JUDGMENT : Hemant M. Prachchhak, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant – State of Gujarat (original complainant) under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31/07/2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dahod (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Sessions Case No.185 of 2006, whereby, the trial court has convicted the respondent No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and ordered to suffer rigorous imprisonment of two years and imposed fine of Rs.5,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, further rigorous imprisonment of six months, whereas, the trial court has acquitted the respondent Nos.2 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the IPC. The trial court also acquitted the accused – respondents herein for the alleged offence under Sections 306 and 114 of IPC. 1.1 At the outset, it may be noted that the respondent No.2 – Gangaben W/o. Laxmanbhai Mathurbhai Pithaya (original accused No.2), having expired pending the appeal, the appeal stands abated qua the said respondent No.2. Learned advocate for the respondents accused has produced copy of death certificate issued by the competent authority, which is taken on record. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that, according to complainant Sugraben, the marriage of deceased Hansaben had taken place with accused No.1 Dashrathbhai Laxmanbhai, resident of Dahod Tekri Dawakhana, Dahod according to custom of the society prior to seven years from the date of incident and she was not having any child during the wedlock. That, the marriage life of deceased Hansaben was going on smoothly and happily for a period of three years, but thereafter, she was subjected to cruelty by her husband as well as her father-in-law and mother-in-law on the ground of issue. It is further the case of prosecution that, prior to one month from the date of incident, daughter of complainant was to be examined by Gynecologist as she was not having any child and accordingly, she was beaten by her husband and sent back to her parental home for bringing money. At that relevant point of time, complainant had given consolation that she will inform to her son Ranjit for arrangement of money, and as such she was sent back to her in-laws’ house. At that relevant point of time, complainant had given consolation that she will inform to her son Ranjit for arrangement of money, and as such she was sent back to her in-laws’ house. Thereafter, on 15/07/2006, at about 7.30 hours, complainant had received a message on telephone that deceased Hansaben has committed suicide by way of strangulation and therefore, complainant Sugraben had filed the aforesaid complaint against respondents accused before Dahod Town Police Station, vide CR No. I-56 of 2006 for the alleged offences under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of IPC. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed and the same was registered as Criminal Case No.1848 of 2006. As the offences committed by the accused persons were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions as per the provisions of 209 of Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Judge committed the case to the Court of Sessions and the case was transferred and placed for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dahod, which was numbered as Sessions Case No.185 of 2006. Thereafter, charge was framed against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution had therefore examined several witnesses and produced various documentary evidences on the record of the case. 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that, the trial court after appreciating necessary evidence led by the prosecution, convicted the accused No.1 Dashrathbhai Laxmanbhai Pithaya for the alleged offence under Section 498(A) of IPC, whereas acquitted accused No.2 Gangaben W/o. Laxmanbhai Mathurbhai Pithaya and accused No.3 Laxmanbhai Mathurbhai Pithaya for the alleged offence under Section 498(A) of IPC. The trial court also acquitted accused No.1 Dashrathbhai Laxmanbhai Pithaya, accused No. 2 Gangaben W/o. Laxmanbhai Mathurbhai Pithaya and accused No.3 Laxmanbhai Mathurbhai Pithaya for the alleged offence under Sections 306 and 114 of IPC. 2.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal for the offence under Sections 306 and 114 of IPC, the appellant – State of Gujarat has filed the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. Heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms.Megha Chittaliya, appearing on behalf of the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr.M.A. Kharadi, appearing on behalf of the respondents – original accused. 4. 3. Heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms.Megha Chittaliya, appearing on behalf of the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr.M.A. Kharadi, appearing on behalf of the respondents – original accused. 4. Learned APP Ms.Chittaliya has submitted that marriage of deceased Hansaben had taken place with the accused No.1 – Dashrathbhai prior to seven years from the date of incident and their marriage life for four years was happy but thereafter, the deceased was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the accused No.1 and 2 being husband and mother-in-law as the deceased was not able to conceive child. She has submitted that even for the treatment purpose, the accused were demanding money from the parents of the deceased and therefore, they have committed the offence as alleged in the complaint, however, the trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its true and proper spirit while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC. She has submitted that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 also came to be acquitted by the trial court from the charges levelled against them for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC, which is absolutely erroneous, illegal and unjust. She has further submitted that it is an admitted fact that for the initial period of four years of the marriage span, there was no dispute or any quarrel and there was no allegations with regard to harassment or ill-treatment or torture but, since the deceased was not able to conceive any child, the deceased was subjected to mental and physical torture by the respondents accused and was also subjected to harassment and illtreatment by the respondents accused, however, this fact was not properly appreciated by the trial court while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 4.1 Learned APP Ms.Chittaliya has submitted that the prosecution has established the case against the respondents accused by leading the evidence of PW-1 - Sugraben being the informant, PW-2 – Prakashbhai being the brother of the deceased, PW-3 – Rangitbhai, PW-4 – Kanubhai being the uncle of the deceased and PW-6 – Lalitaben being the sister of the deceased who had supported the case of the prosecution and their depositions are in consistence and there was no any infirmity in their depositions, however, the trial court has not considered the evidence of those witnesses in its true and proper spirit while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal recorded against the accused persons. She has further submitted that independent witnesses have also supported the case of the prosecution and the prosecution was able to prove the case against all the respondents for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC, however, the trial court had considered the offence qua respondent No.1 only and not qua respondent Nos.2 and 3 and thereby, the trial court has committed a serious error of law and facts while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3. She has further submitted that the deceased was to be examined by a Gynecologist as she was not able to conceive child and accordingly, the deceased was beaten by her husband respondent No.1 and was sent back to her parental home for bringing money and thus, the deceased was mentally and physically harassed by the respondents accused and thus, committed an offence under Section 498A of IPC for which they are all equally liable, however, the trial court has discarded the evidence qua respondent Nos.2 and 3 and has believed the said evidence only qua respondent No.1 while passing the impugned judgment and order, thereby committing a serious error of law, which is completely erroneous, illegal and unjust. She has further submitted that the respondent No.1 was demanding money from the mother and brother of the deceased for the treatment of the deceased, which fact was proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and material evidence, however, the trial court has not considered the same. She has further submitted that the respondent No.1 was demanding money from the mother and brother of the deceased for the treatment of the deceased, which fact was proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and material evidence, however, the trial court has not considered the same. In support of her submissions, learned APP Ms.Chittaliya has referred and relied upon the decisions cited before the trial court and the same are also pressed into service before this Court and has urged that the present appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal be quashed and set aside. 5. As against that, learned advocate Mr.M.A. Kharadi, appearing on behalf of the respondents accused, has submitted that so far as the respondent No.1 – husband of the deceased is concerned, he has already undergone the period of sentence imposed by the trial court even before issuance of notice of admission by this Court, and so far as respondent Nos.2 and 3 are concerned, respondent No.2 – mother-in-law of the deceased, passed away during the pendency of the present appeal and respondent No.3 – father-in-law of the deceased, is now aged almost 70 years against whom there are no allegations found worth the name during the course of investigation or even while recording the evidence before the trial court. He has submitted that except the allegations with regard to house-hold that all the respondents were taunting the deceased, which are general in nature and no other allegations are made against the respondents, infact, the respondent No.3 was serving in Railway Department and till the age of reaching superannuation, he normally did not use to remain present at every occasion at every time and therefore, there was no reason for the respondent No.3 to give any mental or physical torture to the deceased but, in stroke of pain, common allegations are made against all the respondents accused by the complainant and her family members and therefore, after appreciating all these aspects and the evidence led before the trial court, the trial court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 of Cr.P.C., this Court may not interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court, unless and until if there is any irregularity or any perversity is found. He has further submitted that from the bare reading of the evidence, there is material contradiction and omission in the evidence of all the witnesses, which is proved from the deposition of PW-9 – Pratapbhai Punjabhai Asari, Dy.S.P. (Exh.-25). He has submitted that there are lot of exaggerations in the depositions of all the witnesses as the facts stated by them were stated for the first time before the trial court and they had not stated these facts before the concerned I.O. while recording their statements and the said facts were proved from the depositions of the PW-9 Dy.S.P. Asari who had initially investigated the offence which was registered as accidental death entry, and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has rightly considered the depositions of all the witnesses and passed the impugned judgment and order which in consonance with the settled principles of law and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in the present appeal. It is also submitted by the learned advocate Mr.Kharadi that now it is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. and entertaining an appeal against the order of acquittal, if the trial court has believed the probable defence and taken the view in favour of the accused normally while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 is not required to be disturbed and if there are two view possible then also, the view taken by the trial court after considering the deposition, after considering the oral as well as documentary evidence and after recording the demeanor of the witnesses, is not required to be interfered with. Learned advocate Mr.Kharadi has urged that the present appeal may not be entertained and the same be dismissed. 6. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the material placed on record. The issue involved in the present appeal is that, whether the trial court was right and justified in passing the impugned judgment and order, whether the trial court has committed any error while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses and whether it has committed any error while disbelieving and discarding the evidence led by the prosecution to prove the charge for the offence punishable under Section 498A read with Sections 306 and 114 of the I.P.C. or not. I have thoroughly examined the records of the trial court and I have also gone through the depositions of the witnesses and also considered the oral as well as documentary evidence recorded by the trial court. It is an undisputed fact that the marriage span of the deceased Hansaben and the respondent No.1 was more than 7 years. It is also an undisputed fact that the deceased was residing in joint family and during these 7 years, on earlier occasion there was no any quarrel or any grievance raised by the complainant or her family members against the respondents accused with regard to any cruelty or any mental or physical harassment or any ill-treatment mated out to the deceased. It is also an undisputed fact that the allegations qua demand of money for the purpose of treatment was made by the respondent No.1 and except this, there are no any allegations against other family members. It is also an undisputed fact that the accused No.3 was serving in the Railway Department and till reaching the age of superannuation, he was working in the Dahod Railway Division and he was residing in the Quarter allotted to him. It is also an undisputed fact that the near relatives of the deceased, who were residing in the nearby vicinity of the present respondents accused, were neither examined as witnesses nor their statements were recorded to prove the charge levelled against the present respondents accused with regard to any illtreatment or any mental or physical torture mated out to the deceased. 6.1 So far the contention raised by learned APP Ms.Chittaliya with regard to the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 are concerned, there are lot of exaggerations and omissions in their depositions, which is proved from the deposition of PW-9 and it has come on record that initially they had not stated the facts before the I.O. and they had stated before the trial court for the first time while they were deposing on oath. So far as the allegations against the respondent Nos.2 and 3 are concerned, the same are general in nature to the fact that the deceased was not able to conceive any child and therefore, she was given mental and physical torture and was ill-treated by the respondent Nos.2 and 3 and were taunting the deceased for the same and therefore, the trial court was right and justified in considering the evidence qua respondent Nos.2 and 3 while acquitting them from the charges levelled against them. So far as the allegations against the respondent No.1 with regard to demand of money is concerned, the trial court has rightly believed that the respondent No.1 had demanded the amount from his brother-in-law and mother-in-law for the purpose of giving treatment to the deceased Hansaben and for that the trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence and convicted the respondent No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 years and also imposed fine of Rs.5,000/-, which has had already undergone even before the issuance of notice of admission by this Court. It is also required to be noted herein that the deceased had committed suicide by hanging herself was immediately informed to the concerned police station and also to the family members of the deceased by the respondents and even at that relevant point of time, no complaint was filed by the complainant but, the same was filed after almost 6 or 7 hours after consultation with the family members and it was proved that after the deliberation of the family members, the present complaint was filed by the complainant and therefore, under such circumstances, there are all likelihood that the present complaint was an afterthought and it was filed by the complainant after deliberation of the family members, otherwise, in the marriage span of 7 years of the deceased and the respondent No.1, no such allegations of harassment were made by the complainant on earlier occasions and the complainant has also admitted that there was a cordial relationship between both the families and no untoward incident had taken place between both the families in past but, since the deceased was not able to conceive child and due to two miscarriages in the past, the deceased was not keeping good relationship with the respondent No.1 since last four years. Therefore, after considering all these aspects, the trial court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and order while considering the provisions of Section 498A, 306 and 114 of the IPC, which are reproduced hereunder : Section 498A-Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Section 306- Abetment of suicide.— If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 114-Abettor present when offence is committed.— Whenever any person, who is absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence. 6.2 So far as the contention raised by the learned APP Ms.Chittaliya with regard to the amount demanded by the respondent No.1 for the purpose of treatment of the deceased Hansaben is concerned, whether it can be considered as dowry under the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act. In my opinion, it cannot be considered towards dowry as it was demanded for treatment purpose as the deceased had two miscarriages in past and was not able to conceive child. So far as the ATM card is concerned, there are different versions on record. In my opinion, it cannot be considered towards dowry as it was demanded for treatment purpose as the deceased had two miscarriages in past and was not able to conceive child. So far as the ATM card is concerned, there are different versions on record. The complainant – mother of the deceased has stated that it was given to the respondent No.1, in fact, PW-3 Rangitbhai has stated before the trial court that it was given to another brother of the deceased that in case any additional amount is required then he can withdraw the amount and can give to the respondent No.1, therefore, the trial court was right in considering all these aspects while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses. It depends upon the psychological condition of the concerned person committing suicide and therefore, in the immediate past, there was no reason for the deceased to opt for such a harsh step of committing suicide by hanging herself. The Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court have time and again clarified that mere making general allegations qua household work and taunting, does not amount to mental or physical cruelty to the bride who commits suicide at matrimonial house, but the same is required to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the deceased has committed suicide at the matrimonial house after almost 7 years of marriage span and during these 7 years, there was no prior complaint or grievance raised by the complainant or by other family members of the deceased and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has not committed any error of law and facts while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. In view of the settled principles of law that when two views are possible and if the trial court has adopted the view which is in favour of the accused under normal circumstances, it may not be disturbed by the appellate court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court. 6.3 It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras – 37 to 40 as under:- “37. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: - "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [ Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: - "8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 39. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:- (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 6.4 So far as the offence under Section 306 of IPC is concerned, it would be fruitful to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in case of Nipun Aneja and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.654 of 2017 decided on 03/10/2024, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC from paragraph 13 onwards. 7. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the respondents accused stand cancelled. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.