JUDGMENT : NIKHIL S. KARIEL, J. 1. Heard learned Senior Advocates Mr. Harin Raval and Mr. Mihir Thakore with learned advocate Mr. Chintan Champaneri for the petitioners, learned Advocate General Mr. Kamal Trivedi with learned AGP Mr. Vinay Vishen for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and learned Senior Advocate Mr. P.K. Jani with learned advocate Mr. Arpit Jani for the respondent No. 4 and learned advocate Mr. Kunal Nanavati for the respondent Nos. 5 to 7. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioners have challenged an order dated 16.03.2023 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Gujarat State, appointing the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 as Government Nominees in the Managing Committee of M/s. Kheda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., in exercise of power under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) 3. It is the case of the petitioners that they are elected members of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 Union. It is submitted that the respondent No. 4 is a Cooperative Society registered under the provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 and the Managing Committee/Board of Directors are the competent authorities to manage the affairs and the business of the society. It is submitted that under Section 80(2) of the Act, the State Government is empowered to nominate three representatives on the Managing Committee of Society. It is submitted that such nomination is subject to the condition that the State Government is required to form an opinion as regards the public interest involved, it is necessary and expedient to nominate the representatives on the Committee of society. It is submitted that the impugned order is bereft of any such opinion having been formed by the State Government. It is further submitted that the order in question, is in the teeth of decision of this Court between the petitioners and the official respondents dated 26.08.2022 in Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020. It is submitted that the order in question, being passed is in contravention of the applicable provisions of law and in complete contravention of the law laid down by this Court in the identical situation concerning the same Cooperative Society, therefore, this Court may intervene and set aside the order in question. 4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. It is submitted that the order in question, being passed is in contravention of the applicable provisions of law and in complete contravention of the law laid down by this Court in the identical situation concerning the same Cooperative Society, therefore, this Court may intervene and set aside the order in question. 4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raval for the petitioners would submit that the respondent No. 4-Union is being managed by a Managing Committee/Board of Directors and the election of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors, which was held on 29.09.2020 and the result was declared on 31.08.2020 and whereas the petitioners have been elected as Directors. It is submitted that there are 12 elected Directors from the Electoral Division and one elected representative elected by the individual members of the Union. It is submitted that while there is a provision under Bye-laws for nomination of one member by the Registrar and whereas there is also a provision for a representative of a financial institution to be present in Board, if financial assistance has been availed and since no financial support has been obtained, there are no representatives in the Managing Committee under the said head. It is submitted that Section 80(2) of the Act empowers the State Government to nominate its representatives, three in numbers to the Board of the society and whereas it is submitted that the precondition for such nomination is that the State Government should form an opinion that since there is public interest involved in operation of the society, it is necessary or expedient to nominate representatives of the State in the Board of the society. It is submitted that the representatives so nominated, have all rights, duties, responsibilities and liabilities as if the representatives had been elected to the Management Committee/Board of Directors. 5. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that vide the impugned order dated 16.03.2023, the State, through the respondent No. 2 herein i.e. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, has nominated respondent Nos. 5 to 7 as Government Nominees on the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 Union. It is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate that the order does not make out a case as regards the opinion formed by the State on the necessity or expediency to appoint such Government Nominees, based upon public interest involved in operation of the Society. 6. It is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate that the order does not make out a case as regards the opinion formed by the State on the necessity or expediency to appoint such Government Nominees, based upon public interest involved in operation of the Society. 6. Learned Senior Advocate in this regards, would submit that the respondent No. 4 Union has been registered in the year 1946 and since then there had not been any appointment of the Government Nominees in the Managing Committee of the respondent No. 4 Union. 7. It is submitted that as a matter of fact, vide an order dated 20.10.2020, the State through the Registrar had passed an order of appointing three nominees on the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 Union and whereas in a challenge inter alia to the said decision, vide an order dated 26.08.2022 in Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020, a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court had set aside the order of appointment of the said nominees. It is submitted that the order impugned in the present writ petition i.e. order dated 16.03.2023 suffers from the very same infirmities, which led to the earlier order of appointing three nominees dated 20.10.2020 being interfered with by this Court. 8. Learned Senior Advocate would draw the attention of this Court to the order dated 20.10.2020 and would compare the same with the present order impugned dated 16.03.2023 and would submit that the order impugned herein is identically similar to the order, which had been interfered with by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020. As a matter of fact, the learned Senior Advocate would compare both the orders and would submit that except for some minor modifications here and there, which otherwise would not lend any further legality to the decision, the impugned order is copied verbatim from the order, which had been set aside by this Court dated 20.10.2020. As a matter of fact, the learned Senior Advocate would compare both the orders and would submit that except for some minor modifications here and there, which otherwise would not lend any further legality to the decision, the impugned order is copied verbatim from the order, which had been set aside by this Court dated 20.10.2020. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while interfering with the order dated 20.10.2020, this Court vide decision dated 26.08.2022 in Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020, had observed that the order did not fulfill the requirements as set out in the statute i.e. Section 80(2) of the Act, namely the formation of an opinion by the State considering the public interest involved and further coming to a conclusion about there being a necessity and expediency to nominate representatives of the State on the Managing Committee/Board of Directors. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that since the order impugned is a verbatim copy of order dated 20.10.2020, therefore, the order suffers from the same lack of formation of opinion by the State Government as referred to hereinabove, which had led to order dated 20.10.2022 being interfered with by this Court. 9. Learned Senior Advocate would take this Court extensively to the decision of the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 26.08.2022 in Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020 and would submit that the learned Coordinate Bench having concluded that there was no opinion formed by the State as envisaged in Section 80(2) of the Act, therefore, the said decision, having regard to the fact that the present impugned order is a verbatim copy of the order impugned before the learned Coordinate Bench, would apply on all fours. 10. Learned Senior Advocate would also in this context rely upon decision of learned Coordinate Bench in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat, 2021 (4) GLR 3200 , whereby a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court had inter alia explained the scope and ambit of Section 80(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act, in relation to an identical fact situation, where the State had appointed nominees to the Board of Directors of a cooperative society without forming an opinion as regards the necessity and expediency to appoint the Directors considering the public interest involved. 11. 11. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that while order impugned is a verbatim copy of the earlier order in any case, it is submitted that the power of appointment of Government Nominees being circumscribed, there is a requirement of formation of opinion on both i.e. the public interest requiring such appointment and the necessity and expediency in view of the public interest. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while there is no formation of opinion on both the counts, the order also reflects complete lack of independent application of mind leading to the order being required to be struck down by this Court on ground of manifest arbitrariness. It is further submitted that the order has to speak for itself i.e. has to stand on its own legs and whereas no later explanation by the State could be tenable. It is submitted that since the order is nothing, but a verbatim copy of the earlier order, this Court may not countenance any explanation by the State as regards the tenability of the order impugned. 12. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the impugned order suffers from the defect of the State not having afforded opportunity of hearing to the Society before passing the impugned order. It is submitted that while the statute does not envisage a right of hearing, the same has been read into the provision by Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Amreli District Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat, 1984 (2) GLR 1244 . 13. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that while the State is relying upon a communication dated 14.03.2023 by the Chairman of the Managing Committee inter alia informing that the Union would not have any objection to appointment of Government Nominees and such appointment would be ratified in the next meeting of the Board of Directors, which was later followed up by ratification by the Union, yet according to the learned Senior Advocate would not be an alternative to the requirement of right of hearing, which has been read into Section 80(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while a part of the said decision i.e. Amreli District Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union (Supra) has been declared as devoid of any substance and overruled by a subsequent Full Bench decision of this Court in Laxminivas Cooperative Housing Society Vs. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while a part of the said decision i.e. Amreli District Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union (Supra) has been declared as devoid of any substance and overruled by a subsequent Full Bench decision of this Court in Laxminivas Cooperative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar, 2014 (3) GLR 2201 , but the overruling was with regard to the observations of Division Bench with regard to Section 24(1) of the Cooperative Societies Act and the observations with regard to Section 80(2) of the Act having not been interfered with, therefore, the same is still good law. Learned Senior Advocate in this regard, would further submit that as such, before consenting the Chairman of the Union, had not called for a meeting of the Board of Directors and the decision as could be made out, had not received consent of the Board. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that as such, the subsequent ratification by the Union i.e. post facto ratification is not a position, which is envisaged under the law. 14. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that in addition to the impugned order not showing the formation of opinion by the State on the necessity and expediency based upon public interest, the impugned order further reveals that a very strange procedure having been adopted inasmuch as nine societies, who were member societies of the respondent No. 4 Union had recommended the names of certain persons to be appointed as Government Nominees on the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 Union. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that comparing the said number with total numbers of cooperative societies, which are members of the Union i.e. 1224 Societies, it would appear that only 0.44% of the member Societies had recommended the appointment. Learned Senior Advocate in this regard would submit that in addition to the procedure followed not being contemplated under the law, the entire procedure appears to have been initiated at the behest of a very few societies as compared to the membership of the respondent No. 4 Union. 15. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the order also does not reflect as to the special circumstances, which weighed with the Authority while appointing the respondent Nos. 5 to 7. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the order suffers from legal malice and therefore also, it requires to be struck down. 15. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the order also does not reflect as to the special circumstances, which weighed with the Authority while appointing the respondent Nos. 5 to 7. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the order suffers from legal malice and therefore also, it requires to be struck down. Finally, learned Senior Advocate would submit that the petitioners being members of the Managing Committee/Board of Management, they are entitled to bring this challenge before this Court. It is submitted that the stand of the State that post facto approval by the Managing Committee/Board of Management would ratify the decision of the Chairman, would not in any manner overshadow the rights of the petitioners as members of the Managing Committee to submit their objection against the decision of the State at the stage of show cause notice to the Union itself. 16. Learned Senior Advocate in addition to the decisions referred to hereinabove, would rely upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 ; Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors. (2020) 8 SCC 129 ; The Secretary, Central Council of Indian Medicine Vs. T. Retnapandian and Ors. in SLP (C) No. 17472 of 2014 vide decision dated 07.04.2016; S.R. Venkataraman Vs. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 491 ; Ratnagiri Gas and Power (P) Ltd. Vs. RDS Projects Ltd. (2013) 1 SCC 524 ; State of A.P. Vs. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC 739 ; Krishna Rai Vs. Banaras Hindu University, (2022) 8 SCC 713 . 17. This petition is vehemently opposed by the learned Advocate General Mr. Kamal Trivedi on behalf of the State. Learned Advocate General would submit, in so far as the submission that the impugned order does not reflect any formation of opinion as regards the public interest involved in the operation of the society and necessity or expediency to nominate representatives, that while the State is required to form opinion in respect of two separate aspects i.e. involvement of public interest in operation of the society and the necessity or expediency of nominating the Government representatives on the Managing Committee of the Society and whereas according to the learned Advocate General, the State has formed opinion on both the aspects as could be made out from the impugned order. Learned Advocate General would refer to the order impugned and would submit that unnumbered Para 2 clearly reflects the opinion on public interest involved in operation of the society namely the society as per report of 2021-22 having procured 150.17 Crores Kg. milk and later on, having sold the same and that the annual turnover of the society was 10333 Crores, the annual sale of animal feed is approximately 5.47 Lakhs Metric ton, the share value as on 31.03.2022 is Rs.110 Crores with reserved fund of Rs.207 Crores. The order further states that since the activities of the Union are touching upon 1224 Cooperative Societies, which have a total 712000 members, whose interest was involved in management of the Society. According to the learned Advocate General, the observations of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies in the impugned order clearly reflect the formation of an opinion as regards the public interest involved in the operation of the society. 18. Learned Advocate General would further draw the attention of the Court to unnumbered Para 4 of the order and would submit that the said recitation clearly reflects the expediency for appointment of the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the respondent Union. The unnumbered Para 4 inter alia states about the Registrar, Cooperative Societies having perused communication dated 14.03.2023 by the District Registrar of Cooperative Society, Anand, recommending names of six persons having appropriate qualification for being appointed on the Managing Committee/Board of Management of the respondent Union. It is further mentioned that the names of six persons have been recommended by three milk cooperative societies each and considering the same, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies has decided that three persons i.e. respondent Nos. 5 to 7 are appropriately suitable for being appointed as nominated members in respondent No. 4 Union. 19. Learned Advocate General would submit that considering the above observations, it would be clear that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies has in fact formed an opinion as regards the expediency of appointing respondent Nos. 5 to 7 as Government Nominees. 20. Learned Advocate General at this stage would submit that Section 80(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act, inter alia states about necessity or expediency and whereas it is not required for the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to form an opinion on both the necessity for appointment and the expediency of appointment. 5 to 7 as Government Nominees. 20. Learned Advocate General at this stage would submit that Section 80(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act, inter alia states about necessity or expediency and whereas it is not required for the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to form an opinion on both the necessity for appointment and the expediency of appointment. In the instant case, since the Registrar of Cooperative Societies deemed it expedient to appoint respondent Nos. 5 to 7 as Government Nominees of respondent No. 4 Union, there would not be any requirement for the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, to form an opinion on the necessity for appointment. 21. Learned Advocate General would further submit that the requirement of formation of opinion as regards involvement of public interest in operation of the society, having been fulfilled as found in unnumbered Para 2 of the impugned order, yet it is further submitted that the term ‘public interest’ i.e. the constituents of such a term cannot be laid down in any straitjacket formula. It is submitted that the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, having noted about there being 1224 primary cooperative societies, which are members of the respondent Union, which primary cooperative societies in total consists of 712000 whose interest is directly associated with the Union, the same constitutes public interest as per the Registrar, Cooperative Societies and according to learned Advocate General, the said view is an absolutely plausible view. Learned Advocate General would refer to the decision of Amreli District Sale and Purchase (Supra) as well as decision in the case of Gujarat State Marketing Cooperative Federation Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat, 2004 (3) GLR 2342 in support of the above submissions. 22. Learned Advocate General would further submit that the aspect of necessity and expediency are to be considered from view of the fact that the requirement of necessity is an objective fact and the expediency is an opinion drawn from that fact. Learned Advocate General would submit that upon the State Government coming to a conclusion that it is expedient to appoint the Government Nominees then it is a matter of subjective satisfaction and not justiciable or open to judicial review. Learned Advocate General would refer to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Jamnadas G. Pabri, (1975) 1 SCC 138 in support of above submission. Learned Advocate General would refer to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Jamnadas G. Pabri, (1975) 1 SCC 138 in support of above submission. Learned Advocate General would further rely upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Gujarat, (1977) 1 SCC 133 ; Amarjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2010) 10 SCC 43 ; B.K. Pavitra Vs. Union of India, (2019) 16 SCC 129 and decision of this Court in the case of Vadgam Taluka Sahkari Kharid Vechan Sangh Vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) SCC online Guj. 10654. 23. In so far as the submission that the impugned order being flawed, since it was initiated from the office of the District Registrar and not vice-a-versa, it is submitted that there is no provision or bye-law, whereby any method or procedure for appointment of Government Nominees on the Board of Management, which requires that the procedure was to be carried out in a particular manner. It is submitted that under such circumstances, the said submissions as regards the procedure being flawed may not be countenanced. 24. It is further submitted in this regard that the District Registrar, who is carrying out the duties and functions as per the Act at the lowest level and is a bridge between the member of the cooperative society and the State Government. It is submitted that since the persons contesting for Directorship of the respondent No. 4 Union, are nominated from the members society themselves, therefore, it is in this context that some societies had recommended the names of the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 and others and it is the Registrar, who had taken a final call in this regard. It is submitted that the Registrar having considered the aspect of involvement of the public interest in operation of the society and the necessity and expediency of nominating of Government Nominees, therefore, the submissions of the procedure being flawed, may not be countenanced by this Court. 25. It is submitted that the Registrar having considered the aspect of involvement of the public interest in operation of the society and the necessity and expediency of nominating of Government Nominees, therefore, the submissions of the procedure being flawed, may not be countenanced by this Court. 25. Learned Advocate General would further submit that the decision of this Court in case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020) and in the case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel (Supra), where on basis the facts of the case and whereas such gross facts as in the said petitions, are not found in present case, hence, the decisions may not have any bearing in the present circumstances. Learned Advocate General would further submit that the judgments being heavily relied as being in similar set of facts, may not be considered at all by this Court, since there are stark differences in the fact situation in the cases before this Court and the judgments of this Court being relied upon. Learned Advocate General would submit in this regard that in cases of Bharat Sudambhai Patel and Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai challenge was to appointment of Government Nominees, which was made at a time when the Managing Committee was not constituted and the first meeting, where the election of the Chairman and Vice Chairman were to take place, had not been held. Learned Advocate General would submit that the fact situation in the present petition is not comparable, since the Managing Committee of the respondent No. 4 Union is headed by a Chairman and also including a Vice Chairman is in existence. 26. Continuing with the said line of arguments, learned Advocate General would submit that the distinguishing feature referred to hereinabove also raises a question as regards maintainability of the petition itself on the ground of locus standi of the petitioners herein. It is submitted that when a Managing Committee of a Society/Union is in existence and the election of the Chairman/Vice Chairman having concluded, there being incumbents on the post in question, thereafter, individual members would not have any right to question an order passed under Section 80(2) of the Act and whereas the individual members could only act through the Society to challenge such an order. Learned Advocate General would rely upon the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary Vs. Learned Advocate General would rely upon the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary Vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Federation, (2015) 8 SCC 1 and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bengal Secretariat Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank and Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Aloke Kumar and Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 1404 in support of such contention. Learned Advocate General would further submit in this regard that since the Union itself vide its communication dated 14.03.2023 had intimated its concurrence/consent for nomination of Government representatives in the Managing Committee and since the said consent had been formalized by a Circular Resolution dated 17.03.2024 passed by the majority and whereas since the society through its Chairman has reiterated the stand of the society before this Court by filing an affidavit, the requirement of serving individual notices to the members of the Managing Committee would not be a requirement, which was required to be followed, noncompliance of which may render the order under Section 80(2) as vitiated. Learned Advocate General would submit that the procedure having been followed, whereby the principles of natural justice have been complied with, the order may not be interfered with by this Court. Based upon the above submissions, learned Advocate General would request this Court not to interfere in the present petition and to reject the same. 27. The present petition is also opposed by learned Senior Advocate Mr. P.K. Jani with learned advocate Mr. Archit Jani for respondent No. 4 i.e. the Union in question. Learned Senior Advocate would commence his submissions by questioning the maintainability/ entertainability of the present petition. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the petitioners could not claim to be ‘person aggrieved’ for preferring this petition challenging the decision of the State under Section 80(2) of the Act. It is submitted in this regard that a Cooperative Society is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, rather it is submitted that the Cooperative Society is a body corporate as per Section 37 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. It is submitted that the members of the Managing Committee of a Cooperative Society are having as much rights as is conferred to them by the Society under the Bye-laws and under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act and Rules. It is submitted that the members of the Managing Committee of a Cooperative Society are having as much rights as is conferred to them by the Society under the Bye-laws and under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act and Rules. It is submitted that once a person becomes a member of a Cooperative Society, in so far as society is concerned, he loses his individuality and does not have any separate or inalienable rights except those conferred by the Society. In support of such submissions, learned Senior Advocate would rely upon the decisions of Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670 and Vipul M. Chaudhary (Supra) relied upon by the learned Advocate General as well as decision of Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani Vs. State of Gujarat, 2011 (4) GLR 2877 . 28. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that a Cooperative Society is controlled by the General Body of the Society as per Section 73 of the Act, which comprises of members of the Society. It is submitted that the General Body of the Society constitutes a committee by election, which is in overall control of the day to day affairs of the Society. It is submitted that the formation of the Managing Committee is inter alia based on the principle of majority prevailing in a democratic set up and the petitioners, who are just two of thirteen elected members of the Managing Committee, may not be heard to question the decision of the State, which has been approved by the majority of the members. As such, it is contended that the petitioners have not challenged the Resolution of the Society, whereby the appointment of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 has been ratified. 29. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that while Section 80(2) of the Act does not contemplate giving of any opportunity of hearing to the Committee members and whereas in so far as decision of this Court in case of Amreli District Co-op. Sale and Purchase Union Vs. State of Gujarat, 1982 (2) GLR 1822, opportunity is required to be given to the Society and not to the members of the Managing Committee. Sale and Purchase Union Vs. State of Gujarat, 1982 (2) GLR 1822, opportunity is required to be given to the Society and not to the members of the Managing Committee. It is submitted that while this Court had entertained petitions i.e. in cases of Bharat Sudambhai Patel and Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Supra), yet such facts are not found in the present case, since those petitions by individual members had been entertained since the Committee itself was not constituted. It is submitted that as against such facts in the earlier petitions, in the instant case, the Managing Committee is in existence and therefore, the petitioners as members of the Managing Committee have no independent right or locus standi to challenge a decision of the State. 30. It is further submitted by learned Senior Advocate in this regard that the Chairman is having general control over the affairs of the respondent No. 4 Union by virtue of Bye-laws No. 9 of the Society. The Chairman had vide its communication dated 14.03.2023 informed the District Registrar inter alia intimating that the Union would not have any objection, if the nominees are appointed by the State Government and it was further intimated that the Union would pass a Resolution in this regard and inform and intimate the Registrar about the same. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that such communication has been followed up by the society by passing a Circular Resolution dated 17.03.2023 passed by majority of the members and whereas vide a Circular Resolution of the very date, the same had been vide a communication dated 23.03.2023 intimated to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies. It is submitted that subsequent to the same, Resolution No. 68 was passed by the Union on 31.03.2023, whereby the members of the Managing Committee by majority, had approved the nomination of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7, which had been objected to by the petitioners. It is submitted that since the Chairman had consented by virtue of the powers vested in him for appointment of Government nominees and since such decision had been ratified by the Managing Committee/Board of Directors, therefore, the requirement of hearing the Society would pale into insignificance and whereas the petitioners as individual members may not have any right to challenge the nomination vide the impugned order. The Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the Circular Resolution dated 17.03.2023 and Resolution of approval dated 31.03.2023 have become final and whereas the petitioners have neither challenged the said Resolution independently nor in the present petition, the present petition may not be entertained by this Court. 31. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the petitioners by way of this petition, have sought for writ of mandamus and whereas since the condition precedent for grant of writ of mandamus is not satisfied, the present writ petition may not be entertained. Learned Senior Advocate would rely upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sarswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1974) 2 SCC 630 , D. Nagraj Vs. State of Karnataka, (1977) 2 SCC 148 and the decision in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Excise and Taxation-cum-Assessing Authority, AIR 2023 SC 781 in support of such contention. 32. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the decisions of this Court in Bharat Sudambhai Patel (Supra) and Sodha Parmar Kantilal Manibhai (Supra), relied upon by the petitioners would have no bearing on the present fact situation since according to learned Senior Advocate, since those petitions were preferred, when the election of the Chairman and Vice Chairman had not taken place and at which time, the State Government had passed order appointing Government Nominees consequently increasing the numbers of the Directors in the Board of those Cooperative Societies. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that as far as present fact situation is concerned, the election to the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman having been conducted and presently occupying the said post, therefore, the said decision would have no applicability on facts of the present case. 33. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that as far as present Society/Union is concerned, the election of the Managing Committee had taken place on 20.08.2020, whereas the results had been declared on 31.08.2020. 33. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that as far as present Society/Union is concerned, the election of the Managing Committee had taken place on 20.08.2020, whereas the results had been declared on 31.08.2020. It is submitted that the term of the Chairman and Vice Chairman being for two years and six months as per Section 74(C) (2-ii) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act and whereas while the first election for the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman having taken place and their terms having come to an end, the second election had taken place on 14.03.2023 and the term of the incumbents, who had been elected for second term, would come to an end on 07.08.2025. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that since there is a marked difference in the facts of all the two cases referred to hereinabove where the election to the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman had not taken place and the present case, where such election had taken place, therefore, the law laid down by this Court in the above decisions, would not be applicable in the facts of the present case. It is further contended by learned Senior Advocate that it is the ratio of the judgment, which would be binding and not the observation and whereas since the facts are not co-relatable, therefore, even the ratio could not be relied upon. 34. On basis of the above submissions, learned Senior Advocate would submit that the petitioners not having any locus and the decisions being relied upon being on a completely different set of facts, this Court may not entertain the present writ petition. 35. Learned advocate Mr. Kunal Nanavati appearing for the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 would adopt the submissions made by the learned Advocate General as well as learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jani and would submit that since the request to nominate had emanated from the member Society, therefore, upon the subsequent ratification by the Union, the requirement of the State giving reasons to the society explaining the necessity and expediency in public interest to appoint the Government nominees would pale into insignificance. 36. Learned advocate would further submit that the petitioners cannot challenge the decision of the State, without challenging the Circular Resolution dated 17.03.2023 and the later Resolution dated 31.03.2023, whereby the Managing Committee by majority, had welcomed respondent Nos. 36. Learned advocate would further submit that the petitioners cannot challenge the decision of the State, without challenging the Circular Resolution dated 17.03.2023 and the later Resolution dated 31.03.2023, whereby the Managing Committee by majority, had welcomed respondent Nos. 5 to 7, which Resolution had been opposed by the petitioners herein. Learned advocate would submit that the Union having passed such Resolution, it would not be open for the petitioners to challenge the decision of the State without independently challenging the decision of the Union itself. Thus submitting, learned advocate would request this Court not to entertain this petition. 37. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore in rejoinder, would rely upon the observations of the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad Vs. the King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 and would submit that the facts of the present petition reflect violation of a doctrine, which is by now well recognized i.e. ‘when a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.’ Learned Senior Advocate would submit that Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act inter alia requires the State Government to form an opinion and nominate the members to the Managing Committee of a society. It is submitted that the procedure, which has been followed in the present case, was completely alien to the requirement as found in the statute and for that reason itself, the exercise of powers should be deemed as being without any jurisdiction. Learned Senior Advocate would in this regard refer to/rely upon the observations of the Division Bench in case of Amreli District Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union (Supra) and would submit that Section 80(2) having been explained in the said decision, wherein it is inter alia observed that Sub-Section 2 of Section 80, which had been inserted after the principal Act had been promulgated, is enabling power empowering the State Government to nominate the representatives on the Committee of Society, having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of such society. According to the learned Senior Advocate, the Division Bench has further observed that the satisfaction is to be arrived at by the State Government. According to the learned Senior Advocate, the Division Bench has further observed that the satisfaction is to be arrived at by the State Government. It is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate that in the instant case, the process having emanated from the member Cooperative Society, the exercise of powers is not at instance of the State and therefore, the requirement of Section 80(2) of the Act is not complied with. 38. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore would further submit that the petitioners undoubtedly have locus to prefer the present writ petition. Learned Senior Advocate in this regard would submit that there is a distinction in being member of a Cooperative Society and being member of the Managing Committee of the Cooperative Society. Learned Senior Advocate in this regard would refer to Section 74 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, whereby the Committee i.e. the Managing Committee and its powers and duties have been explained. Learned Senior Advocate would thereafter, refer to Rule 33 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Rule, 1965. It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate that while the power contemplated is to be exercised as a group, yet it could not be that the individual members of the group would not have any rights whatsoever. Learned Senior Advocate would thereafter, draw the attention of this Court to the decision of Daman Singh (Supra) and would submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision, refers to the members of a society not having any individual identity qua the society and whereas according to the learned Senior Advocate, the same may not hold good for a member of a Managing Committee of the society. Learned Senior Advocate would further rely upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Brijrajsinh Hemantsinh Jadeja Vs. State of Gujarat, (2012) 3 GLR 2704 . It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate that in the said decision, a Division Bench of this Court has inter alia explained the position with regard to locus standi of Directors of a bank, as regards challenging the decision of the Government to send Government representatives on the Board of bank in which they were Directors. It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate that in the said decision, a Division Bench of this Court has inter alia explained the position with regard to locus standi of Directors of a bank, as regards challenging the decision of the Government to send Government representatives on the Board of bank in which they were Directors. It is submitted that the Division Bench has inter alia observed that since the representatives of the Government are being sent to the Management of the bank, the members of the bank would certainly have locus standi in a given case, to oppose the same as it will have effect on managing the affairs of the bank. It is also observed that the Directors of the bank would be entitled to challenge action of the State in connection with sending representatives to the management of the bank and for which they would have locus standi. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the observations of the Division Bench clinching the issue, no further elaboration on that aspect may be required. 39. Learned Senior Advocate would thereafter rely upon the decision of learned Coordinate Bench in the B.S. Patel (Supra) dated 06.11.2020, whereby it has been observed that the State Government could nominate representatives on the Managing Committee of the Society after forming an opinion as to necessity or expediency having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of the society to do so and would submit that the decision in the said case had travelled from the State to the Cooperative Society. Learned Senior Advocate would further rely upon the decision of the learned Coordinate Bench in case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Supra), where also according to learned Senior Advocate, the decision had emanated from the Government and had travelled to the Society. Learned Senior Advocate would further refer to the decision relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jani in case of Bileshwar Khand Udyog (Supra), which was also with regard to exercise of powers under Section 80(2) and would submit that in the said case also, the decisions had emanated from the State. Learned Senior Advocate would further refer to affidavit of the State Government and relying upon Para 6, submit that the proposal for appointment of respondent Nos. Learned Senior Advocate would further refer to affidavit of the State Government and relying upon Para 6, submit that the proposal for appointment of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 were received by respondent No. 3-District Registrar, supported by nine different Cooperative Societies for appointing them as Government nominees in the Managing Committee of the Union. Learned Senior Advocate would further refer to communication dated 14.03.2023 by the Chairman of the Union, whereby the Chairman has recommended to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to appoint the Government nominees in the Managing Committee since according to the Chairman, there was public interest involved in the functioning of the Union. Learned Senior Advocate would further refer to communication dated 14.03.2023 by the District Registrar, whereby the District Registrar had recommended to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies for appointing respondent Nos. 5 to 7. Learned Senior Advocate based on the above, would emphasize that while the statute i.e. Section 80(2) inter alia requires the State to form an opinion and the aspect to give hearing to the Society had been read into the provisions and whereas according to the learned Senior Advocate, since the Act contemplates a particular action to be taken in a particular manner and since it appears that the action taken is in breach of requirement of the statute, therefore, it is submitted that this Court may intervene and set aside the impugned decision of the State Government. 40. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that as such, the requirement of the Act in so far as forming an opinion as regards the necessity and expediency to appoint the Government nominees is completely missing in the order. Learned Senior Advocate would reiterate the decisions in the cases of Gujarat State Marketing Cooperative Federation (Supra), Bharat Sudam Patel and Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai in support of his submissions. 41. Learned Senior Advocate on the aspect of locus would submit that the respondents are placing great emphasis on a nonissue. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the only difference sought to be emphasized is about the Managing Committee of the Society being formed. 41. Learned Senior Advocate on the aspect of locus would submit that the respondents are placing great emphasis on a nonissue. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the only difference sought to be emphasized is about the Managing Committee of the Society being formed. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while appointment of the Director before the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman may have been the cause for preferring writ petition, but at the same time, the observations of the learned Coordinate Benches, more particularly, in cases of Bharat Sudam Patel, Sodha Parmar (Supra) and Brijrajsinh (Supra), more particularly, in so far as the aspect of public interest and the necessity to form an opinion etc., have no relevance with the aspect of whether the Managing Committee was formed or not and hence, the reliance on the submissions that upon the Managing Committee being formed, the petitioners could not have a right, may not be a submission which may be countenanced before this Court. Thus submitting learned Senior Advocate would request this Court to quash and set aside the decision passed by the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Gujarat State, of appointing the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 as Government representatives/nominees on the Board of the respondent No. 4 Union. 42. Having heard learned Senior Advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents on record and considering the same, to this Court, it would appear that the following issues have arisen for consideration of this Court: (i) Whether the petitioners as members/Directors of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors, independently have a locus to challenge a decision of the State Government, when such decision had been accepted by the majority in the Managing Committee/Board of Directors? (ii) Whether the condition precedent for seeking a writ of mandamus has been fulfilled for this Court to entertain the present petition? (iii) Whether the decision of the learned Coordinate Benches of this Court in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel 2021 (4) GLR 3200 and in case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020), would be applicable to the present case? (iii)(A) Whether impugned order dated 16.03.2023 is a copy of the order impugned in case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Supra) and if the answer is in affirmative, what would be consequence? (iii)(A) Whether impugned order dated 16.03.2023 is a copy of the order impugned in case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Supra) and if the answer is in affirmative, what would be consequence? (iii)(B) Whether the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 fulfills the requirements of Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act? (iv) Whether the impugned order is required to be interfered with? Issue No. I: (a) It is the case of the State as well as the private respondents that the present petition at the instance of individual members/Managing Committee/Board of Directors would not be maintainable, since the individual members could not claim to be aggrieved by a decision, which has been accepted by the Managing Committee/Board of Directors. It is further contended that the members could only act through the Society to challenge an order under Section 80(2) of the Act. It is further contended that the members of Managing Committee of a Cooperative Society would have as much right as provided under the Bye-laws as well as under the Cooperative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder and whereas the right claimed by the petitioner is not found in any of the same. It is contended that upon being member of a Cooperative Society, the person loses his individuality qua the society and would not have any separate or inalienable right except those conferred by the society. It is further contended that since the petitioners have not challenged the Circular Resolution dated 17.03.2023 and later Resolution No. 68 dated 31.03.2023, whereby the Managing Committee/Board of Directors had consented to and later approved the appointment of the Government nominees, therefore, the petition may not be entertained. (b) On the other hand, it is the contention on behalf of the petitioners that since Division Bench of this Court in case of Brijrajsinh Hemantsingh Jadeja (Supra), whereby the rights of the Directors of the bank to challenge the decision under Section 80(2) has been recognized, therefore, the entire arguments of the respondents are without any basis. It is further contended that the decisions relied upon by the respondents would not at all be applicable. Considering the above submissions, it would appear to this Court that the decision in the case of Brijrajsinh, which is being heavily relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners would be required to be appreciated at the first instance. It is further contended that the decisions relied upon by the respondents would not at all be applicable. Considering the above submissions, it would appear to this Court that the decision in the case of Brijrajsinh, which is being heavily relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners would be required to be appreciated at the first instance. It appears that in a similar scenario, a preliminary objection as regards maintainability had been raised on the ground of members not having locus standi to question the decision of the State, when the bank itself had accepted the decision. Para 8 the question had been answered and being relevant for the present purpose as quoted herein-below for benefit: “8. So far as the locus standi of the appellants is concerned, the appellants, who are the original petitioners, are Directors of the bank. Since the representatives of the Government are sent to the management of the Bank, the members of the Bank certainly have locus standi in a given case to oppose the same, as ultimately, it will have effect regarding managing the affairs of the Bank. Under the eventuality, the Directors of the Bank are also entitled to challenge the action of the State in connection with sending representatives to the management of the Bank. It, therefore, cannot be said that the appellants, who are the original petitioners in the writ petitions, have no locus standi to challenge the action of the State Government simply because the Bank itself has not challenged the same. The preliminary objection taken by Mr. Mehta about locus standi of the original petitioners, therefore, rejected.” (c) The Division Bench has inter alia laid down that when the representatives of the State Government are being nominated to the management of the bank, then all the members of the bank would have locus standi to question the same, as nomination by the Government would have a direct effect regarding managing the affairs of the bank. While it also appears that the Division Bench had circumscribed the said right by using the words in a given case, but said aspect would be dealt with later on. While it also appears that the Division Bench had circumscribed the said right by using the words in a given case, but said aspect would be dealt with later on. The intent of the Division Bench clearly appearing to be that while the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of a Cooperative Society would have overall management and control of the Cooperative Society and thus, nomination of representatives in the Managing Committee/Board of Directors would directly effect the rights of the members of the Managing Committee and hence, individual members would have a right to question such a decision irrespective of the Cooperative Society itself having accepted/consented to the same. (d) In so far as term ‘in a given case’ while said term has not explained or elaborated, to this Court, it would mean that in an appropriate situation, individual members would be empowered to question the decision of the State and whereas in the instant case, since the challenge is mounted on the ground that the impugned decision, is not in consonance with the provisions of the statute, whereby a particular opinion is required to be formed by the Government before appointing nominees, therefore, to this Court, it would appear that the present would be an appropriate situation to entertain the challenge by the individual members. (e) The above being the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, this Court will now examine the decisions relied upon by the respondents, more particularly, to examine whether the law laid down by the Division Bench is distinguished/overruled even impliedly in later decision of this Court or in decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Learned Advocate General having relied upon the decisions of Vipul M. Chaudhary (Supra) and Aloke Kumar (Supra), this Court would examine the same. The decision in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary has been relied upon to contend inter alia that a Cooperative Society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles, which are to be reflected in the Cooperative Societies Act, Rules framed thereunder or Bye-laws. The decision in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary has been relied upon to contend inter alia that a Cooperative Society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles, which are to be reflected in the Cooperative Societies Act, Rules framed thereunder or Bye-laws. To this Court, it would appear that the issue in question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was as regards removal of Chair Person/elected office bearer of a Cooperative Society, without there being any procedure prescribed for removal under the Act, Rules or Bye-laws and whereas it was under such circumstances that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that in case of there being no express provision under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws for removal of an office bearer, then an office bearer could be removed by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office upon there being loss of confidence in such elected members. To this Court, it would appear that the said proposition would not come to the aid of the respondents more particularly, when the challenge by the petitioners is not towards any action by the Cooperative Society rather the challenge is to the decision of the State Government. Again to this Court, it would appear that since the procedure prescribed under Section 80(2) does not envisage the decision of the State to be ratified by the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Cooperative Society concerned, therefore, even if the Cooperative Society has consented or approved of the action of the State under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, the same would be nothing, but an exercise in futility as the decision of the Cooperative Society would not in any manner add in further legality to decision of the State. Consequently, when the action of the State is challenged, there is no independent requirement to challenge the decision of the Cooperative Society as referred to hereinabove. Thus, to this Court, it would appear that the decision in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not come to the aid of the respondents. Consequently, when the action of the State is challenged, there is no independent requirement to challenge the decision of the Cooperative Society as referred to hereinabove. Thus, to this Court, it would appear that the decision in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not come to the aid of the respondents. (f) In so far as the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aloke Kumar (Supra), observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that once a person becomes member of a Cooperative Society, he loses his individuality with the Society and he has no independent right except those given to him by the statute and Bye-laws is being relied upon by the respondent State. Para No. 57 of the said decision had been particularly emphasized and the same is reproduced herein-below for benefit: “57. By now it is well established position that once a person becomes a member of the Co-operative Society, he loses his individuality with the Society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and bye-laws. The member has to speak through the Society or rather the Society alone can act and speaks for him qua the rights and duties of the Society as a body [See: Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ]. This view has been followed in the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 681 : AIR 1997 SC 1413 . In this decision, this Court further observed that the member of a Society has no independent right qua the Society and it is the Society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. This Court also observed that the stream cannot rise higher than the source. Suffice it to observe that so long as the Resolutions passed by the General Body of the Appellant Society are in force and not overturned by a forum of competent jurisdiction, the said decisions would bind the Respondent No. 1. He cannot be permitted to take a stand alone position but is bound by the majority decision of the General Body. He cannot be permitted to take a stand alone position but is bound by the majority decision of the General Body. Notably, the Respondent No. 1 has not challenged the Resolutions passed by the General Body of the Appellant Society to redevelop the property and more so, to appoint the Hi-Rise as the Developer to give him all the redevelopment rights.” (g) At this stage, before analyzing the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as above, it would also be relevant to mention here that the contention as above had also been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 Union and the learned counsel in support of his submissions, has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Vipul M. Chaudhary (Supra) as well as in the case of Daman Singh (Supra). Incidentally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aloke Kumar (Supra) had also relied upon the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Daman Singh to arrive at above conclusion. Thus, it would be apposite to refer to (f) the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Daman Singh at this stage. Para 11 of the decision of Daman Singh is reproduced herein-below for benefit: “11. The next submission of the learned counsel was that s. 13 A (8), (9) and (10) did not make express provision for the issue of notice to the members of the concerned Co- operative Societies and were, therefore, violative of the principles of natural justice. He argued that in the absence of any provision, the rules of natural justice may be read into the provisions and notice to the members of the affected societies was imperative. Otherwise, he argued, 13 members of one society would be formed against their will and without being heard to associate themselves with members of another society. We have no hesitation in rejecting this submission also. Once a person becomes a member of a cooperative society, he loses his individuality qua the society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the by-laws. We have no hesitation in rejecting this submission also. Once a person becomes a member of a cooperative society, he loses his individuality qua the society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the by-laws. He must act and speak through the society or rather, the society alone can act and speak for him qua rights or duties of the society as a body, so if the statute which authorises compulsory amalgamation of cooperative societies provides for notice to the societies concerned, the requirement of natural justice is fully satisfied. The notice to the society will be deemed as notice to all its member. That is why s. 13 (9) (a)Provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members. Section 13(9)(b), however, provides the members also with an opportunity to be heard if they desire to be heard. Notice to individual members of a. cooperative society, in our opinion, is opposed to the very status of a cooperative society as a body corporate and is, therefore, unnecessary. We do not consider it necessary to, further elaborate the matter except to point out that a member who objects to the proposed amalgamation within the prescribed time is given, by s. 31(11), the option to walk-out, as it were, by withdrawing his share, deposits or loans as the case may be.” (h) Considering the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would clearly appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has inter alia laid down that once a person becomes member of a Cooperative Society, he loses his individuality with the society and he has no independent right except those given to him by the statute and the Bye-laws. Having observed as thus, it is clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the member has to speak through the society or conversely the society alone can act and speak for the members ‘qua the rights and duties of the society as a body’. The above observations in Daman Singh (Supra) have been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aloke Kumar (Supra). In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed by relying upon the decision in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. Vs. The above observations in Daman Singh (Supra) have been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aloke Kumar (Supra). In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed by relying upon the decision in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees Cooperative Society, (1997) 3 SCC 681 that ‘member of the Society has no independent right qua the Society and it is the Society, which has to represent as the corporate aggregate’. Now, co-relating the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court with the issue involved in the present case, it would appear that while the Hon’ble Supreme Court lays down that upon becoming a member of Cooperative Society, the person loses his individuality with the society, whereas in the instant case, the petitioners have approached this Court in their capacity as members/Directors of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors. It would further appear that the member has right to speak through the Society or the Society alone can speak for the members, yet it would require clarification that this restriction is only qua the rights and duties of the Society as a body. In the instant case, the issue is not with regard to any rights and duties of the Society rather the issue is with regard to alleged incorrect exercise of powers by the State authorities. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that a member of the Society has no independent right qua the Society and the Society is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. (i) In this regard, it requires to be stated that as far as exercise of powers under Section 80(2) of the Act is concerned, the Managing Committee of the Society has a right of being heard by the State before exercise of the powers by the State Government, as having been read in Sub-Section 2 of Section 80 of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Amreli District Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union Ltd. (Supra). Section 80(2) as it does not contemplate any further right or duty cast upon the Cooperative Society. As noticed hereinabove, while the Society has consented and approved a decision of the State Government of appointing respondent Nos. Section 80(2) as it does not contemplate any further right or duty cast upon the Cooperative Society. As noticed hereinabove, while the Society has consented and approved a decision of the State Government of appointing respondent Nos. 5 to 7 as Government nominees, yet except for probably attempting to mask the apparent non-fulfillment of requirement of hearing given to the Society, the Resolution of respondent No. 4 Cooperative Society does not fulfill any other purpose. Again what would be relevant to appreciate here is that the challenge by the petitioners is to a decision of the State Government and whereas the Cooperative Society consenting/ concurring and/or accepting/approving the said decision of the State Government would not render the decision in question being a decision of the Society. The decision is and will remain a decision of the State Government and of no one else. Considering from the said perspective, it would appear that the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court may not be applicable in the present factual scenario since there is no decision of the Cooperative Society, which is sought to be challenged, the present petition not raising any issue of exercise of rights and duties of the Society and the issue being a member of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors questioning the decision of the State Government cannot be equated with the member of the Society challenging the decision of the Society. (j) In the considered opinion of this Court, having regard to analyzing the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also having considered the law laid down by this Court in the case of Brijrajsinh Jadeja (Supra), it would clearly emerge that the petitioners as members/Directors of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors, indeed have the right to challenge decision of the State Government and whereas it could not be contended that the petitioners do not have any locus. Issue No. 1 is answered accordingly. Issue No. III, III(A) and III(B): (a) Since the issues are interconnected, the same are being discussed jointly. In so far as answering issue No. III(A), this Court will have to delve deeply into the decisions being relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Issue No. 1 is answered accordingly. Issue No. III, III(A) and III(B): (a) Since the issues are interconnected, the same are being discussed jointly. In so far as answering issue No. III(A), this Court will have to delve deeply into the decisions being relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel (Supra), the learned Coordinate Bench was concerned with a challenge to order dated 24.08.2020 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, nominating respondent Nos. 6 and 7 therein as representatives of the State Government in Surat District Milk Producer Union Ltd. The contention by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents herein being that the order in question in the said petition having been passed by the State, when the Managing Committee/Board of Directors was not appointed, which is not the case here, therefore, said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case. The question therefore, would be that while the learned Coordinate Bench vide decision dated 06.11.2020, had set aside the decision of the State Government, whether the same was only on the ground that the powers had been exercised when the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the said Society had not been appointed. In this regard, it would be relevant to mention that learned Coordinate Bench had framed five different questions for consideration, which are reproduced as herein-below: “(i) Whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the present writ petition? (ii) Whether the Registrar has formed the opinion that having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of Society it is necessary or expedient to nominate its representative on the committee and if yes, whether the decision making process in that behalf, is in sync with the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 80 of the Act of 1961? (iii) Whether the order dated 24.8.2020 is passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice, more particularly, when the elected members of the Board have not taken the charge? (iv) Whether the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were possessing requisite qualification for being appointed as nominees of the State Government on the committee of the Union? (iii) Whether the order dated 24.8.2020 is passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice, more particularly, when the elected members of the Board have not taken the charge? (iv) Whether the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were possessing requisite qualification for being appointed as nominees of the State Government on the committee of the Union? (v) Whether the Government Resolution dated 20.8.2014 is against the principle laid down by this court in the judgments, namely, Amreli District Cooperative Sales and Purchase Union Ltd. (supra) and Gujarat State Marketing Co-operative Federation Ltd. & Anr. (supra)? (b) It would appear that in so far as issue No. 1 is concerned i.e. on locus standi, while the learned Coordinate Bench had referred to the aspect of the Managing Committee having come into existence without the Chairman and Vice Chairman at the helm of affairs, yet it would clearly appear that apart from reference to the said fact at Paras 28.5 and 28.6, it does not appear that the fact of the Chairman and Vice Chairman not being appointed inspite of election of the Managing Committee, was the sole aspect, which had completely weighed with learned Coordinate Bench, while declaring that the petitioners therein had locus standi to challenge the decision as members of the Managing Committee. In so far as the second question is concerned, the said question with regard to formation of opinion and decision making process, which had been held against the respondent State, it clearly appears that the aspect of Chairman and Vice Chairman not being appointed had not at all weighed with the learned Coordinate Bench. In so far aspect No. 3 i.e. with regard to principles of natural justice not being complied with, it would appear that the aspect of Chairman and Vice Chairman having not been appointed, had substantially weighed with the learned Coordinate Bench, while holding that the impugned decision was passed without following principles of natural justice. The question Nos. 5 and 6 were not gone into by the learned Coordinate Bench. The question Nos. 5 and 6 were not gone into by the learned Coordinate Bench. (c) It would, thus appear that while the learned Coordinate Bench had not been completely swayed by the aspect of Chairman and Vice Chairman not being elected though the Managing Committee was in place, yet as noticed hereinabove, it would appear that in so far as the substantive issue of whether the opinion as required under Section 80(2) of the Act is concerned, while the learned Coordinate Bench had answered in negative, no reliance whatsoever, has been placed on the above referred consideration. It thus, would appear that though there is factual difference as regards the position, the observations of the learned Coordinate Bench on the substantive aspect is not on basis of the factual position as referred hereinabove, therefore, the decision of the learned Coordinate Bench would be binding on this Court in so far as reliance is not placed on the aspect of the Chairman and Vice Chairman not been appointed. (d) Now, coming to the decision of learned Coordinate Bench in the case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai dated 26.08.2022 in Special Civil Application No. 13072 of 2020, it is the case of the respondents that the observations of the learned Coordinate Bench may not hold good in so far as the facts of the present case is concerned. It is contended that as in cases of Bharat Sudambhai Patel (Supra) and Sodhabhai Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Supra), the proposed appointment/appointment of the Government representatives on the Managing Committee/Board of Directors, was at a stage when the election to the Managing Committee had concluded, yet the election for the posts of Chairman and Vice Chairman was not held. (e) Incidentally, the Union in case of Sodha Parmar is a very Union, arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the present petition. (f) Again, as in the case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel, this Court intends to examine the decision in case of Sodha Parmar to evaluate as to whether the aspect of Chairman and Vice Chairman not being appointed in the Managing Committee had weighed with the learned Coordinate Bench and also whether the learned Coordinate Bench had decided any of the issues without any reference to the above. (g) A perusal of the decision reveals that the learned Coordinate Bench had framed three issues for consideration at Para 9, which are reproduced herein-below: “(1) Whether the impugned order dated 20.10.2020 passed by respondent no. 2 is in violation of the principles of natural justice or not? (2) Whether the respondent no. 2 has passed the impugned order dated 20.10.2020 without application of mind or not? (3) Whether the respondent no. 2 has arrived at an opinion having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of the Union that it is necessary or expedient to nominate its representatives on the Committee of the Union read with section 80(1) of the Act?” (h) It would clearly appear that in so for as question No. 3 is concerned, as regards fulfillment of the requirements laid down under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, learned Coordinate Bench relying upon the decision in the case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel, had analyzed the requirements as found in Section 80(2) and had come to a clear and unequivocal conclusion that the requirement of formation of opinion having regard to the public interest involved in operation of the Union that it is necessary or expedient to nominate its representatives on the Committee of the Union, had not been formed at all. Such conclusion having been arrived at without any reference to the differential facts as urged by learned counsel for the petitioners, in the considered opinion of this Court would render the observations of the learned Coordinate Bench in above referred decision, in so far as question No. 3 is concerned, binding on this Court. (i) Now on issue III (A) i.e. whether the order impugned in the present petition i.e. order dated 16.03.2023 was a verbatim copy of order dated 20.10.2020, which was impugned in the case of Sodha Parmar and III (B) i.e. whether the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 fulfills the requirements of Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act. This Court has perused and compared both the orders and whereas while it appears that the order dated 20.10.2020 impugned in the case of Sodha Parmar was passed after hearing was afforded to the Society, order dated 16.03.2023 was passed in context of submissions by the District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Anand, dated 14.03.2023 along with consent letter of the Society also dated 14.03.2023. It would appear that apart from a slight contextual difference explained hereinabove, order dated 16.03.2023 is substantially similar to order dated 20.10.2020, to the extent of later order being nothing but a verbatim copy of the former order, with certain minor factual corrections, to meet with the context. The introductory portion of the later order is verbatim copy of the former. The next paragraph with regard to the activities of the Union being described in detail, is a verbatim copy from the former order except for certain factual modifications since former order was reflecting figures of the year 2019-20, whereas the later order is reflecting figures of the year 2021-22. Para 3 of the later order, is verbatim copy of first four lines of Para 3 of the former order. Para 4 is different since on fact, it appears that there is a difference in the manner in which the order emanated. The said part of the later order states about recommendation received from the District Registrar for inter alia appointing six persons as Government nominees, which recommendation was based upon recommendations of three Milk Unions each. Said Para further reflects that the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Gujarat State, had verified and analyzed the recommendation and had come to a conclusion that the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 are eligible and appropriate for being appointed. Thereafter, the order reads about the Government having approved of the recommendation. Furthermore, the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, relies upon the consent letter of the respondent No. 4 Union dated 14.03.2023 and based upon the same, the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 had been appointed as Government nominees with the respondent No. 4 Union. (j) Furthermore, upon comparing both the orders, while it would appear that in the former order, there appears to be a slight semblance of an attempt to comply with the requirement of Section 80(2) and while learned Coordinate Bench had unequivocally come to a conclusion that the observations did not meet with the requirements under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, yet in the present impugned order, there is not even a semblance of attempt to even comply with the requirements of Section 80(2). It clearly appears that the Registrar, Cooperative Societies was labouring under some mistaken belief that the requirement to form an opinion having regard to public interest involved in operation of a Society, it is necessary or expedient then the representatives may be nominated in the Committee of the said Society, would pale into insignificance upon the Society consenting for appointment of Government nominees in its Managing Committee/ Board of Directors. As observed by the Division Bench in case of Gujarat State Marketing Cooperative Federation Ltd. (Supra), which has been followed by the learned Coordinate Benches in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel and Sodha Parmar, an order nominating representatives in exercise of power under Section 80(2) of the Act, would be interfered with, if the order was contrary to law or if the relevant factors were not considered or irrelevant factors were considered or the decision was such that no reasonable person could have taken it. (k) Having minutely compared the impugned order with the order impugned in case of Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai, as above, this Court is of the clear opinion that the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 being a verbatim copy of order dated 20.10.2020, which has been struck down by this Court, reflects complete non-application of mind on part of the authority concerned. While it is true that some of the parts copied is a reflection of facts, yet either the order should have reflected that the portion are relied upon from the earlier order or there could have been a fresh endeavour altogether. Verbatim copy of paras from an order, which has been struck down by this Court, to this Court reflects poorly upon one of the highest offices in the State Government, under the Cooperative Societies Act. Again, it requires to be observed that the order is completely bereft of formation of the opinion, which is the sine qua non for passing of order under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act for appointing the Government nominees in the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of a Society. Again, it requires to be observed that the order is completely bereft of formation of the opinion, which is the sine qua non for passing of order under Section 80(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act for appointing the Government nominees in the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of a Society. (l) While this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 does not reflect any opinion formed by the State as required under Section 80(2) and whereas since this Court has discussed about the observations made in order dated 20.10.2020 as regards formation of the opinion not finding favour with the learned Coordinate Bench, such an observation of the learned Coordinate Bench in case of Sodha Parmar, where the decision in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel is also referred to, would be relevant for the present purpose and is reproduced herein-below for benefit: “15. Respondent no. 2 has only recorded the activities of the Union with regard to number of societies which are engaged in supply of milk and other products and number of members of such societies and the turnover of the Union, whereas he is supposed to form an opinion having regard to public interest involved as regards the operation of the society and whether it is “necessary and expedient” for nomination of its representatives. On perusal of the impugned order, there is an assertion that there is public interest but thereafter further consideration with regard to the operation of the Union and whether it is necessary and expedient to nominate its representatives is absent. Merely because Union operates on a large scale, State Government cannot assume as if it has subscribed to the share capital of the Union to exercise powers under section 80(1) of the Act. The issue is no more res integra in view of decision in case of Amreli District Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union Limited (supra) and in case of Gujarat State Marketing Cooperative Federation Limited and another (supra). It appears from the facts of the case that respondent no. 2-Registrar has not formed an independent opinion which is fortified by letter dated 13.10.2020 by the District Registrar, Anand. Respondent no. 2-Registrar has reiterated in the show cause notice as well as in the impugned order the same reasons which are narrated in the letter dated 13.10.2020. It is settled legal position that respondent no. 2-Registrar has not formed an independent opinion which is fortified by letter dated 13.10.2020 by the District Registrar, Anand. Respondent no. 2-Registrar has reiterated in the show cause notice as well as in the impugned order the same reasons which are narrated in the letter dated 13.10.2020. It is settled legal position that respondent no. 2- Registrar is required to form an independent opinion and is not required to follow the communication in form of proposal and initiate the proceedings immediately on the next day on 14.10.2020 by issuing show cause notice. The coordinate Bench in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel (supra), with regard to issue of formation of opinion and decision making under section 80(2) of the Act after considering the facts of the said case observed as under: “29.4 One is required to see as to whether there was any formation of opinion by the Registrar, that there is a public interest involved in the operation of the Society. The notings on the file of the Registrar do not suggest that the Registrar has formed any opinion and considered the relevant provisions of law as well as relevant factors. Such aspect is further strengthened by the events which took place from 18.8.2020 till 24.8.2020, when the order came to be passed by the Registrar. Formation of an opinion by the Registrar, which though subjective in nature, must have been based on the existence of objective facts. The opinion must have been formed by the Registrar based upon the circumstances i.e. having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of a Society which required the necessity or expediency for the nomination of the government representatives, which would have gone into the formation of the opinion. Therefore, the discretion conferred on the Registrar entailed the duty to form its opinion based on relevant facts and circumstances for nominating the representatives of the state government on the Committee. xxx xxx xxx 29.6 This court, in the case of Gujarat State Marketing Co-operative Federation Ltd. & Anr. Therefore, the discretion conferred on the Registrar entailed the duty to form its opinion based on relevant facts and circumstances for nominating the representatives of the state government on the Committee. xxx xxx xxx 29.6 This court, in the case of Gujarat State Marketing Co-operative Federation Ltd. & Anr. (supra) while upholding the validity of Sub-Section (2) of Section 80 in paragraph 30, has, inter alia, held: “(30) As the upshot of the above discussion, the conclusions as under can be summarised: (a) the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 80 of the Act are constitutionally valid and there is no reason to take a view different from the view taken by this Court in Amreli District Co. Op. Sale and Purchase Union Ltd. 1984 (2) GLR 1244 . (b) the exercise of power conferred upon the State Government under the provisions of Section 80 (2) in a given case is open to challenge and is subject to judicial review. (c) any order nominating representatives in exercise of the powers under Section 80 (2) of the Act will be liable to be struck down if the order was contrary to law or if relevant factors were not considered or irrelevant factors were considered in making the order or the decision was such that no reasonable person would have taken it. (d) the nomination of representatives on the committee of a society in exercise of the powers under Section 80 (2) is coextensive with and operates only during the term of the committee on which such nominees are appointed. (e) the term of office of the representatives nominated under Section 80 (2) shall depend upon, besides the pleasure of the State Government or the terms specified in their appointment orders, the Rules and bye-laws of the society regarding constitution and term of the committee. (f) the appointment of representatives on the committee of a society by nomination under the provisions of Section 80 (2) has civil consequences, and, therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be observed while forming the opinion that, having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of the society, it is necessary or expedient to nominate the representatives. For compliance with the principles of natural justice, adequate and meaningful opportunity of hearing has to be given to the society and, as a part thereof, the society has to be informed about the grounds on which the opinion as to involvement of public interest in the operation of the society was based and the necessity or expediency for the nomination had arisen. The guidelines evolved and issued in compliance with the observation in paragraph 79 of the judgment in Amreli District Co-op. Sale and Purchase Union Ltd. (supra) are also required to be followed while exercising the power and the exercise of power has to be consistent with such guidelines. (g) the power to nominate under Section 80 (2), by incorporation of the provisions of Sub-Section (1), means the right to nominate three representatives as if the State Government had subscribed to the share capital of the society.” 29.7 At this stage, a reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel (supra) is worth referring to wherein, the Apex Court, while interpreting the proviso to Section 17 (1) (a)(ii) viz. “where the State Government is of opinion that substantial modifications in the draft development plan and regulations are necessary....” held that these words are indicative of the satisfaction being subjective one, but there must exist circumstances stated in the proviso, which are condition precedent for the formation of opinion. Relevant paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 read thus: “24. The proviso opens with the words “where the State Government is of opinion that substantial modifications in the draft development plan and regulations are necessary...” These words are indicative of the satisfaction being subjective one but there must exist circumstances stated in the proviso which are conditions precedent for the formation of the opinion. Opinion to be formed by the State Government cannot be on imaginary grounds, wishful thinking, however, laudable that may be. Such a course is impermissible in law. The formation of the opinion, though subjective, must be based on the material disclosing that a necessity had arisen to make substantial modifications in the draft development plan. 25. The formation of the opinion by the State Government is with reference to the necessity that may have had arisen to make substantial modifications in the draft development plan. The expression: “as considered necessary” is again of crucial importance. 25. The formation of the opinion by the State Government is with reference to the necessity that may have had arisen to make substantial modifications in the draft development plan. The expression: “as considered necessary” is again of crucial importance. The term “consider” means to think over; it connotes that there should be active application of the mind. In other words the term “consider” postulates consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter. A plain reading of the relevant provision suggests that the State Government may publish the modifications only after consideration that such modifications have become necessary. The word “necessary” means indispensable, requisite; indispensably requisite, useful, incidental or conducive; essential; unavoidable; impossible to be otherwise; not to be avoided; inevitable. The word “necessary” must be construed in the connection in which it is used. [See Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005; P. Ramanatha Aiyar] 26. The formation of the opinion by the State Government should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record that it had become necessary to propose substantial modifications to the draft development plan.” 29.8 The Apex Court in the case of Sachidanand Pandey (supra) has affirmed the proposition that a decision must be arrived at after taking into account all relevant considerations eschewing all irrelevant considerations. In the present case, there is no consideration at all by the Registrar much less any opinion formed by him.” 16. Thereafter the Court has come to the conclusion in paragraph no. 29.9 that in facts of the said case, no opinion was formed by the Registrar of the Co-operative Society. Moreover in paragraph no. 29.16 which is reproduced here in above, it was observed that there was no formation of any opinion as per the requirement of subsection (2) of section 80 of the Act by the Registrar. In the facts of the present case, respondent no. 2-Registrar cannot be said to have formed an independent opinion by reiterating the same facts which are stated in the letter of proposal dated 13.10.2020 received from the District Registrar, Anand wherein after narrating the qualifications of respondent Nos. In the facts of the present case, respondent no. 2-Registrar cannot be said to have formed an independent opinion by reiterating the same facts which are stated in the letter of proposal dated 13.10.2020 received from the District Registrar, Anand wherein after narrating the qualifications of respondent Nos. 6 to 8 who are proposed to be nominated as representatives has stated that Kheda District Milk Producers Union Ltd, Anand is having work area in three districts of Kheda, Anand and Mahisagar and there are 7,14,623 animal keepers associated through Primary Milk Producers society and there are 1214 Milk Producers societies. It is further stated in the said letter of proposal that working capital for the year 2019-2020 is Rs.9603.96 lakhs, reserve of Rs.17282.35 lakhs and there is total milk procurement of 11352.81 lakh kilo and turnover of milk is Rs.4,43,103.81 lakhs per year. It is further stated in the said letter that there is annual sale of 566279 metric tons of fodder. Comparing these facts with the show cause notice dated 14.10.2020 as well as the impugned order dated 20.10.2020, there is no difference in the reasons stated to have been recorded for forming an opinion by the respondent no. 2-Registrar. Therefore, it can be said that there is no independent opinion formed by respondent no. 2-Registrar that there is public interest involved in the operation of the Union on the first count and assuming for a while such an opinion is an independent opinion of the respondent no. 2- Registrar, then there is total failure on part of respondent no. 2 to point out any necessity or expediency to nominate his representatives on the Board of Directors of Union.” (m) Thus, from the discussions as above, in the considered opinion of this Court, while the differential facts as attempted to be submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, was not significantly relied upon by the learned Coordinate Benches in the cases of Bharat Sudambhai Patel and Sodha Parmar, for this Court to take a view that the said decisions would not be binding on this Court. Furthermore, from the analysis as above, it would appear that while order dated 20.10.2020 contained some reasoning to justify the aspect of formation of opinion as required under Section 80(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act and whereas while the said issues did not find favour with the learned Coordinate Bench as complying with requirements of the statute, yet the order impugned in the present petition, substantially is a verbatim copy of the order impugned in case of Sodha Parmar and most importantly, the order is completely silent as regards the aspect of formation of opinion by the State Government, having regard to the public interest involved in operation of a Society that it is necessary or expedient to nominate representatives of the State on the Managing Committee of the Society. The order then reflecting absolute silence as regards the requirement as mandated by the legal provision, basis which the power was being exercised i.e. Section 80(2) of the Act. It thus would appear that the impugned order requires interference on the order not fulfilling the mandatory requirement of Section 80(2) of the Act. Thus, issue No. III, III(A) and III(B) are answered accordingly. Issue No. II: (a) In so far as issue of whether the present petition fulfills the requirements for issuing a writ of mandamus, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D. Nagraj and Sarswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. (Supra). As far as decision of D. Nagraj (Supra) is concerned, learned counsel has relied upon Para 7 of the said decision to contend that the present petitioners would not be persons aggrieved for the purpose of invoking writ of mandamus, in the considered opinion of this Court, such a submission cannot be countenanced. For elaborating the same, this Court seeks to rely upon the decision of 9 Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs. M.V. Dabholkar, 1975 (2) SCC 702 . Paras 27 and 28 of the majority judgment being profitable for the present purpose are reproduced herein-below: “27. The words “person aggrieved” are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words “person aggrieved” will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. M.V. Dabholkar, 1975 (2) SCC 702 . Paras 27 and 28 of the majority judgment being profitable for the present purpose are reproduced herein-below: “27. The words “person aggrieved” are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words “person aggrieved” will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Some times, it is said that the words “person aggrieved” correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. 28. Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprieved of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one “a person aggrieved.” Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words a “person aggrieved” is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words “persons aggrieved” in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words “persons aggrieved” in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words “person aggrieved” include “a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.” It has therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette.” (b) Considering the above observations, it would clearly appear that whether the litigant, who has approached the Court as ‘a person aggrieved’, will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and provisions of the statute. The term ‘person aggrieved’ would also correspond to the requirement of having a locus to question the decision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further explained that the meaning of word ‘person aggrieved’ would vary according to the context of the statute, which was being considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision was dealing with the Advocate Act, which deals with professional conduct and morality and not with regard to property rights and in context of that statute, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter alia observed that the words ‘person aggrieved’, could not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burden or financial interest. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at the first instance, it requires reiteration that the locus standi of the petitioners as members to question a decision of the State Government under Section 80(2), has been recognized by the Division Bench of this Court. While discussing the aspect of locus standi, the Division Bench has also observed that the members of the Managing Committee of the bank would have locus standi to oppose the decision of the Government of sending representatives to the management of the Society as ultimately such an action would affect the management of affairs of the Society itself. The above aspect from the perspective of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would answer the issue raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. The above aspect from the perspective of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would answer the issue raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. Having observed as above, it also requires to be stated that the statute i.e. Section 80(2) of the Act, imposes an obligation upon the State to form an opinion having regard to the public interest involved in functioning of the Society, whether it is necessary or expedient to appoint members in Board of Management/Board of Directors of the Society in question. If the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 i.e. Union is accepted, then the position would be that upon the Society consenting for appointment to its Managing Committee/Board of Directors then the State Government could ignore the statutory requirements of formation of an opinion and such an action would not be challengeable by any other member/Director, who may not be agreeable to the decision of the Managing Committee/Board of Directors since he would not be a person aggrieved. To state the least the argument is fallacious and does not require to be countenanced. (c) In so far as the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. (Supra), the same is relied in context of observations by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a writ of mandamus would not be issued unless there was a demand by the person seeking the mandamus and the demand was met by refusal. Paras 24 and 25 of the said decision being relevant for purpose is relied upon for benefit: “24. As the appeals fail on merits we need not discuss the technical difficulty which an application for a writ of certiorari would encounter when no quasi-judicial proceedings was before the High Court. The powers of the high Court under Article 226 are not strictly confined to the limits to which proceedings for prerogative writs are subject in English practice. Nevertheless the well recognised rule that no writ or order in the nature of a Mandamus would issue when there is no failure to perform a mandatory duty applies in this country as well. Nevertheless the well recognised rule that no writ or order in the nature of a Mandamus would issue when there is no failure to perform a mandatory duty applies in this country as well. Even in cases of alleged breaches of mandatory duties the salutary general rule which is subject to certain exceptions applied by us as it is in England when writ of Mandamus is asked for could be stated as we find it set out in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd edition vol. 13 p. 106): “As a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce and that that demand was met by a refusal.” 25. In the cases before us there was no such, demand refusal. Thus no ground whatsoever is shown here for the issue of any writ order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution. These appeals must be and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.” (d) A perusal of the above paras reveals that Hon’ble Supreme Court relying upon the Halsbury’s Laws of England had inter alia observed that in cases of alleged breach of mandatory duty before issuance of writ of mandamus, there would be certain exceptions and whereas referring to the law applicable in England, which is quoted, what is meant to be stated is that mandamus would not be granted unless the party, who is required to perform a duty, was made aware about the same through a demand, whereby the duty was sought to be enforced and the demand was met by refusal. (e) While it is attempted to be contended that demand and refusal of such demand, would be a prerequisite, but to this Court, it would appear that position may not be absolute. Paras 18 and 19 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Bharat Forge Ltd. and Ors. 2022 (17) SCC 188 is reproduced herein-below for profit: “18. Paras 18 and 19 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Bharat Forge Ltd. and Ors. 2022 (17) SCC 188 is reproduced herein-below for profit: “18. Therefore, it is clear that a Writ of Mandamus or a direction, in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus, is not to be withheld, in the exercise of powers of Article 226 on any technicalities. This is subject only to the indispensable requirements being fulfilled. There must be a public duty. While the duty may, indeed, arise from a Statute ordinarily, the duty can be imposed by common charter, common law, custom or even contract. The fact that a duty may have to be unravelled and the mist around it cleared before its shape is unfolded may not relieve the Court of its duty to cull out a public duty in a Statute or otherwise, if in substance, it exists. Equally, Mandamus would lie if the Authority, which had a discretion, fails to exercise it and prefers to act under dictation of another Authority. 19. A Writ of Mandamus or a direction in the nature thereof had been given a very wide scope in the conditions prevailing in this country and it is to be issued wherever there is a public duty and there is a failure to perform and the courts will not be bound by technicalities and its chief concern should be to reach justice to the wronged. We are not dilating on or diluting other requirements, which would ordinarily include the need for making a demand unless a demand is found to be futile in circumstances, which have already been catalogued in the earlier decisions of this Court.” (f) Paras 76 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Hero Motocorp Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2023) 1 SCC 386 , being relevant for the present purpose is also reproduced herein-below for profit: “76. Union of India, (2023) 1 SCC 386 , being relevant for the present purpose is also reproduced herein-below for profit: “76. It could thus be seen that this Court holds that a writ of mandamus can be issued where the Authority has failed to exercise the discretion vested in it or has exercised such a discretion malafidely or on an irrelevant consideration.” (g) Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would appear that a Writ Court could issue mandamus when the authority concerned has failed to exercise the discretion vested in it or has exercised such a discretion malafidely or on irrelevant considerations. It has also been explained that writ of mandamus is to be issued wherever there is a public duty and there is a failure to perform the same. It would also appear that writ of mandamus is not to be withheld on ground of technicalities. In so far as the aspect of demand is concerned, it is clearly mentioned that the requirement to issue a demand would not be pressed for, if the demand is found to be futile in the circumstances. Co-relating the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above cases, while it would appear that for issuance of writ of mandamus a demand is to be issued for performance of a mandatory duty, which has been met with a refusal. In the instant case, the mandatory duty breach of which is complained of, flowed from a statute. Thus, when a public functionary, who was under an obligation to exercise the powers vested with him, in a particular manner, that is to say as per the statute, chooses not to do so and exercises his discretion based upon irrelevant consideration and takes a decision, then to this Court, it would appear that making of demand under such circumstances would be a futile exercise. Again the authority concerned, holding one of the highest offices of the State under the Cooperative law, was also required to be aware about recent decision of this Court on the very issue i.e. in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel and Sodha Parmar Kantibhai Manibhai (Supra), the later decision being more relevant since the Society is the same Society as in the present case and the impugned order as would be clear from the later discussion, was heavily inspired by the order impugned in case of Sodha Parmar. It thus could be appreciated that the above contention had not been raised by the State Government and whereas such a contention also does not appear to have been raised by the State in the earlier two decisions, more particularly in case of Bharat Sudambhai Patel. Thus, the issue of whether the petitioners are persons aggrieved for maintaining a writ or whether a writ of mandamus could be issued without there being a demand and refusal, is answered accordingly. Issue No. IV: (a) Having held as above that the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 requires interference on the ground that the same is passed without application of mind, on complete irrelevant consideration and does not at all fulfill the requirements as found in Section 80(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act, to this Court, it would appear that the order also requires interference on yet another ground. Reference is made to the decision of Privy Council in case of Nazir Ahmad Vs. The King Emperor, 1936 SCC Online PC 3, which has been reiterated in recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Nareshbhai Bhagubhai and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2019) 15 SCC 1 and in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Abhilash Lal and Ors. (2020) 13 SCC 234 . The proposition flowing from the above judgments being that if the statute requires a thing to be done in particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. In case of Nazir Ahmad, the Privy Council has observed that “the Rule, which applies is a different and no less well recognized Rule, namely that where a power is given to do certain thing in certain way then the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In case of Nazir Ahmad, the Privy Council has observed that “the Rule, which applies is a different and no less well recognized Rule, namely that where a power is given to do certain thing in certain way then the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.” The said principle has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Naresh Bhagubhai (Supra) at Para 31, which is reproduced herein-below: “In any event, the order under Section 20D(2) cannot be passed prior to the personal hearing. The mandate of the law is that the order must be passed “after” the grant of personal hearing, and after any further enquiry is made by the Competent Authority. The whole process of granting a personal hearing would be reduced to an empty formality and a farcical exercise, if the order on the objections precedes the grant of personal hearing. This would be clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 20D(2) of the Act. It is well settled that where a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. 12. The provisions of an expropriatory legislation, which compulsorily deprives a person of his right to property without his consent, must be strictly construed. 13. The Railways Act, 1989 being an expropriatory legislation, its provisions have to be strictly construed.” (b) Said principle had been further reiterated in the case of Abhilash Lal (Supra) at Para 39, which is also reproduced herein-below: “39. The principle that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all, articulated in Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 , has found widespread acceptance. In the context of this case, it means that if alienation or creation of any interest in respect of MCGM’s properties is contemplated in the statute through a particular manner, that end can be achieved only through the prescribed mode, or not at all.” (c) Corelating to above principle in the facts of the present case, it would appear that Section 80(2) of the Act, requires the State Government to form a particular opinion. In the instant case, while there is no opinion whatsoever formed by the State Government, as explained hereinabove, it would also appear that the procedure adopted also leaves much to be desired. It would appear that proposal had emanated from the District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, dated 14.03.2023 to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies informing the Registrar, Cooperative Societies that he has received recommendations to appoint certain persons as Government nominees on the Managing Committee/Board of Director of respondent No. 4 Union from Milk Producer Societies and whereas names of six persons were recommended by three Cooperative Societies each. The said communication having been taken into consideration by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies rather the only aspect, which weighed with the Registrar being the said communication and the consent of the Society concerned, which was also annexed with the communication by the District Registrar, while passing the impugned order, to this Court, it would appear was completely against the requirements in the statute. (d) For appreciating the above observation, it would be necessary to refer to Section 80(2) of the Act. “Section 80. (2) Where the State Government is of the opinion that having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of a society it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may nominate its representatives on the committee of such society as if the State Government had subscribed to the share capital of the society and the provisions of Sub-Section (1) shall, so far as may be apply to such nomination.” A bare perusal of Sub-Section reveals that the same is absolutely clear and unambiguous. The provision requires the State to form an opinion. The provision does not envisage that the State is to form its opinion based upon the opinion of either the District Registrar or the Cooperative Society itself i.e. where the State representatives are to be nominated or upon the opinion of the members of such Cooperative Society. The decision i.e. the opinion envisaged is by the State only. Now, corelating the same with the proposition reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment referred to hereinabove, the position that would emerge is that when the statute requires that the State is to form a particular opinion on certain aspects then the opinion could be by the State independently and any other mode of formation of opinion is necessarily forbidden. (e) In the instant case, the opinion that is formed is not of the State independently rather the State has merely collated the recommendations of the member Societies of the respondent No. 4 Union as further recommended by the District Registrar and also the consent of respondent No. 4 Union itself and has directed nomination of Government representatives on the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 Union. Again while the State has acted upon the recommendations and nominated respondent Nos. 5 to 7, the same without formation of an independent opinion as envisaged by the statute. (f) Thus, it becomes apparent that the State which was under an obligation rather a mandate as per Section 80(2) of the Act to take a decision in a particular manner had taken such decision in a manner, which was completely de hors the manner prescribed. In the considered opinion of this Court, since the proposition of law as emanating from the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court require that the procedure as laid down in the statute is to be followed and all other methods are forbidden. Therefore also, the impugned decision cannot be sustained as being in contravention of the procedure emanating from the statute. 43. In the considered opinion of this Court, in view of the discussion, analysis and conclusion, more particularly since this Court has arrived at a conclusion that order impugned in the present petition, reflects complete non-application of mind, is based on irrelevant consideration passed in complete contravention of the procedure as required by the statute and most importantly does not reflect formation of an opinion as per Section 80(2) of the Act, therefore, the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 is hereby quashed and set aside. 44. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 16.03.2023 is hereby quashed and set aside. The present petition succeeds and is disposed of as allowed. Further Order: 1. The present petition had been listed on board on 28.10.2024 for orders and whereas upon an inquiry made by learned advocate Mr. C.P. Champaneri, this Court had informed learned advocate that the petition is allowed and fair copy of the judgment would be available as soon as possible. 2. On 29.10.2024, learned advocate Mr. Archit Jani appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4-Union and learned advocate Mr. C.P. Champaneri, this Court had informed learned advocate that the petition is allowed and fair copy of the judgment would be available as soon as possible. 2. On 29.10.2024, learned advocate Mr. Archit Jani appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4-Union and learned advocate Mr. Vinay B. Vishen appearing on behalf of the respondent-State would jointly request that this Court may stay the said judgment for a period of three weeks for enabling the said respondents to challenge the same before the appellate authority. 3. The request is vehemently objected by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Harin Raval and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore for learned advocate Mr. C.P. Champaneri for the petitioners. Learned Senior Advocates would draw the attention of this Court to an order dated 29.03.2023 whereby the respondents no. 5 to 7 had been permitted to attend meetings subject to further orders that may be passed by this Court. Learned Senior Advocates would submit that since such an arrangement was made, as could be noticed, without any equity being created in favour of the respondents Nos. 5 to 7, they may not be permitted to continue further as nominated directors. Learned Senior Advocates would further submit that in case, this Court is inclined to consider the request made on behalf of the respondent no. 4 and respondent-State then, this Court may as a via media, permit respondents Nos. 5 to 7 to attend the meetings, but, in the interregnum period, the respondents Nos. 5 to 7 may not draw any emolument and should not be permitted to vote in meetings of the Managing Committee. 4. Considering the submissions made by learned advocates for the respective parties, more particularly, considering that the request for staying the judgment as emanating from the respondent no. 4-Union which respondent, to this Court, may not be much concerned with whether the respondents Nos. 5 to 7 continue in the Managing Committee or not and since it does not appear that the request is emanating from respondents no. 5 to 7 themselves and whereas, only on account of the learned AGP Mr. Vishen supporting the request which had emanated from the respondent no. 4, while directing the decision of this Court to remain stayed for a further period of three weeks, appropriate orders are required to be passed. 5 to 7 themselves and whereas, only on account of the learned AGP Mr. Vishen supporting the request which had emanated from the respondent no. 4, while directing the decision of this Court to remain stayed for a further period of three weeks, appropriate orders are required to be passed. Hence, the following order: (i) The above decision shall remain stayed for a period of three weeks from the date the judgment is uploaded on the portal of Gujarat High Court. (ii) The respondents Nos. 5 to 7 shall continue as nominated directors subject to the condition that for a period of three weeks from the date the judgment is uploaded on the portal of the Gujarat High Court, they shall not be permitted to either vote in any meetings of the Managing Committee nor they shall be entitled to any emoluments. (iii) The above arrangement shall exhaust itself upon completion of three weeks from the date the judgment had been uploaded on the web portal of the Gujarat High Court except for intervention by the appellate Court.