JUDGMENT : VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI, J. 1. Heard Ms. Suman Motla, learned A.G.P. appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 16438 of 2007. 2. The matters have been listed for hearing from time to time however, none has appeared for the legal heirs of the respondent no. 1 neither any request is made for adjournment. 3. In view of the aforesaid, by way of the present petitions, the order dated 29.05.2006 passed by the learned Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal in Appeal No. 280 of 2003, which was filed by deceased respondent-Shri M.F. Malek, is challenged. 4. The facts stated in petition being Special Civil Application No. 16438 of 2007 are recited and the said petition is treated as the lead matter. 5. Since the respondent herein was the appellant before the learned tribunal and the appeal was dismissed, for the sake of convenience, Shri M.F. Malek is treated as the petitioner and the State is referred to as the respondent. 6. By way of the present petitions, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 29.05.2006 passed by the Learned Tribunal in application No. 280 of 2003. (B) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present petition, your Lordships may be pleased to stay the execution, implementation and operation of the judgment and order dated 29.05.2006 passed by the Learned Tribunal at Annexure-A to the petition. (C) The Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass such other and further order as may be necessary in the interest of justice.” 7. The petitioner herein was discharging his duties as Agriculture Assistant under the control of Dholka Sub-Division governed by the Gujarat State Land Development Corporation Limited. The petitioner was assigned to take note about the measurement in the measurement book No. 134 for several survey numbers situated at Sandhvi village for the year 1998. The work was undertaken through E.A.S. scheme for the year 1998. On 19.06.1998, the inspection was done by one Shri D.V. Rajpoot, Assistant Director (S.C.) and Shri P.B. Pramal, Regional Supervisor alongwith the present petitioner whereby, several pits were made. The work was undertaken through E.A.S. scheme for the year 1998. On 19.06.1998, the inspection was done by one Shri D.V. Rajpoot, Assistant Director (S.C.) and Shri P.B. Pramal, Regional Supervisor alongwith the present petitioner whereby, several pits were made. The respondent-authority showed 1056 pits whereas, 164 pits without bored found artificial and the amount to the tune of Rs.33,394/- was found to be misappropriated, without the same being sanctioned with the work order alongwith the budget estimate, followed by the amount, which was paid to the concerned workers. In view thereof, the chargesheet dated 31.07.1999 came to be issued, which is duly produced at Annexure-B. Followed by the chargesheet, which was served to the petitioner herein, several witnesses were examined as per the rules under the Gujarat State Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1971 (for short “the Rules of 1971”) and accordingly, the departmental inquiry came to be conducted under Rules 9(2) and 13 of the Rules of 1971, combining two charges. The petitioner herein had replied to the charges by justifying that the petitioner is innocent. 7.1. One Shri C.K. Desai (I.A.S.) was appointed as inquiry officer vide order dated 10.02.2000 issued by the Managing Director, Gujarat State Land Development Corporation Limited. The report is duly produced at Annexure-C concluding that the charges stood proved. 7.2. By orders dated 27.08.2001 and 09.10.2001, the Joint Agricultural Director passed the order of reversion to the pay-scale of Rs.4500/- to Rs.7000/- with permanent effect for 7 years. The said orders are duly produced at Annexure E. 7.3. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 27.08.2001 passed by the Joint Agricultural Director, the petitioner approached the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Gandhinagar by filing Appeal No. 280 of 2003, praying to set aside the order passed by the Director of Agricultural and further prayed for not to recover any amount from the petitioner for a period from 20.08.2001 to 08.07.2003. The learned tribunal, upon examining the relevant documents, germane for adjudication of the dispute, partially allowed the appeal by reducing the punishment to 3 increments giving future effect. The said order dated 29.05.2006 is duly produced at Annexure-A. 7.4. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 29.05.2006 passed in Appeal No. 280 of 2003, the petitioner as also, the respondent-State have challenged the same. The said order dated 29.05.2006 is duly produced at Annexure-A. 7.4. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 29.05.2006 passed in Appeal No. 280 of 2003, the petitioner as also, the respondent-State have challenged the same. Upon issuance of notice by order dated 28.06.2007, by subsequent order dated 11.12.2007 passed by this Court, the impugned order passed by the learned tribunal so far as it relates to substitution of the penalty of withholding of three increments in place of lowering down of payscale as ordered by the disciplinary authority in the disciplinary proceedings, was directed to be stayed. 8. Ms. Suman Motla, learned A.G.P. has taken the Court to the impugned order, which is duly produced at page 8 and submitted that while passing the impugned order, without assigning any reasons, the order of withholding of 7 increments passed by the disciplinary authority, came to be reduced to 3 increments only on the ground that the same would result in financial loss to the petitioner. It is submitted that no reasons are assigned by the learned tribunal as also, the learned tribunal was assessing the dispute in question in supervisory capacity and if the learned tribunal were to reduce the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, reasons were required to be assigned for the same. It is submitted that the charges framed against the petitioner herein stood proved by the disciplinary authority, which are gross. The charge no. 3 is for giving false measurement by artificial work whereby, false vouchers have been prepared though, no real work was performed on the site. As per the charge no. 4, without having sanctioned the work order, along with the budget estimate, the amount was disbursed. It is submitted that the aforesaid charges are grave in nature and in view thereof, the impugned order passed by the learned tribunal is required to be interfered with on the aforesaid ground alone. It is submitted that the respondent-authority has followed the due procedure and inflicted proper punishment in proportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner herein. It is submitted that before coming to the conclusion, the disciplinary authority examined the statements of witnesses produced at the time of proceedings as well as the defenses put forward by the petitioner herein and in view thereof, the learned tribunal ought not to have reduced the punishment. 8.1. It is submitted that before coming to the conclusion, the disciplinary authority examined the statements of witnesses produced at the time of proceedings as well as the defenses put forward by the petitioner herein and in view thereof, the learned tribunal ought not to have reduced the punishment. 8.1. Placing reliance on the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that the petition filed by the respondent-State i.e. Special Civil Application No. 16438 of 2007 be allowed. In the course of hearing, Ms. Motla, learned A.G.P. has also placed on record that upon superannuation, the provisional pension is also being paid to the petitioner. It is submitted that in view of the pendency of the present petitions, the final amount of pension is not extended to the family of the deceased petitioner being family pension. 9. Upon perusal of the prayers, as prayed for, in Special Civil Application No. 29874 of 2007, it emerges that the petitioner herein has prayed that the impugned order be quashed and set aside and the respondent-authorities be directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service as if the said order is not passed. 10. This Court has considered that when the subject matter of challenge is an order passed by the learned tribunal, this Court is required to assess the legality of the said order. This Court has also perused the impugned order dated 29.05.2006. 11. It is apposite to refer to the order dated 11.12.2007 passed by this Court, which reads as under: “1. Heard Mr. Dabhi, learned AGP for the State Government and Mr. Dipak C. Raval for the delinquent officer and the respective parties in both the petitions for admission as well as for interim relief. 2. Prima facie, it appears that the disciplinary authority has taken too lenient view for imposition of the punishment upon the delinquent officer, more particularly when the misconduct is serious in nature. 3. The aforesaid is coupled with the circumstance that the inquiry officer has submitted the report after observing the principles of natural justice and the Tribunal has concurred with the view of the inquiry officer. 3. The aforesaid is coupled with the circumstance that the inquiry officer has submitted the report after observing the principles of natural justice and the Tribunal has concurred with the view of the inquiry officer. By now it is well settled that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the matter of punishment is not as that of the Court of appeal and it is only when the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against the person concerned, the Tribunal or the Court may interfere. The charges levelled against the petitioners are considered and are found proved, by the Tribunal. 4. Apart from the observations made hereinabove that the punishment imposed is lenient in comparison to the charges levelled against the petitioner, in the prima facie opinion of this Court, in any case, the Tribunal could not interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority as if the Court of Appeal. 5. Mr. Rawal, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Tribunal has power to mould the relief and therefore, the Tribunal could reduce the punishment. 6. I am afraid such contentions can be accepted. In a disciplinary proceedings, where the punishment is imposed and the Tribunal is exercising the supervisory power over such proceedings. The scope and ambit of the judicial scrutiny by the Tribunal in a matter of imposition of the punishment in the disciplinary proceedings is by now well settled. It is a clear case where the Tribunal has exceed in exercising the jurisdiction so far as interference with the punishment is concerned, as if the Court of Appeal. 7. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal for substituting punishment deserves to be stayed in any case. 8. I would have undertaken the course for rejection of the petition preferred by the delinquent officer and of admission of the petition preferred by the State. 7. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal for substituting punishment deserves to be stayed in any case. 8. I would have undertaken the course for rejection of the petition preferred by the delinquent officer and of admission of the petition preferred by the State. However, as the Judgment of the Tribunal which is impugned in both the petitions is common, and a with a view to consider the matter in entirety, keeping in view the larger interest of the administration, and enhancement of the punishment, the matter can be considered at the appropriate stage at the time of final hearing and at that stage, the delinquent officer may not contend that he had no opportunity and he considered the matter is closed by rejection of his petition, I find it proper to admit the petition preferred by the delinquent officer so as to keep all questions open including on the aspects of enhancement of the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 9. Hence, Rule. In both the petitions, by ad interim order, there shall be stay against the execution and implementation of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal so far as it relates to substitution of the penalty of withholding of three increments in place of lowering down of the pay-scale as ordered by the disciplinary authority in disciplinary proceedings.” 12. It is also apposite to refer to paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the impugned order, which read as under: 12. During the Departmental inquiry, deposition of Investigating Officer, Assistant Director (Training), Thasra, Shri G.T. Patel was recorded. In the Examination in chief, Shri G.T. Patel has stated that upon checking, total 164 pits were found less. Shri G.T. Patel also stated that, this investigation was carried out, in presence of Appellant Malek, Field Assistant, Field Supervisor, Dhandhuka and Assistant Director, Dholka. Shri G.T. Patel has also stated that, in collusion with the Field Supervisor, malpractice has been done by commencing the works without obtaining approval for the Work Order and Plan/ Estimate. During the cross-examination, Shri G.T. Patel has given clarification that, as there is huge difference in the numbers of the pits, all the revised measurements could not be recorded in the Measurement Book. Therefore, such note was prepared in separate statement. During the cross-examination, Shri G.T. Patel has given clarification that, as there is huge difference in the numbers of the pits, all the revised measurements could not be recorded in the Measurement Book. Therefore, such note was prepared in separate statement. Shri G.T. Patel has also stated in the cross-examination that, D.R.D. Ahmedabad vide letter dated 24/03/1998 has given approval for the project worth total Rs.26.91 Lakhs and the works are to be commenced after the conditions Nos.1 to 17 mentioned in the said statement are fulfilled. Shri G.T. Patel also states that, after the completion of the inquiry procedure, Statement of Inquiry was got prepared by concerned Field Officer, Field Supervisor, and two Field Assistants of Inquiry Branch of the Office of the Assistant Director, Dholka and signatures of delinquents were obtained. 13. It is clear that, as provided in condition-6 in the order dated 24/04/1998 of the Director, District Rural Development Agency, works are to be commenced after the plan estimate of the works to be carried out in the project are sent to the office and approval is obtained. Despite such clear conditions, approval regarding re-plan of this project was not obtained. Further, as per the circular dated 27/04/1997 of the Corporation, before commencing the works in E.A.S. Scheme, the approval for the plan estimate are to be obtained from the authorities and the work order are to be obtained from the authorities on the basis of the same and thereafter the works should be commenced. That means, approval for re-plan has not been obtained as per condition-6 of the order dated 24/03/1998 of the D.R.D. Ahmedabad and the circular and instructions of the Corporation. 14. After examining all the evidence, the Departmental Officer has held the Appellant Shri M.F. Malek guilty for the acquisitions No. 1 and 2. The Departmental Inquiry Officer has recorded all the defenses of the Appellants in detail and has submitted the report only after considering the defenses. The Disciplinary Authority has received the report of the Inquiry Officer and has served show cause notice to the Appellant, sending him the copy of the report. The Appellant has submitted the reply to that notice. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order to put the Appellant in the lower pay scale of Rs.4500-7000 for seven years with permanent effect. The Disciplinary Authority has received the report of the Inquiry Officer and has served show cause notice to the Appellant, sending him the copy of the report. The Appellant has submitted the reply to that notice. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order to put the Appellant in the lower pay scale of Rs.4500-7000 for seven years with permanent effect. Considering the details of the acquisitions against the Appellant in it’s entirety, the same appear to be excessive. The Appellant may suffer huge financial loss due to this order of punishment. In our opinion, purpose of the justice shall be served, if three increments of the Appellant are withheld with future effect. Therefore, order is passed as under. ORDER The order of the respondent, holding the Appellant guilty for the acquisitions is confirmed. Partly approving the appeal of the Appellant regarding the punishment and amending/ decreasing the punishment awarded by the respondent on 10/07/1993, the Appellant is awarded punishment of withholding three increments with future effect. The respondent shall comply accordingly. Pronounced on 29.05.2006. Sd/- Sd/- P.K. Ghosh (B.H. Shah) Member Member Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Gandhinagar 13. In the opinion of this Court, the impugned order is an unreasoned order. The only reason assigned is that the aforesaid would cause financial loss to the petitioner. The order passed by the disciplinary authority wherein, the charges are proved by the disciplinary authority. It is proved that by giving false measurement by artificial work, false vouchers have been prepared though, no actual work was performed on the site. Without sanctioning the work order, along with the budget estimate, the amount was disbursed. The aforesaid charges proved by the disciplinary authority are not at all discussed, while reducing the penalty of withholding of seven increments to three increments only on the ground of financial loss to the petitioner. 14. In the opinion of this Court, reasons are the heartbeat of the order. In the facts of the present case, no reasons are assigned and in view thereof, the impugned order dated 29.05.2006 passed by the learned tribunal required to be quashed and set aside. 15. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basudev Dutta Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. 2024 INSC 940 . Paragraph 12.2 thereof, reads as under: “12.2. 15. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basudev Dutta Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. 2024 INSC 940 . Paragraph 12.2 thereof, reads as under: “12.2. It is settled law that every administrative or quasi-judicial order must contain the reasons. Such reasons go a long way in not only ensuring that the authority has applied his mind to the facts and the law, but also provide the grounds for the aggrieved party to assail the order in the manner known to law. In the absence of any reasons, it also possesses a difficulty for the judicial authorities to test the correctness of the order or in other words, exercise its power of judicial review. In this context, it will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, wherein after a detailed analysis of various judgments, it was held as follows: “27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram v. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 782 : AIR 1979 SC 1918 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes of quasi-judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge held that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made: (See SCC p. 788, Para 14 : AIR p. 1922, Para 14) 28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, (1979) 2 SCC 368 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 197 this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : AIR 1974 SC 87 , held that “rubber-stamp reason” is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra), SCC p. 854, Para 28, to the extent that: “28.......Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions.” (See AIR p. 377, Para 18) 29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. (1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1 while giving the majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC p. 658, Para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn. p. 97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows: “Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.” 30. The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that: [H.H. Shri Swamiji Case (1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1 , SCC p. 658, Para 29] “29.......reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself.” (See AIR p. 11, Para 29) .................... 33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. (1990) 3 SCC 280 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set-up judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the State has to justify its action in various fields of public law. All these necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review both by superior administrative heads and for judicial process and opined that such reasons should be communicated unless there are specific justifications for not doing so (See SCC pp. 284-285, Para 10) .................... 46. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984 in SCC p. 602, Para 11 : AIR Para 11 at p. 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. This Court held that in the United States the courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as “the courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review.” In S.N. Mukherjee (1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984 this Court relied on the decisions of the US Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 87 L Ed 626 : 318 US 80 (1942) and Dunlop v. Bachowski, 44 L Ed 2d 377 : 421 US 560 (1974) in support of its opinion discussed above. 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi- judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubberstamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.[See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. [See Ruiz Torija v. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 EHRR, at 562 Para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions.” (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of due process.” 16. In the facts of the present case, this is a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court deems it fit to refer to the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . Paragraph 15 thereof, reads as under: 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. Paragraph 15 thereof, reads as under: 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 17. In view of the aforesaid, exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the impugned order dated 29.05.2006 passed by the learned tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. 18. Accordingly, the petition being Special Civil Application No. 16438 of 2007 is allowed. Rule is made absolute qua Special Civil Application Nos. 16438 of 2007. Special Civil Application No. 29874 of 2007 is hereby dismissed. Rule qua Special Civil Application No. 29874 of 2007 is discharged.