JUDGMENT : 1. Impugned in this petition, filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, is an order of detention bearing No.PITNDPS-49 of 2023 dated 12.10.2023 [“impugned detention order?] passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Jammu [“the Detaining Authority”] whereby the petitioner has been placed under detention with a view to preventing her from indulging in repeated “illicit trafficking” in narcotics and psychotropic substances. 2. The impugned order of detention has been passed by the Detaining Authority in the exercise of power vested in it under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [“the PITNDPS Act”]. The detention of the petitioner is ordered primarily on the ground that she has been, over the time, consistently engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, in that, three FIRs i.e. (i) FIR No.364/2020 under 8/21/22 NDPS Act, (ii) FIR No.119/2022 under Section 8/21/22 NDPS Act, and (iii) FIR No.381/2023 under Section 8/21/22 NDPS Act stand registered in Police Station, Kathua and final reports in respect thereto have been submitted before the competent court of law after investigation. 3. On the basis of relevant material supplied by the District Police, the Detaining Authority arrived at subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is an incorrigible drug peddler and has been engaged in illicit trade of narcotics since the year 2020. She has been caught thrice in possession of illicit drugs and accordingly, FIRs were registered in the concerned Police Station. The Detaining Authority was aware that the petitioner has been enlarged on bail in all the three cases registered against her but was of the opinion that in case the petitioner is allowed to remain at large and her illicit activities remain unchecked there is every likelihood that the petitioner would expand her illegal trade to other areas of the Union Territory and spoil the life of the youth of the area. It is on the basis of this satisfaction drawn by the Detaining Authority, impugned detention order was passed and the petitioner was taken into preventive custody of the State. 4. The petitioner is aggrieved and has assailed the impugned order of detention, inter alia, on the following grounds:- i) That the detention of the petitioner ordered by the Detaining Authority is dehors the procedure laid down in PITNDPS and in violation of the constitutional safeguards available to a detenue. 4. The petitioner is aggrieved and has assailed the impugned order of detention, inter alia, on the following grounds:- i) That the detention of the petitioner ordered by the Detaining Authority is dehors the procedure laid down in PITNDPS and in violation of the constitutional safeguards available to a detenue. ii) That there is lack of application of mind by the Detaining Authority, in that, the Detaining Authority has not appreciated that the petitioner, though, involved in three FIRs for the commission of offence under NDPS Act was granted bail by the competent court of law despite the rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act. The State was not aggrieved by the release of the petitioner on bail and because of this reason chose not to seek either cancellation of the bail or challenge the same before higher forum. Non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority to the relevant material vitiates the subjective satisfaction and consequently the order of detention. iii) That the Detaining Authority did not provide adequate opportunity to the petitioner to make an effective representation. The communication of the Detaining Authority informing the petitioner of his right of making representation does not indicate the timeline within which such representation could have been made. This action on part of the Detaining Authority, it is submitted, violates the fundamental right guaranteed to the detenue under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India making the impugned order of detention liable to be quashed. iv) That the Detaining Authority has also failed to take into consideration the fact that the petitioner was, though, involved in three different cases of illicit traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, yet, the substantive law had adequately taken its course. Not only the petitioner was arrested in the cases but was later on, only after the competent Court of law intervened, granted bail on merits. In the absence of failure of the ordinary law of the land, the Detaining Authority could not have resorted to the draconian provisions of the law like PITNDPS. 5. Per contra, Mr. Amit Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents justifies issuance of the order of detention on the grounds enumerated in the grounds of detention served upon the petitioner. In the absence of failure of the ordinary law of the land, the Detaining Authority could not have resorted to the draconian provisions of the law like PITNDPS. 5. Per contra, Mr. Amit Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents justifies issuance of the order of detention on the grounds enumerated in the grounds of detention served upon the petitioner. In the reply affidavit filed by the Detaining Authority, it is submitted that the detention is neither a curative nor a punitive action but an anticipatory measure aimed at preventing antisocial and subversive elements from endangering the security of the nation or from disturbing the tranquility or from indulging in illicit traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 6. It is submitted that in the instant case the petitioner has been found indulging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances since 2020. Each time she comes out on bail, she indulges in the same activities yet again. This has happened on two occasions. The petitioner had been managing bail from the Courts on technical grounds and after being enlarged on bail repeating the same activities calculated to imperil the health and welfare of the people in general and young generation in particular. It is submitted that on apprehending that the petitioner, who has deep roots in the illicit trade and would expand her activities beyond the district of Kathua, detention of the petitioner under PITNDPS was found necessary and imperative. The Detaining Authority is on affidavit that the entire procedural safeguards were scrupulously adhered to and the petitioner was given adequate opportunity to make representation against her detention. However, she has chosen not to make any such representation and, therefore, cannot complain that she was not informed as to within what time she was entitled to make her representation. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, I am of the considered opinion that the order of detention impugned in this petition does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 8. The PITNDPS was enacted by the State legislature in the year 1988 with an object to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for matters connected therewith. 8. The PITNDPS was enacted by the State legislature in the year 1988 with an object to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for matters connected therewith. The term “illicit Traffic” is defined in Section 2(c) of the PITNDPS Act, which reads thus:- (c) “illicit traffic” means–– (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant ; (ii) cultivating the opium, poppy or any cannabis plant ; (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State or transhipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances ; (iv) dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances otherwise than as provided in sub-clauses (i) and(iii) ; (v) handling or letting any premises for use for any of the purposes referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) ; (vi) financing any activity by himself or through any other person in furtherance or in support of doing any of the aforesaid acts ; (vii) harbouring persons engaged in any of the activities specified in sub-clauses (i) to (vi) ; or (viii) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance or in support of doing any of the aforesaid acts, except to the extent permitted under the Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, or any rule or order made, or any condition of any licence, permit or authorisation issued thereunder” 9. Section 3 is a provision which confers power on the competent authority to make orders for detaining certain persons, which for ready reference is reproduced hereunder:- “3. Powers to make orders detaining certain persons. – (1) The Government or any officer of the Government, not below the rank of the Secretary to Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by the Government, may, if satisfied with respect to any person (including a foreigner) that, with a view to preventing him from committing any of the acts within the meaning of “illicit traffic” as defined in clause (c) of section 2, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) For the purpose of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.” 10. From a reading of Section 3, in light of the definition of “illicit traffic” given in Section 2(c) , it is evident that the competent authority vested with the powers of detention under Section 3 may pass an order of detention in the following manner:- i) That the detention order must be based on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. ii) It should be with a view to preventing the detenue from committing any of the acts falling within the meaning of “illicit traffic” under PITNDPS Act. iii) The prevention of the detenue must be in respect of committing the acts enumerated in Section 2(c) of the PITNDPS Act defining the term “illicit traffic”. 11. Engaging in production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption etc. etc. fall within the definition of “illicit traffic”. The subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority based upon relevant material is not subject to judicial review by the Court, in that, the Court hearing a challenge against the detention based on subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority cannot substitute its mind for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority nor can it adjudicate upon the validity or otherwise of the detention as if it is a Court of appeal. The law in this regard is well settled. It is only in a case where subjective satisfaction is vitiated by total non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority or the same is based on some extraneous or irrelevant material, the Court would be loath to interfere with the order of detention. 12. In the case of Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad. It is only in a case where subjective satisfaction is vitiated by total non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority or the same is based on some extraneous or irrelevant material, the Court would be loath to interfere with the order of detention. 12. In the case of Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad. AIR 2019 SC 3428 , Hon’ble Supreme Court after surveying the case law on the subject cautioned the Courts hearing detention matters in the following manner:- “The court must be conscious that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is “subjective” in nature and the court cannot substitute its opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and interfere with the order of detention. It does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is immune from judicial reviewability. By various decisions, the Supreme Court has carved out areas within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested.” 13. Viewed in the light of settled legal position, I am of the considered opinion that the subjective satisfaction drawn by the Detaining Authority in the instant case is not vitiated in view of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of judicial reviewability of subjective satisfaction. 14. Not only the Detaining Authority was aware that the petitioner was facing trial in three different cases registered under NDPS Act but was also conscious that in all the three cases the petitioner had been let off on bail. The relevant material in the shape of FIRs registered against the petitioner was before the Detaining Authority, on the basis whereof the Detaining Authority reached its subjective satisfaction that the remaining of the petitioner at large was detrimental to the health and welfare of the public in general and youth in particular. The Detaining Authority was well aware about the propensity of the petitioner to engage in illicit traffic of drugs and narcotics, which was well exhibited by her conduct of indulging in illicit traffic every time she came out on bail. 15. It is true that the police had not placed any material before the Detaining Authority to indicate that any effort was made by the prosecution to seek cancellation of the bail or challenge the orders of bail before the higher Courts, however, in the given facts and circumstances, this omission on part of the police would not vitiate the detention. 16. 16. It is writ large from the record that the petitioner has been indulging in illicit traffic of illicit drugs very cleverly. She has been trafficking illicit drugs in small quantity so that she could easily obtain bail from the Court without being caught by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such situation, challenge to the bail granted by the Court to the petitioner in respect of either a small quantity or an intermediate quantity of illicit drug would have been a futile exercise. 17. The grounds of detention clearly reflect proper application of mind by the Detaining Authority to all aspect of the matter and in particular the propensity of the petitioner in indulging in illicit trade of illicit drugs and narcotics. It cannot be disputed that the petitioner was first caught in the year 2020 with the possession of heroin weighing 2 gms and was later on enlarged on bail by the Court merely on the ground that the petitioner was allegedly found in possession of illicit drug of small quantity. She came out on bail and again indulged in the similar activities and was once again caught on 29.03.2022 and this time with 5-6 gms of heroin. It was again less than the commercial quantity and, therefore, she was let off on bail by the competent court of law. She came out on bail and again indulged in the illicit traffic. On 05.09.2023, she was caught with 2-4 gms of heroin, again a small quantity of contraband. She was again granted bail by the Court. Having regard to her past conduct and her continuous involvement in the illicit traffic without being deterred by registration of cases against her, the police authorities brought the entire material to the notice of the Detaining Authority. 18. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts. The Division Bench judgment in Athar Mushtaq Khan v. UT of J&K ( LPA No. 276/2022 decided on 26-03-2024) places strong reliance on Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and ors, (1984) 3 SCC 14 and Ameena Begum v. The State of Telangana and ors, (2023) 9 SCC 587 . Para 32 of Vijay Narain and para 51 of Ameena Begum are relevant and are thus set out below: (Vijay Narain Pratap v. State of Bihar) “32. Para 32 of Vijay Narain and para 51 of Ameena Begum are relevant and are thus set out below: (Vijay Narain Pratap v. State of Bihar) “32. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an Accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” (Ameena Begum v. The State of Telangana) “51. It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal proceedings where the Detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading top the impugned Detention Order. There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.” What is important in para 32 of Vijay Narain is the expression, „unless the material is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention?. Similarly in Ameena Begum the expression, “…..provision of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention order”, is a line significant in itself. 19. As noticed above, in the instant case where the petitioner had been very smartly indulging in trafficking of heroin of small quantity and the rigors of Section 37 of NDPC were not attracted, an application for cancellation of bail or for that matter filing of appeal or revision would have been an exercise in futility. 19. As noticed above, in the instant case where the petitioner had been very smartly indulging in trafficking of heroin of small quantity and the rigors of Section 37 of NDPC were not attracted, an application for cancellation of bail or for that matter filing of appeal or revision would have been an exercise in futility. Registration of three cases in a row and the propensity of the petitioner to repeatedly indulge in illicit traffic of small quantity of a contraband which fetches highest price in international market was material good enough to invoke PITNDPS. 20. The Detaining Authority, as is clearly apparent from the grounds of detention, applied its mind and reached subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is an incorrigible drug peddler and would not be deterred by the ordinary law of the land, therefore, it is imperative to place her under preventive detention with a view to preventing her from indulging in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 21. So far as the plea of the petitioner that she was not given adequate opportunity to make representation, in the given facts and circumstances, is without any merit. The petitioner does not dispute that she was informed to make representation to the government. Her grievance is only that she was not given the timeline within which she was to make representation. This argument could have held some substance provided it was the case of the petitioner that she made a representation but the same was not considered either by the Advisory Board or the Government as it did not reach the said authority in time. 22. In the instant case, the petitioner has chosen not to make any representation, as such, it is not available to her to contend that either she was not provided requisite material to make effective representation or she was not communicated the timeline within which the representation could have been made by her. 23. Viewed thus, I find no merit in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.