JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, dated 30.09.2002. By the judgment and order, the learned Trial Court, in Sessions Case No. 114 of 1998, acquitted the respondents-accused for the offenses punishable under Sections 302, 504 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The brief case of the prosecution as per the First Information Report is that the accused no. 1-Raghavji Bhagvanji is the son of the deceased Bhagvanji Nanji. He is the second son of the deceased who was staying with his wife, the accused no. 2-Manjuben. The incident occurred as a result of a dispute with regard to the maintenance amount that the accused had agreed to pay to the deceased father. Since the accused did not pay the amount and demand was made by the father Bhagvanji, as per the case of the prosecution, when the father demanded the amount from the son-the accused no. 1, he was told to come to the house in the evening so that the dispute could be settled. When the accused and his wife were at home in the evening and when the father deceased-Bhagvanji approached them, the son-accused no. 1 poured kerosene on his father and set him on fire. When the deceased father was trying to rush out of the home, he was obstructed by the wife of accused no. 1-Manjuben. The deceased succumbed to the injuries. Hence, he was charge-sheeted. The case was committed to the Sessions Court for trial. Upon committal of the case, the learned Sessions Court, Jamnagar, framed charges at Exh.44. The prosecution examined 28 witnesses. It also led documentary evidence. The details of oral as well as documentary evidences are as under: Oral Evidences S. No. Exhibit No. Name of Witness Nature of Witness Remarks 1. 56 Dr. P.H. Shah Post Mortem Officer 2. 60 V.H. Patel Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate 3. 67 Arjan Karana Panch Hostile 4. 68 H.B. Bhupat Panch Hostile 5. 69 M. Harun Panch Hostile 6. 70 B. Vaghajibhai Panch Hostile 7. 71 Kanji Nanji Panch 8. 73 J.C. Pandiya P.S.O. 9. 84 R. Bhagvanjibhai Son of the deceased Hostile Hostile 10. 85 D. Bhagvanjibhai Son of the deceased Hostile 11. 67 Arjan Karana Panch Hostile 4. 68 H.B. Bhupat Panch Hostile 5. 69 M. Harun Panch Hostile 6. 70 B. Vaghajibhai Panch Hostile 7. 71 Kanji Nanji Panch 8. 73 J.C. Pandiya P.S.O. 9. 84 R. Bhagvanjibhai Son of the deceased Hostile Hostile 10. 85 D. Bhagvanjibhai Son of the deceased Hostile 11. 86 D. Bhagvanjibhai Son of the deceased Hostile 12. 87 K. Dhanjijibhai Son-in-law of the deceased 13. 88 P.B. Shatvara Wife of the deceased 14. 89 K. Ramjibhai Daughter-in-law of the deceased Hostile 15. 90 D. Devshibhai Son-in-law of the deceased Hostile 16. 91 R. Dayaljibhai Daughter-in-law of the deceased Hostile 17. 92 K. Kanjibhai Sister-in-law of the deceased 18. 93 M. Dayaljibhai Grandchild Hostile 19. 94 Dayaljibhai Kanjibhai Grandchild Hostile 20. 95 V. Kanjibhai Grandchild Hostile 21. 96 S.V. Shapriya Medical Officer 22. 99 R. Rashubha Head Constable, Jamnagar 23. 101 D. Benesinh P.S.O. 24. 104 M.B. Thakar Circle Officer, Mamlatdar Office 25. 109 B.P. Chaudhary Doctor 26. 112 R.V. Bhochiya Constable, Jamnagar 27. 113 D.A. Jadeja P.S.I. Writer 28. 119 S.N. Bapodara Investigating P.S.I. Documentary Evidences S. No. Exhibit No. Name of Witness Remarks 1. 58 P.M. Note 2. 59 Warrant Application 3. 61 D.D. Yadi 4. 62 D.D. 5. 64 Notification 6. 65 Notification 7. 72 Inquest Panchanama 8. 74 Station Dairy 9. 75 Mark 51/1 10. 97 Case Papers 11. 98 Inquiry Certificate 12. 100 M.L.C. Reg. Copy 13. 102 Yadi 14. 103 Mark 51/17 15. 105 Yadi 16. 106 Chart 17. 110 Medical Papers 18. 115. Panchanama 19. 116 Panchanama 20. 117 Police Report 21. 118 F.I.R. 22. 120 Mark 51/10 23. 121 Gunano P-1 24. 122 Certificate 25. 123 Yadi Mark 51/10 26. 124 Mark 51/14 27. 125 Mark 51/15 2.1 On examination of oral evidences as well as documentary evidences, the Trial Court found that the witnesses viz. the other two sons of the deceased turned hostile. Panch Witnesses also turned hostile. In other words, all the relatives who were examined, turned hostile. Therefore, the case of the prosecution had to be proved only through the evidence of the Medical Officer Dr. P.H. Shah who was examined at Exh.56. The Mamlatdar and the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was also examined at Exh.60. Medical Officer Shri S.V. Sapariya was also examined who was present at the time when the dying declaration was recorded. P.H. Shah who was examined at Exh.56. The Mamlatdar and the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was also examined at Exh.60. Medical Officer Shri S.V. Sapariya was also examined who was present at the time when the dying declaration was recorded. The dying declaration is at Exh.62. The FIR is at Exh.118. In other words, the Trial Court considered, in all, three dying declarations; one recorded by the Executive Magistrate, the FIR recorded in the version of the deceased, and the statement given by the deceased to the on duty head constable R. Rasubha, who was examined at Exh.99. The Sessions Court found discrepancies in the dying declarations and therefore acquitted the accused. We have independently examined the evidences of these witnesses. 3. Learned APP Mr. J.K. Shah has made the following submissions: 3.1 He would submit that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is wrong inasmuch as the dying declarations were not believed. 3.2 He submitted that inasmuch as three dying declarations were on record viz. (i) recorded by the Executive Magistrate, (ii) in form of the FIR and (iii) in form of a statement recorded while being examined by the Doctor. He submitted that there were no contradictions and the evidence on record suggests that the deceased was fully conscious and fit and gave an exact narration of the incident that caused his death. 3.3 Mr. Shah would submit that the learned Judge ought to have believed the case papers of the deceased, the evidence of Dr. S.V. Sapariya, Dr. Chaudhary and the evidences of the police constable Ravirajsinh, police constable Ghanshyamsinh, Executive Magistrate Vallabhbhai Patel and PSI Bapodara before whom the deceased had given a dying declaration in a fit state of mind. 4. Mr. J.M. Buddhbhatti learned advocate for the respondents would support the reasoning given by the learned Sessions Judge and therefore would submit that the appeal be dismissed. 5. We have first examined the evidence of Dr. Pragnesh Shah-the Medical Officer who was examined at Exh.56 and also seen the P.M. Note at Exh.58. From the evidence it is brought on record that the deceased-Bhagvanji sustained burn injuries to the extent of 85 to 90% and the death occurred due to the injuries so sustained. The First Information Report at Exh.118 has been recorded by R. Rasubhathe Head Constable at Jamnagar at Exh.99. From the evidence it is brought on record that the deceased-Bhagvanji sustained burn injuries to the extent of 85 to 90% and the death occurred due to the injuries so sustained. The First Information Report at Exh.118 has been recorded by R. Rasubhathe Head Constable at Jamnagar at Exh.99. Reading of the FIR indicates that the same was recorded in presence of Dr. Sapariya. Reading of this Doctor’s evidence at Exh.96 reveals that when the FIR was recorded, it was found that the deceased was fully conscious. It was only thereafter that the FIR was recorded. 5.1 The Trial Court has found that when the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration and the same was recorded in presence of Dr. V.P. Chaudhary at Exh.109, from the evidence of the Executive Magistrate, it comes out that while recording the dying declaration, except the prosecution reading out the fact that the deceased while giving his dying declaration was fully conscious. There was no suggestion from the Executive Magistrate to the Doctor regarding the fitness of the deceased to give evidence or a statement and therefore oral evidence on record to suggest that the deceased was fit to give his declaration. The Trial Court therefore considering the medical evidence on record which indicated that the deceased had sustained 85 to 90% burn injuries, found that such a dying declaration recorded without certifying the fitness of the declarant was extremely doubtful. Dr. Chaudhary whose evidence was recorded at Exh.109, had in his cross-examination indicated and denied any knowledge as to whether the deceased had suffered burn injuries on his neck, whether that would affect his voice was not known to him. 5.2 Considering the medical evidence and the history recorded by the doctor on admission, when it was found by the Trial Court that the deceased had suffered burns on upper part of his body to the extent of 85 to 90% and there was no evidence to suggest mental alertness of the deceased of being fit to give such a declaration, the Trial Court, in our opinion, rightly so, did not believe that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate as well as the First Information Report version in light of the evidence of the Medical Officer. 5.3 Having independently examined the evidence on record, we see no reason to take a view different than the one taken by the Sessions Court. 5.3 Having independently examined the evidence on record, we see no reason to take a view different than the one taken by the Sessions Court. 6. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Niwas, (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under: “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P. (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: “27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilized society. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilized society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of “The Proof of Guilt” by Glanville Williams, second edition: “I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos.” 28. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos.” 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: “Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations.” “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the noninterference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court.” 8. In Arulvelu and another vs. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 , the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in Para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court’s view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 7. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 11 SCC 444 and Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court’s interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 8. Scope of appeal against acquittal is well laid down in case of Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it was observed: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 9. Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 has held as under: “39. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 9. Even recently, the Apex Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 has held as under: “39. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1 That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2 That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. 41.3 That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 42. 41.2 That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. 41.3 That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 42. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 10. Perusal of the judgment of the trial court would therefore indicate that the learned judge has opined that there does not seem to be a consensus on the evidence of the witnesses viz-a-viz medical evidence and accordingly such evidence also needs to be discarded. Considering these set of evidences on record and in light of the latest decision of the Apex Court as reproduced herein above, which deals with the law on acquittal, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dahod in acquitting the respondents. 11. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order of the trial court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings, if called for, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.