Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 202 (PAT)

Dhirendra Mishra v. State of Bihar

2024-02-20

HARISH KUMAR, K.VINOD CHANDRAN

body2024
K. Vinod Chandran, CJ. – The appellants before this Court are members of the Darbhanga Zila Parishad, challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The appellants contend that the Adhyaksha and Up-adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad were removed by reason of a ‘No Confidence Motion’ after which the writ petition was filed. In the writ petition, the learned single Judge found that ‘No Confidence Motion’ having been moved within two years, the meeting could not have been convened by the Adhyaksha, since the provisions of Section 70 (4) (ii) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) prohibited such a motion during the first two year period of the tenure; of the Council. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants Mr. S. B. K. Mangalam submits that in fact the two year period had passed by one day and the meeting scheduled had gone ahead with 26 out of the 47 members voting in favour of the ‘No Confidence Motion’. 3. Mr. Y V Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent nos. 51 and 52 would submit that the appellants do not have locus standi, since they are not the requisionists. It is also submitted that the rigor insofar as Section 70 (4) (ii) of the Act, is insofar as ‘No Confidence Motion’ within a two year period and the two year period ends only on 04.01.2024; the Adhyaksha and Up-adhyaksha having taken charge on 03.01.2022. It is also submitted that the Up-adhyaksha was not in station and was abroad and there was no notice served on her. There is specific provision as per Section 70 (4) (vi) of the Act that during discussion, an opportunity should be given to the Adhyaksha or Up-adhyaksha, against whom ‘No Confidence Motion’ is moved, to put-forth their defence. It is also submitted that the Up-adhyaksha was not present at the time of the meeting also. 4. Learned Senior Counsel would also contend that yesterday, after finding anomaly in the decision in LPA No. 113 of 2020 [: 2021 (4) BLJ 194 ] (Dharamsheela Kumari vs. Hemant Kumar and Ors.), this Court had referred the matter to a Larger Bench and it is submitted that in such circumstances, this matter also may be referred to a Larger Bench. 5. We will first consider the request for a reference to a larger Bench. 5. We will first consider the request for a reference to a larger Bench. In Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) it was held that a ‘No Confidence Motion’ has to be passed on the basis of the majority of the members present and voting, at the council meeting. However, there was an earlier decision of a co-ordinate Bench in LPA No. 940 of 2008 (Sarita Kumari vs. The State of Bihar) decided on 20.08.2009, which considered Section 70(4) and found that majority should be of the entire members of the elected council. We referred the matter for consideration to a Full Bench since the impugned judgment in that case directed consideration of the ‘No Confidence Motion’, based on Dharamsheela Kumari (supra). 6. We do not find such a contention arising herein. The elected Council in this case contains 47 members. There were 27 members present and 26 members voted in favour of the ‘No Confidence Motion’. Hence, the majority was not only, of those present and voting, but also of the entire elected council. We find absolutely no reason to refer the matter for consideration before a Full Bench, since that question does not arise at all in this case. 7. Now the contention would be as to whether two years has been completed. The Adhyaksha and the Upadhyaksha were elected on 03.01.2022 admittedly. Hence, the two year period gets over as on 02.01.2024. The requisition for convening a meeting to consider the ‘No Confidence Motion’ was on 03.01.2024, a day after the two year period. Hence, the rigor under Section 70(4)(ii) does not at all apply in the aforesaid case. 8. We notice the definition clause Section 3(20) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, of ‘financial year’ which commences on the 1st day of April. The financial year thus ends on the 31st day of March. Further the definition of ‘Year’ in Section 3(66) reckons it according to the British Calendar. Hence two years starting from 03.02.2022 would end on 02.02.2024. We also have to reckon Section 9 which permits the use of the word ‘from’, to exclude the first in a series of days and ‘to’, for including the last in a series of days. The words employed in Section 70 is ‘during the first two year period’ which has to go by the interpretation as supplied by us. 9. We also have to reckon Section 9 which permits the use of the word ‘from’, to exclude the first in a series of days and ‘to’, for including the last in a series of days. The words employed in Section 70 is ‘during the first two year period’ which has to go by the interpretation as supplied by us. 9. We have to also notice that the Adhyaksha had in fact convened a special meeting to consider the ‘No Confidence Motion’ on 12.01.2024 and the ‘No Confidence Motion’ was allowed by a majority of the elected members of the council. It was after that, the Adhyaksha and the Up-adhyaksha approached this Court and they raised a contention with respect to the requisition having been given within the two year period. 10. We find the Adhyaksha to be estopped from taking such a contention, especially when the ‘No Confidence Motion’ was scheduled and it was passed, at a properly constituted meeting of the Council based on the requisition made immediately after the expiry of the two year period. 11. We specifically say the Adhyaksha is estopped, since it is admitted that Up-adhyaksha was not in the country and was abroad and was also not present at the time the ‘No Confidence Motion’ was moved. We are told that ‘No Confidence Motion’ is already scheduled and there is a writ petition filed against this, in which there is an interim order. The appellant would be entitled to contest the same in the writ petition. However, insofar as Adhyaksha is concerned, we are of the opinion that ‘No Confidence Motion’ against her has been moved and it has succeeded in the House. She is no longer entitled to hold the post of Adhyaksha. 12. As far as the locus standi is concerned, we are of the opinion that the appellants though were not the requisitionists’, they being elected members of the Council, definitely have the locus standi to challenge the impugned judgment, especially when they were respondents in the writ petition. 13. The appeal is partly allowed so far as the Adhyaksha is concerned and with respect to the Up-adhyaksha, it is left to be considered in a meeting scheduled, subject to the decision in the writ petition filed and pending as of now.