JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, C.J. 1. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The present petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed to challenge the order dated 09.10.2024 passed by the Commercial Court in Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 12 of 2024 in Commercial Execution Case No. 30 of 2024. 2. The application namely the Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 12 of 2024 had been filed by the Award Debtor namely the respondent herein seeking for stay of the award of the arbitral tribunal dated 11.08.2023, invoking Section 36 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (for short “the Arbitration Act 1996”). 3. It may be noted that the award ordering to pay Rs.6,54,60,814/- with interest was passed unanimously by three arbitrators in favour of the petitioner herein, while rejecting the counter claim of the respondent namely the award debtor. The Commercial Court, while passing the order impugned, has granted an absolute stay to the execution of the arbitral award while allowing the application under Section 36 (3) till the decision of the petition. The only reasoning given by the Commercial Court in passing an unconditional stay is that the validity of the award is subjected to consideration before the competent Court in an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996. It was, though, noted that there is a very limited scope of intervention, however, it was further recorded that the applicant namely the respondent herein has made out a prima facie case in its favour to stay the implementation of the impugned award. It was also observed by the Commercial Court that, in case, the Court enters into the merits of the case of the parties to discuss in detail on each and every aspect, it may adversely affect the case of the parties. 4. Mr. Manish Bhatt, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner would invite attention of the Court to Section 36 (3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 to submit that there cannot be a blanket stay of the operation of an arbitral award for payment of money unless and until any of the condition or the conditions mentioned in the second proviso to Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 is/are fulfilled. Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 categorically states that the Court while considering the application under Sub-Section (2) of Section 36 for stay of the operation of the arbitral award may grant stay, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing. 5. The first proviso to Sub-Section (3) further makes it clear that while considering the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, due regard is to be given to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Second proviso carves out an exception to the aforesaid conditions with a caveat that the unconditional stay of the arbitral award pending disposal of the challenge under Section 34 of the Award can be passed in a case where the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out to the effect that: (a) the arbitration agreement or contract, which is basis of the award. (b) the making of the award itself; was induced or effected by fraud or corruption. 6. A comprehensive reading of Sub-Section (3) of Section 35, as per the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, makes it clear that it is not permissible for the Court while dealing with the application under Section 36(3) for grant of stay of the operation of the arbitral award, to pass a blanket stay order simply stating that the prima facie case is made out for interference under Section 34. 7. Sub-Section (2) of Section 36 further makes it clear that filing of the application under Section 36 by itself shall not render the award unenforceable and there is a requirement for the Court to pass an order of stay of the operation of the arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of Sub-Section (3), on a separate application made for the purpose. 8. 8. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, thus, is that in the instant case, the Commercial Court has completely ignored the requirement of putting condition for reasons to be recorded in writing while granting stay of the operation of the award, in a case, where there is no allegation of the arbitration agreement, which is basis of the award or the making of the award, itself having been induced or effected by fraud or corruption. In all other cases, where arbitral award for payment of money is challenged on merits by filing an application under Section 34, the Court, while dealing with the application under Section 36 (3) for grant of stay, is required to have due regard to the provisions of grant of stay of a money decree under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Pam Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (2019) 8 SCC 112 to substantiate the said arguments and to submit that the provisions of Order XLI Rule 5 and the conditions mentioned in sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 clearly provide for making of deposit or furnishing security by the decree holder seeking stay. CPC does not exempt the government from making deposit, which the Court has the power to direct under Order XLI Rule 5 (5) CPC. It was held by the Apex Court in Pam Developments (supra) that the Arbitration Act is a special act meant for quick resolution of disputes and in case a money decree/award passed by the arbitrator against the Government is allowed to be automatically stayed, the very purpose of quick resolution of dispute through arbitration would be defeated as the decree-holder would be fully deprived of the fruits of the award on mere filing of objection under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that under the scheme of the Arbitration Act, no distinction is made nor any differential treatment is to be given to the Government, while considering an application for grant of stay of a money decree in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that under the scheme of the Arbitration Act, no distinction is made nor any differential treatment is to be given to the Government, while considering an application for grant of stay of a money decree in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996 does not provide for any special treatment to the Government while dealing with the grant of stay in an application under the proceedings of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996. No exceptional treatment, as such, could be given to the Government while considering the application for stay under Section 36 in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The unconditional stay of the arbitral award therein passed by the Calcutta High Court, therefore, was set aside, being unsustainable in the eye of law. 10. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd. [Special Civil Application No. 9590 of 2023] dated 01.07.2023 has further been placed before us, wherein the issue pertaining to grant of stay on the condition of deposit of only 50% of the amount awarded was subjected to challenge, whereas total awarded amount included interest and cost. It was brought before us that the Division Bench, while dealing with the issue, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Pam Developments (supra) and analyzing the provisions of Order XLI Rule 1 (3), Order XLI Rule 5 (5) CPC, while treating them purposefully with the amendment under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996, it has held that wherever the arbitration award is for payment of money, which will partake the money decree, the deposit of the awarded amount in all ordinary circumstances, barring the exceptions of the circumstances, provided in Section 36 itself, has to be a rule, to become condition while granting stay on the operation and implementation of the arbitral award. Merely because the party is Government, the law will not make an exception to operate to require the deposit of the entire awarded amount. 11. Merely because the party is Government, the law will not make an exception to operate to require the deposit of the entire awarded amount. 11. With the above, while modifying the order of stay granted by the Commercial Court therein, interest and cost was also directed to be deposited as the Commercial Court had directed to deposit only the principal amount awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal. 12. Mr. Y.N. Ravani, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, however, referring to the order passed by the Commercial Court, would submit that no interference is called for, for the simple reason that the Commercial Court cannot be said to have ignored the requirement of grant of stay of the operation of award as contained in Section 36 (3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 13. Referring to the observations made by the Commercial Court in Paragraphs ‘10’ and ‘11’ of the order impugned, it was submitted that the Commercial Court, while considering the application for grant of stay, has taken note of the fact that the finding of the arbitral tribunal that the question as to the delay in completion of the work cannot be attributed to the claimant, is an issue which is required to be given thoughtful consideration. 14. Insofar as the calculation of damages under the head of deploying the machinery and the manpower, which allegedly remained idle for the delay of work, it was noted by the Commercial Court that the claim was allowed by the arbitral tribunal on the basis of delay period while believing that the delay was caused solely by the award debtor namely the respondent herein, which appear contrary to the terms and conditions of the contract as well as the evidence on record. 15. It was further noted that the award holder namely the petitioner herein raised overhead claims on the ground of delay of project, which were later withdrawn and the request to extend the delay period was not properly appreciated while dealing with the issue of delay. It was noted that the work order was given for turn-key project. It was, thus, the duty of the petitioner/award holder to approve the plan and also complete the project in its stipulated time instead of that, there is a gross delay of around 835 days. It was noted that the work order was given for turn-key project. It was, thus, the duty of the petitioner/award holder to approve the plan and also complete the project in its stipulated time instead of that, there is a gross delay of around 835 days. The amount awarded for idle manpower and machinery is without any specific reasons and evidence as to how many persons and machinery remained at spot idle and wages were paid to the idle manpower for a particular period. 16. The submission, thus, is that once such is the position on the factual aspect of the claim of the petitioner herein awarded by the arbitral tribunal, no infirmity can be attached to the opinion drawn by the Commercial Court that the applicant/respondent herein has made out a prima facie case to stay the implementation of the impugned award during the pendency of the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 17. It was argued that the question of grant of stay is a question of discretion of the Commercial Court. The Court has given prima facie reasons for granting the stay of the arbitral award, which may not be interfered within the limited scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996, if read carefully, it only speaks that the Court is required to grant stay, subject to certain conditions as it may deem fir and the provisions contained in the CPC for grant of stay of the money decree are only the guiding factors. Once valid reasons are assigned and the Commercial Court was satisfied with the prima facie case made out by the award debtor for grant of stay, no interference is called for within the limited scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 18. With these submissions, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent would argue that no interference is called for within the scope of extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. 18. With these submissions, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent would argue that no interference is called for within the scope of extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. Taking note of the above submissions, we find it apt to take note of the statutory provisions as contained in Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and Order XLI Rule 5, which provide guidance to deal with the application for grant of stay of the operation of the arbitral award during the pendency of the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 20. The question raised before us about the grant of unconditional stay of the operation of the arbitral award for payment of money is guided by the statutory provisions incorporated under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996. As noted hereinbefore in the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Court while dealing with the application under Sub-Section (2) of Section 36 for grant of stay of operation of the arbitral award is required to follow the provisions of Sub-Section (3), which clearly provides the manner in which the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money can be dealt with. At the cost of repetition, it may be noted, at this juncture, that grant of stay of the operation of an arbitral award being guided by the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996, no other course was permissible for the Court other than the manner in which the application can be dealt with under Sub-Section (3). 21. Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 is categorical to the effect that the Court can grant stay of the operation of the award for reasons to be recorded in writing, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit. While dealing with the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, due regard is to be given to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the CPC. While dealing with the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, due regard is to be given to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the CPC. Order XLI Rule 5 (5) CPC, thus, has been imported by virtue of the first proviso to Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 under the Arbitration Act, so as to guide the Court as to what conditions can be imposed while dealing with the grant of stay in an application under Section 36 filed in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Order XLI Rule 5 (5), as noted hereinbefore, provides for making of deposit or furnishing security by the award debtor seeking stay. Thus, under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC, the Court has power to direct for full or part deposit and/or to furnish security of the decretal amount. No exemption is provided under Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 to the Court while dealing with the application for stay except as noted in the second proviso, which is not the situation in the present case. It is not the case of the respondent that the arbitral agreement which is the basis of the award or the making of the award itself, was induced or effected by fraud or corruption. 22. In the said situation, there is no question of any prima facie case having been made out by the respondent/applicant before the Court to stay of the award unconditionally, pending disposal of the challenge under Section 34 of the award. The power to grant unconditional stay of an award is confined to any of the conditions having been fulfilled by the award debtor for making out a prima facie case before the Court while seeking stay. As no such case is made out and the second proviso to subsection (3) of Section 36 is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the learned Commercial Court has committed an error in dealing with the application under Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 seeking for stay of the operation of the arbitral tribunal, which is for payment of money. The Commercial Court has completely ignored the requirement of Sub-Section (3) and the first proviso to the said Sub-Section of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996 while dealing with the application seeking stay of the execution of arbitral award. 23. From the reading of the judgment and order dated 09.10.2024 passed by the learned Commercial Court, it seems that the learned Court got confused with the application for stay of the arbitral award with the simple application for grant of interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 CPC where the question of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are subject matter of consideration while dealing with the application for stay. 24. The present is the case where a three member arbitral tribunal has passed an arbitral award for payment of money to the claimant namely the petitioner herein. The arbitral award is considered to be a money decree within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 36, which provides that the arbitral award shall be enforced in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. 25. While dealing with the application seeking for stay of the money decree, on an appeal filed under Order XLI Rule 1 of the CPC, the Court is guided by the principles stated in sub-rule (3) and sub-rule (5) of Order XLI Rule 5. There is a categorical statement in Sub-Section (2) of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1996 that mere filing of an application under Section 34 to set aside the arbitral award shall not render that award unenforceable and there is a requirement of filing a separate application seeking stay of the operation of the arbitral award, which is to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Sub-Section (3). 26. It was, thus, incumbent upon the Commercial Court, while dealing with the application under Section 36 (3) seeking for stay of the arbitral award for payment of money, to be guided by the principles stated under Order XLI Rule 5 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 27. The Commercial Court has, thus, passed an order impugned in clear ignorance of the statutory provisions contained in Section 36 while granting stay of the award unconditionally pending disposal of the challenge under Section 34 to the Award. 28. 27. The Commercial Court has, thus, passed an order impugned in clear ignorance of the statutory provisions contained in Section 36 while granting stay of the award unconditionally pending disposal of the challenge under Section 34 to the Award. 28. In view of the above, we hold that the Commercial Court has committed a jurisdictional error in passing the order dated 09.10.2024 for granting an absolute (unconditional) stay of the arbitral award and hence, the judgment and order dated 09.10.2024 is liable to be set aside. 29. Consequently, while allowing the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, setting aside the judgment and order dated 09.10.2024 passed by the Commercial Court, the application under Section 36 (3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 filed by the respondent namely Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 12 of 2024, is hereby restored. The Commercial Court is directed to pass a fresh order by dealing with the said application, strictly in accordance with law, keeping in mind all the principles stated hereinabove as noted from the judgment of the Apex Court in Pam Developments (supra) followed in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Shapoorji Pallonji (supra). 30. It is intimated by the learned counsels for the parties that the matter under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is kept for hearing on 07.12.2024. Be that as it may, we direct the Commercial Court to decide the application seeking stay under Section 36(3), as expeditiously as possible and also make an endevour to decide the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996, as expeditiously as possible without granting unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties. 31. With the above, the present petition stands disposed of.