JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. 1. I am considering these two writ petitions together because, though not involving the same parties, they impel identical issues for forensic consideration. 2. The short question involved in these cases is whether the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions (‘District Commissions’ for short) can set opposite parties ‘ex-parte’ and then proceed to dispose of the complaint in their absence, refusing them permission even to participate in the proceedings. 3. The controversy in these cases has its genesis in the fact that the opposite parties, namely the petitioners herein, did not file their counter pleadings within the statutorily stipulated time, thus forfeiting their right to do so; but the ‘District Commissions’ then went on to pass impugned orders, setting them ex-parte, so as to mean that they will not be permitted to participate in the proceedings thereafter, including to cross-examine the witnesses. 4. The petitioners assert that the impugned proceedings are illegal and unlawful because, it is beyond the statutory Scheme, for the ‘District Commissions’ to keep parties away from the proceedings, solely for the reason that they did not file their counter pleadings within the statutorily fixed time. 5. Sri. V. Krishna Menon - learned counsel for the petitioners in both these cases, relied upon various judgments of this Court, as that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court; and in particular, the order dated 04.09.2023 in Civil Appeal Diary No. 31182/2023 between ARN Infrastructure India Limited v. Hara Prasad Ghosh, to argue that, even though the ‘District Commissions’ may be authorized, under the statutory matrix, not to permit an opposite party to file their counter pleadings if it had not been done within the statutory time frame fixed, it does not vest them with any competence to set them ‘ex-parte’ so as to then deny them opportunity to participate in further proceedings, including for cross-examination of witnesses. He thus reiterated that the orders impugned in these Writ Petitions, to the extent to which the Commissions have set the petitioners ‘ex-parte’ be declared to be illegal and unlawful, especially when they obtain no such power under any of the applicable Statutes and Regulations. 6. Sri. He thus reiterated that the orders impugned in these Writ Petitions, to the extent to which the Commissions have set the petitioners ‘ex-parte’ be declared to be illegal and unlawful, especially when they obtain no such power under any of the applicable Statutes and Regulations. 6. Sri. P.M. Satheesh - learned counsel appearing for the respondents in W.P. (C) No. 28138/2023, however, opposed the afore contentions of the petitioners, saying that, when they have not filed their counter pleadings, it can only be presumed that they have nothing to offer in opposition to the claim and hence that their further participation in the proceedings, including to cross-examine the witnesses, becomes untenable and redundant. 7. Sri. P.M. Satheesh then added that the petitioners could not have approached this Court through these Writ Petitions because, their proper remedy is to move the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (‘State Commission’ for short) by way of a statutory appeal against the impugned orders. He thus prayed that these Writ Petitions be dismissed. 8. I have considered the afore rival submissions on the touchstone of the various materials produced on record. 9. Upfront, it is indubitable that this Court will have to first answer the submissions of Sri. P.M. Satheesh that, these Writ Petitions are not maintainable because the proper remedy of the petitioner, at least in W.P. (C) No. 28138/2023, is to approach the ‘State Commission’ through a statutory appeal. 10. That said, it is pertinent that, in the case of the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 29387/2023, they did invoke their alternative statutory remedy by filing a Revision, numbered R.P. No. 43/2023, which ended in Ext.P6 produced therewith, whereby, the ‘State Commission’ held that the ‘District Commission’ was justified declining to permit the petitioner therein to take part in the proceedings by filing their version. The opinion of the ‘State Commission’ is, therefore, that, if a party does not file a counter version within the statutory time, then their right to take part in the proceedings, by subsequently filing it, will stand forfeited. 11. In an abstract sense, I cannot find fault with the afore findings of the ‘State Commission’ because, as rightly held by them, the opposite party, who failed to file their versions within time, cannot be allowed to do so beyond it and to then participate in the proceedings. 11. In an abstract sense, I cannot find fault with the afore findings of the ‘State Commission’ because, as rightly held by them, the opposite party, who failed to file their versions within time, cannot be allowed to do so beyond it and to then participate in the proceedings. However, the question whether they can be allowed to participate even without such a version, has not been dealt with by the ‘State Commission’ in their order, produced as Ext.P6 in W.P. (C) No. 29387/2023. 12. With respect to the afore, the judgment of this Court in Kumar vs. Bincy, 2009 (1) KLT 544 assumes some significance because, the declarations therein are that, when a final order is decided ‘ex-parte’ the proper remedy is only to file an appeal before the ‘State Commission’ for which, an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable. This was a case where a final order was issued by the ‘District Commission’ or ‘ex-parte’ and it was held that the proper remedy to challenge the same was before the ‘State Commission’. 13. However, in ARN Infrastructure (supra), the question, whether an opposite party, who fails or refuses to file their version within the time limits fixed by law, is entitled to participate in the proceedings thereafter, including to cross-examine the witnesses, was answered affirmatively, and an opportunity was given to the petitioners therein to do so, by fixing a date for such purpose. 14. When the path is so illuminated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ARN Infrastructure (supra), it becomes luculent that, even though an opposite party may not be entitled to file a version - if they have not done so within the fixed time frame as per the Statute - they still obtain the right to participate in the Trial and to address final argument before the ‘District Commission’ and, in fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found it objectionable that the request for time for such purpose in that particular case, was denied solely on the ground that a version had not been filed. The Hon’ble Court has rendered it reiteratingly clear that the opposite party was entitled to address arguments on merits and that they were entitled to do so even in the absence of filing its written version against the complaint. 15. The Hon’ble Court has rendered it reiteratingly clear that the opposite party was entitled to address arguments on merits and that they were entitled to do so even in the absence of filing its written version against the complaint. 15. That said, the District Commissions surely obtain the competence to settle disputes ‘ex-parte’ but this encompasses a scenario markedly different from the manner in which it has been done by the respective Commissions in these cases. The statutory provision which vests such power on the Commission is Section 38(3)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (‘Act’ for short), and not Section 38(2)(b) thereof. This distinction is essential to be borne in mind because, the subject matter of both the consumer complaints referred to in the afore Writ Petitions falls within the purview of the afore Section. 16. The grounds impelled in these Writ Petitions surely call for an interpretation of Section 38(3)(b) of the ‘Act’ of 2019, which reads ut infra: “(3) The District Commission shall, if the complaint admitted by it under sub-section (2) of section 36 relates to goods in respect of which the procedure specified in sub-section (2) cannot be followed, or if the complaint relates to any services: (a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Commission. (b) if the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint, referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Commission, it shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute: (i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite party, if the opposite party denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint. (ii) ex-parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant, where the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the Commission. (ii) ex-parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant, where the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the Commission. (c) decide the complaint on merits if the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing.” Apodictically, Section 38(3)(b)(ii) stipulates that the opposite party can be set ‘ex-parte’ where he “omits or fails to take any action to represent his case.” The term “representation” encompasses various acts, such as submitting version, filing interim applications, physically representing themselves, or through their legal representative in court, or any similar actions. Therefore, a close assessment of the provision would make it irrefutable that a party can only be declared ‘ex-parte’ if he/she/they entirely fail to make any form of representation before the court. This implies that, even if a party fails to file their version, as long as they continue to represent their case in any manner, they cannot be subjected to an ‘ex-parte’ order under the statute. 17. In the afore forensic perspective, it is luculent that, though I cannot find fault with the ‘State Commission’ in having issued Ext.P6 in W.P. (C) No. 29387/2023, it relating solely to the question whether the opposite party could take part in the proceedings after filing their version the larger question, whether they are entitled to do so, even without such an opportunity being granted, certainly, has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and answered in their favour affirmatively in ARN Infrastructure (supra). 18. When the declarations of law remain in such manner, the factum of the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 28138/2023, in not having approached the ‘State Commission’ but in having filed this Writ Petition before this Court cannot be found against them, particularly when this matter has been pending for nearly six months now, on the strength of an interim order. 19. Resultantly, being guided by ARN Infrastructure (supra), I allow these Writ Petitions and set aside the impugned orders; however, to the limited extent that it declines permission to the petitioners - the opposite parties before the ‘District Commissions’ - to take part in the proceedings, including by advancing arguments at the final stage and cross-examining the witnesses, even though they have not filed their counter versions within time. 20. 20. Needless to say, the observations above cannot be construed to mean that the petitioners/opposite parties can file any new version on its strength, but only that they will be at liberty to participate in the final disposal of the matter by advancing arguments and cross-examining the witnesses at such stage, as has been permitted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ARN Infrastructure (supra).