JUDGMENT : (NIKHIL S. KARIEL, J.) 1. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. SN Soparkar with learned Advocate Mr. Aditya Mehta on behalf of the petitioner, learned Government Pleader Mr. Gurusharansingh H. Virk with learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. J.K. Shah and learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Dharitri Pancholi on behalf of respondent- State. 2. Considering the issue on hand and with consent of parties final hearing of the petition is being undertaken. 3. The issue in question raised in the present petition being that whether the State through the Mamlatdar and Agriculture Land Tribunal(ALT), Jambusar, District: Bharuch was empowered to initiate proceedings against land belonging to the company under liquidation for breach of Section 63A (1), 63(A)(B), and 63(G) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’ for short) more particularly in view of the moratorium bar of proceedings under Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the I & B Code’ for short). 4. Considering the submissions made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar and learned Government Pleader Mr. Virk since it appears to this Court that while there may not be much of a quarrel with regard to the applicability of provisions of the I & B Code, more particularly the same having been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions and whereas since it appears to this Court that the anxiety of the State is on the aspect of resort being made to the liquidation process under the I &B Code being probably used as a tool to confer valid title upon the lands in question which according to the State it does not have, therefore, the submissions of the learned Advocates would be referred to only from the said perspective. 5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is a special purpose company incorporated for setting up multi product Special Economic Zones in Bharuch District. It is submitted that vide order dated 18.10.2021, the NCLT, Mumbai Bench in M.A. No. 2422/2019 liquidation process has been initiated and one Mr.Vishal Jain had been appointed as liquidator under Section 34(1) of the Code. It is submitted that vide order dated 18.10.2021, the NCLT, Mumbai Bench in M.A. No. 2422/2019 liquidation process has been initiated and one Mr.Vishal Jain had been appointed as liquidator under Section 34(1) of the Code. It is stated by learned Senior Advocate that the order inter alia states that the liquidation proceedings having been initiated subject to Section 52 of the I &B Code no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted except liberty to the liquidator to institute suit or other legal proceedings on behalf of the corporate debtor with prior approval of the NCLT. 5.1 Learned Senior Advocate would extensively take this Court through the provisions of the I & B Code more particularly to Section 33 (5) of the Code and would submit that under Section 33(5), upon liquidation order being passed no suit or other proceedings shall be instituted by or against the corporate debtor as directed by the learned NCLT vide the order referred to hereinabove. Learned Senior Advocate would thereafter draw the attention of this Court under section 35 sub section (1)(b), (d) and (f) and would submit that the liquidator is empowered to take into his custody or control all assets property, effects, and actionable claims of the corporate debtor and also to take such measures to protect and preserve the assets and properties of the corporate debtor and further to sell movable and immovable property and actionable claims of the corporate debtor in liquidation by public auction etc. Reference is also made to Section 36 of the Code whereby the liquidator is empowered to form an estate of the assets [36(1)] and to hold the liquidation estate as a fiduciary for benefit of all creditors [36(2)]. The assets comprising of any assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights [36(3)(a)], assets that may or may not in possession of the corporate debtor including encumbered assets [36(3)(b)] and assets subject to determination of ownership by the Court or authority [36(3)(e)]. 6. Learned Senior Advocate would thereafter draw the attention of this Court to Section 238 of the I & B Code which inter alia lays down that provisions of the I & B Code shall have overriding effect over anything inconsistent with the Code, contained in law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of such law. 7. 7. Learned Senior Advocate would refer to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Indian Overseas Bank v.s M/s R.C.M. Infrastructure Ltd. and Anr. reported in 2022 (8) SCC 516 and would submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has inter alia laid down that upon a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’ in short) being initiated there is moratorium for any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest. Learned Senior Advocate would also refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sundresh Bhatt, liquidator of ABG Shipyard vs. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs reported in 2023 (1) SCC 472 whereby Hon’ble Supreme Court, according to learned Senior Advocate has inter alia observed that no proceedings could be initiated for seeking enforcement of any security interest created by the Corporate Debtor or for that matter no suit or legal proceedings could be instituted against the Corporate Debtor, upon the liquidation process commencing. 8. Learned Senior Advocate based upon the above analysis would submit that Section 33(5) envisages that upon a liquidation order being passed, the moratorium kicks in and no suit or other legal proceedings could be instituted against the Corporate Debtor. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while the notices allege breach of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, yet, upon the liquidation proceedings commencing, no legal proceedings could be brought against the Corporate Debtor and whereas in case of there being an inconsistency between the provisions of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, as against the provisions of the I & B Code then as per Section 238 of the I & B Code the provisions of the Code would prevail. Learned Senior Advocate would therefore, submit that in view of the mandatory nature of the provisions and in view of the explanation of the provisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was not open for the State through Mamlatdar to have initiated proceedings for breach of Tenancy Act against the Corporate Debtor. Learned Senior Advocate would therefore, submit that in view of the mandatory nature of the provisions and in view of the explanation of the provisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was not open for the State through Mamlatdar to have initiated proceedings for breach of Tenancy Act against the Corporate Debtor. 8.1 Learned Senior Advocate would submit that a total 106 notices have been issued by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Jambusar dated 31.07.2024 alleging breach of Section 63(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the same are challenged by way of this common petition and whereas this Court may quash and set aside all the notices as being in violation of the provisions of the I & B Code. 9. As against the submissions by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar learned Government Pleader Mr. Virk appearing on behalf of respondent State would submit a compilation of documents and relying upon the same would submit that as such, the issue is with regard to sale-deeds entered into by the Corporate Debtor for lands situated in three different Villages namely Village: Sarod, Village: Uber and Village : Valipur all situated in Taluka Jambusar, District Bharuch and whereas reference is made to a particular covenant which according to learned Government Pleader is present in all the lands in relation to which the notices has been issued and for the reference of the Court, one sale-deed with regard to each of the village is referred to in the compilation. The offending covenant being that the sale is in anticipation of prior permission under Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. Learned Government Pleader would submit that Section 63 of the Tenancy Act inter alia prohibits transfer of land to non – agriculturist and the covenant, makes it clear that the transaction was in clear violation of the provisions of the Act. 9.1. Learned Government Pleader would submit that Section 63 of the Tenancy Act inter alia prohibits transfer of land to non – agriculturist and the covenant, makes it clear that the transaction was in clear violation of the provisions of the Act. 9.1. It is further submitted that at the relevant point of time when the sale had been entered into i.e. around the year 2013, the Corporate Debtor had initially applied for mutation of an entry with regard to the land in question and whereas later on, it was informed to the Mamlatdar that since the company was in the process of taking permission under Section 63AA/65B, the entries in favour of the company may be cancelled and upon the permissions being granted the company would once again apply for mutation their names in the revenue record. 10. Learned Government Pleader would thereafter draw the attention of this Court upon auction notices issued by the petitioner - company with regard to the lands in question and whereas it is submitted that upon the auction notices being issued, the same had been noticed by the State authorities and whereas it is at that stage, it was realized that the liquidator was attempting to transact with the land in question as being assets of the company when in the first place, the original purchase itself may have been barred under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Learned Government Pleader would submit that the anxiety of the State being that the liquidation process could not be used to improve the title of the lands in question. It is the contention of learned Government Pleader that the liquidator attempting to sell the land by way of public auction, the same may not be treated as conferring of a valid title upon the land in question for the liquidator to have transacted it. It is the case of learned Government Pleader that the transaction of sale with regard to the lands in question being violative of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, the sale itself would be invalid. Learned Government Pleader would further submit that the auction itself would be in violation of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, more particularly since as of now, the lands continue to remain agricultural lands though they have been purchased by the Corporate Debtor who was not an agriculturist as explained in the said Act. Learned Government Pleader would further submit that the auction itself would be in violation of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, more particularly since as of now, the lands continue to remain agricultural lands though they have been purchased by the Corporate Debtor who was not an agriculturist as explained in the said Act. It is further submitted that even without the encumbrance of intervening sale-deed by the Corporate Debtor, agriculture land could only be purchased by an agriculturist and Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agriculture Lands Act bars purchase of agriculture land by persons who are not agriculturists as explained in the said Act. It is submitted in this regard that the auction notice not containing any clarifications, may probably have the effect of misleading prospective buyers. It is submitted that none of the judgements relied upon by learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner would in any manner be read to suggest that the liquidation process inter alia improves the title of the assets of the Corporate Debtor. Thus submitting learned Government Pleader would request this Court not to intervene. 12. As against the same it is submitted in rejoinder by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that the auction notices itself specify that the properties are being sold on as is where is, without any recourse basis. It is thus submitted that there is no attempt whatsoever by the liquidator to improve the title of the land. 13. Considering the submissions made by learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for respondent- State, it would appear that while the petitioner is relying upon Section 33(5) of the I & B Code, to contend that no proceedings could be initiated during the period of moratorium; on the other hand, the contention sought to be canvassed on behalf of respondent- State being that the proceedings under the I & B Code, could not be used as a tool to improve the title of the lands in question. 13.1 The first issue therefore, to be considered is whether the State authorities were entitled to initiate proceedings by issuing the impugned notices. Section 33 (5) relevant for the present purpose is reproduced: Section 33: Initiation of liquidation. 13.1 The first issue therefore, to be considered is whether the State authorities were entitled to initiate proceedings by issuing the impugned notices. Section 33 (5) relevant for the present purpose is reproduced: Section 33: Initiation of liquidation. 5) Subject to section 52, when a liquidation order has been passed, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted by or against the corporate debtor: Provided that a suit or other legal proceeding may be instituted by the liquidator, on behalf of the corporate debtor, with the prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority. Section 33(5) as could be seen from a plain reading, inter alia prohibits any legal proceedings being instituted by or against the Corporate Debtor when a liquidation order has been passed. Thus prima facie, it would appear that the action of the State authorities, in issuing the notices, impugned in the petition, could be stated to be violative of the moratorium. 13.2 Having observed as above, the question would be that whether the moratorium is absolute and does not envisage any further action by the State Authority. To answer the above issue, this Court seeks to rely upon observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sundresh Bhatt, liquidator of ABG Shipyard vs. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (Supra). Paragraph no. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, 53, 54 being relevant for the present purpose are being reproduced for benefit: “39. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of Section 33(5) of the IBC which reads as under: “33. (5) Subject to section 52, when a liquidation order has been passed, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted by or against the corporate debtor: Provided that a suit or other legal proceeding may be instituted by the liquidator, on behalf of the corporate debtor, with the prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority.” 40. We may note that the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. This is clearly made out by a reading of Section 142A of the Customs Act. We may note that the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. This is clearly made out by a reading of Section 142A of the Customs Act. The aforesaid provision notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. Accordingly, such an exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well. 41.Additionally, we may note that Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. Section 238 of IBC provides as under: “238. Provisions of this Code to override other laws:- The provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” 42. The NCLAT, while playing down the effect of Section 142A of the Customs Act and Section 238 of the IBC, has held that the Customs Act is a complete code in itself and no person can seek removal of goods from the warehouse without paying customs duty. The NCLAT relies on the judgment in Collector of Customs v. Dytron (India) Ltd., 1999 ELT 342 Cal., by the High Court of Calcutta, which laid down that customs duty carry first charge even during the insolvency process under Section 529 and 530 of Companies Act, 1956. However, reliance on the said precedent is not appropriate as the NCLAT has failed to notice that such interpretation has been legislatively overruled by the inclusion of Section 142A under the Customs Act, through Section 51 of the Finance Act of 2011. 43. From the above, it is to be noted that the Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act. In present context, this Court has to ascertain as to whether there is a conflict in the operation of two different statutes in the given circumstances. 43. From the above, it is to be noted that the Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act. In present context, this Court has to ascertain as to whether there is a conflict in the operation of two different statutes in the given circumstances. As the first effort, this Court is mandated to harmoniously read the two legislations, unless this Court finds a clear conflict in its operation. 44. At the cost of repetition, we may note that the demand notices issued by the respondent are plainly in the teeth of Section 14 of the IBC as they were issued after the initiation of the CIRP proceedings. Moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC was imposed when insolvency proceedings were initiated on 01.08.2017. The first notice sent by the respondent authority was on 29.03.2019. Further, when insolvency resolution failed and the liquidation process began, the NCLT passed an order on 25.04.2019 imposing moratorium under Section 33(5) of the IBC. It is only after this order that the respondent issued a notice under Section 72 of the Customs Act against the Corporate Debtor. The various demand notices have therefore clearly been issued by the respondent after the initiation of the insolvency proceedings, with some notices issued even after the liquidation moratorium was imposed. 45. We are of the clear opinion that the demand notices to seek enforcement of custom dues during the moratorium period would clearly violate the provisions of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC, as the case may be. This is because the demand notices are an initiation of legal proceedings against the Corporate Debtor. However, the above analysis would not be complete unless this Court examines the extent of powers which the respondent authority can exercise during the moratorium period under the IBC. 46. In the above context, the judgment of this Court in S.V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande, AIR 1972 SC 878 , is extremely relevant. In that case, this Court, while expounding the interplay of Section 446 of the Companies Act 1956 (bankruptcy provision) with the Income Tax Act, 1961, held as follows: “17. 46. In the above context, the judgment of this Court in S.V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande, AIR 1972 SC 878 , is extremely relevant. In that case, this Court, while expounding the interplay of Section 446 of the Companies Act 1956 (bankruptcy provision) with the Income Tax Act, 1961, held as follows: “17. …Looking at the legislative history and the scheme of the Indian Companies Act, particularly the language of Section 446, read as a whole, it appears to us that the expression “other legal proceeding” in sub-section (1) and the expression “legal proceeding” in sub-section (2) convey the same sense and the proceedings in both the sub-sections must be such as can appropriately be dealt with by the winding up court. The Income Tax Act is, in our opinion, a complete code and it is particularly so with respect to the assessment and reassessment of income tax with which alone we are concerned in the present case. The fact that after the amount of tax payable by an assessee has been determined or quantified its realisation from a company in liquidation is governed by the Act because the income tax payable also being a debt has to rank pari passu with other debts due from the company does not mean that the assessment proceedings for computing the amount of tax must be held to be such other legal proceedings as can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court under Section 446 of the Act. The liquidation court, in our opinion, cannot perform the functions of Income Tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax payable by the assessees even if the assessee be the company which is being wound up by the Court. The orders made by the Income Tax Officer in the course of assessment or reassessment proceedings are subject to appeal to the higher hierarchy under the Income Tax Act. There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Supreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commissioner of Income Tax. It would lead to anomalous consequences if the winding up court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assess the company to income tax. It would lead to anomalous consequences if the winding up court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assess the company to income tax. The argument on behalf of the appellant by Shri Desai is that the winding up court is empowered in its discretion to decline to transfer the assessment proceedings in a given case but the power on the plain language of Section 446 of the Act must be held to vest in that court to be exercised only if considered expedient. We are not impressed by this argument. The language of Section 446 must be so construed as to eliminate such startling consequences as investing the winding up court with the powers of an Income Tax Officer conferred on him by the Income Tax Act, because in our view the legislature could not have intended such a result. 18. The argument that the proceedings for assessment or reassessment of a company which is being wound up can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court is also, on the scheme both of the Act and of the Income Tax Act, unacceptable. We have not been shown any principle on which the liquidation court should be vested with the power to stop assessment proceedings for determining the amount of tax payable by the company which is being wound up. The liquidation court would have full power to scrutinise the claim of the revenue after income tax has been determined and its payment demanded from the liquidator. It would be open to the liquidation court then to decide how far under the law the amount of income tax determined by the Department should be accepted as a lawful liability on the funds of the company in liquidation. At that stage the winding up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors under the Act. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that at the Bar no English decision was brought to our notice under which the assessment proceedings were held to be controlled by the winding up court. At that stage the winding up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors under the Act. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that at the Bar no English decision was brought to our notice under which the assessment proceedings were held to be controlled by the winding up court. On the view that we have taken, the decisions in the case of Seth Spinning Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation) (1962) 46 ITR 193 (Punj) (Supra) and the Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation) (1968) 68 ITR 295 (Mys) (supra) do not seem to lay down the correct rule of law that the Income Tax Officers must obtain leave of the winding up court for commencing or continuing assessment or reassessment proceedings.” 47. Therefore, this Court held that the authorities can only take steps to determine the tax, interest, fines or any penalty which is due. However, the authority cannot enforce a claim for recovery or levy of interest on the tax due during the period of moratorium. We are of the opinion that the above ratio squarely applies to the interplay between the IBC and the Customs Act in this context. 53. The NCLAT, by deciding the question of passing of title from the Corporate Debtor to the respondent authority, has clearly ignored the mandate of Section 72(2) of the Customs Act relating to sale. This interpretation of the NCLAT clearly ignores the effects of the moratorium under Sections 14 and 33(5) of the IBC. The fact is that the duty demand notice and notice under Section 72(2) of the Customs Act, were issued during the moratorium period, which has been completely ignored by NCLAT and has resulted in rendering the moratorium otiose. 54. The interpretation provided by the NCLAT, regarding the deemed transfer of title of the goods from the assessee to the Customs Authority under Section 72 of the Customs Act, would fly in the face of Section 14 of the IBC, read with Sections 25 and 33(5). Moreover, such deemed transfer cannot be countenanced in law as the same would be in breach of Article 300A of the Constitution, as properties are deemed to be transferred to the Customs Authority without there being adequate hearing or any adjudication of any form. Such an interpretation cannot be accepted by this court.” 14. It would appear that paragraphs no. Moreover, such deemed transfer cannot be countenanced in law as the same would be in breach of Article 300A of the Constitution, as properties are deemed to be transferred to the Customs Authority without there being adequate hearing or any adjudication of any form. Such an interpretation cannot be accepted by this court.” 14. It would appear that paragraphs no. 36 and 37 being the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the scope and extent of moratorium under Section 14 as well as Section 33(5), would be relied upon by this Court in support of the observations in the preceding paragraph. Paragraph no. 38 the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the overriding effect of the I & B Code by virtue of Section 238 thereof against any inconsistent law in force. 14.1 The Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a question with regard to interplay between Section 142A of the Customs Act and Section 238 of the I & B Code and whereas while the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that the Customs Act and I & B Code act in their own spheres and in case of any conflict, I & B Code would prevail yet, the Hon’ble Supreme Court goes on to harmoniously interpret the legislation to find whether there is any conflict in operation of both the enactments. The Hon’ble Supreme Court thereafter relying upon decision in case of S.V. Kondakar, Official Liquidator vs. V.M. Deshpande, Income Tax Officer reported in AIR 1972 SC 878 observes that while the respondent – Department could initiate assessment or reassessment of dues and other levies they cannot transgress the boundaries and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 35 of the I & B Code. 14.2 Taking a cue from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while it would appear to this Court that the company in liquidation had purchased agricultural land and whereas the same is barred under Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, more particularly since the said section prohibits transfer to a non-agriculturist. 14.2 Taking a cue from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while it would appear to this Court that the company in liquidation had purchased agricultural land and whereas the same is barred under Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, more particularly since the said section prohibits transfer to a non-agriculturist. It also appears that under Section 84(C) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, the State is empowered to hold an inquiry to find out whether a transfer or acquisition is valid or not and in case the transfer or acquisition is declared to be invalid then while the parties have an option of restoring the position prevailing before the transfer or acquisitions, if such restoration is not done within the specified time period, then the land is directed to be deemed to vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. 15. Having observed as above, it would also be pertinent to mention that the notices impugned in the present petition, envisage an inquiry being carried out by the Mamlatdar concerned, to find out whether the transfer or acquisition is valid or not. The notices, initiating a legal proceeding would be in contravention of the moratorium under Section 33(5) of the I & B Code but then to this Court it would appear that the issue would not rest at that. 15.1 While the notices issued under Section 84(C) may be in contravention of the moratorium which would kick in upon order of the liquidation being passed as per Section 33(5) of the I & B Code, yet, the aspect which would require further consideration, is whether the company would have an absolute right to transact the properties in question, irrespective of the statutory limitations upon the property as imposed under the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. To this Court it would appear that while the I & B Code, inter alia envisages a moratorium to be imposed even upon a liquidation order being passed and whereas the Act prohibits initiation of any legal proceedings by or against the Corporate Debtor but at the same time, the provisions, cannot be read to mean that any moratorium imposed would be for all times to come. The entire object of issuing the moratorium is to aid the liquidation process, but none of the provisions envisage that upon the liquidation process commencing, all assets of the Corporate Debtor would be free from the encumbrance which had neither to existed prior to the order of initiation of the liquidation process. 15.2 Undoubtedly while Section 238 envisages overriding effect of the provisions of I & B Code, over any other inconsistent law yet, to this Court it would appear that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and I & B Code more particularly since both operate in their own separate spheres. The moratorium as noticed hereinabove, does not envisage that the assets of the company in liquidation, i.e. insofar as the present case is concerned the lands in question, would be free from all encumbrances upon the moratorium kicking in. Thus while the impact of the moratorium under Section 33(5) would be a bar against institution of legal proceedings against the Company in liquidation, yet the said provision cannot be given so wide an interpretation to mean that the legal encumbrances on the assets of Company in liquidation before the liquidation order is passed would get obliterated. A fair reading of Section 33(5) along with the an overall conspectus of the I & B Code, in light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sundresh Bhatt, liquidator of ABG Shipyard vs. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (supra) would mean that while there may be legal encumbrances existing against the assets of the Corporate Debtor, action under the relevant law could not be initiated after the order of liquidation is passed. While the encumbrances would not vanish or obliterate, they would continue attached with the assets till the liquidation process is complete or the assets change hands. Thus the bar of Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 would remain as it is and whereas upon the liquidation process being complete or the lands changing hand, the authorities exercising power under the Gujarat Tenancy and Agriculture Land Acts would be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings under the said Act. 16. Thus the bar of Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 would remain as it is and whereas upon the liquidation process being complete or the lands changing hand, the authorities exercising power under the Gujarat Tenancy and Agriculture Land Acts would be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings under the said Act. 16. Again to this Court it would appear that unlike the Customs Act which require an assessment or determination of quantum of duties and other levies, Section 84(C) is a provision where the parties would have to substantially agitate as regards their rights to have purchased the property and whereas upon the Mamlatdar coming to a conclusion that the property was invalidly purchased, the consequences as observed hereinabove would follow. Again it would appear that any further action by the Mamlatdar would require the petitioner to participate and whereas the same would being in clear contravention of Section 33(5) of the I & B Code. Thus the position which would emerge is that while the State authorities would not be empowered to initiate proceedings under Section 84(C) upon the moratorium under Section 33 (5) of the I & B Code kicking in, yet, the moratorium or the liquidation process, would in no manner be treated as being imposed for all times to come and upon the land being released from the scope of the liquidation process, it would always be open for the State to re-initiate action under Section 84(C) of the Act. 17. The operation of both the enactments, i.e the I & B Code and the Tenancy Act, explained in the context of the fact situation would indicate that there does not exist any inconsistency in the Tenancy Act as regards any provisions of the I & B Code and consequentially, there would not any question of any overriding effect. 18. Considering the above aspects, and having perused the auction notices, it would appear to this Court that the E-auction is conducted on “AS IS WHERE IS”, “AS IS WHAT IS BASIS”, “WHATEVER THERE IS BASIS” and “NO RECOUSE (sic RECOURSE) BASIS”. 18. Considering the above aspects, and having perused the auction notices, it would appear to this Court that the E-auction is conducted on “AS IS WHERE IS”, “AS IS WHAT IS BASIS”, “WHATEVER THERE IS BASIS” and “NO RECOUSE (sic RECOURSE) BASIS”. To this Court it would appear that when auction notices are totally clear on the said aspect, it would be for the prospective participants in the auction to verify title of the land in question and come to an informed conclusion as to whether they would want to participate in the auction or not. The only clarification required is that the auction purchaser, at a later stage may not be entitled to claim that by purchasing the property through the auction, he was entitled to an improved title over the land in question. This Court also clarifies that none of the observation as above shall be deemed as this Court having opined on the title of the land in question, either way and it is reiterated that it would be for the bidders to take an informed decision in that regard. Again to ensure that perspective buyers are aware about the present order, appropriate direction could also be issued, more particularly to ensure that there are further litigation could be avoided. 19. To this Court it would appear that the above clarification would suffice and whereas any further clarification being issued by this Court may have the potential to disturb the auction process consequently disturbing the liquidation process. 20. In view of the above discussion, observations and conclusions, the following direction are passed: [1] The impugned notices, 106 in numbers dated 31.07.2024 issued by the Mamlatdar and ALT, Jambusar are quashed and set aside. [2] The auction notice shall inform the prospective purchasers to refer to the present order of this Court. It is further observed that any prospective participant in the auction whereby the lands are sought to be sold would be under an obligation to examine the title an obligation to examine the title of the land and take an informed decision and whereas the shield of innocent/bonafide purchaser would not be available to the proposed purchaser. It is further clarified in this regard that none of the observations/directions may be treated as this Court having made any conclusive observation with regard to the validity of the legal encumbrances upon the land. It is further clarified in this regard that none of the observations/directions may be treated as this Court having made any conclusive observation with regard to the validity of the legal encumbrances upon the land. [3] It would be open for the State authorities to initiate proceedings for the self same purpose with regard to the lands in question upon the liquidation process coming to an end or upon lands being removed from the purview of liquidation. 21. With the above observations and directions the present petition stands disposed of as partly allowed.