being satisfied i.e. prior to the evidence having been led by the prosecution etc. What if, prior to the said stage, may be immediately prior to it, a case is made out by the accused that given the facts and evidence, continuance of proceedings any further would lead to unnecessary harassment and abuse of the process of the Court or that the facts of the case require interference at that stage to prevent injustice? It will all depend on the assessment of facts of a case to be undertaken by the Court exercising powers under Section 482. No such general proposition of law can be laid down ousting the jurisdiction of this Court from exercising inherent power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. merely because the charge had been framed under Section 228 or because of Section 232 Cr. P.C. Each case is to be dealt with on its own facts based on the parameters of Section 482 Cr. P.C. One needs to understand the distinction between the proceedings ‘being not maintainable’ and ‘not liable to be entertained’. Not being maintainable would mean it will not lie in the first place. Whereas not liable to be entertained would mean, the application, though it can he, is not liable to be entertained in the facts of the case. The distinction may seem fine and at times blurred but nevertheless it does exist and has to be understood and kept in mind. Of course it can be also said that an application is not maintainable hence not liable to be entertained but that would be the same as the first proportion about non maintainablity. The distinction with the second proportion remains. We can not say that, in the eventualities mentioned in the referred order, in no circumstances would an application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. be maintainable i.e. it will not lie. Whether such an application is to be entertained or not is a question to be considered and answered in the facts of each case and no general proposition or straight jacket formula can be laid down/provided in this regard. P.C. be maintainable i.e. it will not lie. Whether such an application is to be entertained or not is a question to be considered and answered in the facts of each case and no general proposition or straight jacket formula can be laid down/provided in this regard. The guiding principle is as to whether in the facts of a case continuance of proceedings amount to abuse of the process of the Court and/or whether interference of the High Court is necessary to secure the ends of justice or not? Based on these two principles the facts of each case are required to be assessed by the High Court when the power and jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is invoked. 22. We answer the reference accordingly and direct that the case be placed before the learned Single Judge who has been assigned applications under Section 482 Cr. P.C. for admission and disposal, as the case may be.” 61. We entirely agree with the reasoning assigned by the Lucknow Bench of this Court, in the above case, and subscribe to the view that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable, even after filing of charge-sheet, provided necessary conditions for its invocation arise in the facts of the case. 62. To what extent interference would be warranted in a particular case for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would largely depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There can be no straitjacket formula. It would be an undesirable exercise, in our opinion, to even attempt to specify the kind of matters wherein invocation of inherent powers would be justified. The contours of inherent jurisdiction having been crystallized in a series of judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, it would be prudent to leave it to the wisdom of the Hon’ble Judge to apply the law in the given facts and circumstances of a particular case. 63. The jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim order in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would always exist where conditions for its invocation arise, notwithstanding rejection of application for grant of anticipatory bail. To what extent such interference would be warranted would however, depend upon the facts of the particular case. 64. A petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., however, may not be maintainable only for the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. To what extent such interference would be warranted would however, depend upon the facts of the particular case. 64. A petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., however, may not be maintainable only for the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. That would be possible only in a petition filed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. alone. Ordinarily, an order granting anticipatory bail would not be passed in petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. since it is well settled that inherent powers cannot be invoked when specific provision exists elsewhere in the statute. (See: R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 Para 6) 65. However, when a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is entertained for the relief that lies within the ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C., it is always open for the Court exercising its inherent powers to grant such interim relief, as may be required in the facts of the case. Such interim relief, however, can only be in aid of final relief sought in the petition. Such interim relief may include grant of protection from arrest to the applicant if the facts of the case so require. 66. We may however clarify that once the High Court has dismissed the petition for anticipatory bail, it would not be proper for the Court to grant stay from arrest, in a routine manner, unless a strong case is made out for exercise of inherent jurisdiction either to give effect to an order under the code or for preventing the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, in which case appropriate interim relief can always be granted including protection against arrest. 67. At this juncture, we would like to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Krishna Kumar Pandey, (2021) 14 SCC 683 . In that case the employee of the Insurance Company was convicted under Section 498-A IPC. An appeal filed against it was rejected. However, in a Criminal Revision filed before the High Court the sentence was reduced to the period of incarceration already undergone subject to deposit of fine of Rs. 5000/-. On a subsequent application filed by the employee the High Court also held that conviction shall not affect his service carrier. An appeal filed against it was rejected. However, in a Criminal Revision filed before the High Court the sentence was reduced to the period of incarceration already undergone subject to deposit of fine of Rs. 5000/-. On a subsequent application filed by the employee the High Court also held that conviction shall not affect his service carrier. In an appeal filed against such order by the employer to the Supreme Court the Court held such order to be not referable to exercise of revisional jurisdiction. However, the argument regarding absence of power with the Court to do so by virtue of Section 362 Cr.P.C. was not accepted. The Court resorted to the inherent powers of the High Court in such a case. Para 9 & 10 of the aforesaid judgment are relevant and are reproduced hereinafter:- “9. However, Mr Ranji Thomas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent strenuously contended that in view of the embargo spelt out in Section 362 of the Code, there was no power for the High Court to alter or review the judgment rendered earlier in the revision filed by the respondent, except for the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance upon the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 496 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1034 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 208] . It is his contention that the High Court was right in rejecting the application filed by the appellant under Section 482CrPC for recall/review of its earlier order, as the High Court did not have the power to do so. 10. But the above contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is fallacious for two reasons. It is his contention that the High Court was right in rejecting the application filed by the appellant under Section 482CrPC for recall/review of its earlier order, as the High Court did not have the power to do so. 10. But the above contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is fallacious for two reasons. The first is that Section 362 of the Code is expressly subjected to “what is otherwise provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force.” Though this Court pointed out in Davinder Pal Singh [State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 496 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1034 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 208] that the exceptions carved out in Section 362 of the Code would apply only to those provisions where the court has been expressly authorised either by the Code or by any other law but not to the inherent power of the court, this Court nevertheless held that the inherent power of the Court under Section 482CrPC is saved, where an order has been passed by the criminal court, which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice, or where the proceeding amounts to abuse of the process of court. In para 46 in particular, this Court held in Davinder Pal Singh [State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 496 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1034 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 208] as follows : (SCC p. 795) “46. If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 CrPC would not operate. In such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of justice. In such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault.” 68. Experiences in life reveal that often situations arise in a case which are peculiar, unusual or even exceptional and may require the Court to pass such orders, as are found expedient in the interest of justice, including appropriate interim orders to secure ends of justice. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are vested in the High Courts to deal with such exigencies. It is otherwise settled that such powers are to be sparingly exercised in rare cases for giving effect to an order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Once the legislature has not put any restrictions on the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even after rejection of the application filed for anticipatory bail it would be imprudent to put any such fetters on the inherent powers of the higher Constitutional Courts to impart justice. 69. The upshot of the above discussion is that within the narrow confines of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. it would always be open for the Court to pass appropriate orders, as are required to be passed, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, including appropriate interim relief on the terms and conditions as are found expedient in the interest of justice. It goes without saying that such interim protection may include protection from arrest notwithstanding rejection of application for grant of anticipatory bail. 70. To what extent and on what terms such interim protection is warranted in exercise of High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. will depend entirely upon the facts and circumstances of a case within the narrow confines of the jurisdiction itself. 71. The reference is, thus, answered in following terms: (i) An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable even after filing of charge-sheet notwithstanding the fact that anticipatory bail application of the applicant has been rejected in the same matter. 71. The reference is, thus, answered in following terms: (i) An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable even after filing of charge-sheet notwithstanding the fact that anticipatory bail application of the applicant has been rejected in the same matter. (ii) Inherent powers of the High Court to pass interim orders for stay of proceedings or any other interim protection as is deemed fit would subsist, in an appropriate case, within the well delineated contours of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the effect whereof would be to relieve the applicant of his obligation to surrender and seek bail, even after rejection of anticipatory bail or failure of the applicant to surrender and seek bail in terms of the orders of anticipatory bail. 72. Let the matter be now placed before the appropriate Court for consideration of the cause on merits.