JUDGMENT : (J.C. Doshi, J.) 1. These are claimants’ appeal filed u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short “the Act”). 2. Since batch of First Appeals arises out of the common judgment and award passed for same road accident, with the consent of learned advocates for the parties, they are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 3. Present batch of first appeals are filed by the appellants – claimants challenging common judgment and award dated 9.12.2005 passed by the MACT, Surendranagar in MACP Nos.36/1998 to 40/1998. 4. Brief facts of the case are as under:- 4.1. On 8.6.1997 at 5:30 p.m. in the evening, the injured claimants and the deceased were travelling in Ambassador bearing registration No.GJ 3U 1144 driven by deceased Yunusbhai and when reached near Rajkot, truck No.GJ 9 T 6294 while overtaking one Bus, dashed with the Ambassador, as a result, some of the persons have received serious injuries and some have died. 4.2. Legal representative of deceased Preranaben and Chandanben have filed claim petition Nos.36 of 1998 and 38 of 1998 respectively. 4.3. Injured claimants Harshadbhai Mehta, Mansukhlal Mehta and Yogeshkumar Mehta have filed claim petition No.37 of 1008, 39 of 1998 and 40 of 1998. 4.4. In the road accident, the learned Tribunal has assessed negligency of the driver of the Ambassador car and driver of the truck to the extent of 30% and 70%. The insurance companies, who are vicariously liable to pay compensation for negligency of the owner and driver of the offending vehicle, did not question the apportionment of the negligency amongst the drivers of the vehicle. Even the driver, owner and the insurance company have not filed any appeal challenging the findings of the learned Tribunal about the road accident, involvement of the vehicle, liability of the insurance company to indemnify the vicarious liability etc. Therefore, those issues are since not under challenge, they are not touched in deciding the captioned first appeals. 5. Heard learned advocate Mr. Kirtidev Dave for the appellants – original claimants and learned advocates Mr. Nagesh Sood and Mr. Palak Thakkar for the insurance companies. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Therefore, those issues are since not under challenge, they are not touched in deciding the captioned first appeals. 5. Heard learned advocate Mr. Kirtidev Dave for the appellants – original claimants and learned advocates Mr. Nagesh Sood and Mr. Palak Thakkar for the insurance companies. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Dave mainly argued that the learned Tribunal has not considered the income aspect properly, not applied multiplier in correct and true perspective, so also, even the compensation under the conventional head are not granted properly as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi reported in 2017 (16) SCC 680 . Referring to the various documents produced by the claimants before the learned Tribunal to establish the income of the victims of the road accident, learned advocate Mr. Dave would further submit that they are not properly appreciated and considered by the learned Tribunal. 6.1. Upon such submission, learned advocate Mr. Dave requests to allow present First Appeal and enhanced the compensation. 7. On the other hand, learned advocates Mr. Nagesh Sood and Mr. Palak Thakkar would submit that the learned Tribunal has rightly appreciated the income of the victims of the road accident and therefore, no interference is required. They would further submit that in MACP No.36 of 1998, the learned Tribunal has rightly believed that brother of deceased Preranaben is not considered to be dependent and only father of deceased Preranaben can be considered as applicant but not as dependent. In nutshell, they would submit that in all the claim petitions, the learned Tribunal has granted just compensation to the claimants as well as legal representative of the deceased and therefore, since, no error is committed by the learned Tribunal, this Court may not interfere with the common judgment and award. 7.1. Upon such submission, learned advocates Mr. Nagesh Sood and Mr. Palak Thakkar request to dismiss the first appeals. 8. No other and further submissions / arguments canvassed. 9. At the outset, let examine correctness and legality of each impugned judgment and award. 10. First Appeal 3776 of 2006 (judgment in claim petition No.36 of 1998) 10.1. This petition is filed by Mansukhbhai Mehta and Yogeshbhai Mehta – father and brother of deceased Preranaben respectively. That deceased Preranaben was unmarried and 21 years old at the time of road accident. 10. First Appeal 3776 of 2006 (judgment in claim petition No.36 of 1998) 10.1. This petition is filed by Mansukhbhai Mehta and Yogeshbhai Mehta – father and brother of deceased Preranaben respectively. That deceased Preranaben was unmarried and 21 years old at the time of road accident. She was working as Accountant in Prerana Agency and was earning Rs.3500/- per month. She has also working as computer Accountant in Terabit Computers and was earning Rs.1200/- per month and she had potentiality to earn more. It further appears that she has done her graduation. The learned Tribunal has assessed the income of the deceased to Rs.2000/- per month on finding that there is no sufficient / proper evidence produced by the claimant, but considering the potentiality of the deceased to earn more. Moreover, Prerana Agency, in which the deceased was working, belonged to the family. Learned advocates for the insurance companies has submitted that the monthly income of the deceased to Rs.2000/- assessed by the learned Tribunal is much on higher side than the rate of minimum wage available at the time of road accident. However considering the fact that the deceased was working in Prerana Agency as well as Terabit Computers as Accountant and had knowledge of computer and she had potentiality to earn more, her income could not be taken up equally with rate of minimum wages. She being accountant and working as accountant and on account of her young age, learned Tribunal has taken her income on lower tier. According to this Court, the learned Tribunal ought to have assessed Rs.3000/- per month as income of the deceased and therefore, income deserves to be enhanced to that extent. Since the deceased was 21 years of age, multiplier of 18 should be applied. As the deceased was bachelor, ½ of income deserves to be deducted towards personal and pocket expenses. In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pranay Sethi (supra), 40% rise towards future prospect is required to be applied. Even, compensation under the conventional head are also required to be enhanced as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pranay Sethi (supra). 11. It was argued by learned advocates for the insurance company that deceased Preranaben was unmarried and therefore, the claimants who are father and brother of the deceased cannot claim dependency loss. Even, compensation under the conventional head are also required to be enhanced as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pranay Sethi (supra). 11. It was argued by learned advocates for the insurance company that deceased Preranaben was unmarried and therefore, the claimants who are father and brother of the deceased cannot claim dependency loss. I am not impressed by the submission canvassed by the learned advocates. Plain reading of section 166(1) of the Act permits legal representatives of the deceased to prefer claim petition. The MV Act, 1988 does not define term “legal representative”, but section 2(11) of the CPC, reads as under:- “SECTION 2 : Definitions In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (11) "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued; 12. Plain reading of section 2(11) of the CPC indicates that in case of death of a person in the motor vehicle accident, the right is available to the legal representative or the agent of the deceased or injured to claim for compensation under the MV Act. The issue as to who is a legal representative or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may be decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is undeniable that a person claiming to be a legal representative has the locus to maintain an application for compensation under Section 166 of the Act. Said issue came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court for decision in case of Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel and Anr. vs. United India Insurance and Anr., (2014) 3 SCC 394 , whereby, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court after referring to the earlier judgment in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr., (1987) 3 SCC 234 , in para 11 to 17 held as under:- “11. Gabriel and Anr. vs. United India Insurance and Anr., (2014) 3 SCC 394 , whereby, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court after referring to the earlier judgment in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr., (1987) 3 SCC 234 , in para 11 to 17 held as under:- “11. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company tried to persuade us that since the term `legal representative' has not been defined under the Act, the provision of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, should be taken as guiding principle and the claim should be confined only for the benefit of wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death has been caused by the accident. In this context, he cited judgment of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad V/s. Raman Bhai Prabhatbhai & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 1690 . In that case, covered by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, the claimant was a brother of a deceased killed in a motor vehicle accident. The Court rejected the contention of the appellant that since the term `legal representative' is not defined under the Motor Vehicles Act, the right of filing the claim should be controlled by the provisions of Fatal Accident Act. It was specifically held that Motor Vehicles Act creates new and enlarged right for filing an application for compensation and such right cannot be hedged in by the limitations on an action under the Fatal Accidents Act. 12. Paragraph 13 of the report reflects the correct philosophy which should guide the courts interpreting legal provisions of beneficial legislations providing for compensation to those who had suffered loss. "13. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with wellknown principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread- winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira V/s. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, (AIR 1977 Guj.195) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased." 13. From the aforesaid quoted extract it is evident that only if there is a justification in consonance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience, a dependant of the deceased may be denied right to claim compensation. Hence, we find no merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent- Insurance Company that the claim petition is not maintainable because of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. 14. Hence, we find no merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent- Insurance Company that the claim petition is not maintainable because of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. 14. On behalf of the appellants it has been rightly contended that proceeding before the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal is a summary proceeding and unless there is evidence in support of such pleading that the claimant is not a legal representative and therefore the claim petition be dismissed as not maintainable, no such plea can be raised at a subsequent stage and that also through a writ petition. The objection filed on behalf of the Insurance Company, contained in annexure P.2, does not raise any such objection nor there is any evidence led on this issue. As noted earlier, the Tribunal did frame any issue regarding maintainability of the claim petition on law and fact as issue no.1 but the findings recorded by the Tribunal at page 41 of the paper book show that this issue together with issue nos. 2 and 3 were not pressed by the opposite parties during trial and were accordingly decided in favour of the claimants. 15. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order under appeal dated 20.8.2002 allowing the writ petition suffers from apparent mistake in not noticing the relevant issue decided by the Tribunal and also the fact that the Insurance Company, which was the writ petitioner, had not pressed this issue. It had neither raised pleadings nor led evidence relevant for the said issue. 16. On coming to know about the High Court judgment the appellants filed a review petition in which they gave all the relevant facts including the constitution of the society appellant no.1 in support of their claim that a `Brother' of the Society renounced his relations with the natural family and all his earnings and belongings including insurance claims belonged to the society. These facts could not have been ignored by the High Court but even after noticing such facts the review petition was rejected. 17. These facts could not have been ignored by the High Court but even after noticing such facts the review petition was rejected. 17. A perusal of the judgment and order of the Tribunal discloses that although issue no.1 was not pressed and hence decided in favour of the claimants/appellants, while considering the quantum of compensation for the claimants the Tribunal adopted a very cautious approach and framed a question for itself as to what should be the criterion for assessing compensation in such case where the deceased was a Roman Catholic and joined the church services after denouncing his family, and as such having no actual dependants or earning- For answering this issue the Tribunal relied not only upon judgments of American and English Courts but also upon Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even a religious order or organization may suffer considerable loss due to death of a voluntary worker. The Tribunal also went on to decide who should be entitled for compensation as legal representative of the deceased and for that purpose it relied upon the Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court reported in AIR 1987 Pat. 239 , which held that the term `legal representative' is wide enough to include even "intermeddlers" with the estate of a deceased. The Tribunal also referred to some Indian judgments in which it was held that successors to the trusteeship and trust property are legal representatives within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 13. Worthy assistance can be taken from the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v/s. Birender and Ors [ (2020) 11 SCC 356 ], whether married and major sons having gainful employment or earning elsewhere can claim compensation and whether claim petition at their instance is maintainable was issue before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter. Hon’ble Apex Court in para 12 to 14 has observed as under :- “12. The legal representatives of the deceased could move application for compensation by virtue of clause (c) of section 166(1). The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependant on the deceased, would be still covered by the expression “legal representative” of the deceased. Hon’ble Apex Court in para 12 to 14 has observed as under :- “12. The legal representatives of the deceased could move application for compensation by virtue of clause (c) of section 166(1). The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependant on the deceased, would be still covered by the expression “legal representative” of the deceased. This Court in Manjuri Bera (supra) had expounded that liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency of the concerned legal representative. Notably, the expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the Act. In Manjuri Bera (supra), the Court observed thus: “9. In terms of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 166 of the Act in case of death, all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased become entitled to compensation and any such legal representative can file a claim petition. The proviso to said subsection makes the position clear that where all the legal representatives had not joined, then application can be made on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased by impleading those legal representatives as respondents. Therefore, the High Court was justified in its view that the appellant could maintain a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Act. 10. …..The Tribunal has a duty to make an award, determine the amount of compensation which is just and proper and specify the person or persons to whom such compensation would be paid. The latter part relates to the entitlement of compensation by a person who claims for the same. 11. According to Section 2(11) CPC, “legal representative” means a person who in law represents the estate of a de ceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. Almost in similar terms is the definition of legal representa tive under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 i.e. un der Section 2(1)(g). 12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique , the definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. 12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique , the definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir competent to inherit the prop erty of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or adminis trators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression “legal represen tative”. As observed in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatb hai [ (1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal representative is one who suf fers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.” 13. In paragraph 15 of Majnuri Bera, while adverting to the provisions of Section 140 of the Act, the Court observed that even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he was a legal representative, will be entitled to compensation. In the concurring judgment of Justice S.H. Kapadia, as His Lordship then was, it is observed that there is distinction between “right to apply for compensation” and “entitlement to compensation”. The compensation constitutes part of the estate of the deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the deceased would inherit the estate. Indeed in that case, the Court was dealing with the case of a married daughter of the deceased and the efficacy of Section 140 of the Act. Nevertheless, the principle underlying the exposition in this decision would clearly come to the aid of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) even though they are major sons of the deceased and also earning. 14. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Nevertheless, the principle underlying the exposition in this decision would clearly come to the aid of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) even though they are major sons of the deceased and also earning. 14. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it must necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of the deceased being legal representatives have a right to apply for compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to consider the application irrespective of the fact whether the concerned legal representative was fully dependant on the deceased and not to limit the claim towards conventional heads only. The evidence on record in the present case would suggest that the claimants were working as agricultural labourers on contract basis and were earning meagre income between Rs.1,00,000/ and Rs.1,50,000/ per annum. In that sense, they were largely dependant on the earning of their mother and in fact, were staying with her, who met with an accident at the young age of 48 years. 14. Yet, in another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of N.Jayasree Versus Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Ltd., 2022 (14) SCC 712 , where the mother-in-law has been considered dependent of the deceased, the Hon’ble Apex Court after referring judgment in case of Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (supra) as well as Montford Brothers (supra) held that if legal representatives suffers on account of the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realization of compensation. The relevant para of Hon’ble Apex Court is para 14 to 20, which reads as under:- “14. The MV Act does not define the term 'legal representative'. Generally, 'legal representative' means a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person and includes any person or persons in whom legal right to receive compensatory benefit vests. A 'legal representative' may also include any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. Such person does not necessarily have to be a legal heir. Legal heirs are the persons who are entitled to inherit the surviving estate of the deceased. A legal heir may also be a legal representative. 15. A 'legal representative' may also include any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. Such person does not necessarily have to be a legal heir. Legal heirs are the persons who are entitled to inherit the surviving estate of the deceased. A legal heir may also be a legal representative. 15. Indicatively for the present inquiry, the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, defines the term 'legal representative' as under: "Legal Representative" means a person who in law is entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased if he had left any estate at the time of his death and also includes any legal heir of the deceased and the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased." 16. In our view, the term 'legal representative' should be given a wider interpretation for the purpose of Chapter XII of MV Act and it should not be confined only to mean the spouse, parents and children of the deceased. As noticed above, MV Act is a benevolent legislation enacted for the object of providing monetary relief to the victims or their families. Therefore, the MV Act calls for a liberal and wider interpretation to serve the real purpose underlying the enactment and fulfil its legislative intent. We are also of the view that in order to maintain a claim petition, it is sufficient for the claimant to establish his loss of dependency. Section 166 of the MV Act makes it clear that every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realization of compensation. 17. It is settled that percentage of deduction for personal expenses cannot be governed by a rigid rule or formula of universal application. It also does not depend upon the basis of relationship of the claimant with the deceased. In some cases, the father may have his own income and thus will not be considered as dependent. Sometimes, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependents because they may either be independent or earning or married or be dependent on the father. The percentage of deduction for personal expenditure, thus, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. In the instant case, the question for consideration is whether the fourth appellant would fall under the expression 'legal representative' for the purpose of claiming compensation. The percentage of deduction for personal expenditure, thus, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. In the instant case, the question for consideration is whether the fourth appellant would fall under the expression 'legal representative' for the purpose of claiming compensation. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr., (1987) 3 SCC 234 this Court while considering the entitlement of the brother of a deceased who died in a motor vehicle accident to maintain a claim petition under the provisions of the MV Act, held as under: "13. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110A to 110F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110A of the Act have to be done in accordance with wellknown principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhagujri, AIR 1977 Guj 195 and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased." 19. In Hafizun Begum (Mrs) vs. Mohd. Ikram Heque and Ors., (2007) 10 SCC 715 it was held that: "7. ...12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of Banco National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 the definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead, it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir, competent to inherit the property of the deceased, can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression 'legal representative'. As observed in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai3 a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child." 20. In Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel and Anr. vs. United India Insurance and Anr., (2014) 3 SCC 394 this Court was considering the claim petition of a charitable society for award of compensation on account of the death of its member. The appellantsociety therein was a registered charitable society and was running various institutions as a constituent unit of Catholic church. Its members, after joining the appellantsociety, renounced the world and were known as 'brother'. In this case, a 'brother' died in a motor vehicle accident. The claim petition filed by the appellantsociety seeking compensation on account of the death of aforesaid 'brother' was rejected by the High Court on the ground of its maintainability. This Court after examining various provisions of the MV Act held that the appellantsociety was the legal representative of the deceased 'brother'. While allowing the claim petition it was observed as under: "17. This Court after examining various provisions of the MV Act held that the appellantsociety was the legal representative of the deceased 'brother'. While allowing the claim petition it was observed as under: "17. A perusal of the judgment and order of the Tribunal discloses that although Issue 1 was not pressed and hence decided in favour of the appellant claimants, while considering the quantum of compensation for the claimants, the Tribunal adopted a very cautious approach and framed a question for itself as to what should be the criterion for assessing compensation in such case where the deceased was a Roman Catholic and joined the church services after denouncing his family, and as such having no actual dependents or earning- For answering this issue, the Tribunal relied not only upon judgments of American and English Courts but also upon Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even a religious order or an organisation may suffer considerable loss due to the death of a voluntary worker. The Tribunal also went on to decide who should be entitled for compensation as legal representative of the deceased and for that purpose it relied upon the Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court in Sudama Devi v. Jogendra Choudhary, AIR 1987 Pat 239 which held that the term "legal representative" is wide enough to include even "intermeddlers" with the estate of a deceased. The Tribunal also referred to some Indian judgments in which it was held that successors to the trusteeship and trust property are legal representatives within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure." 15. Coming back to the case on hand, it is undeniable fact that the deceased was living with his father and brother. It is also undeniable that they are legal representatives within the personal law governing succession of the deceased and fall within the definition of the legal representatives. The word dependent or dependency cannot be given restrictive meaning and continued only to financial dependency and therefore, the claim petition at the instance of the brother and father of the deceased Preranaben is maintainable. Apt to note that principle of just compensation is a governing field. In Sarla Verma Versus Delhi Transport Corporation reported in 2009 (6) SCC 121 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 16 reads as under:- “10. Apt to note that principle of just compensation is a governing field. In Sarla Verma Versus Delhi Transport Corporation reported in 2009 (6) SCC 121 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 16 reads as under:- “10. Generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation. The question is whether actual income at the time of death should be taken as the income or whether any addition should be made by taking note of future prospects. In Susamma Thomas, this Court held that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand (annual contribution to the dependants); and that where the deceased had a stable job, the court can take note of the prospects of the future and it will be unreasonable to estimate the loss of dependency on the actual income of the deceased at the time of death. In that case, the salary of the deceased, aged 39 years at the time of death, was Rs.1032/- per month. Having regard to the evidence in regard to future prospects, this Court was of the view that the higher estimate of monthly income could be made at Rs.2000/- as. gross income before deducting the personal living expenses. The decision in Susamma Thomas was followed in Sarla Dixit v, Balwant Yadav, 1996 (3) SCC 179 , where the deceased was getting a gross salary of Rs.1543/- per month. Having regard to the future prospects of promotions and increases, this Court assumed that by the time he retired, his earning would have nearly doubled, say Rs.3000/-. This court took the average of the actual income at the time of death and the projected income if he had lived a normal life period, and determined the monthly income as Rs.2200/- per month. In Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India, 2003 (3) SCC 148 , as against the actual salary income of Rs.42,000/- per annum, (Rs.3500/- per month) at the time of accident, this court assumed the income as Rs.45,000/- per annum, having regard to the future prospects and career advancement of the deceased who was 40 years of age.” 16. Director General, Geological Survey of India, 2003 (3) SCC 148 , as against the actual salary income of Rs.42,000/- per annum, (Rs.3500/- per month) at the time of accident, this court assumed the income as Rs.45,000/- per annum, having regard to the future prospects and career advancement of the deceased who was 40 years of age.” 16. At this juncture, I may also remind the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of N.K.V.Bros.Private Limited Versus M.Karumai Ammal reported in 1980 (3) SCC 457 . Para 3 is important, which reads as under:- “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other case, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their "neighbour". Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 17. Thus, in the instance case, the claimants, who are father and brother of the deceased, are entitled to claim compensation for the death of unmarried daughter / sister. Father of the deceased is also to be given filial consortium. In view of above, the compensation awardable to the claimant is reworked as under:- Deceased Preranaben Particulars Amount (Rs.) Future Loss of Income 4,53,600/- (Rs.3000/- x 40% = Rs.4200/- - 1/2 deduction = Rs.2100 x 12 x 18 multiplier Loss of Estate 18,150/- Funeral expenses 18,150/- Filial Consortium 48,400/- Total… 5,38,300/- Awarded by the Tribunal 2,03,000/- Additional amount which is awarded 3,35,300/- 18. First Appeal 3778 of 2006 (judgment in claim petition No.38 of 1998) The claimants are the husband and major son of deceased Chandanben. In order to claim the income of the deceased, it is argued that the learned Tribunal has not taken into consideration income tax returns produced by the claimants at Exhs.62 to 65. On strength of notion and reason, the learned Tribunal believed that the income tax returns are filed for the purpose of eye wash the income of the deceased, as they were filed recent past. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal after taking into consideration the age of the deceased as 56 years, believed that she did not do any business or cannot be partner of any business, but earn the amount stated in the income tax return. Therefore, it is submitted that the learned Tribunal committed serious error in adopting notional income without proof of the income available on the record. Apart from the above pleadings, it is also argued that the learned Tribunal committed serious error in not granting the compensation for loss of future prospect, also applied wrong multiplier and the compensation under the conventional head is also on the lower side. 19. What could be noticed from the findings of the learned Tribunal that at Exhs.62 to 65, the claimants have produced the income tax assessment orders of the deceased. 19. What could be noticed from the findings of the learned Tribunal that at Exhs.62 to 65, the claimants have produced the income tax assessment orders of the deceased. These are the sufficient evidence of the income and they are to be believed to be true whenever available for compensation of the income of the deceased. In case of Anjali & Ors. Versus Lokendra Rathod & Ors., 2022 (17) Scale 298 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid as under:- “"10. .We are in agreement with the High Court that the determination must proceed on the basis of the income tax return, where available. The income tax return is a statutory document on which reliance may be placed to determine the annual income of the deceased." 20. The income tax returns for the AY 1996-97 (FY 1995-96) at Exh.65 was filed on 31.8.1996 for the income of the deceased as Rs.45,150/- p.a. The learned Tribunal was required to take up the last income of the deceased available from the statutory evidence [see : Rupali Kailash Mamode v/s. National Insurance Co.Ltd. 2023 ACJ 327 (SC)]. However, the learned Tribunal has grossly erred in taking up the notional income on the ground that the income tax return does not inspire confidence and it is not showing the incorrect income of the deceased as they are filled to got up the income of deceased. This is clear error on the part of the learned Tribunal in disregarding the statutory evidence. Therefore, considering the above, the income of the deceased is taken as Rs.45,150/- per annum. The deceased was 56 years old at the time of road accident and therefore, in view of judgment of the Pranay Sethi (supra), multiplier of 9 should be applied and 10% rise in the future prospect should be required to be added. Since, the claimants are two dependents, 1/3 should be deducted towards personal and pocket expenses. Even, the conventional head is also required to be enhanced as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pranay Sethi (supra). Since, the claimants are two dependents, 1/3 should be deducted towards personal and pocket expenses. Even, the conventional head is also required to be enhanced as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pranay Sethi (supra). So, the compensation awardable to the claimant is reworked out as under:- Deceased Chandanben Particulars Amount (Rs.) Future Loss of Income 2,97,990/- (Rs.45,150/- p.a. x 10% = Rs.49,665/- - 1/3 deduction = Rs.33110 x 9 multiplier Loss of Estate 18,150/- Funeral expenses 18,150/- Spousal and parental Consortium Rs.96,800/- (Rs.48,400/- x 2) Total… 4,31,090/- Awarded by the Tribunal 1,38,200/- Additional amount which is awarded 2,92,890/- 21. First Appeal 3777 of 2006 (judgment in claim petition No.37 of 1998) The claimant has received injuries due to the road accident. According to the claimant, he was pharmacist and was working with Prerana Agency as a pharmacist and his monthly income was Rs.4500/-. Learned advocate for the claimant would submit that the degree certificate of the claimant was produced at Exh.110; the name of the claimant in the drug licence of Prerana Agency is mentioned as pharmacist, said licence is produced at Exh.111. These two evidence on record indicate that the claimant was pharmacist at the time of road accident. Exh.114 establishes the income of the claimant. However, all these documents have been ignored by the learned Tribunal and has assessed monthly income of the claimant as Rs.2500/- for calculating the compensation. It is submitted by learned advocate for the claimant that at least Rs.5000/- should be treated as monthly income of the claimant considering his degree as pharmacist. The claimant has also produced medical expenses to the tune of Rs.1,87,223.35 at Exh.117. Yet, the learned Tribunal reduced the compensation to Rs.1,50,000/- without giving any reason. Even the compensation under special diet and transportation etc. is also on the lower side. 22. On perusal of the impugned judgment and award, what could be noticed that the learned Tribunal has ignored the degree certificate of the claimant. Undisputedly, the claimant proved himself to be pharmacist and therefore, assessing the income of the claimant to Rs.2500/- per month by the learned Tribunal is on the lower side. Considering the time period of accident i.e. year 1997, according to this Court, income of the claimant should be taken up to Rs.3000/- per month. Undisputedly, the claimant proved himself to be pharmacist and therefore, assessing the income of the claimant to Rs.2500/- per month by the learned Tribunal is on the lower side. Considering the time period of accident i.e. year 1997, according to this Court, income of the claimant should be taken up to Rs.3000/- per month. At the time of road accident, the claimant was 33 years old and therefore, in view of judgment of Pranay Sethi (supra), multiplier of 16 should be applied and 40% rise in the future prospect should be required to be added.. The learned Tribunal has taken up 19% as functional disability body as a whole looking to the injury certificate and according to this Court, this finding of the learned Tribunal is maintained. The learned Tribunal has also committed error in not granting amount of compensation equivalent to the medical expenses discernible from Exh.117, but granted Rs.1,50,000/- instead. The bills produced at Exh.117 prove to be Rs.1,87,223.35, I round up the figure to Rs.2 lakh towards medical compensation. Even, the conventional head is also required to be enhanced as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pranay Sethi (supra). So, the compensation awardable to the claimant is reworked out as under:- Particulars Amount (Rs.) Future loss of income 1,53,216/- (Rs.3000 x 40% = Rs.4200/- x 19% disability 798 x 12 x 16) Pain, shock and suffering 20,000/- Actual loss of income 12,000/- Medical expenses 2,00,000/- Special diet, attendant charges, transportation 10,000/- Total… 3,95,216/- Less : Amount which is already awarded 2,98,750/- Additional amount which is awarded 96,466/- 23. First Appeal 3779 of 2006 (judgment in claim petition No.39 of 1998) In this claim petition, Mansukhlal Mehta died due to natural death on 11.2.2001 surviving for 44 months after receiving injury from the road accident. The learned Tribunal assessed the income of the claimant to Rs.4000/- and considered 12% as disability and calculated the same with 44 months to grant Rs.21,888/- and round up to Rs.22,000/- to the heirs of the claimant and in addition thereto, granted compensation for actual loss of income for four months and medical expenses for Rs.75000/- and in total, Rs.1,15,000/-was granted towards the compensation for actual loss of income. Considering the over all facts and circumstances, more particularly, that the deceased was died by natural death after three years and eight months of the road accident, but noticing the conservative approach of the learned Tribunal in granting under compensation under the other conventional heads, I deem it fit to enhance the total compensation from Rs.1,15,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/- under the doctrine of granting just and fair compensation. 24. First Appeal 3780 of 2006 ( judgment in claim petition No.40 of 1998) In this claim petition, the claimant is 30 years old at the time of road accident. He has placed on record the income tax returns from Exh.104 and 105 to establish his income, but those income tax returns was filed subsequent to the road accident and therefore, cannot be countenanced to calculate the income of the claimant. He has also not produced any certificate of injury. He is injured due to road accident, but has produced only prescriptions, yet suffered fractures in 10th and 11th rib. His functional impairment was assessed to 10%. The learned Tribunal on various heads, granted total compensation of Rs.88,500/-. Noticing the conservative approach of the learned Tribunal, I enhance the same total compensation from Rs.88,500/- to Rs.1 lakh. 25. For the reasons recorded above, the first appeals are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. 26. The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced amount as indicated above with 9% p.a. interest from the date of claim petitions till realization before the concerned Tribunal, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 27. The Tribunal shall disburse the entire awarded amount lying in the FDR and/or with the Tribunal, with accrued interest thereon, if any, to the claimant/s, by account payee cheque / NEFT / RTGS, after proper verification and after following due procedure. 28. While making the payment, the Tribunal shall deduct the courts fees, if not paid, in accordance with rules/law. 29. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Tribunal, forthwith.