JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, J.-A preliminary objection has been raised as to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India against the order impugned dated 23.6.2024 passed by Vice Chancellor as remedy lies under Section 68 of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter called as 'Act of 1973') before the Chancellor. 2. The question as to whether an alternative remedy is an absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 has been under constant legal vigil of not only the Apex Court but also of this Court. From time to time the Hon'ble Apex Court had dealt with the issue in extenso and in categorical terms held that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution. 3. The matter as to exhaustion of statutory remedy came up for consideration before Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ''... It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.'' 4. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.'' 4. The Constitution Bench of Apex Court in case of A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 , considered the above view and held as under : ''10. The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor-General formulated to the normal Rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible Rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court.'' 5. Another Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Companies District I Calcutta and another, AIR 1961 SC 372 , again had the occasion to consider the issue in regard to alternative remedy in a matter relating to income tax and the Court held as under : ''26. Mr Sastri next pointed out that at the stage when the Income Tax Officer issued the notices he was not acting judicially or quasi judicially and so a writ of certiorari or prohibition cannot issue. It is well-settled however that though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. It is well-settled however that though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts, it is well-settled, will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences.'' 6. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , Hon'ble Apex Court again had the occasion to consider the matter of exhaustion of remedies and whether the writ under Article 226 was maintainable in case there was any alternative remedy. The Court held that power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of Constitution. However, the Court laid down that alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of principle of natural justice, or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Relevant paragraphs are extracted hereasunder : ''14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for ''any other purpose''. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.'' 7. Relying upon the decision in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 , reiterated the above provisions and held as under : ''7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ].) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.'' 8. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.'' 8. In Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and others v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited, (2022) 16 SCC 447, the Apex Court while dealing with provisions of Section 107 of Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 found that where an appeal lies against an order of deduction and notice issued under Section 20 but a writ petition was filed. The Apex Court held as under : ''10. The respondent had a statutory remedy under Section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is: (i) a breach of fundamental rights; (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation.'' 9. Similarly, in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise &Taxation Officer-cum-Accessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95, the Apex Court discussed the concept of ''entertainability'' and ''maintainability'' of a writ petition and held that they are distinct concepts and held as under : ''4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the High Courts holding writ petitions as ''not maintainable'' merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition ''not maintainable''. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the ''maintainability'' of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that ''entertainability'' and ''maintainability'' of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to ''maintainability'' goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the Courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to ''maintainability'' goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the Courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of ''entertainability'' is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.'' 10. Thus, from the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court cited above, it is clear that alternate remedy is not an absolute bar. There is self contained restriction upon the Courts to entertain writ petitions in case there is an statutory remedy available. Right from the year 1958 till date, Hon'ble Apex Court had held that writ petitions are maintainable under Article 226, and the jurisdiction cannot be ousted merely on the ground of alternative remedy. The Constitution Bench of 1961 had carved out the exceptions under which the writ petitions are maintainable. 11. Much water has flown since then and in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had clearly laid down the three contingencies under which alternative remedy would not operate as a bar. They are - (i) where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights (ii) where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or (iii) where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. The said principles as laid down had been followed in the subsequent decisions of Apex Court which till date is being followed. 12. Now, adverting to the facts of the instant case which are necessary for the better understanding of the case as to whether the writ petition filed before this Court is maintainable or not under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 13. 12. Now, adverting to the facts of the instant case which are necessary for the better understanding of the case as to whether the writ petition filed before this Court is maintainable or not under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 13. There is a Sanskrit Degree College in the name of Jubilee Sanskrit College, Ballia. It is affiliated with Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi and provisions of first Statute are applicable. The Institution is under grant in aid list of State Government and Payment of Salary Act, 1971 is applicable by virtue of Section 2(b) of the Act. Being a degree college, it is governed by the Act of 1973. 14. After retirement of one Baij Nath Pandey, who was the Principal of the College, in the year 2015, the post of Principal fell vacant. An advertisement was published in two newspapers on 16.7.2015. The fourth respondent applied and filled his application form on 23.7.2015. Alongwith the application documents including experience certificate issued by Principal of one Sri Ramanand Peeth Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Karnghanta, Varanasi dated 12.1.2015 was also annexed which reflects his appointment since July, 2004. The interview was held on 3.4.2016. The fourth respondent submitted another experience certificate issued by Principal, Sri Ramanand Peeth Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Karnghanta, Varanasi dated 23.7.2015 which reflects that he was appointed in month of July, 2010 by the Committee of Management and was teaching up till date on the post of Sahayak Vyakaran Pravakta. He joined the Institution on 15.6.2016. His probation period was from 15.6.2016 to 15.6.2017. 15. The Committee of Management of the Institution through correspondence dated 1.6.2017 sought verification of the experience certificate dated 23.7.2015. The Manager of Sri Ramanand Peeth Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Karnghanta, Varanasi on 3.7.2017 apprised that fourth respondent was never appointed in his College and experience certificate dated 23.7.2015 appears to be forged and fabricated. The Committee of Management sought clarification from fourth respondent on 13.5.2017. A reply was submitted on 11.7.2017 alongwith an affidavit stating that all the documents were submitted at the time of appointment and there was no criminal case pending against the fourth respondent except a criminal case registered under Section 107/116 of I.P.C. The period of probation was extended for another six months by Committee of Management on 16.7.2017. Thereafter, he submitted his certificates of educational qualifications alongwith experience certificate dated 23.7.2015 through letter dated 18.7.2017. Thereafter, he submitted his certificates of educational qualifications alongwith experience certificate dated 23.7.2015 through letter dated 18.7.2017. It appears that a complaint was made in respect of the experience certificate of fourth respondent, pursuant to which the Committee of Management decided to conduct an inquiry. Notices were issued to fourth respondent seeking his reply in the matter. The inquiry report was submitted by Chairman on 4.2.2018 to Manager of the Institution. The Committee of Management proceeded to suspend the fourth respondent on 18.2.2018 and directed to hand over the charge to senior most teacher Mr. Siddharth Shanker Ojha. The Manager, thereafter, passed a consequential order on 19.2.2018 putting the fourth respondent under suspension. Thereafter, charge-sheet was served and the matter was placed before Vice Chancellor through letter dated 20.2.2018. An objection was filed to the said charge-sheet on 3.3.2018. On 11.5.2018, last opportunity opportunity was given to fourth respondent for submitting his explanation. On 7.6.2018, the appointment of fourth respondent as Principal was cancelled. The matter was placed before Vice Chancellor on 19.6.2018. 16. The order cancelling appointment was challenged by fourth respondent before this Court through Writ Petition No. 3813 of 2022. The writ Court on 27.4.2022 directed the Vice Chancellor of the University to take decision regarding termination of service of fourth respondent. The Vice Chancellor on 14.11.2022 approved the suspension as well as termination order of fourth respondent. Again, the same was challenged by fourth respondent through Writ-A No. 20283 of 2022. The writ Court on 13.12.2022 while disposing of the writ petition set aside the order passed by Vice Chancellor and remanded back the same to be decided again. 17. Post remand, the Vice Chancellor by order dated 16.4.2023 again approved the suspension and termination order. The fourth respondent again challenged the same through Writ Petition No. 9080 of 2023. The order was again quashed and remanded back to Vice Chancellor on 23.5.2023 for deciding afresh. Post remand, the Registrar of the University issued a letter on 25.7.2023 requiring all the parties to appear on the date of hearing which was fixed for 11.8.2023. The Committee of Management filed its reply on 11.8.2023. 18. The Vice Chancellor on 17.8.2023 passed an order reinstating fourth respondent. This order was challenged by the present petitioner through Writ-A No. 15912 of 2023. The Committee of Management filed its reply on 11.8.2023. 18. The Vice Chancellor on 17.8.2023 passed an order reinstating fourth respondent. This order was challenged by the present petitioner through Writ-A No. 15912 of 2023. In the said writ petition, the fourth respondent took specific ground that writ petition was not maintainable in view of alternative remedy available under Section 68 of the Act of 1973. The writ Court dealt with the same and found the writ petition to be maintainable looking to the factual background of the case and allowed the writ petition on 1.12.2023 and set aside the order passed by Vice Chancellor on 17.8.2023 and remanded back the matter for consideration afresh. 19. The Vice Chancellor constituted a Three Member Committee on 29.2.2024. The Vice Chancellor on the report of inquiry committee passed the order impugned on 23.6.2024 for reinstating the fourth respondent and providing all the consequential benefits. 20. The present writ petition has been filed mainly on the ground that order of Vice Chancellor dated 23.6.2024 does not address the basic issue as to why a person who lacks qualification of a Principal can be appointed in an Institution. The certificate submitted by him is forged as it has not been issued by appointing authority. Reliance has been placed by fourth respondent on certificates dated 12.1.2015 and 23.7.2015 which have not been issued by appointing authority which is Committee of Management and they have been issued by Principal, and there is denial by Committee of Management of Sri Ramanand Peeth Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Karnghanta, Varanasi as to appointment of the fourth respondent in the Institution. Moreover, no finding has been recorded by Vice Chancellor despite direction by writ Court on 1.12.2023 whether the Principal of Sri Ramanand Peeth Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Karnghanta, Varanasi was competent to issue such experience certificate. 21. Sri Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing for fourth respondent has heavily relied upon the decision of Apex Court rendered in case of Commercial Steel Limited (supra) wherein the Apex Court had held that a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is a breach of Fundamental Rights, or violation of principles of natural justice, or excess of jurisdiction or a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation. 22. 22. Rebutting the argument, Sri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner had submitted that Apex Court had constantly laid guidelines as to the entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 and the instant case is covered under the principles so laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court. According to him, this is the fifth round of litigation between the parties, and each time the order is passed by Vice Chancellor. It is subjected to the jurisdiction of the writ Court. On earlier four occasions, the matter has been remanded back to Vice Chancellor to decide the issue as to the certificate issued by Sri Ramanand Peeth Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Karnghanta, Varanasi. Till date, the adjudication to the moot question as to whether Principal of an Institution is competent to issue such a experience certificate has not been decided. The order impugned also lacks adjudication by Vice Chancellor despite repeated directions of this Court. According to him, the petitioner cannot be ousted on the ground of alternate remedy as the Vice Chancellor has failed to perform his duty and not complied the directions of this Court issued in specific terms. The proceedings are without jurisdiction and thus the order is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. 23. I have heard respective counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 24. The question as regards the maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India and alternate remedy being not an absolute bar had been under active consideration of Hon'ble Apex Court since long. 25. The Constitution Bench in case of A.V. Venkateswaran (supra) found that there cannot be an absolute bar to a writ petition under Article 226 in view of statutory provision. With passage of time much water has flown and the Hon'ble Apex Court had laid down the principles for the entertainment of the writ petition. 26. What culls out from the decision of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) that three guiding principles where a writ petition can be entertained and alternative remedy will not operate as a bar are for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights or where there has been violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or vires of Act is under challenge. 27. 27. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) went a step further and distinguished between the concept of ''entertainability'' and ''maintainability'' of writ petition. A fine distinction has been made by Their Lordships at the Apex Court and held that real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that objection as to the maintainability goes to the root of the matter and if such objections were found to be of substance, the Courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the contrary, the question of ''entertainability'' is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Court, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a Court for many reasons or relief and could be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point. The Court further held that dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper. 28. Thus, considering the above dictum in the light of the present case, it would be unjust to relegate the matter to Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act of 1973 as on four earlier occasions either the fourth respondent or the petitioner has assailed the orders passed by Vice Chancellor and in the earlier round of litigation, similar stands was taken by fourth respondent which was repelled by the Court and the Vice Chancellor proceeded to adjudicate the matter. 29. Taking the same ground would be injustice and unnecessarily dragging the matter. The dispute raised is only as to the genuineness of experience certificate and competence of issuing authority/Principal is before this Court as well as it was before the Vice Chancellor. 30. On the two occasions, the Vice Chancellor has failed to address the real issue as to whether the Principal was competent enough to issue such experience certificate being not an appointing authority. He was required to adjudicate whether an experience certificate could be issued by a Principal of an Institution or by the appointing authority. 31. 30. On the two occasions, the Vice Chancellor has failed to address the real issue as to whether the Principal was competent enough to issue such experience certificate being not an appointing authority. He was required to adjudicate whether an experience certificate could be issued by a Principal of an Institution or by the appointing authority. 31. The issue raised by Sri Ojha goes to the root of the matter which the Vice Chancellor has failed to address despite the repeated remand orders passed by this Court. The present writ petition cannot be thrown away on the ground of alternative remedy as has already been held by Apex Court that it is not an absolute bar and is maintainable under the guidelines laid down by Apex Court. 32. Reliance placed upon Commercial Steel Limited (supra) by respondent counsel also only fortifies the principle laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) which has been followed in subsequent decisions. 33. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that the preliminary objection raised by counsel for fourth respondent has no legs to stand and the same stands overruled. The present writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 34. Put up this matter, as fresh, on 19th September, 2024 for further hearing. 35. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and order passed by Vice Chancellor/respondent No. 2, the order impugned dated 23.6.2024 shall remain stayed till the next date of listing.