JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The informant used to talk to the petitioner on his mobile phone. The informant complained that the petitioner had raped her. The police registered the F.I.R. No. 14/2020 dated 13.03.2020 at Women Police Station Bhiuli District Mandi, H.P. for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. The police conducted the investigation. The police obtained the call details record and arrested the petitioner. The statement of the informant was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. in which she stated that the petitioner had met her on 12.03.2020 and dropped her in her home. He returned at 9:30 pm-10:00 p.m. to the informant’s home and raped her. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing a petition seeking to quash the F.I.R. N o. 14/2020 and consequential proceedings of Sessions Trial No. 42 of 2020, pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi, H.P. 3. It was asserted that a perusal of the F.I.R. and statement of the informant shows that the allegations are false and the proceeding isan abuse of process of the Court. The medical record does not show any visible injury except bleeding. A married woman who enters into a consensual sexual relationship with a man other than her husband cannot prosecute him for rape on the false pretext of marriage. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R. and consequential proceedings be quashed 4. I have heard Mr Parveen Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no.1-State and Ms Ambika Kotwal, Advocate for respondent no.2. 5. Mr Parveen Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The contents of the F.I.R. do not show the commission of cognizable offence. The informant is a married woman and her plea that she had entered into a cons ensual relationship with the petitioner on the pretext of the marriage is not acceptable. He relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in S.Rajadurai Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi & another W.P. (CRL) 208/2023 & CRL M.A. 5217 of 2023, decided on 13.09.2023 and Kerala High Court in Tino Thankacha vs. State of Kerala 2022, CRL.MC No. 1819 of 2019 decided on 22nd November 2022 in support of his submission. 6. Ms. State (NCT) of Delhi & another W.P. (CRL) 208/2023 & CRL M.A. 5217 of 2023, decided on 13.09.2023 and Kerala High Court in Tino Thankacha vs. State of Kerala 2022, CRL.MC No. 1819 of 2019 decided on 22nd November 2022 in support of his submission. 6. Ms. Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no.1-State submitted that the petitioner had raped the informant forcibly. There is a presumption under Section 114A of Cr.P.C. regarding the absence of consent in a rape case; hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Ms Ambika Kotawal, learned counsel for respondent no.2 adopted the submissions advanced by Ms. Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General and further submitted that no person has a right to force himself upon a woman, therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:- “17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon thecritical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon thecritical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** 27.16. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 9. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions o f the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed: “10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 11. One other reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 11. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine 1083 wherein it was observed: 12. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [ (2019) 14 SCC 568 ], this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self- restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. 12. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 13. Heavy reliance was placed upon the copy of the F.I.R. No. 261 of 2018 stated to have been lodged by the informant against her husband, asserting that friends of the husband forcibly raped her, to submit that the informant is a married woman and she cannot be deceived on the pretext of marriage. It is apparent from the perusal of these two F.I.R.s that there is nothing to connect the informant in the two cases. In one F.I.R. the name of the mother has been mentioned, whereas in the other the name of the husband was mentioned. The year of birth of the informant was mentioned as 1995 in one F.I.R., whereas it was mentioned as 1994 in the other FIR. Even the permanent address in the two F.I.Rs. of the informant is not the same. The year of birth of the informant was mentioned as 1995 in one F.I.R., whereas it was mentioned as 1994 in the other FIR. Even the permanent address in the two F.I.Rs. of the informant is not the same. Thus, the informant in the two F.I.Rs cannot be said to be the same, and it is difficult to agree with the submission that the informant in the present case is the same person, who had lodged the earlier F.I.R. Hence, the judgments cited at bar that a married woman cannot be deceived on the pretext of marriage does not apply to the present case. 14. The scope of inquiry under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is very limited. The Court has to see the material, which has been relied upon by the prosecution and it is not permissible to look into any other material while exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115, that the proceeding s can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 15. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 16. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 17. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 18. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 19. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: 55. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by section 482, Cr. P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the FIR and the report submitted by the police. 21. It was submitted that the police had conducted the investigations and presented the challan. Hence, this court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 that the High Court will continue to exercise the power even if the charge sheet has been filed. It w as observed: “11. This being the factual backdrop, we may note at the very outset that the contention that the appellants' quash petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any event, as the chargesheet in relation thereto was submitted before the Court and taken on file, needs mention only to be rejected. It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the FIR even when a chargesheet is filed by the police during the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat ( (2011) 7 SCC 59 )]. It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the FIR even when a chargesheet is filed by the police during the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat ( (2011) 7 SCC 59 )]. This principle was reiterated in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home [ (2019) 11 SCC 706 ]. This issue, therefore, needs no further elucidation on our part.” 22. Thus, the submission that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised after filing of the charge sheet is not acceptable. 23. The informant has specifically stated in the F.I.R. and her statement on oath that the petitioner had forcibly raped her. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89 that Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when the victim states in a case of rape that she had not consented, the Court has to presume that there was no consent. It was observed:- “10. It would be germane to note that the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence warrant that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent evidence, however, considering the ethos and culture of the Indian Society, and considering the rising graph of the commission of the social crime - ‘Rape’, the courts have been permitted to raise a legal presumption as contained in Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act. As per Section 114A, a presumption could be raised as to the absence of consent in certain cases pertaining to Rape. As per the said provision, if sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question arises as to whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped, and if she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.” 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 615 , that in view of Section 114-A when the victim says that she had not consented, the Court has to presume the absence of the consent. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 615 , that in view of Section 114-A when the victim says that she had not consented, the Court has to presume the absence of the consent. It was observed:- “15. In this connection, reference may be made to the amendment made in the Evidence Act. Section 114-A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114-A reads as under: "114-A. Presumption as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.-In a prosecution for rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent." 16. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutrix and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. The presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the instant case as per the statement of PW 1, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry her." 25. This judgment was followed in Anurag Soni Vs State of Chhattisgarh, 2019 (13) SCC 1 . Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Court cannot infer consent, when the victim stated that she had not consented to the sexual intercourse. 26. This judgment was followed in Anurag Soni Vs State of Chhattisgarh, 2019 (13) SCC 1 . Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Court cannot infer consent, when the victim stated that she had not consented to the sexual intercourse. 26. The allegations in the FIR and statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. clearly show that the petitioner had raped the informant without her consent, therefore, the same discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, hence, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground that no cognizable offence has disclosed. 27. It was submitted that the contents of the FIR are false and the same should be quashed. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the Hig h Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: 21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC. 28. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and it is for the learned Trial Court to see the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the chargesheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the chargesheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the chargesheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 29. In view of the above, it is not a fit case where the extraordinary power to quash the FIR can be exercised. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 30. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.