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2024 DIGILAW 200 (ALL)

Dinesh Kumar Singh v. State of U. P.

2024-01-18

J.J.MUNIR

body2024
JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This judgment will decide the present writ petition and connected Writ (A) No. 11275 of 2023. There are common questions of fact and law involved in both the writ petitions, and, therefore, the two have been heard together, with Writ (A) No. 11275 of 2023 being treated the leading case. The facts, therefore, will be noticed from the record of Writ (A) No. 11275 of 2023, where affidavits have been exchanged. 2. An advertisement was issued by the Director, Local Bodies, U.P. Lucknow dated 20th December, 2018, acting on a letter of the Government, bearing No. 3591@9&4&18&50 t@17 VhŒlhŒ fnukad 05-11-2018 advertising posts of Assistant Commissioner/ Executive Engineer Class-1/Deputy Secretary, Development Authority, Executive Engineer Class-2, Executive Engineer Class-3, besides Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, being 22, 13, 16 and 107 posts, in that order. The advertisement said that in public interest, the aforesaid posts would be filled up from amongst officials working under the Government on the basis of deputation against each of the four categories of posts. The pay-scale and the relative essential qualifications for a direct recruit were indicated. The advertisement indicated further eligibility qualifications that a government servant working in one or the other department, must possess in order to be appointed on deputation to one or the other of the posts advertised. It was also stipulated that the appointment would be valid till a regular arrangement was made or for a period of one year, whichever is earlier. The other matters mentioned in the advertisement may not be of much consequence. 3. The petitioners, who are fourteen in number in the leading writ petition, have come up with a case that each of them are holding permanent substantive posts under the Government in one department or the other, and that all of them are eligible. The petitioners, accordingly, applied in response to the advertisement for consideration of their candidature for the posts of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat on deputation. Each of the petitioners, being eligible, were called to interview and they faced the selection committee appointed for the purpose. Each of them were selected for appointment. 4. It is common ground that the petitioners selected for the positions of Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat were granted appointment by means of appointment orders dated 31.01.2019, 26.02.2019 and 09.03.2019. Each of the petitioners, being eligible, were called to interview and they faced the selection committee appointed for the purpose. Each of them were selected for appointment. 4. It is common ground that the petitioners selected for the positions of Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat were granted appointment by means of appointment orders dated 31.01.2019, 26.02.2019 and 09.03.2019. The orders of appointment granted appointment on deputation for a period of one year till a regular arrangement was made. Pursuant to the orders of appointment, each of the petitioners joined immediately and have been working as Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat at different places. The dates of joining of each of the petitioners are indicated in Paragraph No. 17 of the writ petition, which all lie in the months of January to March, 2019. The petitioners say that subsequent to their joining on the post of Executive officer, Nagar Panchayat on deputation, they have been transferred from one place to another and served also at stations of transfer, different from the Local Body to which they were appointed or, so to speak, initially posted. The current places of posting of each of the fourteen petitioners are pleaded in Paragraph No. 19 of the writ petition, but no gainful purpose would be served by enumerating all those details. 5. It is the petitioners’ case that their work and conduct is satisfactory. There is no cause for complaint to the Local Bodies concerned, wherever they have served. The case of the petitioners further is that there is large vacancy in the cadre of the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat in the State. It is averred in Paragraph No. 21 that apart from the posts, against which officers appointed pursuant to the advertisement dated 20th December, 2018, are working on deputation, there is a vacancy of 200 posts of Executive Officers in different Nagar Panchayat of the State, which continue to be substantially vacant, and wherefor no regular selection has been held as yet. There is said to be an extreme shortage of regularly selected Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat. Regular selection to the post of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat is made by the U.P. Subordinate Service Selection Commission (for short, ‘the Commission’). No regularly selected candidate from the aforesaid Commission is available or appointed. 6. There is said to be an extreme shortage of regularly selected Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat. Regular selection to the post of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat is made by the U.P. Subordinate Service Selection Commission (for short, ‘the Commission’). No regularly selected candidate from the aforesaid Commission is available or appointed. 6. It is also the petitioners’ case that though they were initially appointed for a period of one year, but the said period of time has been extended from time to time, in consequence of which, the petitioners have been in continuous engagement. The extension has been granted beyond the period of one year vide order dated 24th August, 2021 issued by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of U.P. in the Department of Local Bodies. Now, the State Government have issued a Government Order, directing the services of these Executive Officers appointed on deputation to be discontinued. The Government Order of 5th July, 2023 refers to an earlier Government Order dated 16.03.2019, which in turn purports to give effect a still older Government Order of 16th March, 1999. Acting in deference to the Government Order dated 05.07.2023, the Director, Local Bodies has issued a consequential order dated 07.07.2023. There is another order passed by the State Government on 9th July, 2023, directing that the charge of the vacant post of the Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat, including those held by the petitioners on deputation, shall be given as additional charge to the Executive Officers of different Nagar Panchayat. The effect of the Government Order dated 05.07.2023 and that of the Director, Local Bodies dated 07.07.2023, is that the petitioners’ appointment on deputation in the Nagar Panchayat would come to an end and the petitioners would go back to their respective parent Departments. 7. Aggrieved by the order dated 05.07.2023 passed by the Government and the order dated 07.07.2023 passed by the Director, Local Bodies, putting an end to the appointment on deputation for the petitioners on positions of the Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat, this writ petition has been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. A supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Palika Adhishashi Adhikari Seva Sangh through its General Secretary, Kunwar Gaurav Singh. 8. A supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Palika Adhishashi Adhikari Seva Sangh through its General Secretary, Kunwar Gaurav Singh. The affidavit has been filed by one Chaitanya Kumar Tiwari, the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Handia, District Prayagraj. This association has not been formally impleaded as a party-respondent to the petition, but heard nevertheless under Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, as the decision in this petition is likely to affect the interest of other members of the association. 9. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Government, respondent No. 1, which is a personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary, Urban Development, Government of U.P. Lucknow. 10. Heard Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Siddharth Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. Mr. S.K. Singh, Advocate, appearing for the non-parties, has been heard under Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of Rules of the Court, 1952. 11. In the connected writ petition, Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Siddharth Khare, learned Counsel has been heard on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State. 12. Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate has argued that the State Government and the Director, Local Bodies have, in passing the orders impugned dated 05.07.2023 and 07.07.2023, committed a manifest illegality, inasmuch as they have not borne in mind the seminal distinction between a ‘transfer on deputation’ and an ‘appointment on deputation’. Whilst a transfer on deputation does not confer any right on the deputationist to continue on the post, an appointment on deputation does confer some rights. It is argued that a transfer on deputation is no recruitment to the post where the deputationist is working. But, an appointment on deputation, by contrast, is indeed a recruitment to the post. Therefore, according to Mr. Khare, an appointment on deputation cannot be disturbed at the sweet will of the employer. The rights of an appointee on deputation have to be judged in accordance with the terms of appointment and the ancillary rights arising therefrom, including equities. But, an appointment on deputation, by contrast, is indeed a recruitment to the post. Therefore, according to Mr. Khare, an appointment on deputation cannot be disturbed at the sweet will of the employer. The rights of an appointee on deputation have to be judged in accordance with the terms of appointment and the ancillary rights arising therefrom, including equities. In support of this distinction, in the nature of appointment by way of deputation and a mere transfer on deputation, Mr. Khare has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel vs. Union of India and Another, (2012) 7 SCC 757 and Union of India and Another vs. S.N. Maity and Another, (2015) 4 SCC 164 . 13. Elaborating his submissions, the learned Senior Advocate argues that the petitioners’ appointments are tenure appointment, where each of them were entitled to continue until a regularly selected candidate. He has invited the Court’s attention to the appointment orders dated 31.01.2019, 26.02.2019 and 09.03.2019, which say that the appointment would continue till permanent arrangement is made or for one year, whichever is earlier. It is urged that this nature of the tenure demonstrates the intention of the Appointing Authority, which is to the effect as indicated hereinabove. In support of this submission, the learned Senior Advocate has called attention to Paragaph Nos. 4 and 15 of the report in S.N. Maity (supra), which read: “4. The High Court after posing the questions took note of the fact that the Union of India had issued an advertisement in Employment News dated 20-10-2001/26-10-2001 calling for applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the post of CGPDTM and the Ministry had proposed to fill up the post by transfer on deputation, including short-term contract. The first respondent, being eligible, applied through his parent department i.e. Central Mining Research Institute, Dhanbad and his selection was made by the Union Public Service Commission (for short “UPSC”) which held interview on 4-6-2002 and finding him suitable, recommended his name for appointment. The competent authority approved the appointment of the first respondent, the petitioner before the High Court, for the post of CGPDTM in the pay scale of Rs 18,400-500-22,400 on deputation basis for a period of five years or until further orders, whichever was earlier from the date of assumption of the charge of the post. The competent authority approved the appointment of the first respondent, the petitioner before the High Court, for the post of CGPDTM in the pay scale of Rs 18,400-500-22,400 on deputation basis for a period of five years or until further orders, whichever was earlier from the date of assumption of the charge of the post. The said order was communicated vide Letter No. 8/52/2001-PP&C (Vol. II) dated 23-6-2003 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. Thereafter, a letter of appointment dated 11-8-2003 was issued to the first respondent in the name of the President, appointing him on deputation basis for a period of five years or until further orders, whichever was earlier. 15. The controversy that has emerged in the instant case is to be decided on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles of law. We have already opined that it is not a case of simple transfer. It is not a situation where one can say that it is a transfer on deputation as against an equivalent post from one cadre to another or one department to another. It is not a deputation from a government department to a government corporation or one Government to the other. There is no cavil over the fact that the post falls in a different category and the first respondent had gone through the whole gamut of selection. On a studied scrutiny, the notification of appointment makes it absolutely clear that it is a tenure posting and the fixed tenure is five years unless it is curtailed. But, a pregnant one, this curtailment cannot be done in an arbitrary or capricious manner. There has to have some rationale. Merely because the words “until further orders” are used, it would not confer allowance on the employer to act with caprice.” 14. It is next submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner that there does not exist any reason to issue the order dated 05.07.2023 cancelling appointment of all the deputationists on the post of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat. This action is without reason and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is argued that the State Government could not have removed without cause all the Executive Officers appointed on deputation by one stroke of pen, without consideration of individual cases, the circumstances in each Nagar Panchayat and the individual performance. This action is without reason and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is argued that the State Government could not have removed without cause all the Executive Officers appointed on deputation by one stroke of pen, without consideration of individual cases, the circumstances in each Nagar Panchayat and the individual performance. In support of this contention of his, Mr. Ashok Khare has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 212 . In this regard, attention has been drawn by the learned Senior Advocate to Paragraph No. 12 of the counter affidavit, which claims, according to him, unfettered rights in the State Government to remove all the deputation appointees at will and by fiat. 15. The next submission advanced by the learned Senior Advocate is that the impugned order dated 07.07.2023 issued by the Director, Local Bodies, Lucknow has not been passed upon an individual application of mind to each case and the exercise of his discretion, but is one made on the dictate and command of the State Government. It is urged that an order, where the Authority, possessed of jurisdiction to pass it, does not do so in the exercise of its own discretion, but on the dictate and command of a superior or another, renders the order non est. Reliance in this connection is placed by the learned Senior Advocate on the decision of the Supreme Court in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and Another vs. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302 . Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja (supra), where it is observed: “11..........This is a case of power conferred upon one authority being really exercised by another. If a statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority’s instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether. In other words, the discretion vested in the DSP in this case by Section 20-A(1) was not exercised by the DSP at all. 12. Reference may be made in this connection to Commr. In other words, the discretion vested in the DSP in this case by Section 20-A(1) was not exercised by the DSP at all. 12. Reference may be made in this connection to Commr. of Police vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : 1952 SCR 135 : AIR 1952 SC 16 , in which the action of Commissioner of Police in cancelling the permission granted to the respondent for construction of cinema in Greater Bombay at the behest of the State Government was not upheld, as the rules concerned had conferred this power on the Commissioner, because of which it was stated that the Commissioner was bound to bear his own independent and unfettered judgment and decide the matter for himself, instead of forwarding an order which another authority had purported to pass. 13. It has been stated by Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn. at pp. 358-359 under the heading “Surrender, Abdication, Dictation” and sub-heading “Power in the wrong hands” as below: “Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority may share its power with someone else, or may allow someone else to dictate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting to their wishes or instructions. The effect then is that the discretion conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void. So strict are the courts in applying this principle that they condemn some administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper to those who make them…. Ministers and their departments have several times fallen foul of the same rule, no doubt equally to their surprise.....” 14. The present was thus a clear case of exercise of power on the basis of external dictation. That the dictation came on the prayer of the DSP will not make any difference to the principle. The DSP did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by the statute and did not grant approval to the recording of information under TADA in exercise of his discretion.” 16. In the connected writ petition, Mr. That the dictation came on the prayer of the DSP will not make any difference to the principle. The DSP did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by the statute and did not grant approval to the recording of information under TADA in exercise of his discretion.” 16. In the connected writ petition, Mr. Khare has submitted that an additional feature on facts that requires consideration is that the petitioner in that case was appointed on deputation pursuant to the order of appointment dated 12.07.2022 on 28.07.2022 and has been removed by the orders impugned, short of completing a year of service on the deputation appointment. 17. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and Mr. S.K. Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties heard under Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of the Rules of Court, are unanimous in refuting the submissions of Mr. Khare. It is argued by them that deputation, whether by transfer or appointment, does not confer any right upon the deputationist. It does not give rise even to a legitimate expectation in favour of the appointee. It is next submitted that in any case, so far as the petitioners of Writ (A) No. 11275 of 2023 are concerned, they have completed three years of their tenure on deputation, which is the usual period for a deputation appointment in accordance with the Government Order dated 16.03.1999. It can be extended up to five years with the concurrence of the Finance Department, but that does not confer a right upon the deputation appointee to ask for a tenure for the maximum permissible of five years. Learned Counsel for the respondents have placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan and Others, (1998) 7 SCC 66 and Kunal Nanda vs. Union of India and Another, (2000) 5 SCC 362 . They have further placed reliance upon a Bench decision of this Court in Dr. O.P. Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2002 (4) AWC 3067 (LB), where S. Raghunathan (supra) and Kunal Nanda (supra) were followed to hold about the right of a deputationist to continue on deputation: “24. Applying the above principles, we are of the view that it is the prerogative of an employer to call back its employee from deputation or to post any other officer of higher rank in his place. Applying the above principles, we are of the view that it is the prerogative of an employer to call back its employee from deputation or to post any other officer of higher rank in his place. Petitioner can have legitimate expectation where he has permanent lien but he has no right or lien on the deputation post even if he has been sent to the borrowing department for a specific period. We are further of view that the period of deputation can be curtailed by the employer at any point of time on administrative ground or in public interest. The policy pointed out by the petitioner is equivalent to the policy of transfer which does provide for minimum stay of a Government, employee on a particular station for three years but the State Government or for that matter, the authority competent, may transfer the employee prior to three years period on administrative ground or in administrative exigencies. Policies are merely guidelines and have no statutory force of law.” 18. We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both sides by learned Counsel for the parties. 19. The question that falls for determination in this case is: Whether the deputation appointment in the petitioners’ favour confers some kind of a right upon them, which cannot be curtailed by the orders impugned, relieving them of their position as Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat and asking them to join their substantive posts in the parent department? 20. All the law relating to deputation, which says that the deputationist has no right to the post, bears no lien on it and can be required by the lending or the borrowing employers to go back to his parent department, is said to have no application here, because there is a seminal distinction between a ‘transfer on deputation’ and an ‘appointment on deputation’. There is no cavil about the legal position, where a deputationist is sent by the lending department or the employer to the borrowing employer, as a purely temporary arrangement, on deputation, which has been described as transfer on deputation. 21. There is no cavil about the legal position, where a deputationist is sent by the lending department or the employer to the borrowing employer, as a purely temporary arrangement, on deputation, which has been described as transfer on deputation. 21. In Kunal Nanda, the issue arose in the context of a claim for permanent absorption in the Central Bureau of Investigation by an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police belonging to the CRPF, who had been sent there on deputation, apparently a transfer to the borrowing employer, without any kind of selection in accordance with Rules by the borrowing department. The facts in Kunal Nanda may best be described in the words of their Lordships: “2. ............... The appellant, a member of CRPF and serving as an Assistant Sub-Inspector in the said parent Department w.e.f. 1-1-1987, joined the service of CBI on deputation in the same capacity as ASI on 1-8-1991. He continued to work as ASI on the deputation terms for the initial period, which came to be extended from time to time with the mutual consent of the lending and borrowing Department. In the year 1994, no doubt, the borrowing Department expressed an inclination for permanent absorption in CBI and sought for the concurrence of CRPF to which, it appears, the lending Department also conveyed its clearance. 3. It may be noticed at this stage that while on such deputation in CBI, the appellant was also appointed as Sub-Inspector on 1-6-1995 and in his parent Department also he was promoted as such. There are no specific statutory rules as such governing the question of absorption of a deputationist. On the other hand, the said subject is governed by departmental instructions and circular orders as per which the qualification and experience of the officers to be selected should be comparable to those prescribed for direct recruits to such posts where direct recruitment has also been prescribed as one of the methods of the appointment in the Recruitment Rules. In consonance with such procedure, the appellant was asked to undertake a written test. In consonance with such procedure, the appellant was asked to undertake a written test. He made a formal application disclosing his credentials and on the basis of his performance in the written test, the record relating to the last five years’ ACRs (Part I - Personal Data) for the period 1993-94 to 1997-98 in which the appellant mentioned about his basic educational qualification as BA and his performance in the interview, the Screening Committee constituted for the purpose recommended the absorption of the appellant in CBI as Sub-Inspector. But when the appellant was asked to produce the documents in original in support of his educational qualifications etc., the appellant started explaining that for a person of his standing in service the basic educational qualification of passing the senior secondary examination is enough and passing of the degree examination, may not be insisted upon. This was not only contrary to his earlier representation that he was a graduate but the Screening Committee’s recommendation for absorption in CBI was also on the basis that the appellant was a graduate, as disclosed by him. This seems to have been taken also as proof of his doubtful integrity in furnishing wrong information about his educational qualification to be graduation to somehow gain absorption. Since, in terms of the relevant Rules the total period of deputation in the rank of ASI/SI including that of deputation in any other cadre/cadre post cannot be for more than five years, the appellant was repatriated to his parent Department and also relieved with effect from 31-1-1999 (AN) with a direction to report for duty to the parent Department......” 22. The appellant in Kunal Nanda, having concurrently failed in his challenge to the order of repatriation before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court, appealed by special leave to their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Negativing the deputationist’s claim, it was held: “6. On the legal submissions also made there are no merits whatsoever. It is well settled that unless the claim of the deputationist for a permanent absorption in the department where he works on deputation is based upon any statutory rule, regulation or order having the force of law, a deputationist cannot assert and succeed in any such claim for absorption. On the legal submissions also made there are no merits whatsoever. It is well settled that unless the claim of the deputationist for a permanent absorption in the department where he works on deputation is based upon any statutory rule, regulation or order having the force of law, a deputationist cannot assert and succeed in any such claim for absorption. The basic principle underlying deputation itself is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position therein at the instance of either of the departments and there is no vested right in such a person to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation. The reference to the decision reported in Rameshwar Prasad vs. M.D. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. (1999) 8 SCC 381 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 60 is inappropriate since the consideration therein was in the light of the statutory Rules for absorption and the scope of those Rules. The claim that he need not be a graduate for absorption and being a service candidate, on completing service of 10 years he is exempt from the requirement of possessing a degree needs mention, only to be rejected. The stand of the respondent Department that the absorption of a deputationist being one against the direct quota, the possession of basic educational qualification prescribed for direct recruitment i.e. a degree is a must and essential and that there could be no comparison of the claim of such a person with one to be dealt with on promotion of a candidate who is already in service in that Department is well merited and deserves to be sustained and we see no infirmity whatsoever in the said claim.” 23. No doubt, the decision in Kunal Nanda is about the right of a deputationist to be absorbed in the service of the borrowing department and the essence of that decision turns on the principle that a deputationist does not have a right to absorption in the borrowing department’s service, unless his right is founded on a ‘statutory Rule, Regulation or Order having the force of law’, to borrow the words of their Lordships. But, this principle is about the right to seek absorption in the borrowing department’s service, which is not involved here at all. But, this principle is about the right to seek absorption in the borrowing department’s service, which is not involved here at all. Behind the holding in Kunal Nanda is also the underlying principle spoken of by their Lordships in clear words, that there is no right of the deputationist to continue in the service of the borrowing employer and he can be repatriated to his parent department at the instance of either of them. This principle, in turn, is apparently founded on the premise that a deputation arising in whatever manner and of whatever nature, to wit, a ‘transfer on deputation’ or an ‘appointment on deputation’, is after all not the conferment of a substantive right to hold a post or a lien as it is called. 24. S. Raghunathan was a case where the deputationists were Executive Engineers (Civil), employed with the Central Public Works Department, whose services had been placed at the disposal of the National Buildings Construction Corporation, New Delhi (for short ‘the NBCC’) for appointment as Resident Engineer (Civil) on projects of the NBCC in Iraq for a period of two years initially, in public interest, as per terms and conditions of appointment shown in the office order appointing them issued by the NBCC. It was a case, no doubt, of a ‘transfer on deputation’ but never involved the rights of the deputationists to continue in service of the borrowing employer or a question of lien. The question involved was about the entitlement of the deputationists to a component of their pay, called ‘foreign allowance’, which, by the terms of their appointment, they were entitled to receive at the rate of 125% of their Basic Pay. The basic pay had been revised in terms of the Fourth Pay Commission, which the deputationists were held entitled to. However, the foreign allowance was paid at the rate of 125% (pre-revised) and not on the revised basic pay as per recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission. The deputationists had claimed a revision of the foreign allowance in the revised basic pay as per the Fourth Pay Commission and invoked the principle of legitimate expectation to support their claim. 25. However, the foreign allowance was paid at the rate of 125% (pre-revised) and not on the revised basic pay as per recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission. The deputationists had claimed a revision of the foreign allowance in the revised basic pay as per the Fourth Pay Commission and invoked the principle of legitimate expectation to support their claim. 25. This claim of the deputationists, founded as it was on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, was repelled relying on Fundamental Rule 51, by holding foreign allowance not a component of the salary, but something akin to deputation (duty allowance), which was in the nature of a residuary perquisite. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 51 of the Fundamental Rules was held to invest the Government with a discretion to pay the government servant on deputation in a foreign country such compensatory allowance as thought fit by the President. The payment of foreign allowance as well as its quantum was found to be left to the absolute discretion of the President, as it was not one of the conditions of agreement of deputation. The principle of legitimate expectation was held not to apply, because the right to receive foreign allowance was governed by policy decision of the President, in the absence of any right based on contract or otherwise. The legitimate expectation was held to have been displaced by policy decision. 26. The policy decision was noted to be based on an objective assessment of the prevailing circumstances, including the financial stringency forthcoming in Iraq. Also, the right based on a legitimate expectation was rejected in S. Raghunathan by their Lordships, because there were no pleadings in the writ petition to support that right. The policy decision was held not to suffer from any kind of arbitrariness. The decision in S. Raghunathan, though rendered in the context of a claim by a deputationist, but does not lay down any principle governing the right of a deputationist, whether transferred on deputation or appointed on deputation, to hold the post for a particular period of time. The principle of legitimate expectation has, no doubt, been expounded copiously by their Lordships, but again, in the context of the deputationists’ right to receive the foreign allowance at the specified rate of their revised salary. It is not in the context of their right to hold the post on deputation. The principle of legitimate expectation has, no doubt, been expounded copiously by their Lordships, but again, in the context of the deputationists’ right to receive the foreign allowance at the specified rate of their revised salary. It is not in the context of their right to hold the post on deputation. This decision, therefore, may not have much bearing on the point, except about the principle of legitimate expectation generally expounded there. 27. The Bench decision of this Court in Dr. O.P. Singh (supra) says it to be a case where members of the Agricultural Services, as it is described in the report, including the petitioner, were sent on deputation to different departments. The petitioner was sent on deputation as the Chief General Manager (Marketing) to the U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Limited. The facts show that the arrangement was purely interim or temporary. The petitioner was sent on deputation as aforesaid by an order dated 22nd June, 2001 and he took charge on the 26th June, 2001. By an order of the 29th June, 2002, the State Government posted another officer as the Chief General Manager (Marketing), U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd., apparently ousting the petitioner in that case. In Dr. O.P. Singh, the ousted deputationist challenged his repatriation on ground that though initially the deputation was temporary and no terms and conditions were framed, but on 25th May, 2002, the terms and conditions of his deputation with the Corporation had come to be settled. One of the conditions framed was that the petitioner, who was described as a person engaged in something called ‘outer services’ and working on deputation on the position of the Chief General Manager (Marketing), would have a term of three years. 28. By the order of 29th June, 2002, the deputationist being repatriated to his parent department and another deputationist being brought in to substitute him, it was argued that without amending, altering or cancelling the order dated 25th May, 2002, carrying the terms and conditions of the petitioner’s deputation, the order dated 29th June, 2002 was illegal and arbitrary. It was also urged that there was nothing against the petitioner in that case, who had been successfully working on his deputation. It was also urged that there was nothing against the petitioner in that case, who had been successfully working on his deputation. It was in the context of the aforesaid facts that their Lordships of the Division Bench, after noticing the decisions of the Supreme Court in S. Raghunathan as well as Kunal Nanda, observed: “19. It is important to mention at this place that the learned standing counsel appearing for the State Government produced before us an order, a perusal whereof Indicates that State Government on 23rd January, 2002 took a policy decision of filling the posts in different corporations including the post of Chief General Manager (Marketing) in U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation by an officer of the rank of Additional Director Agriculture, as such, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that without upgrading the post, an officer of the rank of Additional Director Agriculture has been posted instead of posting Deputy Director Agriculture as Chief General Manager (Marketing) is not correct and has no force. 24. Applying the above principles, we are of the view that it is the prerogative of an employer to call back its employee from deputation or to post any other officer of higher rank in his place. Petitioner can have legitimate expectation where he has permanent lien but he has no right or lien on the deputation post even if he has been sent to the borrowing department for a specific period. We are further of view that the period of deputation can be curtailed by the employer at any point of time on administrative ground or in public interest. The policy pointed out by the petitioner is equivalent to the policy of transfer which does provide for minimum stay of a Government, employee on a particular station for three years but the State Government or for that matter, the authority competent, may transfer the employee prior to three years period on administrative ground or in administrative exigencies. Policies are merely guidelines and have no statutory force of law.” 29. Mr. Khare, however, seeks to distinguish these decisions by submitting that a case of ‘appointment on deputation’ is materially different from a ‘transfer on deputation’, which we have already noted to this end. The facts in S.N. Maity leading to the appeal by special leave may best be recounted in the words of their Lordships: “2. Mr. Khare, however, seeks to distinguish these decisions by submitting that a case of ‘appointment on deputation’ is materially different from a ‘transfer on deputation’, which we have already noted to this end. The facts in S.N. Maity leading to the appeal by special leave may best be recounted in the words of their Lordships: “2. Shorn of the unnecessary details, the facts which are requisite to be stated are that the first respondent was working as a Scientist E-II in Central Mining Research Institute (Council of Scientific and Industrial Research). On 29-7-2003, he was appointed on deputation to the post of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (for short “CGPDTM”). After serving there for one year, by Order F No. 8/52/2001-PP&C dated 31-8-2004, he was repatriated to his parent department. The said order was challenged before the Tribunal contending, inter alia, that he could not have been prematurely repatriated to his parent department and there had been a violation of the principle of audi alteram partem. The said stand of the first respondent was contested by the authorities of the Union of India proponing, inter alia, that he had no right to continue in the post as he was on deputation. Be it stated, some reliefs were claimed with regard to the TA bills and salary for certain period. The Tribunal accepted the stance put forth by the Union of India and dismissed the original application. However, as far as payment regarding TA and salary for certain period is concerned, the Tribunal directed that the same should be decided by the respondents after due verification in accordance with law. 3. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal, the first respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court posed two questions, namely, whether Order F No. 8/52/2001-PP&C dated 31-8-2004 issued by Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion repatriating the petitioner to his parent department was illegal? and whether the petitioner had the right to continue as the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks? 4. and whether the petitioner had the right to continue as the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks? 4. The High Court after posing the questions took note of the fact that the Union of India had issued an advertisement in Employment News dated 20-10-2001/26-10-2001 calling for applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the post of CGPDTM and the Ministry had proposed to fill up the post by transfer on deputation, including short-term contract. The first respondent, being eligible, applied through his parent department i.e. Central Mining Research Institute, Dhanbad and his selection was made by the Union Public Service Commission (for short “UPSC”) which held interview on 4-6-2002 and finding him suitable, recommended his name for appointment. The competent authority approved the appointment of the first respondent, the petitioner before the High Court, for the post of CGPDTM in the pay scale of Rs 18,400-500-22,400 on deputation basis for a period of five years or until further orders, whichever was earlier from the date of assumption of the charge of the post. The said order was communicated vide Letter No. 8/52/2001-PP&C (Vol. II) dated 23-6-2003 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. Thereafter, a letter of appointment dated 11-8-2003 was issued to the first respondent in the name of the President, appointing him on deputation basis for a period of five years or until further orders, whichever was earlier. 5. In pursuance of the aforesaid order of appointment, the first respondent joined the said post and continued to function, but after eleven months, the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, issued Order F No. 8/52/2001-PP&C dated 31-8-2004 repatriating him to his parent department. 5. In pursuance of the aforesaid order of appointment, the first respondent joined the said post and continued to function, but after eleven months, the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, issued Order F No. 8/52/2001-PP&C dated 31-8-2004 repatriating him to his parent department. The High Court, taking note of the factual backdrop, and the nature of the appointment of the first respondent, came to hold that his appointment was not a case of simpliciter deputation; that the employer did not have the prerogative to get him repatriated to his parent department as the controversy fundamentally related to appointment and the source of appointment i.e. deputation on transfer; that the principles inhered under Articles 14 and 16 were violated, for the authorities did not disclose the ground for which such appointment had been disturbed by repatriating him to the parent department; that in the absence of any reasonable or valid ground, the order was bound to be treated as arbitrary thereby inviting the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and that the Under-Secretary to the Government of India could not have passed the order of repatriation as the order of appointment was issued by the President of India. Being of this view, the High Court set aside the impugned order of repatriation and directed the writ petitioner to be reinstated in the post of CGPDTM on similar terms and conditions with all consequential benefits.” 30. We have already noticed the holding in this context in Paragraph No. 15 of the report in S.N. Maity. The Court made a distinction between a ‘transfer on deputation’ on the one hand and an ‘appointment on deputation’ on the other. The hallmark of an appointment on deputation appears to be that it comes to the deputationist after going through a selection process for the deputation post, and if that is the nature of deputation, it is an appointment. It has also been laid down that if the appointment on deputation is made for a fixed tenure, a curtailment of it cannot be done in an arbitrary exercise of power. The curtailment must be informed by some rationale. The term in S.N. Maity was five years or until further orders. It has also been laid down that if the appointment on deputation is made for a fixed tenure, a curtailment of it cannot be done in an arbitrary exercise of power. The curtailment must be informed by some rationale. The term in S.N. Maity was five years or until further orders. It was held that the words ‘until orders’ did not empower the employer to prematurely curtail the deputationist’s term by a capricious act. Their Lordships then went on to look into the order of repatriation, which did not say for a reason, by as much as a word, why the deputationist was repatriated. Nevertheless, the deputationist’s tenure in that case, which was for five years or until further orders, was prematurely curtailed at the end of eleven months. The High Court quashed the order and their Lordships approved of it in principle, upholding the distinction between a ‘transfer on deputation’ and an ‘appointment on deputation’. 31. It is quite another matter that in S.N. Maity by time the appeal came up, the deputationist had already been repatriated and a long period of time had elapsed. Bearing that fact in mind and some principles noticed in that regard, the direction to reinstate was substituted by a direction to pay the entire salary to Maity, to which he was entitled serving on the deputation post for the entire period of five years minus the period that he had worked and drawn salary. That feature has no bearing on the principle here. It, therefore, has to be accepted for a principle that an appointment on deputation is essentially different from a transfer on deputation. The former confers a right to hold the post as it comes after a selection in accordance with Rules. The right is limited to the tenure mentioned in the appointment and subject to its own nature about the period of time etc. However, it is certainly different from a ‘transfer on deputation’, where there is no right to the post or a lien held with the consequence that a deputationist may be called back by the lending employer, the parent department, or repatriated by the borrowing employer. There is no concept of that kind in the context of an appointment on deputation. There is a right, which the employee may enforce, if infringed. There is no concept of that kind in the context of an appointment on deputation. There is a right, which the employee may enforce, if infringed. The same distinction has been laid down by the Supreme Court between an ‘appointment on deputation’ on one hand and a ‘transfer on deputation’ on the other in Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel (supra). 32. Now, it is to be seen if the right that the petitioners in this case have acquired has indeed been infringed. There is hardly an issue on facts that each of the petitioners here were selected in accordance with rules for the post of an Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat after the issue of an advertisement. They applied for the post, because they were eligible by virtue of being government servants, possessed of qualifications mentioned in the advertisement. They faced the selection committee for the purpose and were selected. Subsequently, the petitioners in the leading writ petition were appointed through appointment-cum-posting orders dated 31.01.2019, 26.02.2019 and 09.03.2019. The terms of appointment are carried in the orders dated 31.01.2019 and 26.02.2019. The relevant parts of these orders read: “The order dated 31st January, 2019 33. A perusal of the terms of appointment as carried in the orders dated 31.01.2019 and 26.02.2019 would show that the appointments to the post of Executive Officers in various Nagar Palika Parishad and the Nagar Panchayat, in this case Nagar Panchayat alone, were made as protem appointments on deputation till such time that regular arrangement, which is to be understood as regular appointments, were made to the vacant posts. A perusal of the advertisement would show vide Note-2 that the appointment on deputation would be made for a period of one year or until regular arrangement was made, whichever be earlier. 34. The petitioners’ case is that though the appointment was one made initially for a period of one year, the period of appointment has been extended and remained a constant engagement. Reference in this connection has been made to a Government Order dated 24th August, 2021, to which allusion has already been made, which extends the period for the petitioners on deputation by one year or until regularly selected candidates are posted. The petitioners say that there is a very large number of vacancies in the cadre of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat and no substantive appointments have been made. The petitioners say that there is a very large number of vacancies in the cadre of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat and no substantive appointments have been made. Instead, the State Government have issued the impugned Government Order dated 05.07.2023, directing cancellation of these deputation appointments relying on older Government Orders of 16th March, 1999 and 16th March, 2019, which limit deputation to a period of three years and in special circumstances, make it five years. The submission is that the Government Order dated 16th March, 1999, which is the raison d’être for the Government to pass the impugned order dated 05.07.2023, cancelling the deputation appointments, is concerned with transfers on deputation and not appointments on deputation done in accordance with Rules after following the procedure prescribed. It is, therefore, submitted that the Government Order dated 05.07.2023 proceeds on manifestly illegal ground and a basis for the decision, that is not really attracted here. The basis for the decision carried in the impugned Government Order dated 05.07.2023 is, therefore, extraneous and irrelevant. 35. The other submission is that the impugned order dated 07.07.2023 passed by the Director of Local Bodies, already noticed, is that it is illegal, because he is the competent Authority to take a decision in the matter, but has chosen to act on the dictate and command of the Government. The last limb of the submission, again already noticed, is that the Government has taken a decision to remove all the Executive Officers appointed on deputation in accordance with Rules by one stroke of pen and have fallen foul of the principle in Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), which eschews such a course of action holding it an arbitrary exercise of power. 36. A perusal of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State shows that the stand of the State, on the other hand, is that at the time the petitioners were selected, pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.12.2018, to fill up the posts of Executive Officers of various categories as an arrangement to manage the shortage of hands, a letter of requisition dated 05.11.2018 was issued to the Commission to select candidates for posts of these Executive Officers. The Commission have recommended 107 names by a letter dated 16.01.2023. It is the respondents’ case that of these 107 recommendees, all 107 have been appointed. Out of those appointed, 85 have joined services as Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat. The Commission have recommended 107 names by a letter dated 16.01.2023. It is the respondents’ case that of these 107 recommendees, all 107 have been appointed. Out of those appointed, 85 have joined services as Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat. 37. There is another requisition letter dated 01.01.2020 to the Commission, requiring them to select for another 97 posts and still another dated 24.07.2021 for the filling up 27 posts. A total of 107 posts of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat are said to be in the process of selection and appointment. It is the Government’s stand that bearing in mind the appointments already made and those to be shortly made, the appointments on deputation have been brought to an end and the officers repatriated, because their appointments were effective until time that regular appointments were made or the period specified. 38. Considering the matter on all possible vantage, the respondents are not right in saying that the principle of the normal deputation period for three years, as laid down in the Government Order dated 16.03.1999 being over, the petitioners would, in any case, have to be repatriated. They are also not right in saying that permitting a deputationist to continue up to five years, requires the approval of the Finance Department. These principles regarding the upper limit of the tenure of three years and the maximum of five years with the Finance Department’s approval, appear to govern cases of ‘transfer on deputation’; not ‘appointments on deputation’ made in accordance with Rules. Nevertheless, the advertisement relating to the post of Executive Officers, against which the petitioners applied, selected and appointed, shows that it is unequivocal about the terms and the tenure. It is a protem arrangement till regular selections and appointments are made. The term is one year or until a regular appointment is made, whichever is earlier. 39. The fact that it has been extended does not confer any kind of a right on the appointee on deputation to function beyond the term or the contingency of a regular arrangement being made. In this case, both contingencies have fallen. In the case of all the writ petitioners in the leading writ petition, they have served for more than a year on extended terms and the extended terms too have ended with efflux of time. Also, regular arrangements have been made with the selection of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat by the Commission. In this case, both contingencies have fallen. In the case of all the writ petitioners in the leading writ petition, they have served for more than a year on extended terms and the extended terms too have ended with efflux of time. Also, regular arrangements have been made with the selection of Executive Officers, Nagar Panchayat by the Commission. Hundred and seven Executive Officers have already been appointed, out of whom, 85 have joined. The appointments of others are said to be underway. In these circumstances, the writ petitioners in the leading writ petition, notwithstanding the fact that their is a case of appointment on deputation, as distinguished from a transfer on deputation, have no right to continue beyond their term of appointment, which they have accepted with open eyes. They have, in any case, no right to continue in either contingency, both of which have fallen bringing to end their respective appointments. 40. So far as the writ petitioner of Writ (A) No. 11172 of 2023 is concerned, it was particularly emphasized by the learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner has not completed one year in office as an Executive Officer, since he joined much later after he had to enforce his rights through a writ petition before this Court and also contempt action. The petitioner in the connected writ petition aforesaid actually joined on 12.07.2022 and his services on deputation came to an end on 05.07.2023 in terms of the State Government’s order to the Director, Local Bodies. 41. It cannot be lost sight of that the term of the appointment in this case also was one year or till regular arrangement was made. This fact is evident from a perusal of a memo dated 8th March, 2018 issued by the Director, Local Bodies to advertise the posts for deputation appointment. Thus, regular appointments, that have now been undertaken, would make the second contingency fall, curtailing the deputation appointment in its term. Also, in any event, now the term of one year is over, and, for the said reason, no relief on account of the curtailment of the petitioner’s term, a few days before one year, can be a realistic basis to grant the relief of reinstatement. Also, in any event, now the term of one year is over, and, for the said reason, no relief on account of the curtailment of the petitioner’s term, a few days before one year, can be a realistic basis to grant the relief of reinstatement. In the above conspectus of facts, the principle about the distinction between an ‘appointment on deputation’ and a ‘transfer on deputation’ laid down in Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel and S.N. Maity would not come to the petitioners’ aid. 42. There is still the other submission by the learned Senior Counsel to be answered, common in both matters, and that is, that the order dated 07.07.2023, determining the petitioners’ deputation appointment has been passed on the dictate and command of the State Government. The repatriation, no doubt, has been directed on the command of the State Government carried in the Government Order dated 05.07.2023. There is no serious dispute raised that the competent Authority to order repatriation is the Director of Local Bodies and not the Government. The principle, therefore, in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja certainly applies and would have vitiated the order passed by the Director, but for the fact, that on an overall conspectus of the petitioners’ rights and the manner and for the reasons that these have been determined, repatriating them, quashing the orders of the Director, would not make any material difference to the petitioners’ right to relief. The reason again is that the term of appointment for each of the petitioners, that is limited to one year or until a regularly selected candidate joins, is a self-determining term with the passage of time. There is no quarrel about the fact that the petitioners’ term of one year, last extended in each case, has expired. Also, regular arrangements have either been already made or in the process. Since this is the undisputed position, quashing the order dated 07.07.2023 passed by the Director, Local Bodies, would not entitle the petitioners to be reinstated in service or to any other relief, whatsoever. It is for the said reasons that there is no force in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on this premise. 43. This takes us to the last limb of the submission advanced by Mr. It is for the said reasons that there is no force in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on this premise. 43. This takes us to the last limb of the submission advanced by Mr. Khare that the impugned order passed by the State Government is a ‘one stroke action’ of terminating all appointments on deputation for these Executive Officers on deputation, bringing in arbitrariness. The submission, as already noticed, is founded on the principle that individual cases ought to have been appraised and not a general direction, setting at naught all appointments on deputation made. In this connection, Mr. Khare has drawn the Court’s attention to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Shrilekha Vidyarthi: “33. No doubt, it is true, as indicated by us earlier, that there is a presumption of validity of the State action and the burden is on the person who alleges violation of Article 14 to prove the assertion. However, where no plausible reason or principle is indicated nor is it discernible and the impugned State action, therefore, appears to be ex facie arbitrary, the initial burden to prove the arbitrariness is discharged shifting onus on the State to justify its action as fair and reasonable. If the State is unable to produce material to justify its action as fair and reasonable, the burden on the person alleging arbitrariness must be held to be discharged. The scope of judicial review is limited as indicated in Dwarkadas Marfatia case [ (1989) 3 SCC 293 ] to oversee the State action for the purpose of satisfying that it is not vitiated by the vice of arbitrariness and no more. The wisdom of the policy or the lack of it or the desirability of a better alternative is not within the permissible scope of judicial review in such cases. It is not for the courts to recast the policy or to substitute it with another which is considered to be more appropriate, once the attack on the ground of arbitrariness is successfully repelled by showing that the act which was done, was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. As indicated by Diplock, L.J. in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935 the power of judicial review is limited to the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. As indicated by Diplock, L.J. in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935 the power of judicial review is limited to the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the case of arbitrariness, the defect of irrationality is obvious. 34. In our opinion, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts and the other rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for this reason that we base our decision on the ground that independent of any statutory right, available to the appointees, and assuming for the purpose of this case that the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, must satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down. However, we have referred to certain provisions relating to initial appointment, termination or renewal of tenure to indicate that the action is controlled at least by settled guidelines, followed by the State of U.P. for a long time. This too is relevant for deciding the question of arbitrariness alleged in the present case. 35. It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind. 36. The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. 36. The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that ‘be you ever so high, the laws are above you’. This is what men in power must remember, always. 43. Non-application of the mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments throughout the State of U.P. is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the circular. It is obvious that issuance of the impugned circular was not governed by any rule but by the whim or fancy of someone totally unaware of the requirements of rule of law, neatly spelled out in the case of John Wilkes, (1984) 3 All ER 935 more than two centuries back and quoted with approval by this Court almost a quarter century earlier in Jaisinghani Case, (1967) 2 SCR 703 , 718-19 : AIR 1967 SC 1427 : (1967) 65 ITR 34 . We have considered it necessary to re-emphasize this aspect and reiterate what has been said so often by this Court only because we find that some persons entrusted with the task of governance appear to be unaware of the fact that the exercise of discretion they have must be governed by rule, not by humour, whim, caprice or fancy or personal predilections. It also disturbs us to find that the Legal Remembrancer’s Department of the State of U.P. which has the duty to correctly advise the State Government in such matters, overlooked the obvious and failed to discharge its bounden duty of correctly advising the State Government in matters of law. We would like to believe that the impugned circular was issued for want of proper legal advice in this behalf instead of any ulterior motive suggested by the petitioners/appellants.” 44. Shrilekha Vidyarthi was a case that had emerged out of very different and unusual facts. By a circular letter dated 06.02.1990 issued by the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Government terminated, by a general order, the appointments of all Government Counsel (Civil/ Criminal and Revenue) in all the districts of the State w.e.f. 28th February, 1990 and directed the preparation of fresh panels of names for appointment in place of the incumbents. This was done irrespective of the fact if the incumbents had their term left to serve. There was no individual evaluation of cases. Apparently, the decision impugned in Shrilekha Vidyarthi came in the exercise of sudden and arbitrary exercise of power to determine the tenure of all State Counsel working in the districts by one stroke of pen, as it was described. The observations, to which Mr. Khare has drawn our attention, came in the background of that extraordinary situation of abuse of authority. Here, that is not remotely the case, as noticed much in detail. The appointment of the petitioners was, to begin with, an arrangement for such time that regular appointments were made to the posts of Executive Officers of the Nagar Panchayat. The appointments were limited to a year or until regular arrangements were made. If the Government have taken a decision upon regular selections being made not to continue with the appointments on deputation, which, in any case, would require an extension after every year, the same cannot be said to be in the teeth of the principle eschewing arbitrariness, as laid down in Shrilekha Vidyarthi. The submission, therefore, on that score is rejected. 45. In the result, this Court does not find any force in the writ petitions, both of which fail and are dismissed. 46. There shall be no order as to costs.