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2024 DIGILAW 1969 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Patel Ramnik Devshissbhai

2024-10-23

BIREN VAISHNAV, MAULIK J.SHELAT

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JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. Appeal has been filed by the Appellant State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) against the Judgment and Order of acquittal passed by the Ld.Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”) in Sessions Case No.23 of 1994 on 22.07.1997. By the judgement and order under challenge, the Trial Court has acquitted the respondents - accused for the offences punishable under Sections 498 (A), 302, 304 (B), 201, 213 and 34 of Indian Penal Code (“IPC” for short) and Sections 3 & 4 Of Dowry Prohibition Act. 1.1 Pending the appeal, the respondents no. 2 & 3 have died and their death certificates have been placed on record by the learned counsel for the respondents. Accordingly as far as respondents no. 2 and 3 are concerned, the appeal stands abated. 2. The brief case of the first informant as alleged in the First Information Report which had ultimately given rise to the present appeal are as follows: 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that on 07.07.1993, one Vimuben was killed by the accused persons by way of severe beating and by strangulation. The said fact was known by the complainant from the village people. It is also the case of prosecution that on the next day of the demise i.e. on 08.07.1993, the cremation of the deceased was also done and thereafter the complainant and the family members were informed that due to blood loss, the deceased Vimuben had expired. It is the case of prosecution that upon reaching the village, from the village people, the complainant and other relatives had come to know that the deceased was killed by the accused persons. 2.2 It is also the case of prosecution that before one and half months of the incident, when the deceased came to her parental home, she had conveyed and informed the parents and relatives that she was being tortured mentally and physically by the in-laws. Accordingly, on 13.07.1993, the complainant lodged the complaint. 2.3 In pursuance of the above, First Information Report was lodged with the Gariyadhar Police Station, Bhavnagar, for the offences punishable under Sections 498 (A), 302, 304 (B), 201, 213 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, vide I-CR No.81 of 1993. Accordingly, on 13.07.1993, the complainant lodged the complaint. 2.3 In pursuance of the above, First Information Report was lodged with the Gariyadhar Police Station, Bhavnagar, for the offences punishable under Sections 498 (A), 302, 304 (B), 201, 213 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, vide I-CR No.81 of 1993. Investigating Agency during the course of investigation recorded statements of the witnesses, drew various panchnamas including panchnama of scene of offence, collected medical papers, PM Report etc. for the purpose of proving of the offence. After having found sufficient material against the respondents – accused, charge sheet came to be filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class which was thereafter committed to the Sessions Court, Bhavnagar as provided under Section 209 of the Code, which was numbered as Sessions Case No.23 of 1994. 2.4 Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, the Ld. Sessions Judge, framed charges against the Respondents - Accused for the aforesaid offences. The Respondents - Accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. They were tried for the said offences and in order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 7 prosecution witnesses and also produced various documentary evidence before the Ld. Trial Court. The details of the evidence led by the prosecution are reproduced in the tabular form hereunder: Oral Evidences Sr. No. Ex. No. Name of Witness Nature of Witness 1. 27 Ramnikbhai Kalabhai Chavda Medical Officer 2. 3 Kanjibhai Khimjibhai Panch Witness of Place of Incident 3. 33 Shambhubhai Gangadasbhai Complainant Father of the deceased 4. 35 Nathubhai Punabhai Complainant’s Neighbour 5. 37 Rameshbai Shambhubhai Brother of the deceased 6. 38 Kanchanben Himmatbhai Relative of Deceased 7. 39 Champaben Karshanbhai Relative of Deceased 8. 40 Himmatlal Chhotalal Shah Maleria Worker 9. 41 Shantaben Dhambhubhai Mother of the deceased 10. 43 Bhikhalal Chhaganlal PSO who received complaint 11. 44 Chandubhai Limbaji Kharadi Head Constable 12. 46 Hamirbhai Savdarbhai Bhatiya PSI Documentary Evidences Sr. No. Exh. No. Name of Witness 1. 34 FIR 2. 14 Panchnama of place of Cremation 3. 15 Panchnama of clothes of the Dead body of Deceased Accused 4. 31 Panchnama of place of offence 5. 32 Panchnama of pesticide medicine 6. 18 Panchnama of the arrest of the accused 7. 19 Pension of the blood samples 8. 20 That certificate of the deceased 9. 29 Medical certificate of the deceased 10. 15 Panchnama of clothes of the Dead body of Deceased Accused 4. 31 Panchnama of place of offence 5. 32 Panchnama of pesticide medicine 6. 18 Panchnama of the arrest of the accused 7. 19 Pension of the blood samples 8. 20 That certificate of the deceased 9. 29 Medical certificate of the deceased 10. 24 & 25 F.S.L. report 11. 26 Serological FSL report 2.5 At the end of the evidence, necessary pursis was presented before the Trial Court declaring closure of evidence. The Trial Court has thereafter proceeded to record the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. With such evidence being noticed, the Trial Court after evaluating the same, arrived at a conclusion that prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the respondents - accused and has thereby recorded acquittal. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this acquittal appeal has been preferred by the State. 3. Mr. Manan Maheta, learned APP appearing for the appellant State has submitted that despite there being a clear case of section 304 (B) as well as 302 of IPC and the fact that marriage span was less than 7 years, rather the marriage span is of almost 5 months, and the statement and oral evidences of witnesses who are the father of the deceased, mother of the deceased, brother of the deceased that the deceased was mentally and physically tortured, the court below had discarded the same without assigning any cogent and valid reasons and committed serious error in acquitting the accused persons. 3.1 Mr. Maheta, learned APP would submit that the Trial Court has relied on minor contradictions and discarded the evidence of the witnesses and thus, the reasons assigned by the Trial Court while acquitting the accused are unjust, improper, perverse and unwarranted to the facts of the prosecution case and thereby, has committed an error in acquitting the accused. It is further submitted that the prosecution has established the guilt of all the accused and the Trial Court has committed an error both on law and facts. Thus, the Trial Court has wrongly recorded the order of acquittal, which deserves to be quashed and appropriate sentence for the offences be passed against all the accused. 4. Mr. It is further submitted that the prosecution has established the guilt of all the accused and the Trial Court has committed an error both on law and facts. Thus, the Trial Court has wrongly recorded the order of acquittal, which deserves to be quashed and appropriate sentence for the offences be passed against all the accused. 4. Mr. G.K. Vaghani, learned advocate appearing for the respondents – accused submitted that based on evidence on record, the trial court has in its opinion rightly come to the conclusion that the case of the prosecution regarding torture etc. of the deceased has not been made out as no specific allegations are mentioned either in the complaint lodged by the father of the deceased or from the testimony of the mother, complainant and the neighbour. He would submit that even on the examination of the brother Rameshbhai it was not proved by the prosecution that there was mental and physical torture of deceased. There was no evidence on record except hearsay evidence that deceased died due to the act of strangulation committed by accused no.1. 4.1 Mr. Vaghani, learned advocate would invite our attention to P.W. 8 – Himmatlal Shah’s deposition who was the neighbour of the deceased and he would submit that it is evident from the record that the deceased was suffering from T.B and that the death could have been due to the disease, particularly, when the doctor who had examined the deceased and referred to Palitana hospital found that there were no evident marks of injury especially on the area of neck. 5. We, therefore, independently proceed to examine the deposition of a few important witnesses i.e. one Ramnikbhai Kalabhai Chavda, P.W. 1 at Ex. 27 who is the Medical Officer; that of P.W. 3 Shambhubhai – complainant and father of the deceased, P.W. 4 – Nathubhai Punabhai, neighbour of the complainant at Ex. 35 and that of one Mr. Himmatlal Shah, the neighbour of the deceased. 6. P.W. 1 - Ramnikbhai Chavda, the Medical Officer working at Gariadhar Primary Health Center as Superintendent has deposed in his testimony particularly the examination-in-chief that while he was on duty at 6 am, the deceased was brought in for treatment by her relatives. That she was unconscious was informed by her relatives. Himmatlal Shah, the neighbour of the deceased. 6. P.W. 1 - Ramnikbhai Chavda, the Medical Officer working at Gariadhar Primary Health Center as Superintendent has deposed in his testimony particularly the examination-in-chief that while he was on duty at 6 am, the deceased was brought in for treatment by her relatives. That she was unconscious was informed by her relatives. The relatives stated that the deceased was unconscious for the last four hours and that she was five months into pregnancy. The condition of the deceased when she arrived was critical. The relatives then requested the doctor that they would take her to the Palitana hospital. He confirms in his testimony that the case papers were signed by Vithalbhai Devsibhai – accused no. 4. 6.2 From the cross examination of this witness, it is evident that he did not think it fit to record the case in the MLC register and inform the police. He particularly did so, because he found that the relatives were willing to take her to another hospital. The cross examination further indicates that there were no signs of any injury on the body of the patient who was brought in. no evident marks on the neck of the deceased was found so as to suggest the prosecution theory of she having been strangulated. 7. Shambhubhai Rangdasbhai - father of the deceased has been examined as P.W. 3 at Ex. 33. Reading his deposition indicates that on 08.07.1993, while he was staying at village Junvadar, one Mukeshbhai the brotherin- law of the deceased with one unknown person came around 9 am at his place and informed him that his daughter was not well. On he being so informed, he went to one Nathubhai Bhadani, his neighbour and they left for Virdi immediately. On their way to Virdi, they met somebody from the family of his daughter’s in-laws and they were informed that their daughter had died and the cremation was already done, they returned to their village. It was thereafter that they left for Virdi together with a few villagers in all comprising of six men and six women including his wife. On going to the village Virdi, at the matrimonial home of the deceased, this witness asked Devsibhai as to what had happened to his daughter to which Devsibhai denied having any knowledge. It was thereafter that they left for Virdi together with a few villagers in all comprising of six men and six women including his wife. On going to the village Virdi, at the matrimonial home of the deceased, this witness asked Devsibhai as to what had happened to his daughter to which Devsibhai denied having any knowledge. This witness further states that on being asked his son Ramesh told him that it was Devjibhai who told him that the daughter was not well and she was being taken to Gariadhar. When the doctor at Gariadhar refused to treat the deceased, she was taken to Palitana. 7.1 This witness in the cross examination has admitted that he did not inform his wife of the death of his daughter at the first instance. He would admit that the utensils and the ornaments which were given in marriage to the daughter were returned by the family of the inlaws. That the belongings of the deceased were sent by her in-laws in a tempo. 8. Nathubhai Punabhai, the neighbour with whom Shambhubhai had left for Virdi was examined at Ex. 35 as P.W. 4. His deposition indicates that Shambhubhai came over and told him that Vimuben’s brother-in-law had come and had informed him that Vimuben was not well and therefore they must leave for the village. On being so informed, both he and Shambhubhai left for village Virdi. On way to Virdi, they were told by people who met them on their way that Vimuben had died and the cremation was already done. Thereafter, they came back to their village. Later, they left for village Virdi where they reached at 5’0 clock. Nathubhai has testified that he asked Devsibhai as to what happened to Vimuben and it was then told to him that she had fallen ill and was taken to Gariadhar hospital and from there to Palitana hospital. 8.1 In the cross examination, this witness admits that the police had recorded his statement after 2 – 3 days of the incident. Nothing substantial comes out from the testimony of brother Ramesh except the fact that it was Ramesh who had asked Devsi as to the reason of his sister’s death when he was told that she died because of she being unwell. Nothing substantial comes out from the testimony of brother Ramesh except the fact that it was Ramesh who had asked Devsi as to the reason of his sister’s death when he was told that she died because of she being unwell. What is also apparent from reading of the evidence of Rameshbhai is that he testifies that the complaint was lodged by his father through an advocate four to five days after the date of the incident. 9. The next important witness which the prosecution examined is at Ex. 40, P.W. 8. His testimony indicates that he was a Malaria worker and the neighbour of accused Devsibhai. It was his testimony that on being informed that Vimuben was not feeling well, on the invitation of Devsibhai he went and examined Vimuben. Vimuben had told him that she was feeling very weak and not feeling good. On the date of incident, Vitthalbhai Devsibhai had called him at 5 in the morning informing him that Vimuben had not been feeling well. 8.1 The cross examination of this witness indicates that he admits he had been called at 5 am. He denies that he had heard any commotion or any incident in the neighbourhood which the deceased as well as Devsibhai was sharing. He admits that his wife had never told him about Vimuben being tortured mentally or physically. Based on these testimonies, the trial court found that from the evidences of prosecution witnesses, especially from the evidences of the parents of the deceased, nothing had come on record in terms of any specific allegation that the deceased Vimuben was facing any mental or phuysical torture. What has also come on record from the evidence of Rameshbhai - the brother of the deceased that there were no specific instances that were mentioned by him of Vimuben having been tortured which could lead her to commit suicide. It was only on the basis of hearsay evidence that these witnesses had a presumption that the deceased was tortured. 9. The trial court has extensively dissected the evidence of the neighbour of Devsibhai where Vimuben is alleged to have died as a result of strangulation. What comes out from his evidence is that the deceased would complain of being unwell and physically weak. At 5 am, on the date of the incident, it was at Vitthalbhai – accused no. 9. The trial court has extensively dissected the evidence of the neighbour of Devsibhai where Vimuben is alleged to have died as a result of strangulation. What comes out from his evidence is that the deceased would complain of being unwell and physically weak. At 5 am, on the date of the incident, it was at Vitthalbhai – accused no. 4’s behest that he went to examine the deceased. He also admits that during the course of the previous night or the day before the incident, there were no suggestion to infer that Vimuben was strangulated. No noises, commotion or fights were heard from the house of the accused to suggest strangulation of Vimuben. 10. Reading the medical evidence in the form of Superintendent of PHC – P.W. 1 – Ramnikbhai Chavda in light of this background would indicate that on examination of Vimuben, the doctor did not find any injury marks on the neck to suggest the prosecution theory that she was strangulated. 11. Another important feature of the case as discussed by the trial court is that from the behaviour of the family of the deceased i.e. the father Shambhubhai, it cannot safely be inferred that the deceased was tortured or mentally harassed by the family. On being informed by Mukesh - the brother-in-law that the daughter was not feeling well, Shambhubhai left with Nathubhai for Virdi. On way, when he met some relatives of the in-laws and on being informed that Vimubhai had died and was cremated, he came back to his own house at village Janudar. This is a behaviour which is contrary to the normal reaction of a father who on hearing of the daughter’s death and cremation would immediately rush to the matrimonial house of the daughter. Not doing so, he turned back and went back home and returned to his daughter’s matrimonial home only in the evening. Adding to that, the complaint was lodged four days after the date of the incident. After a police statement was made on 11.07.1993, the complaint was lodged on 13.07.1993 i.e. five days after the date of the incident. This unusual delay in lodging of the FIR seriously dents the prosecution theory that the death of Vimuben was as a result of the act of strangulation which was a consequence of being mentally harassed and physically tortured by her in-laws. This unusual delay in lodging of the FIR seriously dents the prosecution theory that the death of Vimuben was as a result of the act of strangulation which was a consequence of being mentally harassed and physically tortured by her in-laws. Based on the lack of evidence accordingly the trial court acquitted the accused from the alleged offences for which they were charged. 12. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: "27. The Court further observed: "27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the non-interference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 8. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 12.1 As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 12.2 Scope of appeal against acquittal is well laid down in case of Chandrappa and ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it was observed: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, ’substantial and compelling reasons’, ’good and sufficient grounds’, ’very strong circumstances’, ’distorted conclusions’, ’glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ’flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 12.3 Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] has held as under: “39. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 12.3 Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] has held as under: “39. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: - "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [ Chandrappa v.State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 40. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:- "8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:- 41.1 That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2 That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; 41.3 That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 42. 42. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 13. Considering these set of evidences on record and in light of the latest decision of the Apex Court as reproduced hereinabove, which deals with the law on acquittal, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the trial court in acquitting the respondents. 14. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order of the trial court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings, if called for, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.