JUDGMENT : SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner by means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has assailed the judgment and order dated 31.10.2023 passed by the Rent Authority/Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Meerut in Case No. 297 of 2022 (Computerized Case No. D202211520000297) (Devendra Kumar Rastogi Vs. Vishal Rastogi) and the judgment and order dated 11.03.2024 passed by the Rent Tribunal/District Judge, Meerut in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 487 of 2023 (Vishal Rastogi Vs. Devendra Kumar Rastogi). 3. The brief facts of the case are that respondent no. 3, who is landlord, instituted Case No. 297 of 2022 (Computerized Case No. D202211520000297) against the petitioner/tenant for eviction from the shop situated at Subhash Bazar, Mawana Kalan, Pargana Hastinapur, Tehsil Mawana, District Meerut (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) on the ground of need, and expiry of term of tenancy. 4. The Rent Authority/Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Meerut, respondent no. 2, found the need of the respondent no. 3 genuine. Consequently, it allowed the release application of the respondent no. 3 under Section 21 (2) (m) of The Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021') vide order dated 31.10.2023. 5. The petitioner/tenant, thereafter, preferred statutory appeal which was numbered as Misc. Civil Appeal No. 487 of 2023 (Vishal Rastogi Vs. Devendra Kumar Rastogi) before the Rent Tribunal, who affirmed the finding of the Rent Authority and dismissed the appeal by judgment and order dated 11.03.2024. 6. Challenging the aforesaid orders, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Rent Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the respondent no. 3 under Section 21 (2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 inasmuch as admittedly in the present case, no intimation with regard to the tenancy had been given by the respondent no. 3 to the Rent Authority as contemplated under Section 4 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, therefore, the orders impugned are without jurisdiction and are non est in law. 7. To elaborate the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed Section 38 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021. 3 to the Rent Authority as contemplated under Section 4 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, therefore, the orders impugned are without jurisdiction and are non est in law. 7. To elaborate the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed Section 38 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021. He submits that under Section 38 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act, 2021, it is provided that the jurisdiction of the Rent Authority shall be limited to tenancy agreement submitted to it as specified in the Schedule-I, and since in the present case, no intimation specifying the details given in Schedule-I with regard to the tenancy had been given by the respondent no. 3 under Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, therefore, the Rent Authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 21(2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 and remedy of the respondent no. 3 is to file regular civil suit in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Amit Gupta Vs. Gulab Chandra Kanodia in S.C.C. Revision No. 158 of 2022. It is submitted that in such view of the fact, the impugned orders cannot be sustained in law. 8. It is further contended that in the release application under Section 21 (2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, the respondent no. 3 has not made the prayer for eviction rather has prayed for declaring a vacancy of the suit premises, therefore, since no prayer for eviction has been made by the respondent no. 3, therefore, the Rent Authority as well as Rent Tribunal has erred in law in granting the prayer of eviction. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that this Court in the case of Amarjeet Singh Vs. Shiv Kumari Yadav (2024) 163 ALR 775 has held that where the tenancy is admitted, no information as contemplated under Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 is required to be given by the landlord to the Rent Authority. Shiv Kumari Yadav (2024) 163 ALR 775 has held that where the tenancy is admitted, no information as contemplated under Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 is required to be given by the landlord to the Rent Authority. It is contended that the judgment of this Court in the case of Amit Gupta (supra) has been considered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Amarjeet Singh, and this Court in almost similar circumstances held that the judgment of the Amit Gupta (supra) is of no help to the petitioner in that case. 10. It is submitted that following the judgment of Amarjeet Singh (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court decided a bunch of petitions leading of which was Writ (A) No. 2030 of 2024 (Alok Gupta Vs. District Judge/Rent Tribunal and Others). This Court followed the judgment of Amarjeet Singh (supra) and dismissed the bunch of writ petitions. 11. It is submitted that one Ankit Nanda preferred Writ (A) No. 1895 of 2024 which was also decided with the bunch of Alok Gupta case and he (Ankit Nanda) preferred Special Leave Petition numbered as Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 10671 of 2024 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the Apex Court dismissed the said Special Leave Petition vide order dated 13.05.2024. Thus, it is contended that since the judgment of Alok Gupta (supra) which is later in time has been affirmed by the Apex Court as Special Leave Petition has been dismissed by the Apex Court, therefore, the judgment of Alok Gupta (supra) being later in time may be followed by this Court and the judgment of Amit Gupta (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. 12. To the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the case of Alok Gupta (supra) as well as Amarjeet Singh (supra), this Court has not considered the effect of Section 38 of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Alok Gupta (supra) and Amarjeet Singh (supra) do not come to the rescue of the respondent no. 3. 13. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 14. The respondent no. 3. 13. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 14. The respondent no. 3 instituted Case No. 297 of 2022 under Section 21 (2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 in respect to the suit property. The Rent Authority allowed the release application of the respondent no. 3 and the order of the Rent Authority has been affirmed by the Rent Tribunal in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 487 of 2023. 15. Now, to appreciate the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be useful to reproduce Sections 4 & 38 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, which reads as under: “4. Tenancy Agreement: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, after the commencement of this Act, let or take on rent any premises except by an agreement in writing, which shall be informed to the Rent Authority by the landlord and tenant jointly, in the form specified in the First Schedule within a period of two months from the date of tenancy agreement: Provided that in cases or residential tenancies for a period of less than twelve months, the landlord and tenant shall not be required to inform the Rent Authority about such tenancy. (2) Where the landlord and the tenant fail to jointly inform the execution of the tenancy agreement referred to in Sub-Section (1), the landlord and tenant shall separately inform the execution of tenancy agreement to the Rent Authority within a period of one month from the date of expiry of the period specified in Sub-Section (1). (3) Where, in relation to a tenancy created before the commencement of this Act: (a) if an agreement in writing was entered into between the landlord and the tenant, they shall jointly present a copy thereof to the Rent Authority within three months of the commencement of this Act. (3) Where, in relation to a tenancy created before the commencement of this Act: (a) if an agreement in writing was entered into between the landlord and the tenant, they shall jointly present a copy thereof to the Rent Authority within three months of the commencement of this Act. (b) if no agreement in writing was entered into, the landlord and the tenant shall enter into an agreement in writing with regard to that tenancy and present the same to the Rent Authority within three months of the commencement of this Act: Provided that where the landlord or the tenant fail to present jointly a copy of the tenancy agreement or fail to reach an agreement within specified period, such landlord and tenant shall separately file the particulars about such tenancy with the Rent Authority within one month from the date of expiry of period mentioned in clause (b) above, in the form specified in First Schedule. If the landlord has submitted his particulars within the specified period but tenant fails to submit such particulars, the landlord may file an application for eviction on this ground alone: Provided further that during such eviction proceedings, the Rent Authority shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, decide interim rent payable by the tenant during such adjudication. (4) The State Government shall, put in place a digital platform in the Hindi or English language for enabling submissions of document in such form and manner as may be prescribed. (5) The Rent Authority shall, after receiving information about the execution of tenancy agreement along with the documents specified in the First Schedule, provide a unique identification number to the parties. (6) The terms of authorization of the property manager, if any, by the landlord to deal with the tenant shall be such as agreed to by the landlord and tenant in that behalf in the tenancy agreement. (7) The information provided under Sub-Sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be conclusive proof of the facts relating to tenancy and matters connected therewith, and in the absence of any statement of information, the landlord may file an application for eviction on this ground alone. 38. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Barred in respect of certain matters.-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the provisions of this Act. 38. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Barred in respect of certain matters.-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the provisions of this Act. (2) The jurisdiction of the Rent Authority shall be limited to tenancy agreement submitted to it as specified in the First Schedule and shall not extend to the question of title or ownership of premises.” 16. Emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 4 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 to contend that since under the said Provision, an intimation with regard to tenancy has to be given to the Rent Authority, but in the present case, since admittedly no tenancy agreement as specified in the Schedule-I is in existence, and Section 38 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 specifically provides that jurisdiction of the Rent Authority is limited to tenancy agreement submitted to it as specified in the Schedule-I, therefore, the Rent Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the respondent no. 3. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1170 to contend that if Section 4 of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 is interpreted in a manner that the default on the part of the landlord in not intimating tenancy particulars does not bar the filing of eviction suit under the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, that would defeat the object of Section 38 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, therefore, this Court may not interpret Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 in a manner which may lead to a situation where Section 38 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 becomes redundant. 18. This Court in Amit Gupta (supra) has held that when the landlord has submitted the details as per Schedule-I, but the tenant has failed to discharge its obligation as per Proviso to Section 4 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, then landlord can seek eviction of tenant on this ground. 18. This Court in Amit Gupta (supra) has held that when the landlord has submitted the details as per Schedule-I, but the tenant has failed to discharge its obligation as per Proviso to Section 4 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, then landlord can seek eviction of tenant on this ground. However, if the landlord fails to do so and the tenant also does not comply with Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, no eviction of the tenant has been provided for under the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021. Consequently, this Court in the case of Amit Gupta (supra) concluded that in such a situation the jurisdiction of the Rent Authority is ousted and the remedy of the landlord/ respondent is to institute a regular suit for eviction. 19. The judgment of Amit Gupta (supra) was considered by this Court in the case of Amarjeet Singh (supra) and this Court distinguished the said judgment as the judgment of Amit Gupta (supra) did not notice Section 4 (7) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021. Paragraph nos. 11 to 14 of the judgment of the Amarjeet Singh (supra) are reproduced herein-below: “11. A conjoint reading of the various Sub-Sections of Section 4 of the Act reveals that the intention of legislature for requiring both the landlord and the tenant to inform to the Rent Authority in the form specified in the First Schedule within a certain time frame is to treat the information as conclusive proof of the facts relating to the tenancy and matters connected with it. It does not appear to be the sine qua non for maintaining an application under Section 21 (2) of the Act. Where the tenancy is admitted, in the opinion of the Court, no such information as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act is warranted. Where the tenancy or its terms are disputed, it is always open for the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases before the respective authorities. 12. Ms. Where the tenancy is admitted, in the opinion of the Court, no such information as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act is warranted. Where the tenancy or its terms are disputed, it is always open for the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases before the respective authorities. 12. Ms. Shalini Goel, learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Amit Gupta v. Gulab Chandra Kanodia, SCC Revision No. 158 of 2022 decided on 15.5.2023 to submit that the Court in Para 96 of the said decision has observed that the jurisdiction of the Rent Authority under the 2021 Act is limited to dispute relating to Tenancy Agreement submitted to it as specified in the First Schedule. If no agreement in writing as per Section 4 (3) has been submitted, then the tenant can be evicted only In one condition that is where landlord has submitted details as per First Schedule, but the tenant has failed to discharge his obligation vide proviso to Section 4 (3) of the 2021, Act. However, if the landlord also fails and so also the tenant to comply with Section 4 (3), no eviction of the tenant has been provided for. The observation is being quoted hereunder: “96. In earlier part of this judgment, I have already referred to scope and ambit of the provisions of the new Tenancy Act, 2021 with reference to individual sections therein and I have also discussed the tenancy agreement referrable to Section 4 of the new Act. During discussion in respect of point no. (a) above, I found, while 11 months unwritten agreement tenancy was conceived under the new Act but the remedial aspects so as to enable landlord to seek eviction of tenant had not been touched by the legislature. Section 38(2) defines jurisdiction of Rent Authority and limits it to dispute relating to tenancy agreement submitted to it as specified in the first schedule. First schedule agreements are there that create tenancy after new Tenancy Act has come into existence and also the written tenancy agreements that were in existence when the new Act came into force, provided such agreements were submitted to the Rent Authority as per Section 4(3) of the new Act. First schedule agreements are there that create tenancy after new Tenancy Act has come into existence and also the written tenancy agreements that were in existence when the new Act came into force, provided such agreements were submitted to the Rent Authority as per Section 4(3) of the new Act. The word “tenant” though includes old tenant at the time of enforcement of the new Act vide Section 2(j) but only for agreement in writing as per Rule 4 (3) and if there is no agreement in writing as per Rule 4(3), such tenant can be evicted only in one condition that is where land lord has submitted details as per first schedule but tenant has failed to discharge his part of obligation vide proviso to Section 4(3) of the new Tenancy Act. However, if land lord also fails and so also the tenant to comply with Section 4(3), no eviction of tenant has been provided for.” 13. I have gone through the observation made by the co-ordinate Bench in the decision cited by Ms. Shalini Goel. In the case cited, the issue before the Court were: “(a) Whether a Small Cause Suit already instituted, since prior to coming into force of the new Tenancy Act, 2021 and so also such SCC revision arising therefrom would stand saved or the SCC suit and SCC Revision being not mentioned in the repeal and saving clause of Section 46, the proceedings of such suit and revision would stand abated. (b) Whether the bar created under Section 38 of the Tenancy Act is not an absolute one and so Small Cause Suit for arrears of recovery of Rent and Eviction (SCC Suit) and SCC Revision arising therefrom would still be maintainable even after the enforcement of the New Tenancy Act, 2021 qua the of tenancies not covered by tenancy agreements provided for under Tenancy Act, 2021.” 14. The issued urged in this petition is as to whether information to the Rent Authority in form specified in the First Schedule by the landlord is a sine qua non for maintaining an application under Section 21 (2) of the Act. The observation made by the co-ordinate Bench reproduced hereinabove does not help the petitioner inasmuch as, it ignores the import of Section 4 (7) of the Act. The import of the Section 4 has been explained in the preceding paras of this order.” 20. The observation made by the co-ordinate Bench reproduced hereinabove does not help the petitioner inasmuch as, it ignores the import of Section 4 (7) of the Act. The import of the Section 4 has been explained in the preceding paras of this order.” 20. The Coordinate Bench of this Court again following the judgment of Amarjeet Singh (supra) decided the Bunch of writ petitions, leading of which was Writ Petition No. 2030 of 2024, Alok Gupta Vs. District Judge/Rent Tribunal (supra) and in paragraph-22 of the judgment, it held that though Section 4 visualizes a situation where a tenant fails to comply with provisions of submitting particulars giving the landlord a ground to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in submitting the particulars, but the provision is silent about the outcome of the default at the instance of the landlord. This Court held that the intention of legislature is obvious that it would not affect the rights of the landlord to file application for eviction of tenant. Paragraph nos. 22 & 23 of the judgment of Alok Gupta (supra): 22. Sub-Section (3) relates to a tenancy created before the commencement of the Act. Sub-Clause (a) thereof deals with a situation where an agreement in writing was entered between the landlord and tenant in which case they shall jointly present a copy thereof to the Rent Authority within three months of the commencement of the Act. Sub-Clause (b) on the other hand deals with a situation where no agreement in writing was entered into between landlord and tenant in which case they shall enter into an agreement in writing with regard to that tenancy and present the case to the Rent Authority within three months of the commencement of the Act. The proviso takes into consideration a situation where the landlord or the tenant fail to present jointly a copy of the Tenancy Agreement or fail to reach agreement within specified period such landlord and tenant shall separately file the particulars about such tenancy with the Rent Authority within one month from the date of expiry of the period mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-Section 3 of Section 4 in the Form specified in First Schedule. If the landlord has submitted his particulars within the time specified but the tenant fails to submit such particulars, the landlord may file an application for eviction of the tenant on that ground alone. Though the provision visualizes a situation where a tenant fails to comply with provisions of submitting particulars giving the landlord a ground to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in submitting the particulars but the provision is silent about the outcome of a default at the instance of the landlord. The intention of the legislature is obvious that it would not affect the rights of the landlord to file for eviction of the tenant. Sub Clause 4 deals with providing the digital platform in Hindi and English enabling submission of the documents in such form and manner prescribed. The Sub-Section (5) of Section 4 provides that the Rent Authority after receiving information about the execution of Tenancy Agreement along with the documents specified in the First Schedule shall provide a Unique Identification Number to the parties. The Sub-Section (6) of Section 4 provides that the terms of authorization of the Property Manager, if any, by the landlord to deal with the tenant shall be as agreed to by the landlord and tenant in the Tenancy Agreement. Sub-Section (7) of Section 4 provides that the information provided under Sub-Sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be conclusive proof of the facts relating to tenancy and matters connected therewith and in absence of any statement of information, the landlord may file an application for eviction on this ground alone. 23. A conjoint reading of the various Sub-Sections of Section 4 of the Act reveals that the intention of legislature for requiring both the landlord and the tenant to inform to the Rent Authority in the form specified in the First Schedule within a certain time frame is to treat the information as conclusive proof of the facts relating to the tenancy and matters connected with it. It does not appear to be the sine qua non for maintaining an application under Section 21 (2) of the Act. Where the tenancy is admitted, in the opinion of the Court, no such information as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act is warranted. It does not appear to be the sine qua non for maintaining an application under Section 21 (2) of the Act. Where the tenancy is admitted, in the opinion of the Court, no such information as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act is warranted. Where the tenancy or its terms are disputed, it is always open for the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases before the respective authorities.” 21. As noted above, the judgment of Alok Gupta (supra) was challenged by one of the petitioner Ankit Nanda in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 10671 of 2024 and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Apex Court vide order dated 13.05.2024. The order of the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition is reproduced herein-below: “We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned Judgments passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioners prays for six months' time to vacate the suit premises. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the suit premises shall be vacated by the petitioners on or before 31.10.2024 subject to payment of rent and arrears thereof. The petitioners shall hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondents on or before 31.10.2024 and shall not part with or create third party right therein. The petitioners shall file a usual undertaking in this regard within a period of two weeks from today before the Registrar. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The violation of the aforesaid terms would be treated as non-compliance of the order of this Court. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, is/are disposed of.” 22. The judgment of Amarjeet Singh (supra) was followed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Alok Gupta (supra) and the same has been affirmed by the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 10671 of 2024. In such view of the fact, the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Alok Gupta (supra) is binding upon this Court. 23. The judgment of the Alok Gupta (supra) has been sought to be distinguished by the petitioner on the ground that it had not considered the affect of Section 38 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021. 24. 23. The judgment of the Alok Gupta (supra) has been sought to be distinguished by the petitioner on the ground that it had not considered the affect of Section 38 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021. 24. It is pertinent to note that this Court has held that intention of the legislature was not to affect the rights of landlord to file an application for eviction by not providing any consequence in case of default at the instance of landlord in not intimating tenancy to the Rent Authority and the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Alok Gupta (supra) has been affirmed by the Apex Court. 25. One of the cardinal principle of interpretation of statute is that it should be interpreted and construed in the manner that achieves the object of the Act. Paragraphs no. 9 & 10 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo and Others, (1954) 1 SCC 122 are relevant in the context of the present case and are reproduced herein-below: “9. Viewing the question as a plain matter of construction, we find that when Section 33(2) was framed, those who passed it had in mind the desirability of excluding certain classes of persons from its scope and they chose to limit those classes to three. Therefore, in the absence of express provision to the contrary elsewhere, or unless it follows by necessary implication, the section must be construed to mean that those not expressly excluded are intended to be included. As government servants are not in the excluded categories it follows that so far as this section is concerned they are not disqualified from proposing and seconding a candidate's nomination. 10. Now, does Section 123(8) contain express provision to the contrary or can such provision be inferred by necessary implication? It is usual, when one section of an Act takes away what another confers, to use a non-obstante clause and say that “notwithstanding anything contained in section so and so, this or that will happen”, otherwise, if both sections are clear, there is a head-on clash. It is the duty of courts to avoid that and, whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.” 26. It is the duty of courts to avoid that and, whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.” 26. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chandra and Another vs. Mukund Lal and Others, (2002) 2 SCC 678 that the provision of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. 27. Now, this Court proceeds to consider the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of any tenancy agreement, whether the Rent Authority has the jurisdiction to decide the application filed by the landlord for eviction of tenant. 28. Proviso to Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 contemplates a situation where the landlord or tenant failed to present jointly a copy of the agreement or failed to reach the agreement within a specified time, such landlord or tenant shall separately file the particulars of such tenancy within one month from the date of expiry of period mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 in the form specified in the First Schedule. 29. The Proviso further contemplates that if the landlord has submitted such particulars within the specified period but the tenant fails to submit such particulars, the tenant may face consequence of eviction for not submitting the particulars as required under Proviso to Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the Act 2021. 30. The Proviso though provides the consequence where the landlord has furnished particulars of tenancy but the tenant has failed to furnish the particulars of tenancy by providing an additional ground to the landlord to evict the tenant, but no consequence has been contemplated in the Proviso in case of default committed by the landlord. 31. Now, to appreciate the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, let us take a case where the landlord and tenant failed to reach an agreement and particulars required to be furnished as provided under First Schedule of the Act No. 16 of 2021, has been furnished by the tenant but not by the landlord. 31. Now, to appreciate the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, let us take a case where the landlord and tenant failed to reach an agreement and particulars required to be furnished as provided under First Schedule of the Act No. 16 of 2021, has been furnished by the tenant but not by the landlord. In such a case, the Rent Authority has jurisdiction to entertain the application of the landlord for eviction of the tenant under Section 22 of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 despite there is no tenancy agreement between the landlord and tenant. So the Legislature has not contemplated to oust the jurisdiction of Rent Authority for deciding application of landlord for eviction where the landlord or the tenant has failed to reach agreement and intimation with regard to particulars of tenancy has been submitted by the tenant to the Rent Authority and there is no tenancy agreement. 32. It is pertinent to note that an agreement is a mutual understanding between the two or more parties that can be oral or written and explicit or implied. In India, both agreements whether oral or written are valid and fall under the ambit of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 33. The Delhi High Court in the case of Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Alag, AIR 1991 Delhi 315, held that an oral agreement is valid and enforceable as a contract. The paragraph no. 8 of the judgment is reproduced herein-below: “(8) Existence of a contract is sine qua non or the grant of relief of specific performance. The entire provisions of Specific Relief Act contained in Chapter II refer to contracts which can be specifically enforced or otherwise. As per the provisions of Section 2(h) of the Contract Act” an agreement enforceable by law is a contract”. Even in oral agreement can be a valid and enforcement contract. “Therefore, in the strict sense, it is not essential that a contract must be in writing. Where the parties contemplate a writing to complete the contract or where the contract is required by law or otherwise to be in writing, it will be necessary that the contract is reduced to writing. “Therefore, in the strict sense, it is not essential that a contract must be in writing. Where the parties contemplate a writing to complete the contract or where the contract is required by law or otherwise to be in writing, it will be necessary that the contract is reduced to writing. Further, where all the specific terms have been agreed upon and reduced into writing, the mere fact that it is stated that a formal contract will be executed, does not render the writing, in the first instance, to be of no avail. These are certain general principles regarding formation of contracts.” 34. The Apex Court in the case of Civil Appeal No. 6197 of 2000 Alka Bose v. Parmatma Devi & Ors. has also upheld the validity of an oral agreement. 35. So a tenancy agreement can be in writing or oral, and there is no express Provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 or it follows by necessary implication by reading the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 that it excludes and does not recognize oral tenancy agreement between the parties. 36. The expression ‘tenancy agreement’ submitted to it as specified in the First Schedule in Section 38(2) of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 must be construed to include the oral tenancy agreement and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Authority if the tenancy agreement has not been reduced into writing and there is an oral tenancy agreement between the parties. The jurisdiction of Rent Authority is not barred to decide the application of landlord for eviction even in cases where the landlord or tenant failed to reach an agreement and particulars of the tenancy has not been submitted either by the landlord or by the tenant. 37. Thus, it can be safely said that the legislature by incorporating term “tenancy agreement submitted to it as specified in the First Schedule” Section 38(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 did not bar the jurisdiction of the Rent Authority to entertain the application under Section 21(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 in case information specified in the Schedule-I relating to tenancy agreement has not been submitted to the Rent Authority. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the Rent Authority is vested with the jurisdiction to consider the application under Section 21 even in cases where no intimation as specified in the Schedule-I in respect to tenancy agreement is given to the Rent Authority as there is no tenancy agreement between the landlord or the tenant. 38. The only rider or limitation on the power of the Rent Authority is that it cannot enter into the question of title or ownership of the premises and its jurisdiction is limited only to the extent of determination of the rights of the parties in relation to tenant and landlord. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of merit. 39. So far as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 1961 (0) AIR (SC) 1170 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the said judgment has been rendered in a different factual backdrop and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 40. So far as the second argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is evident from the release application that the respondent/ landlord sought the eviction of the petitioner/tenant on the ground of need. If the relief in release application is read in the light of the facts stated in the application under Section 21 (2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021, it is evident that the respondent no. 3 sought eviction of the petitioner/tenant from the suit premises. In such view of the fact, it would be too technical to dismiss the application under Section 21(2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 on the ground that respondent no. 3 has sought the release of the suit premises. 41. The law is settled that the authority can grant a relief in the interest of justice, and in the present case, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not intend to reject the application under Section 21(2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 of the respondent no. 41. The law is settled that the authority can grant a relief in the interest of justice, and in the present case, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not intend to reject the application under Section 21(2) (m) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 16 of 2021 of the respondent no. 3 on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 42. Thus, for the reasons given above, the writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.