JUDGMENT : (J.C. Doshi, J.) 1. The present First Appeal, under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is preferred by the appellant – original claimant being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and award dated 13.02.2007 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gondal in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.65 of 1999. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1 The brief fact of the present appeal is such that on 30.12.1998, the claimant was travelling in Rickshaw No.GJ-3X- 346 with his goods and going from Atkot to Mota Davda which was driven by opponent No.1 in rash and negligent manner. The driver of Rickshaw lost control over the vehicle and resultantly the vehicle turned turtle. The claimant sustained severe injuries out of the road accident. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr.D.R.Bhatt appearing for the appellant – claimant and learned advocate Mr.Nagesh Sood appearing for the Insurance Company. 4. In an appeal seeking enhancement of the compensation, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt would submit that the learned Tribunal despite believed that the claimant was mechanic and having garage to repair the vehicles, believed income of the claimant to Rs.2,400/- per month on the ground that the claimant has not produced any documentary evidence to suggest and prove his income. He would submit that the income part taken up by the learned Tribunal is on lower tier. He would submit that the claimant was just 22 years old at the time of road accident. He was running auto garage and according to pleading, the claimant was earning Rs.5,000/- per month. He would submit that looking to the facts and circumstances, learned Tribunal ought to have believed that the claimant was earning Rs.3,000/- per month and to calculate the compensation taking up that figure as income. He would further submit that the claimant suffered paraplegic injuries. He has become totally dysfunctional below waist and he has become 100% functionless, yet learned Tribunal believed functional disability of 75% of body as a whole. He pointed out that this is the second error committed by the learned Tribunal. Thirdly, he would submit that learned Tribunal considering the age of the claimant at 22 years, in view of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation - (2009) 6 SCC 121 , was required to take the multiplier of 18 instead of 17. Thirdly, he would submit that learned Tribunal considering the age of the claimant at 22 years, in view of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation - (2009) 6 SCC 121 , was required to take the multiplier of 18 instead of 17. He would further submit that learned Tribunal has also granted lesser amount under conventional head namely compensation for pain, shock and suffering. Even learned Tribunal has not assessed and granted compensation under the head of loss of marriage prospects as well as loss of life amenities. He would further submit that the learned Tribunal was grossly unjustified in not granting the compensation with regard to loss of future prospects as well. In view of above submissions, he submits to allow this appeal and to enhance amount of compensation. 5. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Nagesh Sood appearing for the Insurance Company would submit that the learned Tribunal has taken up monthly income of the claimant to Rs.2,400/- which is on higher side than the rate of minimum wage available at the time of road accident. Therefore the calculation of the claimant’s income was already on higher side and it need not be disturbed in this appeal. Therefore, he submits to dismiss this appeal. 6. Regard being had to the rival submissions of learned advocates for both sides, it is apt to note that the issue of road accident, involvement of the offending vehicle in the road accident, paraplegic injuries sustained by the claimant as a result of the road accident and he became functionless below waist on account of receiving the injuries are not in dispute. Since the Insurance Company has not challenged the impugned judgment and award fastening liability of the Insurance Company is also not in dispute. 7. In background of above, if we assess the fact situation available from the evidence on record to ascertain that whether learned Tribunal committed error in assessing the income figure less than what he ought to have? It is true that the claimant apart from pleading about his income has not produced on record any evidence to substantiate the income. The claimant himself entered into the witness box at Exhibit-32. It is true that the claimant apart from pleading about his income has not produced on record any evidence to substantiate the income. The claimant himself entered into the witness box at Exhibit-32. In crossexamination, learned advocate appearing for the Insurance Company except putting suggestion that he has not produced any documentary evidence to establish income of Rs.3,000/- to Rs.4,000/- from his garage work, has not raised any other question. In chief examination, the claimant has stated that he was running Bhakti Auto Garage at Aatkot and was earning gross income around Rs.4,000/- per month and his net income was around Rs.3,000/- per month. This statement though is challenged by the learned advocate appearing for the other side, what could be noticed that the fact of claimant earning income is not challenged. Moreover, the work the claimant doing is vehicle repairing and running auto garage is also not challenged. Status of claimant being skilled vehicle repairer is established by this evidence, which could by smart guesswork, allowed to presume income more than regular labourer. In nutshell, according to this Court, learned Tribunal has committed error in taking up income of Rs.2,400/- per month. According to this Court, the claimant’s income should be taken up at Rs.3,000/- per month as notional income in given facts and circumstances of the case. Another aspect which which could be noticed that learned Tribunal has taken up multiplier of 17 for assessing the future loss of income. In view of judgment of Sarla Verma (supra), since the claimant’s age was 22 years, the multiplier of 18 is required to be adopted. 8. The injury caused to the claimant out of the road accident resulted into permanent disablement is noted in medical certificate at Exhibit-38. It reads as under : “1. Compress with dislocation of spine D10 and D11. 2. Traumatic paraplegia both lower limb.” 9. The above injuries discloses that the claimant having received the fracture injuries on D10 and D11 in the spinal cord became paraplegic and his lower half of body has become nonfunctional. Even while he appeared in the Court for crossexamination, he was on wheel-chair. This aspect has been succinctly noted by the learned Tribunal in the deposition of the claimant at Exhibit-32. Learned Tribunal has taken up 75% permanent disablement. The finding is completely erroneous. Even while he appeared in the Court for crossexamination, he was on wheel-chair. This aspect has been succinctly noted by the learned Tribunal in the deposition of the claimant at Exhibit-32. Learned Tribunal has taken up 75% permanent disablement. The finding is completely erroneous. The claimant has become non-functional at the age of 22 years on the ground of paraplegia and therefore, he could be attributed 100% functional disablement. Loss of future prospects is also not granted by learned Tribunal which is another error on the part of the learned Tribunal. Since claimant was self employed and his age was around 22 years, compensation for loss of future prospects is capped at 40% of his income. 10. In case of Jithendran vs. New India Assurance Company Limited – AIR 2021 SC 5382 , in para 11 to 16, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “11. The Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of social welfare legislation and its provisions make it clear that the compensation should be justlydetermined. Justice A.P. Misra in Helen C. Rebello and Others v. Maharashtra SRTC and Anr., (1999) 1 SCC 90 , held the following on the contours of ‘just’ compensation, “The word “just”, as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having a large peripheral field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just.” A person therefore is not only to be compensated for the injury suffered due to the accident but also for the loss suffered on account of the injury and his inability to lead the life he led, prior to the life- altering event. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud speaking for a three judges’ bench in Jagdish Vs. Mohan and others, (2018) 4 SCC 571 makes the following relevant observation on the intrinsic value of human life and dignity that is attempted to be recognised, through such compensatory awards, “…the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law.” 12. The Courts should strive to provide a realistic recompense having regard to the realities of life, both in terms of assessment of the extent of disabilities and its impact including the income generating capacity of the claimant. In cases of similar nature, wherein the claimant is suffering severe cognitive dysfunction and restricted mobility, the Courts should be mindful of the fact that even though the physical disability is assessed at 69%, the functional disability is 100% in so far as claimant’s loss of earning capacity is concerned. 13. The extent of economic loss arising from a disability may not be measured in proportions to the extent of permanent disability. This aspect was noticed in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Anr., (2011)1 SCC 343 , where Justice R.V. Raveendran made the following apt observations: “10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced shows 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation.” 14. The test for determining the effect of permanent disability on future earning capacity involves the following 3 steps as was laid down in Raj Kumar5 and reiterated by Justice Indu Malhotra in Chanappa Nagappa Muchalagoda vs.Divisional Manager, New India Insurance Company Limited. “13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions 5Ibid 6 (2020)1 SCC 796 so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood.” 15. The above yardstick to be adopted in such exigencies was reaffirmed by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat in Pappu Deo Yadav vs. Naresh Kumar and others, (2020) SCC Online 752. The following was set out by the three Judges’ Bench: “13. The factual narrative discloses that the appellant, a 20-year-old data entry operator (who had studied up to 12th standard) incurred permanent disability, i.e. loss of his right hand (which was amputated). The disability was assessed to be 89%. However, the tribunal and the High Court re- assessed the disability to be only 45%, on the assumption that the assessment for compensation was to be on a different basis, as the injury entailed loss of only one arm. This approach, in the opinion of this court, is completely mechanical and entirely ignores realities. Whilst it is true that assessment of injury of one limb or to one part may not entail permanent injury to the whole body, the inquiry which the court has to conduct is the resultant loss which the injury entails to the earning or income generating capacity of the claimant. Thus, loss of one leg to someone carrying on a vocation such as driving or something that entails walking or constant mobility, results in severe income generating impairment or its extinguishment altogether. Likewise, for one involved in a job like a carpenter or hairdresser, or machinist, and an experienced one at that, loss of an arm, (more so a functional arm) leads to near extinction of income generation. If the age of the victim is beyond 40, the scope of rehabilitation too diminishes. These individual factors are of crucial importance which are to be borne in mind while determining the extent of permanent disablement, for the purpose of assessment of loss of earning capacity.” “20. Courts should not adopt a stereotypical or myopic approach, but instead, view the matter taking into account the realities of life, both in the assessment of the extent of disabilities, and compensation under various heads. In the present case, the loss of an arm, in the opinion of the court, resulted in severe income earning impairment upon the appellant. As a typist/data entry operator, full functioning of his hands was essential to his livelihood. In the present case, the loss of an arm, in the opinion of the court, resulted in severe income earning impairment upon the appellant. As a typist/data entry operator, full functioning of his hands was essential to his livelihood. The extent of his permanent disablement was assessed at 89%; however, the High Court halved it to 45% on an entirely wrong application of some ‘proportionate’ principle, which was illogical and is unsupportable in law. What is to be seen, as emphasized by decision after decision, is the impact of the injury upon the income generating capacity of the victim. The loss of a limb (a leg or arm) and its severity on that account is to be judged in relation to the profession, vocation or business of the victim; there cannot be a blind arithmetic formula for ready application. On an overview of the principles outlined in the previous decisions, it is apparent that the income generating capacity of the appellant was undoubtedly severely affected. Maybe, it is not to the extent of 89%, given that he still has the use of one arm, is young and as yet, hopefully training (and rehabilitating) himself adequately for some other calling. Nevertheless, the assessment of disability cannot be 45%; it is assessed at 65% in the circumstances of this case.” 16. As noted earlier, the impact on the earning capacity for the claimant by virtue of his 69% disability must notbe measured as a proportionate loss of his earning capacity. The earning life for theappellant is over and as such his incomeloss has to be quantified as 100%. There is no other way to assess the earning loss since the appellant is incapacitated for life and is confined to home. In such circumstances, his loss of earning capacity must be fixedat 100%.As his monthly incomewas Rs.4,500/-, adding 40% future prospect thereto,the monthly loss of earning is quantified as Rs.6,300/-. We therefore deem it appropriate to quantify Rs.13,60,800/- (Rs.6,300 x 12 x 18) as compensation for 100% loss of earning for the claimant. Accordingly, under this head, the amount awarded by the High Court is enhanced proportionately.” 11. In view of above, since the claimant has been incapacitated to do any work, his income loss has to be assessed at 100%. He is confined to home during his life time and while doing it loss of future prospects is required to be calculated. Accordingly, under this head, the amount awarded by the High Court is enhanced proportionately.” 11. In view of above, since the claimant has been incapacitated to do any work, his income loss has to be assessed at 100%. He is confined to home during his life time and while doing it loss of future prospects is required to be calculated. 12. Apart from above, perusal of the impugned judgment and award indicates that learned Tribunal has granted Rs.1,00,000/- towards pain, shock and suffering. The claimant having stayed in hospital for long time and having become non-functional for life time deserves compensation to be enhanced under the head of pain, shock and suffering to Rs.1,50,000/-, in view of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sri Lakshmana Gowda B.N. Vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another – 2023 Live Law (SC) 528. 13. As on account of injury, the claimant sustained 100% disablement of body as a whole has clipped the marriage prospect as his chance of having marriage has become bleak, this Court is of the opinion that for the loss of marriage prospects and loss of life amenities, the claimant deserves to be granted compensation which is assessed at Rs.1,00,000/-. In addition to that six months actual loss arrived at Rs.18,000/- (Rs.3,000/- x 6 months) is also required to be granted. 13. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chandramani Nanda vs. Sarat Chandra Swain and another – 2024 Live Law SC 803, held that the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal can not limit its relief to the amount claimed by the claimant in the claim petition to get the compensation. If the just compensation assessed stands on higher then the claim amount, it can be granted. It is held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under : “20. An argument is raised by learned counsel for the insurance company that the appellant has initially claimed a sum of 30,00,000/- and since the same Rs.30,0,0/- and since the same having been awarded to him by the High Court, no further enhancement is possible. We cannot accept this argument and it is duly rejected. It is a settled proportion of law, that the amount of compensation claimed is not a bar for the Tribunal and the High Court to award more than what is claimed, provided it is found to be just and reasonable. We cannot accept this argument and it is duly rejected. It is a settled proportion of law, that the amount of compensation claimed is not a bar for the Tribunal and the High Court to award more than what is claimed, provided it is found to be just and reasonable. It is the duty of the Court to assess fair compensation. Rough calculation made by the claimant is not a bar or the upper limit. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand Mahto.” 14. In view of above finding, the compensation which is to be granted to the claimant is reworked as under : Particulars Amount awarded by Tribunal Amount (Rs.) to be awarded Future loss of income =Rs.3,000/- + Rs.1,200/- (40% rise) =Rs.4,200 x 12 x 18 x 100% =Rs.9,07,200/- 3,67,200/- 9,07,200/- Loss of marriage prospects -- 1,00,000/- Pain, shock and suffering 1,00,000/- 1,50,000/- Actual loss of income 14,400/- 18,000/- Medical expenses 50,000/- 50,000/- Special diet, attendant charges, transportation 25,000/- 25,000/- Total… 5,56,600/- 12,50,200/- Less : Amount which is already awarded -- 5,56,600/- Additional amount which is awarded -- 6,93,600/- 15. Therefore, I hold that the claimant is entitled to get the enhanced compensation of Rs.6,93,600/- with 9% p.a. interest from the date of filing the claim petition till its realisation, which would meet the ends of justice. Rest of the direction(s) of the Tribunal remain same. 16. For the reasons recorded above, the following order is passed : 16.1 The present appeal is partly allowed. 16.2 The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced amount Rs.6,93,600/- with 9% p.a. interest from the date of claim petition till its realization before the concerned Tribunal, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 16.3 The Tribunal shall disburse the entire awarded amount lying in the FDR and/or with the Tribunal, with accrued interest thereon, if any, to the claimant, by account payee cheque / NEFT / RTGS, after proper verification and after following due procedure. 16.4 While making the payment, the Tribunal shall deduct the courts fees, if not paid, in accordance with rules/law. 16.5 Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Tribunal, forthwith.