JUDGMENT : VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI, J. 1. Heard Mr. P.J. Yagnik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners and Ms. Pooja Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State authorities. 2. The petitioners herein have challenged the impugned order passed by the Secondary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated 08.10.1999 and has prayed for a direction to direct the respondents to revise the pay scale of each of the petitioners as directed by the order of the Tribunal dated 08.10.1999 and the petitioners be extended all consequential benefits, which has accrued thereupon, which are paid to the similarly situated persons working with the same department. 3.1. Briefly stated that, the petitioner no. 1 is possessing the degree of M.A. B.Ed. petitioner no. 2 is possessing the degree of B.Com. B.Ed. and petitioner no. 3 is possessing the degree of M.Com., M.Ed. All the petitioners came to be appointed in the respondent no. 3 School in the year 1982 as Higher Secondary Teachers. No adverse remarks or complaint was received by the management of respondent no. 3-New Era School against any of the petitioners. Upon completion of more than 25 years of services, petitioner no. 1 retired on 31.05.2009, petitioner no. 2 retired on 31.05.2014 and petitioner no. 3 took voluntary retirement from service on 31.05.2013. 3.2. As per the government resolution dated 18.01.1989, the higher secondary teachers were given the notional pay scale of Rs.550-900 from the date of appointment or from 01.07.1979, whichever is later and thereafter from 01.01.1986, the pay scale was required to be fixed in the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900. As the petitioners were not given the chance to opt for the date from which they wanted the new pay scale, by passage of time, there was recurring loss of one increment to each of the petitioner. 3.3. It is the case of the petitioners that, to avail their legitimate rights, they were compelled to approach the Gujarat Higher Secondary School Service Tribunal at Ahmedabad, by filing Application No. 93 of 1993, praying that because of not sanctioning the one increment, each of the petitioners are losing the effect of revised pay scale from the stipulated date. The petitioners have prayed that the petitioners are entitled for the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900, from the date of 01.09.1986 instead of 01.01.1986, while giving the effect of one increment to each of the petitioner. 3.4. The petitioners have prayed that the petitioners are entitled for the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900, from the date of 01.09.1986 instead of 01.01.1986, while giving the effect of one increment to each of the petitioner. 3.4. The Tribunal after hearing the respective parties, by order dated 08.10.1999 held that the petitioners are entitled to the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900, w.e.f. 01.09.1986 instead of 01.01.1986 and are entitled for the benefit of one increment, as per the new date. 3.5. It is the case of the petitioners that, the respondent authorities have failed to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal vide order dated 08.10.1999 and in view thereof, the petitioners are constrained to approach this Court for implementation of the order dated 08.10.1999 passed by the Tribunal. It is also the case of the petitioners that the petitioners had approached the respondent authorities from time to time, however, the respondents have not extended the benefits to the petitioners as directed by the Tribunal, and therefore, the petitioners are suffering loss to the tune of Rs.2000/- per month. 3.6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid action of the respondent authorities, the petitioners have approached this Court for the following reliefs: “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this Application. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to revise the pay scale of each of the petitioners as directed by the Ld. Secondary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated: 8/10/1999. (C) Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondents to pay the revise pay scale to each of the petitioner with all consequential benefits accrued thereon and paid to the similarly situated persons working in their department. (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondents to pay the arrears of salary on the basis of revision of pay-scale as directed by the Ld. Education Tribunal dated 8/10/1999 with cost and interest and further be pleased to direct the respondents to complete the process of revision of pay-scale of each of the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of the order which may be passed by this Hon'ble Court. (E) Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent no. 1 and 2 for submitting the report for not implementing the judgment and order passed by the Ld. (E) Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent no. 1 and 2 for submitting the report for not implementing the judgment and order passed by the Ld. Education Tribunal in Application No. 93 of 1993 filed by the present petitioners. (F) Pending admission and till final disposal of this petition Your Lordships be pleased to direct the respondents to pay the revise pay scale to the petitioners as directed by Ld. Tribunal adding the increment in present pay scale. (G) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant such other and further relief/s which may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 4.1. Mr. P.J. Yagnik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the facts as referred above and submitted that the respondent authorities be directed to comply with the order dated 08.10.1999 passed by the Tribunal. That all the petitioners are entitled to the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 w.e.f. 01.09.1986 and that they are entitled for the benefit of one increment, as per new date. 4.2. Mr. Yagnik, learned advocate placed reliance on the calculation placed on record by the petitioners herein, which is duly produced at Page-66, which according to the petitioners is the correct calculation and is in compliance of the order passed by the Tribunal and the petitioners would be entitled to have the basic pay of Rs.2375/- instead of Rs.2300/- the effect of 1st higher pay scale Rs.2000-3500 from 01.09.1991. In the same manner, the basic pay of Rs.8100/- instead of Rs.7900/- in the pay scale (ROP) of Rs.6500-10500. 4.3. It is submitted that the petitioner nos. 1 and 3 will be entitled to the benefit of 2nd higher pay scale of Rs.8000- 13500 on basic pay of Rs.9925/- instead of Rs.9650/- from 01.09.2002. 4.4. It is submitted that, in view thereof, the prayers as prayed for by the petitioners are such that the same be allowed. 5.1. Ms. Pooja Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State relied on the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent-authority, which is duly produced at Page-33 and submitted that the present petitioner is filed seeking compliance of the order passed by the Tribunal dated 08.10.1999 in Application No. 93 of 1993. It is submitted that the said order stands complied with by the respondent authority and on the aforesaid ground alone, the present petition is required to be dismissed. 5.2. It is submitted that the said order stands complied with by the respondent authority and on the aforesaid ground alone, the present petition is required to be dismissed. 5.2. It is submitted that since the petitioner was not granted the benefit of one increment, the petitioner approached the learned Tribunal vide Appeal No. 93 of 1993, whereby, by order dated 08.10.1999, the respondent authority was directed to grant one increment. Pursuant to the said order, pay of the petitioner was fixed at Rs.1940/- from 01.09.1986. The entry of the said revision was also made in the service book of the petitioner. Reliance is placed on the abstract, duly produced at Annexure-R-1. The said entry was also approved by the higher authority i.e. the Commissioner of Schools. By placing reliance on Annexure-R-III, it is submitted that the petitioner was granted the benefit of first higher pay scale on 01.09.1991 and the pay was fixed at Rs.2300/- in the pay band of 2000-3500. It is submitted that, the pay fixed, even after giving effect to the order passed by the learned Tribunal would come to Rs.2300/-. It is submitted that the petitioner was also granted benefit of second higher pay scale on 01.09.2002 and the pay was fixed at Rs.9650/- in the pay band of 8000-275-13500. 5.3. It is submitted that, upon superannuation of the petitioner, the petitioner is getting retiral benefits as per the 6th pay commission in the pay scale of 9300-34800 in the pay grade of Rs.5400/-. 5.4. The reliance is placed on Para-7 of the reply and placing reliance on the same, it is submitted that, the petitioner no. 3 was also extended the same benefits, as petitioner no. 1. It is submitted that with respect to the petitioner no. 3 also, the entry of the revision has been done in the service book, the said entry is also relied upon, which is duly approved by the Commissioner of Schools. It is submitted that the petitioner no. 3 was also granted the first higher scale on 01.09.1991 and the pay was fixed at Rs.2300/- in the pay band of Rs.2000-3500. It is submitted that, the pay fixed after giving effect to the Tribunal’s order would come to Rs.2300/-. It is submitted that the second higher pay scale was granted on 01.09.2002 (Page 36) and pay was fixed at Rs.9650/- in the pay band of 8000-275-13500. It is submitted that, the pay fixed after giving effect to the Tribunal’s order would come to Rs.2300/-. It is submitted that the second higher pay scale was granted on 01.09.2002 (Page 36) and pay was fixed at Rs.9650/- in the pay band of 8000-275-13500. It is submitted that, thus, the petitioner no. 3 is also extended the benefits of 6th pay commission, as the petitioner no. 1. The aforesaid is reiterated with respect to the petitioner no. 2 also, wherein, placing reliance on the Para-8 of the reply, it is submitted that, in view of the aforesaid, the prayers as prayed for, are as such that, no directions be issued to the respondent authorities, as the directions issued by the learned Tribunal, are duly complied with. 6.1. In rejoinder, Mr. Yagnik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners reiterated the contentions raised earlier, and submitted that the difference of the amount, in accordance with the order passed by the learned Tribunal be accorded to the petitioners herein and the prayers as prayed for, be allowed. 7.1. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, it emerges that the petitioners herein are seeking the compliance of the order dated 08.10.1999 passed by the Gujarat Higher Secondary Service Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Application No. 93 of 1993, whereby, in the said order, it was directed the applicants/petitioners are entitled for the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 from the date 01.09.1986 instead of 01.01.1986 and are entitled for the benefit of one increment, as per this new date. Further, the respondent no. 3 school was directed to send revised pay scales and upon verification, the respondent authorities were directed to take appropriate steps in accordance with rules and regulations. 7.2. It emerges that, the respondents herein have complied with the order passed by the Tribunal, by extending the benefits of the higher pay scale to all the petitioners, fixing the pay of the petitioners to Rs.2300/- and 2nd higher pay scale was also extended to the petitioners, on 01.09.2002, whereby, the pay was fixed at Rs.9650/- in the pay band of 8000-275-13500. The petitioners are also extended the retiral benefits as per the 6th pay commission and the pay scale of 9300-34800 in the pay grade of Rs.5400/-. Upon perusal of the service book of the petitioner no. The petitioners are also extended the retiral benefits as per the 6th pay commission and the pay scale of 9300-34800 in the pay grade of Rs.5400/-. Upon perusal of the service book of the petitioner no. 1, which is duly produced at Page-42, Annexure-RI, it is stated that the pay is fixed in accordance with the Gujarat Civil Services Rules, 1987. The initial pay of Rs.1940/- w.e.f. 01.09.1986 was considered in the scale of Rs.1640-60-2600 - Rs. 75-2900, with the date of next increment, i.e. 01.09.1987. It is submitted that, upon perusal of Annexure-R-II, it emerges that the petitioners are fixed in the 1st higher pay scale on 01.09.1991 and higher pay scale is fixed to 2300 in the pay band of Rs.3500. On perusal of Annexure-R-III, it emerges that, the pay fixed, even-after, giving effect to the order passed by the Tribunal would be Rs.2300/- and that the 2nd higher pay scale was granted on 01.09.2002 and the pay was fixed at Rs.9650/- in the pay band of 8000-275-13500. 7.3. Upon superannuation, the petitioners are also granted the benefits as per the 6th pay commission in the pay scale of 9300-34800 in the grade pay of Rs.5400/-. The petitioners are also extended the retiral benefits, upon superannuation, i.e. petitioner no. 1 retired on 31.05.2009, petitioner no. 2 retired on 31.05.2014 and petitioner no. 3 took voluntary retirement from service on 31.05.2013, upon which the reitral benefits are also granted to all the petitioners. 7.4. Upon considering the aforesaid documents, which are produced on record, this Court is not inclined to issue the directions as prayed for, in the present petition. The respondent authorities, have complied with the order passed by the Tribunal dated 08.10.1999 in Application No. 93 of 1993. POSITION OF LAW: 8. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio as laid down in the case of Union of India vs. Subrata Nath, 2022 Live Law (SC) 998, wherein, in Para-15 to 22, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “15. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are mala-fides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere. 16. In the above context, following are the observations made by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra): “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Actnor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” [Emphasis laid] 17. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, a two Judge Bench of this Court held as below: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. [Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil] [Emphasis laid] 18. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and Others v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, a two Judge Bench of this Court referred to several precedents on the Doctrine of Proportionality of the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and held that: “21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved.” 19. Laying down the broad parameters within which the High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran held thus: “12. Laying down the broad parameters within which the High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran held thus: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 20. In Union of India and Others v. Ex. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 20. In Union of India and Others v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, a two Judge Bench of this Court made the following pertinent observations: “23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. 24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.” 21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa and Others (supra) held that if the order of dismissal is based on findings that establish the prima facie guilt of great delinquency of the respondent, then the High Court cannot direct reconsideration of the punishment imposed. Once the gravity of the misdemeanour is established and the inquiry conducted is found to be consistent with the prescribed rules and reasonable opportunity contemplated under the rules, has been afforded to the delinquent employee, then the punishment imposed is not open to judicial review by the Court. Once the gravity of the misdemeanour is established and the inquiry conducted is found to be consistent with the prescribed rules and reasonable opportunity contemplated under the rules, has been afforded to the delinquent employee, then the punishment imposed is not open to judicial review by the Court. As long as there was some evidence to arrive at a conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority did, such an order becomes unassailable and the High Court ought to forebear from interfering. The above view has been expressed in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur. 22. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.” 9. Upon a pertinent query put to Ms. Pooja Ashar, learned AGP appearing for the respondent-State, upon contentions raised by Mr. Yagnik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners that whether the benefits that accrue in favour of the petitioners herein are not complied with or are not approved by the Local Fund, resultantly, the petitioners herein are not extended the benefits of the Tribunal’s judgment in favour of the petitioners, till today. Ms. Yagnik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners that whether the benefits that accrue in favour of the petitioners herein are not complied with or are not approved by the Local Fund, resultantly, the petitioners herein are not extended the benefits of the Tribunal’s judgment in favour of the petitioners, till today. Ms. Ashar, learned AGP, upon instructions, states that, the Junior Assistant Examiner, Commissioner of M.D.M. & Schools, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar is holding the equivalent powers as that of the Local Fund Auditor and has duly approved the same. This Court has also perused the same from the documents produced/service book of the petitioners, which is duly approved by the said authority and the benefits are extended to the petitioners. 10. Upon the aforesaid statement made by Ms. Ashar, learned AGP, no further directions are required to be issued. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the present petition stands DISMISSED, accordingly. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. Rule discharged.