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2024 DIGILAW 1960 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Abbas Musa Sanghad

2024-10-22

BIREN VAISHNAV, MAULIK J.SHELAT

body2024
JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1 This appeal under Sec. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been filed by the State against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, Jamnagar in Sessions Case No. 20 of 1995 on 23.05.1997. The Trial Judge has acquitted the respondents – accused for offences punishable under Sec. 302 read with Sec.34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec.135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. 2 Brief case of the prosecution is as under: 2.1 That on 22.07.1994, at about 7:30 p.m, the deceased Hasam Jusab, after taking dinner had gone to the shop of Ismail Sidik Vandha, to buy bidi. The Prosecution Witness No.1, Sarabai, who followed him to purchase edible oil, near the shop of Ismail Siddik Vandha, witnessed the accused persons picking up a quarrel with the deceased Hasam Jusab alleging that Hasam Jusab had usurped the labour charges. When the deceased Hasam Jusab refused those allegations, the accused No.1, Abbas inflicted knife blow on his neck. Accused No.2, Natho attempted to assault Hasam by a knife, but could not succeed in his attempt as the witnesses Smt.Jenabai Daud, Hajuben Osman and Ismail Sidik came there on hearing the shouts of the complainant Sarabai and the accused persons ran away. 2.2 The deceased Hasam Jusab was taken to the hospital for treatment, where the doctor on examination, declared him dead. A complaint was given by Sarabai in the hospital which was recorded by P.S.I (Investigation) City ‘B’ Division Police Station, Jamnagar. The FIR came to be lodged with the concerned police station for the offences in question. The Investigating Officer recorded statements of the witnesses, drew panchnamas, collected medical papers, Post Mortem Reports etc. The Investigating Officer, after concluding the investigation, submitted the charge-sheet in the Court of concerned Magistrate, Jamnagar. Since the alleged offences were triable by the Court of Sessions, learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court, Jamnagar, which was numbered as Sessions Case No. 20 of 1995. 2.3 Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, Jamnagar, the learned Sessions Judge, framed charges vide Exh.2 against the respondents – accused for the offences punishable under Secs. 302 r/w. Sec.34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec.135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The respondents – accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. 2.3 Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, Jamnagar, the learned Sessions Judge, framed charges vide Exh.2 against the respondents – accused for the offences punishable under Secs. 302 r/w. Sec.34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec.135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The respondents – accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. They were tried for the said offences and in order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined 14 prosecution witnesses and also produced various documentary evidences before the Ld.Trial Court. The details of the evidence ie. oral and documentary led by the prosecution are reproduced in a tabular form hereunder: Oral Evidences PW No. Exh. No. Name of Witness Nature of Witness Remarks 1. 17 Saraben Hasam Jusab Complainant 2. 19 Dr. Bansidhar G. Gupta Doctor who performed PM 3. 22 Khatuben Ismail Eye Witness 4. 23 Kasham Jushab Panch of inquest panchnama 5. 23 Gani Hushene Panch of scene of offence panchnama 6. 27 Kasham Ibrahim Panch of scene of offence panchnama 7. 28 Faruk Husen Panch of arrest panchnama 8. 30 Abdul Ali Panch of discovery panchnama 9. 33 Narsing Karamsinh Panch of discovery panchnama 10. 36 Devshi Chakubhai Panch of panchnama of clothes of deceased 11. 37 Mukundray Bhaishankar PSI / recorded FIR 12. 40 Ranjitsinh N. Rana PSO 13. 44 Gulabsinh D. Rajput IO 14. 47 Hedidan Kishandan Charan IO Documentary Evidences Sr. No. Exh. No. Documentary Witness Remarks 1. 18 FIR 2. 20 Yadi for PM 3. 21 PM note 4. 24 Inquest Punchnama 5. 26 Scene of offence Punchnama 6. 29 Arrest Punchnama 7. 31 Discovery Panchnama 8. 34 Discovery Panchnama 9. 35 Muddamal Receipt 10. 37 Punchnama of clothes of the deceased 11. 39 Yadi sent by Doctor to PSI 12. 41-42 Original Station Dairy 13. 43 Special report 14. 45 Yadi sent by PI to casualty M.O 15. 49 Certificate 16. 50 Receipt from FSL 17. 51 Letter from FSL 18. 52 Notification 19. 53 Dropping pursis. 2.4 Thus, prosecution has examined the complainant, along with other witnesses, medical officer and the police witness. The prosecution has also relied upon documentary evidences in corroboration of the oral evidence and pursis was given before the Ld. Trial Judge declaring closure of evidence. 50 Receipt from FSL 17. 51 Letter from FSL 18. 52 Notification 19. 53 Dropping pursis. 2.4 Thus, prosecution has examined the complainant, along with other witnesses, medical officer and the police witness. The prosecution has also relied upon documentary evidences in corroboration of the oral evidence and pursis was given before the Ld. Trial Judge declaring closure of evidence. The Learned Trial Judge has thereafter recorded the further statements of the accused under section 313 of CR.P.C. After considering the evidence, the Learned Trial Judge arrived at a conclusion that prosecution has failed to prove the charge and thereby recorded acquittal. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the acquittal appeal is preferred by the State of Gujarat. 2.5 Prosecution has examined PW. No. 1 viz. Saraben Hasam Jusab who is the complainant and as per her evidence, on the date of incident at 7.00 PM, her husband came home and after having dinner, went to the shop of Khatuben Ismail for buying Bidi which is at nearby distance from the residence of the complainant. Thereafter, the complainant also left for buying edible oil. On the way, she saw that Abbas Sanghad, whom she identifies in the Court, was asking her husband as to why has he not paid the amount of labour. To this, the husband of the complainant i.e. the deceased said that he was not supposed to pay any money. This infuriated the accused Abbas, who then inflicted a blow of knife on the left side of the neck of Hasam – her husband. During this time, the accused Natho, whom she also identifies in the court, tried to inflict knife blow on her husband, but because of her shouting, the accused Natho, could not cause any injury to Hasam but fleed the spot. It is also deposed by her that her husband was not able to speak anything. Hasam was taken to Irwin hospital in rikshaw and the complainant also went along with her deceased husband. At the hospital, on examination of Hasam, the doctors declared him dead. 2.6 She has further deposed that she knew the accused as the accused were staying in the same vicinity before the incident. She has further deposed that the incident took place at about 6:45 PM and now said that the incident took place at 7.45 or 8.00 PM. At the hospital, on examination of Hasam, the doctors declared him dead. 2.6 She has further deposed that she knew the accused as the accused were staying in the same vicinity before the incident. She has further deposed that the incident took place at about 6:45 PM and now said that the incident took place at 7.45 or 8.00 PM. She has further deposed that accused No. 1 was having knife in his hand. She has further deposed that at that point of time it was dark and she has seen the knife in the dark. 2.7 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 2 viz. Dr. Bansidhar Gupta at Exhibit No. 19 who has performed Postmortem on the deceased. He found injuries on the deceased. It is further deposed by the doctor that after performing Postmortem, he came to the conclusion that the deceased died due to injury on neck and that the said injury was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. 2.8 Prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness. No. 3 viz. Khatuben Ismail who is an eye witness to the incident as the incident had taken place at her shop. She has not supported the case of the prosecution and has turned hostile. 2.9 Prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness. No. 4 viz. Kasham Jushab, who stood as panch witness of inquest panchnama. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 5 and 6 viz. Gani Hussain and Kasham Ibrahim at Exhibit No. 23 and Exhibit No. 27 respectively who stood as panch witness of scene of offence panchnama. However, they have not supported the case of the prosecution. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 7 viz. Faruk Husen who stood as panch witness of arrest panchnama and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 8 viz. Abdul Ali who stood as panch witness of discovery panchnama at Exhibit – 31 and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 9 viz. Narsing Karamsinh who stood as panch witness of discovery panchnama at Exhibit – 34 and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 10 viz. Devshi Chakubhai who stood as panch witness of seizure panchnama of clothes of deceased at Exhibit – 37 and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 11 viz. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 10 viz. Devshi Chakubhai who stood as panch witness of seizure panchnama of clothes of deceased at Exhibit – 37 and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 11 viz. Mukundray Bhaishankar who was serving as PSI and recorded FIR at Irwin Hospital, Jamnagar and recorded the FIR as per say of the complainant, and has also drawn inquest panchnama which is signed by him and made communication for conducting PM and forwarded the complaint to Police Station for its registration. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 12 viz. Ranjitsinh N. Rana who was serving as PSO, who made entry in the station dairy on the basis of Yadi received from Head Constable from Irwin Hospital and thereafter gave Yadi to PSI, M. D. Vyas for registration of FIR and PSI, M. D. Vyas returned at 23:15 hours after registration of the FIR and entry of the same was made in the station dairy. He further deposed that after registration of the FIR, the investigation was entrusted to PSI G. D Rajput and sent the copy of the FIR to concerned Court. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 13 viz. Gulabsinh D. Rajput who was serving as PSI with Jamnagar City Branch ‘B’, Police Station and has investigated the offence. He has deposed that he has drawn scene of offence panchnama and collected blood stained soil from the scene of offence and has recorded the statement of Hajuben, Jenaben, Khatuben and Isa Jusab on 23.07.1994. He further deposed that on 23.07.1994, he arrested both the accused persons from Gandhinagar and has drawn arrest panchnama and sent the accused persons to Irwin Hospital for taking the blood samples and thereafter drawn discovery panchnama at the instance of Abdul Ishak and Nathu on 24.07.1994. Discovery Panchnama was drawn at the instance of accused viz. Abbas Musa. He further deposed that on 26.07.1994, he received clothes and blood samples of the deceased in sealed cover and panchnama to that effect has been drawn. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 14 viz Hedidan Kishandan Charan who was serving as PSI and has taken over the investigation from PI Rajput and has forwarded the Muddamal knife, clothes of deceased, sample of soil taken from scene of offence to FSL for its examination and has produced the FSL report along with Ravangi Nondh. Prosecution has examined PW. No. 14 viz Hedidan Kishandan Charan who was serving as PSI and has taken over the investigation from PI Rajput and has forwarded the Muddamal knife, clothes of deceased, sample of soil taken from scene of offence to FSL for its examination and has produced the FSL report along with Ravangi Nondh. 2.10 Mr.Himanshu Patel, learned APP, would submit that despite there being evidence of any eye-witness PW 1, the complainant, the learned Trial Judge discarded her evidence. The learned Trial Judge also discarded the evidence of discovery of knives at the instance of accused person which is getting corroboration from the evidence of the Investigating Officer. Mr.Patel, learned APP, would further submit that despite there being evidence of PW No. 2 viz Dr. Bansidhar Gupta, who performed the Postmortem and deposed that the injury found on the deceased was possible by the Muddamal Knife which was discovered from the accused person and further deposed that the injury inflicted on the deceased was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. The deposition of this doctor has not been considered by the learned Trial Judge. 2.11 Mr.Patel, learned APP, submitted that the blood found from the hair of the accused, which were collected at the time of drawing arrest panchnama matched with the blood group of the deceased indicating his involvement in the crime. However, the same was not taken into consideration by the learned Trial Judge. 2.12 Mr.Patel, learned APP, would submit that learned Trial Judge has not taken into consideration the above set of evidences and rather raised questions and disbelieved the various aspects of evidences, including that of not believing on the eye-witness PW 1 and also not believing PW 2, PW 3, Postmortem Report etc., and thereby acquitting the respondents – accused. 3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor Mr.Himanshu Patel and Mr.Pratik Barot, for the respondents, and have independently examined the evidence of the Prosecution Witness one Sarabai, the wife of the deceased Hasam Jusab. We have also examined the evidence of Prosecution Witness No.2, Khatuben, the owner of the shop before whom the alleged incident has occurred. We have also examined the evidence of Prosecution Witness No.2, Khatuben, the owner of the shop before whom the alleged incident has occurred. The presence of Sarabai, based on her evidence and on the basis of the statement made before the Police which was an FIR registered by the Police Officer, what is evident is that in her version before the Court, it is her case that after the meal at 7:00 p.m. Hasam walked out towards the shop of Khatuben for buying a bidi. She followed Hasam immediately with a view to buy edible oil carrying a can and a five rupee note. It is evident on reading the FIR as well as the testimony of this witness, that from the panch witnesses version of the scene of the offence, the can and the five rupee note article which she threw off on having seen that her husband was being accosted, has not been found from the site of the incident. Khatuben in her testimony has stated that while she was sitting at the shop, she heard a commotion outside the shop and saw Abdul, accused No.1, and the deceased Hasam getting into an argument. She immediately put down the shutter of the shop so as to avoid any confrontation. When she subsequently opened the shutter, she found Hasam lying on the floor. If these two witnesses’ evidence is seen in juxtaposition of each other in addition to the fact when the testimony of Sarabai is considered, at one stage in the cross-examination, she states that she saw Abdul Abbas inflicting blows on the neck of the deceased – Hasam, whereas Nathubhai was walking towards them and passed by her at a distance of 30 feet. That the place where the incident occurred was not well lit. On the contradiction, found from the evidence of Khatuben who said that there was a street light and the place of the incident was well lit, the prosecution’s theory that the incident in question was witnessed by the eye-witness wife and also Khatuben was found to be not acceptable. That the place where the incident occurred was not well lit. On the contradiction, found from the evidence of Khatuben who said that there was a street light and the place of the incident was well lit, the prosecution’s theory that the incident in question was witnessed by the eye-witness wife and also Khatuben was found to be not acceptable. The presence of the Prosecution Witness 1 itself was in doubt when, it has come from the evidence on record that the wife Sarabai was having a child aged two years old whom she, in her version said to have carried her while she walked towards the shop which sold edible oil whereas, in the other version, she only was carrying a can and a five rupee note. Even on the question of whether the accused No.2 at all was present, was not clearly stated and in fact, reading of the FIR and the version in the cross-examination indicates that she specifically denied the role of the Prosecution Witness 2. All these contradictions went a long way to impress the Trial Court, based on the demeanor of witnesses to seriously doubt the presence of the Prosecution Witness 1 at the place of the incident. 4. On the discovery of the knives in question which were sought to be proved by the discovery panchanamas at Exh.31, though the panch witnesses Prosecution Witness-8, Abdul Ali and Proseuction Witness – 9, Narsinh Karamsinh had turned hostile, it is evident from their cross-examination that in accordance with the provisions of Sec.27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the discovery did not reveal that what was sought to discovered were the weapons used in commission of the crime. What was evident from the testimony of these witnesses was that the accused voluntered to show the place where the knife was kept. There was no correlation from the testimony that the knives that were kept were the knives used for the very commission of the crime of inflicting the stab wounds on the neck. These circumstances made the Trial Court to believe the discovery panchnamas. 5. Prosecution Witness 3, Hatuben had turned hostile. There was no correlation from the testimony that the knives that were kept were the knives used for the very commission of the crime of inflicting the stab wounds on the neck. These circumstances made the Trial Court to believe the discovery panchnamas. 5. Prosecution Witness 3, Hatuben had turned hostile. The other ground on which the Trial Court did not believe the Prosecution Witness 1 is the contradiction in the evidence inasmuch as, in her testimony Sarabai had stated that Anvar had taken the husband to the hospital in an autorickshaw and that she had rushed to her husband when he fell after being inflicted the blows. While the FSL Report on record shows no presence of blood on the clothes of the wife and therefore, that was one other count on which the Sessions Judge did not believe the presence of the Prosecution Witness 1, on the scene of the offence. 6 Having perused the judgement of the Sessions Court, we therefore, find that when taking the whole gamut of evidence on record, namely the evidence of the Investigating Officer, the Police Officer who recorded the FIR, Prosecution Witness 1 and Prosecution Witness 3, Khatuben, the Trial Court found that there was no evidence to prove beyond doubt the presence of the eye witness at the location and even from the scene of the offence Panchnama, the veracity of the actual place of the incident was seriously in doubt. What has also been brought on record is that in the Examination-in-Chief, it was the version of the Prosecution Witness-1, Sarabai, that it was Abbas who inflicted the blows and not Nathu, the accused No.2. She did not even name the accused No.2 in the FIR. When confronted with the location or the locality in which Nathu Sangad, the accused No.2 was staying, there were contradictions in her evidence to suggest at one stage that the accused No.2 was staying at Madhapar Banga whereas later on it was found that he was residing at Garibnagar. 6.1 All these evidences when taken into conjunction, what was established by the defence is that, the presence of the Prosecution Witness 1, the wife of the deceased itself was in doubt coupled with the contradiction of the place of the incident and also the Prosecution Witness 3, the shop owner from whom the bidi was purchased having turned hostile. 6.1 All these evidences when taken into conjunction, what was established by the defence is that, the presence of the Prosecution Witness 1, the wife of the deceased itself was in doubt coupled with the contradiction of the place of the incident and also the Prosecution Witness 3, the shop owner from whom the bidi was purchased having turned hostile. The sole eyewitness therefore Sarabai’s evidence, therefore not being beyond doubt, the Trial Court, in our opinion, has rightly acquitted the accused of the offences in question. 6.2 Having perused the judgement of the Sessions Judge and in view of the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when even two opinions are possible, the fact that the accused have earned an acquittal should suggest that we should be slow in interfering with the judgement of the Sessions Court. 7. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: "27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the noninterference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 8. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 8. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 9. Scope of appeal against acquittal is well laid down in case of Chandrappa and ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it was observed: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, ’substantial and compelling reasons’, ’good and sufficient grounds’, ’very strong circumstances’, ’distorted conclusions’, ’glaring mistakes’, etc.; are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ’flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 10. Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] has held as under: “39. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 10. Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] has held as under: “39. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below:- "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [ Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 40. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:- "8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re- appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:- 41.1 That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2 That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; 41.3 That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 42. 42. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 11. Considering these set of evidences on record and in light of the latest decision of the Apex Court as reproduced hereinabove, which deals with the law on acquittal, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, in acquitting the respondents. 12. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order of the trial court passed by the Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, in Sessions Case No. 20 of 1995 on 23.05.1997 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings, if called for, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.