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Gujarat High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 2009 (GUJ)

Bipinchandra H. Gohil v. Commissioner

2024-10-29

VAIBHAVI D.NANAVATI

body2024
JUDGMENT : Vaibhavi D. Nanavati, J. 1. Heard Mr.B.B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr.Parthiv Bhatt, learned advocate for the petitioner, Ms.Pooja Ashar, learned A.G.P. for the respondent no.1 and Ms.Dimple Thaker, learned advocate for the respondent no.2. 2. By way of the present petition, the petitioner herein has challenged the order dated 25.09.2006 passed by the respondent no.2, which is duly produced at Annexure-D, whereby, the suspension of the petitioner was withdrawn and the petitioner was allowed to resume his duties with the respondent no.2 – board upon five conditions, which are at page 38 i.e. (i) The amount of Rs.157.27 ps. to be recovered from the petitioner. (ii) Since the petitioner was not present at the head-quarters during suspension period, it is not necessary to pay him subsistence allowance. (iii) The period of suspension is to be treated as suspension period. (iv) When the petitioner was suspended, he was in the pay-scale of Rs.950-1500 and, therefore, he is to be allowed to resume duties and to be posted in the same pay-scale and (v) Pending suspension, criminal complaint was filed against the petitioner for misappropriation of the amount at Vav police station and in connection with which, revision application was also filed by respondent No.2 – board against acquittal of the petitioner in the case at Bhachav, no pay and allowance was to be paid to the petitioner for the period of suspension. 3. Upon such order being passed, the petitioner made a representation to the respondent – board to delete the conditions imposed in the impugned order. Thereafter, pursuant to the order dated 25.09.2006, the respondent no.2-board, by letter dated 18/19.10.2006, directed the petitioner to resume the duties within seven days as the contentions raised in the representation could be raised only after resuming the duties The petitioner showed readiness and willingness to resume the duties by representation dated 30.10.2006 however, the petitioner was not permitted to resume the duties by letter dated 02.11.2006. Thereafter, by letter dated 03.11.2006, the District Development Officer, Kutch at Bhuj, directed the Programme Officer, Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), Bhuj to allow the petitioner to resume the duties and accordingly, the petitioner resumed the duties at the office of ICDS Branch, Taluka Panchayat Office, Bhachav. 3.1. By order dated 27.12.2006, the pay of the petitioner was determined at Rs.3125/- and the question of increment was to be decided on 01.11.2007. 3.1. By order dated 27.12.2006, the pay of the petitioner was determined at Rs.3125/- and the question of increment was to be decided on 01.11.2007. The petitioner accepted the same with objections by communication dated 02.01.2007. Since the petitioner did not receive any reply from the respondent in response to his representation dated 06.10.2006, notice was issued through the petitioner’s advocate on 22.02.2007. The petitioner chose not to approach the Court because of the pendency of Criminal Misc. Application No.6023 of 2002, which was filed by the petitioner for quashing of the criminal complaint. The said application came to be allowed by judgment dated 13.04.2007. The petitioner thereafter, informed the respondent no.2 – board by letter dated 25.05.2007, requesting to delete the conditions imposed on 25.09.2006 and for extending all the benefits including pay-fixation, increments, promotions etc. to the petitioner. The petitioner also sent the certified copy of the order passed in the said Criminal Misc. Application No.6023 of 2002. By communication dated 31.05.2007, the petitioner was relieved from ICDS office at Bhachav and was repatriated to the Gujarat State Social Welfare Board. The petitioner was once again posted at ICDS Bachav Unit on 07.07.2007 and resumed the duties on deputation. The petitioner resumed his duties on 26.07.2007 at Bhachav and was serving at ICDS, Bhachav. 3.2. On 06.08.2007, the petitioner was informed by the respondent no.2 – board that the application of the petitioner was allowed only on the ground of delay and nothing further was required to be done in the matter and the conditions as laid down in the order dated 25.09.2006 would continue. Upon receipt of the said communication dated 06.08.2007, the petitioner made grievances before the various authorities and finally, made a detailed representation on 15.04.2008 giving details of the petitioner’s service as the petitioner had suffered financial loss for the period between 1994 till March, 2008. Upon receipt of the said communication dated 06.08.2007, the petitioner made grievances before the various authorities and finally, made a detailed representation on 15.04.2008 giving details of the petitioner’s service as the petitioner had suffered financial loss for the period between 1994 till March, 2008. The said representation is duly produced at Annexure-O. In absence of any reply received from the respondent – authorities, the petitioner herein has approached this Court and has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) This Honourable Court may be pleased to admit the present petition; (B) This Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25th September 2006 [Annexure “D”] passed by respondent No.2-Board; (C) This Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to grant all the benefits to the petitioner by treating period of suspension as period on duty, including difference in salary, increments, promotions and other incidental and consequential benefits; (D) And to pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just and proper. 30. It is further prayed that, pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition, this Honourable Court may be pleased to stay and suspend the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned order dated 25th September 2006 [Annexure “D”] passed by respondent No.2-Board; and direct the respondents to grant all the benefits to the petitioner by treating period of suspension as period on duty, including difference in salary, increments, promotions and other incidental and consequential benefits, by necessary interim orders.” 4. Mr.B.B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr.Parthiv Bhatt, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated 25.09.2006 is required to be interfered with wherein, the period of suspension is not regularized and the same is considered as on leave mainly on the ground that the petitioner herein was acquitted by the competent Court by the judgment dated 26.02.2002 passed in Criminal Case No.1506 of 1996, which is duly produced at page 133. It is submitted that upon the order of acquittal, it was incumbent for the respondent – authority to regularize the period of suspension under Rule 152 of the Gujarat Civil Services Rules, 1959 (for short, “the Rules of 1959”). It is submitted that though the impugned order states that the acquittal is on the ground of benefit of doubt, it is actually honourable acquittal. Once the petitioner is acquitted honourarbly for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner’s suspension period is required to be regularized under Rule 152(1) of the Rules of 1959. It is further submitted that while passing the impugned order dated 25.09.2006, declining to regularize the period of suspension, the same is without following the cardinal principles of natural justice and without issuing notice for granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 4.1. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid, the prayers, as prayed for, in the present petition, are required to be allowed. 5. Ms.Dimple Thaker, learned advocate for the respondent no.2 placed reliance on the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent – authority, duly produced at page 94 and submitted that the petitioner herein was suspended by order dated 28.06.1994 and during the said period, the petitioner made a representation on 21.06.2005 that the petitioner be permitted to resume the duties, which was permitted on certain conditions. 5.1. It is submitted that for the criminal complaint, which came to be registered at Bhachav police station on 24.06.1994 for temporary misappropriation of funds as Criminal Case No.1506 of 1996 in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner came to be acquitted from the said case due to lack of evidence. It is further submitted that the FIR came to be registered against the petitioner for misappropriation of funds for the period from 1983 to 1989 on 19.09.2001 at Vav police station vide C.R.No.40 of 2001. The said FIR and the consequential proceedings were quashed by the order dated 13.04.2007 in a petition filed by the petitioner, seeking quashing of the charges on the ground of delay in filing the FIR after 13 years of the incident. The said FIR and the consequential proceedings were quashed by the order dated 13.04.2007 in a petition filed by the petitioner, seeking quashing of the charges on the ground of delay in filing the FIR after 13 years of the incident. It is submitted that the petitioner confessed the offence and has paid the misappropriated funds and was also imposed the punishment of reduction of the basic salary in the said case. It is submitted that in view of the above, order dated 25.09.2006 passed by the respondent – authority of imposing conditions is just and reasonable. It is submitted that respondent – authority while passing the said order, has taken into consideration all the aspects about the petitioner’s involvement in the criminal case and his confession about the offence committed earlier. It is submitted that the petitioner was acquitted on the technical grounds due to lack of evidence and benefit of doubt and in the other case, the petitioner has already confessed the offence. 5.2. Reliance is placed on Rule 152 of the Rules of 1959 and it is submitted that the case of the petitioner falls under Rule 152(3). Placing reliance on the aforesaid, it is submitted that the committee was constituted to give recommendation for reinstating the petitioner in service. The order came to be passed by the respondent – authority on the basis of the recommendation of the committee upon perusal of the documents germane for adjudication of the dispute. It is submitted that the aspect of suspension during the departmental inquiry or contemplation of departmental inquiry or initiation of the criminal case was extensively dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment rendered in the case of K.D. Desai vs. High Court of Gujarat reported in 2009(3) GLH 631 . 5.3. Placing reliance on the aforesaid, it is submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent – authority is just and proper, reinstating the petitioner in service however, declined to regularize the suspension period. 5.4. Ms.Thaker, learned advocate has filed further reply, which is placed on record at page 182. It is submitted that the petitioner herein was granted opportunity of hearing and the petitioner was aware about the same. Placing reliance on the documents produced on record, it is submitted that the committee, that was constituted by the respondent – authority, gave ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner herein was granted opportunity of hearing and the petitioner was aware about the same. Placing reliance on the documents produced on record, it is submitted that the committee, that was constituted by the respondent – authority, gave ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner was heard by the committee on 02.06.2006 and 05.07.2006. The notice was also issued on 30.06.2006, calling upon the petitioner to remain present before the committee on 05.07.2006. The petitioner also replied to the said notice on 05.07.2006. Reliance was placed on the file notings, which provided details about the proceedings dated 02.06.2006 and 05.07.2006 indicating that the petitioner was heard at length by the committee and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice, as stated by Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. 5.5. Placing reliance on the letter dated 20.07.2006, it is submitted that board in fact, informed the State Government with respect to the proceedings. It is submitted that the letter dated 06.08.2007 was produced on record by the petitioner wherein, at the relevant unnumbered paragraph 3 at page 82, it is recorded that the petitioner remained present before the committee but, even on insistence of the committee to respond in writing to the committee, the petitioner chose not to respond, which indicates that the petitioner was heard by the committee and the petitioner also remained present. 5.6. Placing reliance on the aforesaid, it is submitted that the respondent – authority has duly followed the procedure as provided under Rule 152 of the Rules of 1959 and also the judicial pronouncements whereby, the principles of natural justice are required to be followed before passing any order that may adversely affect the rights of the employees. 6. Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel thereafter, in rejoinder, reiterated that the proceedings before the committee were not just and proper and that, due procedure was not followed. The contentions raised earlier are reiterated by Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel. It is submitted that the prayers, as prayed for, be granted. 7. 6. Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel thereafter, in rejoinder, reiterated that the proceedings before the committee were not just and proper and that, due procedure was not followed. The contentions raised earlier are reiterated by Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel. It is submitted that the prayers, as prayed for, be granted. 7. To substantiate the submissions, Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the ratio laid down in the case of Laxman Popatbhai Solanki vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 1976 GLR 371, in the case of The State of West Bengal and others vs. Bata Krishna Burman reported in 1970(3) SCC 612 and in the case of Narayan Prasad Rewany vs. State of Orissa and another reported in AIR 1957 ORISSA 51. 8. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the following emerge:- 8.1. The petitioner herein was appointed as Accounting Clerk in the office of the Director Social Defence, Gujarat State. After his appointment, the petitioner was posted at Vav in Border Area Project under the Gujarat State Social Advisory Board. The petitioner joined duties at Vav on 14.03.1983. The petitioner served at Vav from 1983 to 1989. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted by order dated 11.07.1989 as office Superintendent and was posted at Ahwa, District Dang and he joined the duty accordingly. 8.2. During the tenure at Vav, respondent no.2 found that there were some irregularities in maintenance of the accounts by the petitioner and there was some misappropriation by the petitioner of the amount belonging to the respondent – board. 8.3. On 02.11.1989, the petitioner was reverted back to the post of accounting clerk and the show-cause notice was issued to him, directing him to furnish explanation to the said allegations. On 01.12.1989, the petitioner gave explanation and the same was not found acceptable and, therefore, the chargesheet was served on the petitioner on 12.02.1990, alleging misappropriation of the amount of Rs.45,455.24 ps and the petitioner was directed to submit reply to the said chargesheet. On 13.02.1990, the petitioner replied to the said chargesheet, confessing the irregularities committed by him and the charges leveled against him and also giving an undertaking that he would pay up the amount and that, the petitioner may be continued in service. On 13.02.1990, the petitioner replied to the said chargesheet, confessing the irregularities committed by him and the charges leveled against him and also giving an undertaking that he would pay up the amount and that, the petitioner may be continued in service. After receipt of the said reply, on 13.02.1990, respondent - board by order dated 14.02.1990, directed the petitioner to deposit the said amount of Rs.45,455.24 ps at Vav and accordingly, the petitioner paid the said amount on 15.02.1990 to the various persons and the respondent - board. On 16.02.1990, the petitioner wrote a letter intimating the same. 8.4. In pursuant to the said letter, the respondent - board imposed punishment of reducing basic salary of the petitioner from Rs.1,090/- to Rs.990/- from 01.03.1990 and it was also stated in the said order that the increment, which was due on 14.03.1991, would be granted if the services of the petitioner would be found satisfactory and after considering the honesty and integrity of the petitioner at the relevant time. 8.5. On 03.10.1992, the petitioner was transferred from Ahwa, District: Dang to Bachav in Border Area Project. On 17.09.1992, the petitioner was issued chargesheet. On 19.05.1994, memo came to be issued to the petitioner, calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation regarding the accounts of the year 1993-94 when the petitioner was serving at Bachav. The petitioner replied on 13.06.1994. Thereafter, the criminal complaint was filed at the Bachav Police Station on 24.06.1994 against the petitioner for temporary misappropriation, which was registered as Criminal Case no.1506 of 1996 in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. On 26.02.002, the petitioner came to be acquitted by the learned trial court. The acquittal was on the basis that the prosecution failed to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner. 8.6. Vide order dated 28.06.1994, the petitioner was suspended from service during the investigation at Bachav. On 01.08.1994, chargesheet was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter, replied to the said chargesheet on 13.09.1994. The petitioner was acquitted in Criminal Case No.1506 of 1996 pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj. 8.7. 8.6. Vide order dated 28.06.1994, the petitioner was suspended from service during the investigation at Bachav. On 01.08.1994, chargesheet was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter, replied to the said chargesheet on 13.09.1994. The petitioner was acquitted in Criminal Case No.1506 of 1996 pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj. 8.7. On 19.09.2001, FIR came to be registered at Vav Police station vide C.R.No.40 of 2001 against the petitioner for misappropriation of amounts for the period from 1983 to 1989. On 07.02.2002, chargesheet came to be filed against the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the same before this Court by way of Criminal Misc. Application No.6023 of 2002 under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of the complaint and the proceedings. On 13.04.2007, this Court was pleased to quash the said FIR. 9. The petitioner made a representation on 21.06.2005 after being acquitted by the learned trial Court for resuming his duties. Based on the said representation, a committee was constituted to consider the petitioner’s representation. The committee, on 05.07.2006, recommended reappointment of the petitioner. Based on the recommendations of the committee, on 25.09.2006, the impugned order came to be passed wherein, the petitioner was permitted to resume the duties on certain conditions. While passing the impugned order, the suspension period was not regularized, considering the following conditions at page 38, which read as under:- (i) The amount of Rs.157.27 ps. to be recovered from the petitioner. (ii) Since the petitioner was not present at the headquarters during suspension period, it is not necessary to pay him subsistence allowance. (iii) The period of suspension is to be treated as suspension period. (iv) When the petitioner was suspended, he was in the pay-scale of Rs.950-1500 and, therefore, he is to be allowed to resume duties and to be posted in the same pay-scale. (v) Pending suspension, criminal complaint was filed against the petitioner for misappropriation of the amount at Vav police station and in connection with which, revision application was also filed by respondent No.2 – board against acquittal of the petitioner in the case at Bhachav, no pay and allowance was to be paid to the petitioner for the period of suspension.” 10. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Rule 152 of the Rules of 1959, which reads as under:- 152. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Rule 152 of the Rules of 1959, which reads as under:- 152. (1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to for the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order.- (a) Regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or in the case of suspension that it was wholly unjustified the Government servant shall be given the fully pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be. (3) In other case, the Government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may prescribe; Provided that the payment of allowances under clause (2) or (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible. (4) In a case falling under clause (2) the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In case falling under clause (3) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. Instruction-Payment of pay and/or allowances under this rule should be withheld for any period during which the Government servant has accepted private employment or engaged in trade or business. A certificate as prescribed in the Instruction below Rule 151 should be obtained from him before payment is made.” 11. It is also apposite to refer to the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Dahyabhai Nathubhai Patel Since Decd. vs. Director of Primary Education reported in 2016 JX(Guj) 771. Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the said judgment, read as under:- “(8) Short question which falls under consideration before us is that whether the suspension of the petitioner was justified at the relevant time. vs. Director of Primary Education reported in 2016 JX(Guj) 771. Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the said judgment, read as under:- “(8) Short question which falls under consideration before us is that whether the suspension of the petitioner was justified at the relevant time. Perusal of the impugned order dated 10.02.1997 clarifies that the authority concerned has taken into consideration all the aspects about his involvement in the criminal case. It is specifically stated that the petitioner was acquitted on technical grounds due to lack of evidence. The aspect of suspension during the departmental inquiry or contemplation of departmental inquiry or initiation of criminal case was extensively dealt with in the Division Bench judgment in the case of K.D.Desai (supra). Division Bench has observed as under: “While deciding the question under subrules (2) and (4) of Rule 152, whether the delinquent should be given full pay and allowances for the period of suspension, the Competent authority will have to consider both the questions whether delinquent was fully exonerated in the Departmental inquiry or whether suspension was wholly justified in light of the findings given at the conclusion of the Departmental Inquiry. Even where the charges are not proved, the Competent Authority would be justified in considering whether the charges were not proved on account of insufficiency of evidence or benefit of doubt having been given to the delinquent. Disciplinary authority has discretion under the Rules to decide whether the period of suspension should be treated as period spent on duty or not spent on duty. On facts, upon perusal of Inquiry report accepted by Competent authority, it was found that charge Nos. 2 and 3 were not proved on account of lack of sufficient legal evidence and therefore it cannot be said that suspension of petitioner was wholly unjustified merely because all the charges leveled were not proved.” (9) The suspension order dated 17.12.1988 is passed in view of involvement of the appellant in the criminal case. Petitioner was also convicted in the said offences by the lower court, though subsequently he was acquitted by this Court. The petitioner also remained in custody for more than 48 hrs., which is undisputed. Hence, it cannot be said that the suspension of the petitioner at the relevant point of time i.e. due to his arrest on his involvement in the criminal case was “unjustified”. The petitioner also remained in custody for more than 48 hrs., which is undisputed. Hence, it cannot be said that the suspension of the petitioner at the relevant point of time i.e. due to his arrest on his involvement in the criminal case was “unjustified”. Petitioner is also acquitted by this Court in appeal on technical ground due to lack of evidence. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the order dated 10.02.1997 passed by the authority is unjustified or illegal. (10) Reliance placed by the learned advocate for the petitioner on circular dated 13.04.1970 will not salvage the situation for him. Said circular does not state about deemed suspension of a Government servant for remaining in custody for 48 hrs. Moreover, in view of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment dealing with Rule 152 of the BCSR, we hold not the suspension of the petitioner was justified. (11) In view of what is stated above, judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge does not require any interference. However, as observed in Paragraph No.15 of the order of learned Single Judge, no subsistence allowance granted to the appellant-petitioner shall be recovered. Appeal stands dismissed. No costs.” 12. It is apposite to deal with the position of law relied upon by Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the following judgments. (a). Laxman Popatbhai Solanki vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 1976 GLR 370 wherein, in the said case, pension and gratuity was forfeited without passing a reasoned order. (b). The State of West Bengal and others vs. Bata Krishna Burman reported in 1970(3) SCC 612 wherein, it was held that the order imposing penalty was bad in absence of any findings recorded by the competent authority. The aforesaid decisions are not applicable in the facts of the present case wherein, the petitioner is acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt. The impugned order dated 25.09.2006, challenging the aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, is passed after following the cardinal principles of natural justice. 12.1. The aforesaid decisions are not applicable in the facts of the present case wherein, the petitioner is acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt. The impugned order dated 25.09.2006, challenging the aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, is passed after following the cardinal principles of natural justice. 12.1. Narayan Prasad Rewany vs. State of Orissa and another reported in AIR 1957 ORISSA 51 wherein, it was held that where an order of suspension is made against the government servant pending an inquiry and as a result of the inquiry, an order of dismissal by way of the penalty is passed, the order of suspension lapses with that order and subsequent declaration by the Civil Court that the order of dismissal was illegal cannot revive that order of suspension, which did not exist. 12.2. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner is acquitted upon benefit of doubt and in view thereof, it is open for the respondent – authority to invoke Rule 152(4) of the Rules of 1959 which provides discretionary powers to the authority to decide whether, suspension should be treated as period spent on duty or not spent on duty. 13. By way of the rejoinder, Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel submitted that while acquitting the petitioner by order dated 26.02.2002, though the competent Court opined in paragraph 30 on merits, the petitioner was acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, the order has to be read in true spirit. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioner has accepted the said order wherein, the petitioner is acquitted on benefit of doubt and the same has attained finality and in view thereof, the aforesaid contention raised by Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is negatived as the case of the petitioner is required to be considered as the petitioner acquitted on benefit of doubt. 14. On a harmonious reading of Rule 152 of the Rules of 1959 and the judgment, as referred above, wherein, placing reliance on the ratio laid down in K.D. Desai (supra), the Division Bench held that once the acquittal is upon benefit of doubt, the disciplinary authority has discretion under the Rules to decide whether the period of suspension to be treated as period spent on duty or not spent on duty. 15. 15. It is not in dispute that the order of acquittal dated 26.02.2002 passed in Criminal Case No.1506 of 1996 has attained finality and in view thereof, the acquittal is granted upon benefit of doubt. 16. This Court has considered the documents that are produced on record by way of further affidavit, which is filed by the respondent no.2. Upon perusal of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent no.2, which is duly produced at page 94, the facts stated in the said affidavit-in-reply are uncontroverted, so far as the contention raised by Mr.Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is passed without following the principles of natural justice. It emerges that after the order of acquittal dated 26.02.2002 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj, acquitting the petitioner on benefit of doubt, the petitioner made representation seeking reinstatement. The government constituted the committee to take appropriate decision. The committee constituted, granted ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Upon perusal of the affidavit, in paragraph 2, it is stated that the petitioner was heard by the committee on 02.06.2006 and 05.07.2006. In fact, the notice was issued on 30.06.2006, calling upon the petitioner to remain present before the committee on 05.07.2006. The petitioner also replied to the said notice on even date and the petitioner was heard. On 30.06.2006, the petitioner addressed reply to the Secretary, which indicates the presence of the petitioner. 17. Upon perusal of the file notings, which are produced on record, it further emerges that the petitioner was heard at length by the committee on the aforesaid dates. In view thereof, the respondent – authority has, in the opinion of this Court, complied with the principles of natural justice. The board informed the respondent – State regarding the proceedings by communication dated 20.07.2006. On 06.08.2007, the petitioner remained present before the committee however, even on insistence of the committee to respond in writing to the committee, the petitioner chose not to respond. 18. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarvepalli Ramaiah v. District Collector Chittoor District and others, reported in (2019)4 SCC 500 . Paragraphs 43 and 44 of the said judgment read as under:- “43. Judicial review under Article 226 is directed, not against the decision, but the decision-making process. Paragraphs 43 and 44 of the said judgment read as under:- “43. Judicial review under Article 226 is directed, not against the decision, but the decision-making process. Of course, a patent illegality and/or error apparent on the face of the decision, which goes to the root of the decision, may vitiate the decision-making process. In this case there is no such patent illegality or apparent error. In exercise of power under Article 226, the Court does not sit in appeal over the decision impugned, nor does it adjudicate hotly disputed questions of fact. 44. The decision of the Collector was based on materials and thus not liable to be interfered with. The High Court very rightly did not interfere with the decision. It was not for the High Court, exercising its extraordinary power of judicial review, to re-analyse the evidence on record and adjudicate the disputed question of whether the Mahanth of the Mutt had at all granted Saswatha Patta to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, whether the takeed was duly executed by the Mahanth, whether the ryotwari pattas were genuine or otherwise valid or not. Nor was it for the High Court to adjudicate the disputed fact of whether the land in question was in fact a water body or the dried bed of a water body. Cultivation is often carried out on the dried bed of water bodies. That does not denude the land of its character as a water body.” 19. In light of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred above and in the facts of the present case, the impugned order dated 25.09.2006 to the extent of refusal of regularizing the suspension period of the petitioner, does not require any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the same is passed considering the facts and by following the due procedure of law and cardinal principles of natural justice. Further, this Court is not inclined to sit in appeal over the question of facts determined by the respondent – authority while passing the impugned order. 20. For the foregoing reasons, no case is made out to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. Accordingly, the present petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.