JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN) Re.: The Challenge 1. In the captioned appeals, the challenge, is to the CAV judgment dated 20.12.2005 passed by the learned single Judge whereby, the writ petition being Special Civil Application no.13065 of 1994, has been allowed and (i) order dated 16.08.1993 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Lodhika; (ii) order dated 09.12.1993 passed by the Deputy Collector; and (iii) order dated 12.10.1994 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”), have been quashed and set aside. Special Civil Application no.10235 of 1996 filed by the State Government, has been dismissed and Special Civil Application no.5174 of 1996 by the petitioner-holder, has been disposed of, it having been rendered infructuous in view of the repeal of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the ULC Act”). Re: Brief background 2. Center to the issue, is land bearing survey no.250, admeasuring 198 acres and 39 gunthas of village Raiya (hereinafter referred to as “the land in question”) and the proceedings arising out of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Act of 1972”), which came to be enacted with effect from 01.04.1976 so also the scope of remand order passed by the Apex Court and the co-ordinate bench of this Court. Issue, ancillary to the main issue, also touches the provisions of the ULC Act. 2.1 The issue involved, has a chequered history; however, facts, in crisp, are set out hereinbelow: 2.2 Shri Harishchandrasinhji Bharatsinhji Jadeja the original petitioner i.e. the respondent no.1 in Special Civil Application no.13065 of 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the holder or the petitioner, as the context warrants”), had filed form no.2 under the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1960”) as amended by the Amendment Act of 1972, declaring total holding of acres 311 of village Raiya and Pal, including survey no.250, admeasuring acres 198 and 39 gunthas, i.e. the land in question. Notably, the ceiling limit as per the schedule-I for class ‘H’ prescribed is 51 acres, as one unit, hence, ceiling case no.19/1976-1977 was registered by the Mamlatdar & ALT who, declared acres 209 and 6 gunthas as surplus land, by passing an order dated 31.01.1977. Notably, the ceiling limit as per the schedule-I for class ‘H’ prescribed is 51 acres, as one unit, hence, ceiling case no.19/1976-1977 was registered by the Mamlatdar & ALT who, declared acres 209 and 6 gunthas as surplus land, by passing an order dated 31.01.1977. Appeal as well as revision both came to be rejected which led to the filing of Special Civil Application no.148 of 1980 before this Court. 2.3 The writ petition was heard and the Hon’ble Division Bench, was pleased to remand the matter to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal with a direction that: “the Tribunal will afford to the petitioner an opportunity to make selection in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Act and it will redetermine the said issue in light of the representation of the petitioner and in accordance with law…….” “the petitioner will himself prefer an application for selection before the said Tribunal within a period of one month and upon receipt of such application, the Tribunal shall proceed to consider and decide the same within a period of one month.” 2.4 An application was made to the Mamlatdar by the petitioner indicating the land and the survey nos. which the petitioner desired to retain i.e. acres 102 including acres 49 and 29 gunthas of the land in question and the land acre 209.05 gunthas that may be vested in the State Government. Order dated 30.05.1983 was passed giving choice to the petitioner, allowing him to retain acre 49.29 gunthas whereas, acres 149.11 gunthas was declared as a surplus land. On the other hand, the State Government had filed a review application being Miscellaneous Civil Application no.489 of 1983 on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which was rejected. Being aggrieved, the State preferred a Civil Appeal before the Apex Court and the Apex Court, vide order dated 25.10.1983, while setting aside the oral judgment dated 19.04.1983, remanded the case to the High Court, to decide the issue of option according to law and all points on the question of option were left open including the effect and validity of Annexure ‘A’ dated 22.12.1976. Vide another order dated 25.10.1983, the review application was restored to the original file. Vide another order dated 25.10.1983, the review application was restored to the original file. 2.5 On 19.04.1984, the application came to be allowed and the Division Bench, revived the writ petition, keeping all the points on the question of option open including the effect and validity of Annexure ‘A’ dated 22.12.1976. The matter was thereafter heard by the Division Bench and vide oral judgment dated 22.04.1991, the writ petition came to be partly allowed. The Division Bench was of the opinion that in the judgment of the Tribunal, there is discrepancy and the matter was remanded to determine as to whether on the specified date i.e. 01.04.1976 there was any minor son in the family of the petitioner or not? 2.6 Subsequent thereto, the Mamlatdar & ALT vide its order dated 16.08.1993 declared that holder was not entitled to 1/5th of unit for his minor son. Moreover, it also noted that the holder had not declared agricultural land of villages Jasvantpura and Pal and hence, the total holding, was declared as acres 311 and 5 gunthas. The holder was declared to be entitled to hold two units i.e. acres 101 and 39 gunthas and acres 234 and 10 gunthas were declared as surplus, including the land in question. The order was challenged before the Assistant Collector who, vide judgment dated 09.12.1993, rejected the same. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Tribunal which, vide detailed judgment dated 12.10.1994, inter alia, declared the petitioner is entitled to retain acres 112 and 8 gunthas being 2 – 1/5th unit. Mamlatdar & ALT, Lodhika was directed to provide the choice from the surplus land within one month. Also, the findings about acres 23 and 33 gunthas i.e. additional lands of villages Jasvantpura and Pal, were set aside. 2.7 The petitioner being aggrieved, preferred the writ petition being Special Civil Application no.13065 of 1994 challenging the orders passed by the authorities and Tribunal. The State being partly aggrieved, preferred writ petition being Special Civil Application no.10235 of 1996. Writ petition being Special Civil Application no.5174 of 1996 was filed by the holder-petitioner challenging the order dated 05.10.1995 passed by the Competent Authority & Additional Collector, ULC rejecting the exemption under Section 21 of the ULC Act. The State being partly aggrieved, preferred writ petition being Special Civil Application no.10235 of 1996. Writ petition being Special Civil Application no.5174 of 1996 was filed by the holder-petitioner challenging the order dated 05.10.1995 passed by the Competent Authority & Additional Collector, ULC rejecting the exemption under Section 21 of the ULC Act. All the three writ petitions were heard by the learned single Judge and vide CAV judgment dated 20.12.2005, as stated hereinabove, Special Civil Application no.13065 of 1994 filed by the petitioner came to be allowed and Special Civil Application no.5174 of 1996 came to be disposed of, it having become infructuous in view of the repeal of the ULC Act whereas, Special Civil Application no.10235 of 1996 by the State Government has been dismissed. Hence, the captioned appeals. Letters Patent Appeal no.2111 of 2009 was agreed to be treated as lead matter and hence, facts are derived therefrom. Submissions were made by the learned counsel accordingly. Re: Submissions of the Appellant State 3. Ms Manisha Luvkumar Shah, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr Siddharth Rami, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that as per the definition contained in sub-section (17) of Section 2, the expression “land”, inter alia, means land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes. The definition is an inclusive definition. By virtue of the amendment, sub-section (6) was added in Section 2 of the principal Act, defining the term “class of land” to mean, inter alia, “dry crop land”. Clause (e) to Explanation-I, states that “dry crop land” means land other than the land specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) and grass land, that is to say, land which abounds in grass grown naturally which is capable of being used for agricultural purposes. It is further submitted that grass grows naturally in the bid land and the land in question, undisputedly being bid land, would be covered within the definition “land” as defined under sub-section (17) of Section 2 read with sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act of 1960 without any interpretative aid from the amended definition of “land” and “agriculture” under the Amendment Act of 1972. Further, subsection (17) of Section 2 had undergone a change and the land, inter alia, means the bid lands held by the Girasdars or Barkhalidars under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 or the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952, as the case may be. It is submitted that the ceiling area was specified in Schedule-I, providing various classes and Class ‘H’, covered local areas including district Rajkot and taluka Lodhika. Ceiling area was 120 acres as per the Act of 1960 and as per the Amendment Act of 1972, the ceiling area was reduced to 51 acres. 3.1 While adverting to the merits and referring to the convenience compilation, it is submitted that the holder claims to be a family of eight members, namely, wife, major son, married daughter, two minor daughters, one minor son and mother. The holder declared, its total holding of lands admeasuring 311 acres. The Mamlatdar & ALT, in the Ceiling Case no.19/1976-77, concluded that the holder would be eligible to retain two units, i.e. 102 acres. While acres 209 and 6 gunthas were declared as surplus lands and directed vesting of it in the State Government. Appeal was preferred before the Deputy Collector, raising three grounds, namely, (i) that the land has been declared surplus without the consent of the land holder, (ii) that the land admeasusring acres 6.35 gunthas of the survey no.41, may not be considered as the same was sold before 24.01.1971 and (iii) that not to include the Bid land as per the provisions of sub-section (17) of Section 2. Appeal came to be dismissed and the order was subject matter of challenge before the Tribunal and it rejected the Revision Application, inter alia, observing that since the member of the family does not exceed five, he would not be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of subsection (3B) of Section 6. Aggrieved, that a writ petition was filed and before the Division Bench it is clearly recorded that the petitioner no longer disputes that he is a surplus holder to the extent of 209 acres and 6 gunthas. The order further records the statement of the petitioner having conceded to the ceiling area and waiving of all grounds except the selection of retainable land. The order further records the statement of the petitioner having conceded to the ceiling area and waiving of all grounds except the selection of retainable land. The Division Bench, has therefore remanded the matter, which was truncated qua the choice under section 20 of the Act of 1960. 3.2 It is further submitted that in terms of the order, an application was made to the Mamlatdar, specifically indicating the survey numbers which the petitioner desired to retain, that is, acres 102 including acres 49.29 gunthas of land in question as well as the details of the land i.e. acres 209.05 gunthas, that may be vested in the State Government. The Mamlatdar, therefore, has passed an order dated 30.05.1983, giving the choice to the petitioner and allowing him to retain acres 49.29 gunthas of village Raiya. Whereas, acres 149.11 of survey no.250, that is, land in question was declared as surplus and was directed to be vested in the State Government. Hence, adjudication with respect to the ceiling area and retainable land stood crystallized for, the said order dated 30.05.1983 has not been challenged. 3.3 It is next submitted that Special Leave Petition was preferred against the order of the Division Bench and the matter, was remanded to the High Court only to decide the limited question of option, according to law. Accordingly, review application was filed before the High Court and was allowed, keeping the question of option open including the effect and validity of the affidavit dated 22.12.1976. It is submitted that though the writ petition was revived on a limited issue, the Division Bench, considered the aspect of validity, so also the aspect of eligibility of the members as per the provisions of sub-section (3B) of Section 6. It is submitted that the said issue, was not at all available, for, the Apex Court, has remanded the matter to decide only the issue of selection; however, the matter was remanded for deciding the question as to whether on the specified date i.e. 01.04.1976, there was any minor son in the family of the holder or not? It is submitted that the said issue, was not at all available, for, the Apex Court, has remanded the matter to decide only the issue of selection; however, the matter was remanded for deciding the question as to whether on the specified date i.e. 01.04.1976, there was any minor son in the family of the holder or not? It is submitted that the order of remand for reconsideration was extremely limited and hence, it was not open to the petitioner-holder to seek adjudication of any other issues either before the authorities or before the learned single Judge inasmuch as, there was no challenge to the judgment date 22.04.1991 passed by this Court. 3.4 It is submitted that on remand the Mamlatdar & ALT, considering the provisions of sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of Section 6, concluded that the minor son was not eligible for 1/5th of the ceiling area. Besides, the land of villages Jashvantpur and Pal admeasuring acres 20.00 gunthas and acres 3.33 gunthas were declared as surplus land which were not disclosed earlier. Accordingly, acres 234.10 gunthas was declared as surplus land and acres 101.39 gunthas was directed to be retained, including acres 49.28 gunthas of survey no.250 paiki village Raiya of district Rajkot. The Tribunal in the revision, was of the opinion that the Mamlatdar was to only find out whether the holder was entitled to get 1/5th unit for the minor son or not. The tribunal, held that Mamlatdar could not have added any other land in the holding of the holder namely of the villages Jashwantpur and Pal. The claim of mother of the holder for one unit was also turned down. 3.5 While adverting to the proceedings under the ULC Act, it is submitted that the holder, had filed a declaration form, under subsection (1) of Section 6, declaring that the land in question is a bid land and is being cultivated. It is further submitted that section with respect to the retainable land does not cover the land in question. Item no.2, as to whether the statement is applicable to a person, family, company etc., the reply given was ‘no’. Similarly, the details at item no.10A, was as to whether any agreement has been executed under sub-section (1) of Section 21 with anybody. Reply given, was ‘no’. The family members shown were his wife, children, but not the mother. Item no.2, as to whether the statement is applicable to a person, family, company etc., the reply given was ‘no’. Similarly, the details at item no.10A, was as to whether any agreement has been executed under sub-section (1) of Section 21 with anybody. Reply given, was ‘no’. The family members shown were his wife, children, but not the mother. 3.6 It is submitted that vide order dated 30.05.1983, the Mamlatdar had already decided the retainable land and the holder’s entitlement. The issue stood crystallized and nothing further was to be done, save and except offering the choice, despite which, the holder had an audacity to submit an application dated 05.12.1983 requesting the Additional Collector, Urban Land Ceiling, Rajkot, not to take any further decision in view of the dispute being pending before the High Court; however, the holder-petitioner had categorically accepted that the Bid land, is situated in the agricultural zone and is not to be considered within the purview of the ULC Act. 3.7 It is submitted that clause (q) of section 2, defines the term “vacant land” to mean land not being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in urban agglomeration. Furthermore, clause (o) defines the term “urban land”, inter alia, to mean any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan. Explanation (B), provides that the lands shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture if such land has not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed date as for the purpose of agriculture. Explanation (C) further stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation (B), land shall not be deemed mainly used for agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for the purpose other than agriculture. It is submitted that undisputedly, as per the communication dated 28.05.1976, issued by the Additional Collector, the whole of the area of Rajkot has been included in the schedule. Similarly, as per the communication dated 02.11.1976 of the Additional Collector, ULC, the land in question is clearly stated to be an agricultural land. Therefore, in the master plan, the land has been shown as agriculture land. Similarly, as per the communication dated 02.11.1976 of the Additional Collector, ULC, the land in question is clearly stated to be an agricultural land. Therefore, in the master plan, the land has been shown as agriculture land. It is submitted that even the resolution dated 03.06.1976 of the Revenue Department, clarifies that the lands which are mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and are so earmarked in the master plan, shall be governed by the provisions of Act of 1960 and not the ULC Act. 3.8 It is next submitted that review was allowed despite which, the Additional Collector was approached pointing out that in the form, inadvertently, some of the lands have been left out and therefore, revised form no.1 was submitted. It is next submitted that despite everything got crystallized, an application dated 06.04.1993 was filed by one Dhananjay B. Patel, power of attorney of the holder-petitioner, requesting to apply the ULC Act. A letter was also addressed dated 09.04.1993, making incorrect statement that his title has been proved and is entitled to hold the land from the date of the passing of the order dated 22.04.1991 of this Hon’ble Court. It is submitted that there was no title established in favour of the holder-petitioner, more particularly, when this Court has only given the limited right of option, and that there was no question of claiming title over the land in question. The application came to be rejected by passing an order dated 05.10.1985 by the Competent Authority & Additional Collector, inter alia, on the ground that form no.5 has not been submitted within the stipulated period, but after more than fourteen years. 3.9 While referring to the revenue record in the convenience compilation, it is submitted that entry no.454 dated 21.09.1962 was posted indicating the holding of the petitioner as acres 6.14 gunthas. Vide three registered sale deeds, all dated 20.01.1963, the whole of the area was sold away and the account of the holderpetitioner was NIL. Interestingly, entry no.985 was posted in the revenue record on 20.08.1966 which was as per the new measurement. The said entry was with respect to the land of village Raiya which came to be canceled observing that there are no documents produced in support of the land in question being in the name of the Girasdar i.e. the respondent. Interestingly, entry no.985 was posted in the revenue record on 20.08.1966 which was as per the new measurement. The said entry was with respect to the land of village Raiya which came to be canceled observing that there are no documents produced in support of the land in question being in the name of the Girasdar i.e. the respondent. The entry came to be canceled on 29.10.1966; however, immediately within less than one month, on 24.11.1966, surreptitiously entry no.1140 was posted which, came to be allowed by the Awal Karkun who, is an officer subordinate to the Mamlatdar. It is submitted that some portion of this land came to be sold in favour of one Gayatri Nagar Cooperative Housing Society and the entry no.4301 dated 12.04.1985 came to be posted in the revenue record; however, so far as sale in favour of Siddhi Infrastructure is concerned, there is no such entry in the revenue record. As per the reply filed by the Siddhi Infrastructure i.e. respondent no.4 in the Letters Patent Appeal, out of total holding of acres 311.0 gunthas of land, acres 120.0 gunthas would be retainable and balance acres 191.0 gunthas, may vest with the State Government. It is submitted that such statement, is also not in the right earnest for, the land declared as the retainable area was acres 102.00 gunthas and if one is to consider the 1/5th of the ceiling area of the minor son, that would be at the most around acres 112.8 gunthas, but not acres 120.0 gunthas. 3.10 It is submitted that in the writ petition filed by the holder, the prayer was for additional unit for mother and to exclude the bid land from the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1972 and processing the form under Section 6 of the ULC Act. Such prayer, could not have been allowed in view of the judgment and orders of this Court. It is submitted that the learned single Judge was very much conscious about the proceedings before this Court and the orders and the limited scope of remand. However, the learned single Judge has considered and allowed additional unit in favour of the mother. It is also concluded that the land situated in village Raiya, could not have been decided under the provisions of the Act of 1960, notwithstanding the fact that the land in question is a Bid land. However, the learned single Judge has considered and allowed additional unit in favour of the mother. It is also concluded that the land situated in village Raiya, could not have been decided under the provisions of the Act of 1960, notwithstanding the fact that the land in question is a Bid land. Though the petitioner has shown as holding as agriculture land, the learned single Judge concluded that the petitioner’s land is included in residential zone as per the master plan. The learned single Judge also committed error in observing that after filling the form under Section 6 of the Act, the petitioner made declaration in form 5 for obtaining exemption under Section 21 of the ULC Act on 21.04.1993 and prior thereto, the development plan was already prepared by the Rajkot Urban Development Authority showing the land in question situated in the recreation-cum-residential zone. It is submitted that everything got crystallized long back in the year 1985 and therefore, the exemption under section 21 ought not to have been considered. 3.11 It is submitted that filling up of the form under Section 21 in the year 1993 would not confer any right except either acceptance or rejection of the application. Section 21, that is, for weaker section and would not confer any entitlement in favour of the owner. It is submitted that the learned single Judge was also of the opinion that the land of village Raiya was never an agriculture land and was used only for raising of grass, and was used as bid land and not agriculture land. Such findings are erroneous inasmuch as the grass grown naturally would also be construed to be as a bid land. It is submitted that notably, there is no discussion on the writ petition filed by the State Government. Also, suppressed land does not find any reference and the petition by the State Government, has been dismissed only in one line. 3.12 It is submitted that the learned single Judge was bound by the judgment of the Division Bench, so also the Hon’ble Supreme Court and once the issue stands concluded it could not have been opened up. Even the judicial propriety demands that the learned single Judge ought not to have expanded the scope of the writ petition. Everything has been considered except the choice. Even the judicial propriety demands that the learned single Judge ought not to have expanded the scope of the writ petition. Everything has been considered except the choice. Reliance, is placed on the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax vs. M/s. Western Electric and engineering Company passed in Tax Appeal no.1337 of 2010 in support of the proposition that once the order of remand is passed the authority and courts cannot travel beyond the subject of remand. It has been held and observed that upon remand, reopening several issues, which were never at large, would be impermissible. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of Bai Jasud Wd/o. Kantilal @ Fulchand Anupchand vs. Ratilal Anoopchand Shah reported in (1997) 2 GLH 493 . It has been held and observed that when the restricted orders of remand are passed, pertaining to a particular issue and if the parties had not urged for open remand it would be impermissible for anyone to enlarge the scope of remand order that too by a side window. It has also been pointed out that if such course is permitted, it would be destructive of all judicial discipline and will strike at the very root of the efficacy and binding nature of an order of a superior Court on the parties to a dispute and the necessity of a subordinate Court to faithfully implement an order of the superior Court. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivshankara and Anr. vs. H.P. Vedavyasa Char reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 358. It has been held and observed that Court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to the order of remand is contrary to law. In other words, an order of remand has to be followed in its true spirit. 3.13 It is submitted that as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, what was to be considered, was the limited issue of choice and even if one is to go by the judgment dated 22.04.1991, the limited aspect, which was required to be considered was 1/5th share of the ceiling area in favour of the minor son. 3.13 It is submitted that as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, what was to be considered, was the limited issue of choice and even if one is to go by the judgment dated 22.04.1991, the limited aspect, which was required to be considered was 1/5th share of the ceiling area in favour of the minor son. Even the tribunal, has taken note of the fact about the limited consideration and it did not allow the suppressed land to be considered so also one unit in favour of the mother. Despite which, submissions were made before this Court that the tribunal committed an error in not awarding one more unit to the mother as she was alive as on 01.04.1976. Such contention, was strictly impermissible in view of the limited consideration. In alternative, the submission was allowed that the land in question of village Raiya is part of Rajkot agglomeration and forming part of residential cum entertainment zone and therefore, the provisions of the ULC Act were applicable. 3.14 For the proposition of res judicata, reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land Board Peermade & Anr. reported in (1999) 5 SCC 590 . It has been held and observed that the principles of estoppel and res judicata are based on public policy and justice. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again, even though the determination may even be demonstratively wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. It is therefore, submitted that before the Division Bench, all the contentions were dropped and it was the State, who went in appeal and not the petitioner. Subsequently, even when the whole matter was opened, it was remanded only for the limited issue of 1/5th of ceiling area to be considered for the minor son. The issue of the ceiling area for mother and the nature of Bid land, ought not to have been opened which, came to be opened by the learned single Judge. Subsequently, even when the whole matter was opened, it was remanded only for the limited issue of 1/5th of ceiling area to be considered for the minor son. The issue of the ceiling area for mother and the nature of Bid land, ought not to have been opened which, came to be opened by the learned single Judge. 3.15 In support of the proposition for the entitlement of additional unit, reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Nathekhan Sojalkhan Bihari vs. Mamlatdar, Vadgam reported in 1984 (2) GLR 1473 . Sub-section (3B) of Section 6 of the Act of 1960 was considered and it has been held that where a family or a joint family consists of more than five members comprising a person and other members belonging to the categories stated therein, shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of 1/5th of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five, so however that the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Jat Laxmanji Talasji reported in (1988) 2 SCC 241 wherein, it has been held and observed that in order to claim the benefit of sub-section (3B) of Section 6 two-fold tests must be satisfied. It has been observed that access to sub-section (3B) of Section 6 is barred by two doors and in order to secure entry, the family must consist of more than five persons. If there are more than five persons, including the land holder himself, the first door will be opened and the land holder will be entitled to have an access, provided the second door does not bar his entry inside the beneficial area. The second door will also be opened provided some of the other members, meaning thereby members other than individual land holder belong to one of the three categories specified in the section. 3.16 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010) 10 SCC 594 . It is submitted that the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act of 1972 has been upheld and hence, the contention of the petitioner about its unconstitutionality, and nullity, may not be accepted. 3.16 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010) 10 SCC 594 . It is submitted that the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act of 1972 has been upheld and hence, the contention of the petitioner about its unconstitutionality, and nullity, may not be accepted. It is submitted that the question before the Apex Court, was about applicability of the Amendment Act of 1972 to the bid lands. Contention that bid lands which are uncultivable waste lands cannot be included in the clause (e) to Explanation-I of sub-section (6) of Section 2 was negated and it has been held and observed that the definition of the land includes the bid lands of Girasdars or Barkhalidars within the definition of term “land”. 3.17 Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja reported in (2013) 2 SCC 300 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the provisions of the Act of 1960, Amendment Act of 1972 and the ULC Act. The Apex Court held and observed that bid lands shall be included in the definition of agriculture land without considering wider definition of bid land under the Amendment Act of 1972. It has been held and observed that the ULC Act would govern only such lands as those would fall within its area of operation to the specific exclusion of agricultural lands. It has also been held and observed that the definition of “urban land” makes it clear that any land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. The purport and intent therefore, was to exclude the land used for agriculture from the purview of the ULC Act. It is submitted that therefore, the Amendment Act of 1972, was only clarificatory in nature and by virtue of the 1960 Act, the bid land, is already covered within its purview. 3.18 For the proposition, namely, scope and nature of powers to be exercised under Article 227, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker & Anr. reported in (1977) 4 SCC 587 . 3.18 For the proposition, namely, scope and nature of powers to be exercised under Article 227, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker & Anr. reported in (1977) 4 SCC 587 . It has been held and observed that the limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts, however erroneous those may be. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors. reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566 wherein, it has been held and observed that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. It is submitted that the remand was limited and that the learned single Judge, ought not to have opened up everything, disregarding the limited scope of remand. Ms Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Additional Advocate General, finally urged that the appeals, deserve to be allowed. Re: Submission of the respondent no.1, that is, the holderoriginal petitioner 4. Mr Mihir J. Thakore, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr Salil Thakore and Mr Hemang Shah, learned advocates for the respondents no.1.1 to 1.6 submitted that sub-section (1) of section 2, defines the term “agriculture” and includes horticulture, raising of crops, grass or garden produce, the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or part thereof for grazing etc. Sub-section (6) of Section 2, provides for the “class of land” to mean, perennially irrigated land, seasonal irrigated land, dry crop land. Clause (e) to Explanation-I of sub-section (6) of Section 2, defines the term “dry crop land”, to mean, land other than perennially or seasonally irrigated or rice land and includes grass land, which abounds in grass grown naturally and which is capable of being used for agriculture purposes. Therefore, the requirement for being included in the definition of dry crop land, the land should be capable of being used for agriculture purpose. Therefore, the requirement for being included in the definition of dry crop land, the land should be capable of being used for agriculture purpose. It is further submitted that the term “land” is defined in sub-section (17) of Section 2 to mean, the land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes, and includes the sites of farm buildings, appurtenant to such land and the definition, has undergone a change by way of an Amendment Act of 1972 adding sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (17) of Section 2. It, inter alia, provides for inclusion of bid lands held by the Girasdars or Barkhalidars under the respective statutes. Prior to the year 1976, the definition of land was limited, and only the land capable of being used as an agriculture land, was covered. 4.1 It is submitted that relevant would be the provisions of Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1952’). Section 5, is an exception to provision of sections 3 and 4 and would be relevant for the present purpose. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 5, states that no bid land, which is also uncultivated waste, wadas and kodias, shall vest in, and be the property of the State. Clause (b), which is couched in a negative manner, states that no bid land comprised in the estate of Girasdar, who is considered to be of B and C class, shall vest in and be the property of the State of Gujarat. Therefore, clause (b) deals with the lands falling within class B and class C. It is submitted that Circular dated 30.04.1966 has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5. Permission, was required to be taken for agricultural purpose for the bid lands also for agriculture use in the case of cultivable bid lands. It is only after getting the permission for agricultural use, the same, was to be considered in holding of the agricultural land and the applicability of the Act of 1960. The Act, would apply only to those lands which were either cultivable or cultivated. It is only after getting the permission for agricultural use, the same, was to be considered in holding of the agricultural land and the applicability of the Act of 1960. The Act, would apply only to those lands which were either cultivable or cultivated. The permission was sought for by the holder for cultivation and sale of the land of survey no.250, Raiya; however, the Collector vide communication dated 26.06.1983, denied the permission for agriculture use, treating the same in class A. 4.2 It is next submitted that in the year 1968 and prior to the amendment, proceedings were initiated which culminated into order dated 31.07.1968 holding that the holder is not possessing any surplus land and the land, is within the ceiling limit. It is submitted that a notice was sent to declare the surplus land. The holder, responded to it indicating that the land in question is a bid land and is not capable of being cultivated and hence, cannot be considered for the purposes of the Act of 1960. As a result, order was passed declaring that the petitioner holds 114 acres and 14 gunthas of land which is within the ceiling limit and the proceedings were closed. It is further submitted that Section 31 of the Amendment Act provides that where a proceeding is pending immediately before the commencement of the Act, amended provisions shall apply. Hence, the Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to apply the provisions of amendments to cases where proceedings already got closed and in the case on hand, it was in the year 1968. 4.3 It is next submitted that the writ petition before this Court, involved two aspects, namely (i) the holder giving something and the Court giving something in return; and (ii) as the holder, was getting a fresh choice, he waived all the contentions, the issue, was almost like a quid pro quo. It is submitted that once the petition was revived, the order goes, so also the statement of the holder. It is submitted that the order dated 19.04.1983 was subject matter of challenge before the Apex Court and the Apex Court, took note of the affidavit dated 22.12.1976 (Annexure-A). The Apex Court, remanded the case to the High Court to decide the question of option according to law. It is submitted that the order dated 19.04.1983 was subject matter of challenge before the Apex Court and the Apex Court, took note of the affidavit dated 22.12.1976 (Annexure-A). The Apex Court, remanded the case to the High Court to decide the question of option according to law. Moreover, all points on the question of option were left open, including the effect and validity of Annexure- A. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has quashed the order and therefore, the State Government could not have filed the review, which it filed seeking review of the order dated 19.04.1983. It is further submitted that the writ petition came to be decided and it has been recorded that at the time of passing of the order dated 31.07.1968 by the Tribunal, the petitioner was holding 114 acres and 11 gunthas of agricultural land and the land in question of Raiya, was not forming part. It is submitted that the Court, observed that it can inquire into all the aspects and that is how, challenge to the validity of the provisions of the Act of 1960, was also considered. 4.4 It is next submitted that an application was filed to the Competent Authority & Additional Collector under the ULC Act, seeking exemption for weaker section of the society under subsection (1) of Section 21 read with Rule 11(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976. Another communication, dated 06.04.1993 was addressed to the Secretary, Revenue Department, inter alia, pointing out that the land, has been covered under the ULC Act and therefore, the provisions of the Act of 1960, shall not apply. It was also pointed out that the Amendment Act of 1972, has been enacted with effect from 01.04.1976; whereas, the ULC Act, has already come into effect from 17.02.1976 and therefore, the provisions of the ULC Act, would apply to the land in question and not the Act of 1960. 4.5 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2004) 12 SCC 645 . It is submitted that a categorical stand has been adopted by the State Government that in view of the overriding provisions contained in the ULC Act, the land, would be governed under the said Act and not by the Act of 1960. It is submitted that a categorical stand has been adopted by the State Government that in view of the overriding provisions contained in the ULC Act, the land, would be governed under the said Act and not by the Act of 1960. It is submitted that after enactment of the ULC Act w.e.f. 01.02.1976, the land, having been covered within the periphery of the corporation area, would be governed by the provisions of the ULC Act. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat (supra). It is submitted that the limited issue was involved therein, whether the bid land was required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of land ceiling under the Act of 1960, as amended and came into force with effect from 01.04.1976. The Apex Court, held that the definition of “land” after amendment, would include the bid lands of girasdars or barkhalidars. Therefore, in paragraph 23, it has been pointed out that the bid lands “are now sought to be covered by the Act of 1960”, meaning thereby, earlier this very bid lands, were not included. 4.6 It is submitted that in the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja (supra), the Apex Court has declared the Amendment Act to be a stillborn Act vis-a-vis lands which fall within the urban agglomeration as defined under the ULC Act in view of Article 252 of the Constitution of India. The Amendment Act is to that extent stillborn in view of lack of legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact such law for the land of urban agglomeration. It is submitted that when the Amendment Act itself is stillborn and null and void, the proceedings initiated by the Mamlatdar in the year 1976 under the Amendment Act of 1972, are also null and void and ineffective. It is submitted that therefore, every order passed and every action taken pursuant to the stillborn Act is ineffective, null and void. 4.7 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Thumati Venkaiah & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 295 . Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973 vis-a-vis the provisions of ULC Act, was in issue. 4.7 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Thumati Venkaiah & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 295 . Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973 vis-a-vis the provisions of ULC Act, was in issue. The Apex Court, has held and observed that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within urban agglomeration, it would be outside the area of its legislative competence, because it cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property. 4.8 Reliance is placed on of the judgment in the case of Chudasma Shambhaji Kalubha vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in 1984 GLH 1001 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder & Ors. vs. Ram Kumar & Anr. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 24 wherein, it has been held and observed that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation, such legislation does not affect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of the suit or adjudication of the suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of suit. 4.9 It is further submitted that mere participation of the holder in the proceedings, will not take away the right of the party from raising the challenge. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A.C. Jose vs. Sivan Pillai & Ors. reported in (1984) 2 SCC 656 with a specific reference to paragraph 38. It has been held and observed that when the Court is considering a constitutional or a statutory provision, there can be no estoppel against the statute. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of State of Punjab vs. Sri Hardayal reported in (1985) 2 SCC 629 . It is further submitted that the order passed by the authorities lacks inherent jurisdiction and if that be so, the order would be nullity. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Bihar State Mineral Dev. Corpn. & Anr. It is further submitted that the order passed by the authorities lacks inherent jurisdiction and if that be so, the order would be nullity. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Bihar State Mineral Dev. Corpn. & Anr. vs. Encon Builders (I) Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 418 . It has been held and observed that an order which lacks inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity and thus, the procedural law of waiver or estoppel would have no application in such a situation. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of State of H.P. versus Ram Lok & Ors. reported in 2023 (4), ShimLC 2047:Manu/HP/1595/2023. 4.10 For the proposition that the question of law can be raised at any stage, reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of M/s. Ariane Orgachem Pvt. Ltd. vs. Wyeth Employees Union & Ors. reported in (2015) 7 SCC 561 . Reference has been made to the judgments and more particularly, judgment in the case of Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. vs. Kavanagh reported in (1892) AC 473 (PC) wherein, it has been held and observed that “when a question of law is raised for the first time in a Court of last resort, upon the construction of a document, or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient, in the interest of justice, to entertain the plea.” It is therefore urged that the impugned judgment does not deserve to be interfered with. Re: Submission of the respondent no.4, that is, Siddhi Infrastructure and Developers 5. Mr Mihir H. Joshi and Ms Trusha K. Patel, learned Senior Advocates assisted by Mr Tattvam K. Patel, learned advocate for respondent no.4, has taken this Court to the chronology of events and submitted that with effect from 01.09.1961, the Act of 1960 had come into force and order dated 31.07.1968 came to be passed, dropping the proceedings on the ground that there is no surplus land available. The said order, has attained finality inasmuch as, it has not been taken in revision, for which limitation is one year. If the Act of 1960 is to apply, then acres 120 each is to be allowed and same would be acres 360, rendering the whole exercise, academic. The said order, has attained finality inasmuch as, it has not been taken in revision, for which limitation is one year. If the Act of 1960 is to apply, then acres 120 each is to be allowed and same would be acres 360, rendering the whole exercise, academic. 5.1 It is next submitted that with effect from 17.02.1976, the ULC Act has come into force pursuant to the resolution dated 14.08.1972 passed by the Legislative Assembly under clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution of India. It is resolved that the imposition of ceiling on the holding of urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto, should be regulated in the State by Parliament by law; whereas, the amendment Act came into force with effect from 01.04.1976 and therefore, in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja (supra), the Apex Court, has held Amendment Act of 1972 to be a stillborn Act. It has been held and observed that Amendment Act of 1972 was without legislative competence inasmuch as, it was brought into force with effect from 01.04.1976 by which time, the legislature had ceded its authority to the parliament and it also enacted ULC Act with effect from 17.02.1976. 5.2 It is submitted that the petition was filed, raising the contention that once the ULC Act has come into force, applicability of Act of 1960, is barred and the land in question must be excluded from the operation of the Act of 1960. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has taken exactly the same view and therefore, contention in that sense, is not raised for the first time. It is submitted that the learned single Judge, therefore, considered the issue that the land situated in village Raiya, since is shown in the form filled in by the petitioner under the provisions of the ULC Act, it should be decided under the provisions of the said Act instead of deciding the same under the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1972. The learned single Judge also considered the zonal certificate dated 29.07.1991, certifying that the land is situated in the recreation and residential zone and hence, it cannot be said to be an agricultural land even though it may have been shown by the holder in the form filled under the provisions of the ULC Act. It is submitted that no ground is raised in the appeal memo as regards non-applicability of the ULC Act and therefore, there is no challenge to that extent and what has been challenged is the entitlement. 5.3 It is submitted that it has been specifically held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja (supra) that if the powers were handed over to the Parliament to make law and if the law is made, i.e. the ULC Act, then, after the introduction of the ULC Act, the Act of 1974 will have no application at all. It is submitted that the judgment of the Apex Court, deals with aspect, namely, that the 1974 Act is invalid, which ratio has been accepted by the State Government. 5.4 Mr Mihir H. Joshi, learned Senior Advocate, took this Court to the provisions of the ULC Act. It is submitted that Section 3 speaks about the entitlement of the person to hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. Clause (q) of Section 2 defines the term “vacant land” to mean land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include the categories as mentioned therein. Clause (o) of Section 2 defines the term “urban land” which, inter alia, means any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. It is submitted that Explanation further describes the term “agriculture”, but does not include raising of grass and therefore, the bid land, would automatically go out of the clutch of the term “agriculture”. Similarly, Explanation (C) to clause (o) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of the Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for the purpose other than agriculture. Similarly, Explanation (C) to clause (o) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of the Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for the purpose other than agriculture. 5.5 It is further submitted that Section 6 of the ULC Act provides for filing of the statement by a person holding the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. In the year 1988, the land in question, has ceased to be an agriculture land as it was designated as a residential and recreational zone and would be governed under the ULC Act and therefore, there could not be valid order passed under the amended Act of 1974. All orders from the year 1988 to 1989 are hence invalid. 5.6 It is next submitted that if the Act of 1960, so also the amendment Act of 1974 has revived and in currency with effect from 01.04.1999, the land in question on that day, has ceased to be an agriculture land. If the Act of 1974 is to be applied, position as on 31.03.1999, will have to be taken into account and not the specified date. It is submitted that by virtue of Section 15 and 21 of the Amended Act of 1972 if the revised form is to be reprocessed on and from 31.03.1999, by deletion of words ‘on the appointed date’, the land should be surplus agricultural land on the date of passing an order under Section 21 for being declared as surplus and even on that count, the subject land is not agricultural land; as on date. It is submitted that so far as the scope of remand is concerned, there was no restricted remand and everything, was open to be decided. Re: Submissions of the respondent no.3, that is, Gayatrinagar Cooperative Housing Ltd. 6. Mr Devang S. Nanavati, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr Dipak B. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent no.3 has submitted that a choice was given to the land holder who, has filed an application dated 02.05.1983, clearly stating that the land acres 49.29 gunthas, has been sold in favour Gayatrinagar Cooperative Housing Ltd. vide registered sale deed and relevant entry no.6233 dated 24.09.1982, was posted in the revenue record confirming the said transaction. In any case, the land acres 49.29 gunthas is already been declared as a retainable land and therefore, the respondents, in that case, would not be affected either way. Re.: Rejoinder and the responses 7. Ms Manisha Luvkumar Shah, learned Additional Advocate General, while responding to the submissions made by the learned counsel, contended that the respondent has sought to argue the matter, as if the matter is being adjudicated on a fresh canvas; however, there is absolutely no answer to or reference to any of the 14 adjudicatory processes, namely, the orders passed by the authorities below and the orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. It is further submitted that the appeal of the State Government is being responded to, by raising arguments which were never canvassed in any of the proceedings, including the writ petitions preferred by the petitioners themselves. The matter is also argued as if everything was left open while remanding the matter and the learned single Judge has decided as if it was to be decided afresh; so was never the intention or the scope of the orders passed by this court. It is submitted that it is also sought to be argued that the order dated 19.04.1983 passed by this Court, was a quid pro quo. There lies a fallacy inasmuch as, there is always adjudication by the High Court and the orders passed, are never quid pro quo. After examination, that this Court, held that since the choice was not given to the holder, give the choice. Hence, such submission, is not tenable. 7.1 While responding to the submission of the respondent that all doors were opened by the Apex Court, it is submitted that the same is also erroneous for, even the Supreme Court, has given the conditional and restrictive remand. It is clearly observed, that “all points on question of option will remain open, including the effect and validity of Annexure A”. The said affidavit Annexure-A, was only limited to the option to be exercised and the fact that land owner wants to surrender the bid land to the State Government. The review was also allowed in terms of the order of the Supreme Court; however, the Division Bench decided the matter contrary to the direction of the Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench. The review was also allowed in terms of the order of the Supreme Court; however, the Division Bench decided the matter contrary to the direction of the Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench. The Division Bench could not have opened up and should have limited its examination only qua the option, so also the effect and validity of the affidavit dated 22.12.1976. It is submitted that it is not clear as to whether the State was heard inasmuch as, there is no arguments recorded having been advanced on behalf of the State Government. If everything was open, the State could have made submissions, more particularly, when the issue of vires to the provisions of sub-section (3B) of Section 6, was also examined. It is submitted that, if according to the respondent, everything was left open, the petitioner could have argued about the orders passed in the year 1968 and finality attached to it. However, nothing was argued. Even the issue of nullity, was not argued before the Division Bench, so also all orders having passed after the year 1968 being void, was also not the contention raised. 7.2 It is submitted that it is also sought to be argued that once the proceedings for the selfsame land having been dropped, it cannot be reopened in the year 1976. It is submitted that as per the Act of 1960 the ceiling area was 120 acres which, was reduced to 51 acres in the Amendment Act of 1972. As per the Amendment Act, the appointed date, was 01.04.1976. Section 6, provided the ceiling on holding land. Therefore, it is the law which mandates that from 01.04.1976, if any person is holding the land in excess has to fill up the form, which accordingly, was filled on 29.06.1976. It is submitted that the said submission, is not tenable also for the simple reason that from the year 1968, for almost 50 years, 14 proceedings have taken place. At no point of time, there was a contention raised that the authorities, are denuded of their powers from reopening. All the orders passed; by the Apex Court, by the High Court and the authorities, cannot be obliterated. At no point of time, there was a contention raised that the authorities, are denuded of their powers from reopening. All the orders passed; by the Apex Court, by the High Court and the authorities, cannot be obliterated. It is further submitted that the issues were very much before the Court and applying the principle of constructive res judicata and issue estoppel, one cannot be permitted to seek to argue the ceiling, entitlement, vires etc. and to contend that everything, was contrary to law. Hence, the submission raised by the respondent holder, that it was impermissible to reopen the proceedings, is misplaced and misconceived. 7.3 Adverting to the submission of the respondent, that if bid land is not capable of being used for agriculture it would not be covered under the ULC Act, it is submitted that the same is untenable. It is also sought to be argued that the Act draws the distinction between the position prevailing pre 1976 and post 1976. It is submitted that if one is to consider the definition of the “agriculture”, it, inter alia, includes land used for grazing and excludes the categories indicated therein. It is submitted that the expression “for grazing”, has been considered by the Apex Court and it is held that “the amendment is in one sense clarificatory in nature, so far as bid lands are concerned, as it always existed as agricultural lands under the old Act.” Reference is made also to the judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat (supra). The Apex Court has held and observed that bid lands of Girasdars or Barkhalidars were included within the definition of term ‘land’. The Apex Court has held and observed that under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1952, all lands saved from acquisition, had to be the bid lands, which by the definition under the Act of 1952, were the lands being used by a Girasdar or a Barkhalidar for grazing cattle or for cutting grass. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of Thumati Venkaiah & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of Thumati Venkaiah & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (supra), reference is made to paragraph 5 of the said judgment wherein, it has been observed that there can be no doubt that so far as the urban agglomerations are concerned, it was not within the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within the urban agglomeration; however, it is difficult to see how the Andhra Pradesh Act could be said to be outside the legislative competence insofar as the land situate in the other areas of the State. 7.4 Ms Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that when the Division Bench decided the writ petition in the year 1991, there was a challenge to the Amendment Act. It is submitted that the challenge was negated by holding that the Act of 1960 was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India by the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974. The Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974 was assented to by the President, it being in Ninth Schedule and therefore, the same is protected by virtue of the provisions of Articles 31B and 31C. The challenge therefore would be very limited. Moreover, in the case of Khachar Godadbhai Pithubhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2004) 2 GLH 589 , the challenge, was to the orders declaring the bid lands held by the Girasdars to be surplus lands. The challenge, was on two grounds of Act being not applicable to the bid lands and the relevant provisions being ultra vires the Constitution. The challenge failed on the ground that the Act and the provisions are not only immune to any challenge under the provisions of Article 31B but in view of the protective umbrella of Articles 31A and 31C being available. Besides, in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat (supra), the issue, was whether the bid lands were required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of land ceiling under the Act of 1960 as amended by Amendment Act of 1974. The challenge was laid to the provisions of the Amendment Act 1974 as violative of Articles 14 and 19. The challenge was laid to the provisions of the Amendment Act 1974 as violative of Articles 14 and 19. Since the Act, was included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act it was given up in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case I.R. Coelho (Decd.) By LRS vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Others reported in (2007) 2 SCC 1 . 7.5 It is submitted that the amendment is not only enacted in terms of the guidelines issued by the Government but has also received the assent of the President and therefore, there is no question of repugnancy. The judgment in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja (supra) nowhere gives such a declaration. Stray observations are being taken recourse to contend that the Apex Court, has declared it as a stillborn and therefore, nullity. It is submitted that the Apex Court, has dealt with the six issues in paragraph 41. It is submitted that the Apex Court, while examining the nature of the bid lands held that without reference to the Amendment Act, bid lands by their very nature, stood included as agriculture lands falling within the purview of the Act of 1960. It is also held and observed that the ULC Act with effect from 17.02.1976 occupied the domain of lands falling under urban agglomeration and the lands falling within the agricultural zone in the urban agglomeration, stood excluded. The Apex Court, has pointed out that bid lands would be covered within the definitions of “agriculture” and “land” defined in the Act of 1960, without reference to the Amendment Act of 1972. Therefore, in the context of bid land, there is no declaration in the judgment to hold that the 1974 amendment is void, without jurisdiction, invalid or stillborn. In fact, judgments in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat (supra) and State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja (supra), fortifies the stand of the State Government, as per the observations made in paragraphs 59, 61, 69, 74, 82, 87 and 90. It is therefore urged that considering the limited scope of remand and the judgment of the learned single Judge having traveled beyond the scope is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. It is therefore urged that considering the limited scope of remand and the judgment of the learned single Judge having traveled beyond the scope is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. In response, Mr Mihir Joshi, learned senior counsel submitted that the initial proceedings were under the Act of 1960 and culminated in the year 1968. Therefore, res judicata will be in favour of the holder and not the State Government. It is submitted that thereafter, second stage of proceedings were initiated under the Amendment Act which culminated into passing of the order by the Tribunal in the year 1994 and admittedly, all the proceedings are under the 1974 Amendment Act. It is submitted that in the year 2013, the Apex Court, has unequivocally declared that the 1974 Amendment Act was a stillborn and it had no effect in law because the State was denuded of the legislative competence to enact the law in view of the resolution passed by the State ceding its power to the parliament. Therefore, the position is entirely changed when this Court is to determine the issue. It is further submitted that the 1974 Amendment Act, having been declared as void by the Apex Court, the procedural contention of res judicata, estoppel etc. would not come into play. It is next submitted that principle of res judicata is that it must be order passed between the parties in a court of competent jurisdiction in a competent proceedings. Also, the principle of res judicata will not apply as the proceedings are ongoing inasmuch as, it applies to the new proceedings. In fact, even in the case of different proceedings, Apex Court, says that if there is a fundamental change in law, earlier orders cannot be construed as res judicata. It is submitted that there is no question of applying the issue of constructive res judicata to the constitutionality. 8.1 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1955 SC 781 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra reported in (1990) 1 SCC 193 . 8.1 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1955 SC 781 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra reported in (1990) 1 SCC 193 . It has been held and observed that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction, is a nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. Further reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Nand Kishore vs. State of Punjab reported in (1995) 6 SCC 614 . It is observed that if it is held invalid, it can’t be barred on any count and it must apply and therefore, principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata can’t apply. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Hindustan Zinc Limited (H.Z.L.) vs. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited reported in (2019) 7 SCC 82 to respond to the submissions that once having participated, it cannot raise any objection. Mere participation would be insignificant as the proceedings, are without jurisdiction. While concluding, it is submitted that 2013 judgment, refers to the proceedings as non est and if that is accepted, the issue of res judicata and constructive res judicata, estoppel would not arise. 9. Mr Mihir J. Thakore, learned senior counsel, while responding to the submissions that the arguments are being raised for the first time, submitted that there is no dispute that no submissions were made; however, it was the law which was enacted in the year 1974 and brought into effect in the year 1976 was operating and submissions, were made. It is submitted that all throughout, till the stage of the judgment of the learned single Judge, the said impression prevailed. It is only after the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Manoharsinghji (supra) declared by the Apex Court, that the law was settled and accordingly, the submissions have been made. 9.1 It is further submitted that during the proceedings in the year 1960, application was filed disclosing the lands at Raiya and Pal. It is only after the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Manoharsinghji (supra) declared by the Apex Court, that the law was settled and accordingly, the submissions have been made. 9.1 It is further submitted that during the proceedings in the year 1960, application was filed disclosing the lands at Raiya and Pal. Bid land was also stated and it is only after considering everything that the authorities have passed an order in the year 1968 and bid land, was not included in the order. If the bid land was not included and the order stood crystallized, if thereafter it is found that the agricultural land was available, nothing can be done and the holder will be at liberty to retain the said land inasmuch as, there is no machinery in the Act to govern those lands. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Krishnadas Vithaldas Sanjanwala vs. State of Gujarat reported in (1966) 7 GLR 244. It has been held and observed that once the declaration is made by the authority about the total agricultural land and entitlement that becomes final and subsequently if it is found that the land is available, the authorities cannot take any action in view of there being no machinery in the Act governing those eventualities. In the present case, the provisions of the 1974 Amendment Act does not come into play and if the Act of 1960 is to be applied, the proceedings got concluded and nothing can be reopened and only argument available would be under Section 31 of the Amendment Act which governs the pending applications and not the concluded orders. 9.2 It is submitted that so far as the aspect of principle of res judicata is concerned, it cannot apply. Res judicata is nothing else but estoppel, estoppel by judgment, conduct, issue and the estoppel, cannot apply against the law. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Canara Bank vs. N. G. Subbaraya Setty & Another reported in (2018) 16 SCC 228 . The judgment in the case of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors vs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy reported in (1970) 1 SCC 613 has been referred to. It has been held and observed that an erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of the court cannot clothe that court with jurisdiction where it has none. The judgment in the case of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors vs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy reported in (1970) 1 SCC 613 has been referred to. It has been held and observed that an erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of the court cannot clothe that court with jurisdiction where it has none. 9.3 It is next submitted that all the orders passed on the presumption that Amendment Act applies and when the law is now declared void, in spite of this, if this court were to upheld the orders and set aside the order of the learned single Judge, it would result in upholding the order of the Tribunal and Mamlatdar which are contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court. All the proceedings from 31.01.1977 till the year 2005 are null and void and without jurisdiction and therefore, the principle of res judicata, will not apply. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Chief General Manager (IPC) Madhya Pradesh Power Trading Company Limited & Another vs. Narmada Equipment Private Limited reported in (2021) 14 SCC 548 . It has been held and observed that if there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can be taken at any stage and also in a collateral proceedings. It has been pointed out that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. The defect of jurisdiction cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties. 9.4 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Others reported in (2015) 4 SCC 801 wherein, it has been held and observed that when the State deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities and if the State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just one even though legal defenses, may be open to it, must act as has been said by eminent judges, as an honest person. Re.: Discussion 10. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and respective respondents. The Bench has accorded its consideration to the submissions made, so also the documents available on record. 11. Re.: Discussion 10. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and respective respondents. The Bench has accorded its consideration to the submissions made, so also the documents available on record. 11. As such, the controversy lies in a very narrow compass, namely, the scope and ambit of the remand directed by the Coordinate Bench by judgment dated 22.04.1991. Plethora of submissions is made coupled with citing voluminous judgments in support thereof. Since the captioned appeals involve chequered history, relating back to the year 1976, some portion also touching the period prior thereto, it would be rather inevitable to set out the facts in detail, the proceedings and the orders passed therein so to appreciate the controversy. 12. The Act of 1960 came to be enacted by the legislature with a view to fixing the ceiling on holding agricultural land as well as to provide for acquisition and disposal of surplus agricultural lands. Section 4 of the Act of 1960, provides for classes of local areas in the State as specified in Schedule-I and the local areas falling in each such class shall be as specified in Schedule-II. Section 5 states that ceiling areas in relation to each class of land shall be specified in the schedule against respective class of local areas subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3). The land in question as per Schedule-I was classified as class ‘H’ and the ceiling area in acre, for dry crop land was 120 acres. The holder-petitioner, was possessing 114 acres and 14 gunthas of land in city of Rajkot. The Mamlatdar & ALT had passed an order dated 31.07.1968 declaring that the holder is not possessing excess land. 13. In the year 1976, Act of 1960 came to be amended with effect from 01.04.1976 and as per the amendment, the ceiling area in class ‘H’ came to be reduced from 120 acres to 51 acres. Various amendments were effected, namely, definition of land, ceiling area, Schedule so on and so forth. Apropos the said amendment, holder filed the form no.2 declaring his total holding to the extent of 321 acres as on 29.06.1976 including the land in question of village Raiya. Pursuant to the declaration, the Mamlatdar & ALT, Lodhika passed an order dated 31.01.1977. Various amendments were effected, namely, definition of land, ceiling area, Schedule so on and so forth. Apropos the said amendment, holder filed the form no.2 declaring his total holding to the extent of 321 acres as on 29.06.1976 including the land in question of village Raiya. Pursuant to the declaration, the Mamlatdar & ALT, Lodhika passed an order dated 31.01.1977. Exhibit 19, that is, the statement of the holder was considered by Mamlatdar & ALT declaring that he possesses acres 122 and 36 gunthas of village Pal and acres 198 and 39 gunthas of village Raiya and hence, the total holding is acres 321 and 35 gunthas. The holder requested for four units, as the family was of 4 adults and 3 minors. Also, the land of survey no.24 admeasuring acres 6 and 35 gunthas, since has been sold in the year 1969-70, it may not be considered. Statement of the holder was also concerning the land of village Raiya as a bid land, admeasuring acres 198 and 39 gunthas and that he is willing to handover the same to the State Government. Hence, the Mamlatdar & ALT declared acres 198 and 39 gunthas of survey no.250 of village Raiya and acres 10 and 7 gunthas of survey no.299/1 of village Pal, total admeasuring acres 209 and 6 gunthas as surplus land; allowing the holder to retain 2 units, that is, 102 acres for himself and for his major son Amarsinh. 14. The holder since was aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector. Three grounds were raised, namely, (i) that the Mamlatdar & ALT has declared the surplus land without taking the consent; (ii) that not to consider the land admeasuring acres 6 and 9 gunthas of survey no.41 as it was sold before 24.01.1971; and (iii) that not to consider the bid land in the total holding, as per the provisions of sub-section (17) of Section 2 and that the holder does not possess any surplus land; however, the appeal came to be rejected by the Deputy Collector vide order dated 06.06.1977. 15. The revision filed against the above referred order passed in appeal, also came to be rejected by passing an order date 20.03.1979. 15. The revision filed against the above referred order passed in appeal, also came to be rejected by passing an order date 20.03.1979. The holder, in support of his challenge before the Tribunal, had raised three contentions, namely, (i) that the bid land admeasuring 251 acres and 30 gunthas did not fall within the definition of land as per sub-section (17) of Section 2 of the Act of 1960 inasmuch as, the lands are not cultivable; (ii) that the applicant has eight members, namely, wife, mother, one major son, one married daughter, two minor daughters and one minor son and therefore, is entitle to hold, in excess of the ceiling area, to the extent of 1/5th of the ceiling area for each member in excess of 5 and (iii) that land admeasuring 6 acres and 35 gunthas of survey no.247 has been sold to the third party and the same should be excluded from the total holding. The Tribunal did not consider and as aforesaid, dismissed the revision application. 16. It is noteworthy that writ petition being Special Civil Application no.148 of 1980 was preferred before this Court and vide order dated 19.04.1983, it came to be partly allowed observing the aspect of petitioner raised before the authorities. The Division Bench, also stated that the petitioner no longer disputes that he is a surplus holder to the extent of 209 acres and 6 gunthas. The submission as regards opportunity to select the area, which the holder was entitled to hold within the ceiling limit, in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act of 1960 was accepted. Relevant excerpts of the oral judgment are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference. “In the petition, the impugned decision was challenged on several grounds. At the final hearing however, the petitioner has given up all those challenges, save and except one to be presently considered. Be it stated clearly that the petitioner no longer disputes that he is a surplus holder to the extent of 209 acres and 6 gunthas. The only submission made for our consideration was that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to select the area which he was entitled to hold within the ceiling limit in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act. The only submission made for our consideration was that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to select the area which he was entitled to hold within the ceiling limit in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act. It appears prima facie, that the petitioner had given no indi- cation about such selection to the competent authority at the appropriate stage of the proceeding. However, having regard to the fact that the petitioner is no longer disputing the extent of surplus land and that he has made grievance in regard to selection even before the appellate authority, interest of justice requires that an opportunity should be given to him even at this stage to make such selection in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act. Under the circumstances, while declining to interfere on merits with the decision of the authorities under the Act, and more particularly, with the decision that the petitioner is a holder of surplus land to the extent of 209 acres and 6 gunthas, the specification of land which the petitioner is entitled to hold and which vests in the State as made in the said decision is quashed and set aside and the case is remanded to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal (second respondent) with a direction that the said Tribunal will afford to the petitioner an opportunity to make selection in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act and it will redetermine the said issue in light of the representation of the petitioner and in accordance with law. It is clarified however, that the fact, if any, that such selection has not been made within the time prescribed shall not be put up as a bar to the selection. The petitioner will himself prefer an application for selection before the said Tribunal within a period of one month from today. Upon receipt of such application, the Tribunal shall proceed to consider and decide the same within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of the application. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Upon receipt of such application, the Tribunal shall proceed to consider and decide the same within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of the application. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Writ of the order to be sent down to the second respondent with the utmost expedition.” This Court, declined to interfere on merits with the decision of the authorities and more particularly, the decision that the petitioner is a holder of surplus land to the extent of 209 acres and 6 gunthas. The limited direction was liberty to the petitioner to prefer an application for selection and the Mamlatdar & ALT was directed to consider and decide the application after affording to the petitioner an opportunity to make selection in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. 17. Apropos the directions issued by this Court, the holder filed an application dated 02.05.1983, requesting to decide it as per the order dated 19.04.1983. Further request was made that for permissible land of acres 102 – 00 gunthas choice be given and acres 209 - 05 gunthas, be vested in the State Government. The holder also declared before the authority that except selection all the disputes have been given up and accepting the same, that the High Court has passed the order. With this background, the holder made it clear that he is desirous of retaining the land as indicated in the application i.e. acres 102 – 00 gunthas. While out of the land in question i.e. acres 198 – 39 gunthas, acres 49 – 28 gunthas be retained by him as the agreement to sell has been executed in favour of one Gayatrinagar Co-operative Housing Society. Therefore, the understanding on the part of holder was more than clear. Accepting the application, the Mamlatdar & ALT passed an order dated 30.05.1983 giving the choice of retainable land. The said order, is not challenged and accepted by the petitioner-holder. 18. In the interregnum, it appears that review application being Miscellaneous Civil Application no.489 of 1983 was filed, which came to be rejected vide order dated 06.07.1983. Pertinently, the oral judgment of the Division Bench dated 19.04.1983 was accepted by the holder-petitioner. The said order, is not challenged and accepted by the petitioner-holder. 18. In the interregnum, it appears that review application being Miscellaneous Civil Application no.489 of 1983 was filed, which came to be rejected vide order dated 06.07.1983. Pertinently, the oral judgment of the Division Bench dated 19.04.1983 was accepted by the holder-petitioner. The Civil Appeal no.10025 of 1983 filed by the State Government came to be disposed of by passing an order dated 25.10.1983, observing that the High Court proceeded on the presumption that the option was not exercised at all. The matter came to be remanded setting aside the oral judgment dated 19.04.1983 of the High Court, observing thus; “Heard counsel for the parties. It seems to us that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the option was not exercised at the appropriate stage although Annexure "A" dated 22.12.1976 clearly shows that the option was exercised and it states that the land owner wanted to surrender Vid land to the Government The High Court proceeded on the presumption that the option was not exercised at all. In these circumstances we propose to remand the case to the High Court and we would not like to make any observations which may prejudice either party. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court to decide the question of option according to law. All points on the question of option will remain open including the effect and validity of "Annexure- A."” Clearly, the matter was remanded to decide the question of “option in accordance with law”. In view of the above order, in the considered opinion of this Court, the only option which was allowed and available was selection of the land, other aspects were kept intact including the declaration of surplus land of 209 acres and 6 gunthas. 19. This Court, had perused the original papers of Special Civil Application no.148 of 1980, and it emerges that another order of the even date was passed by the Apex Court on the same line and the Miscellaneous Civil Application no.489 of 1983 was restored to its original file. 19. This Court, had perused the original papers of Special Civil Application no.148 of 1980, and it emerges that another order of the even date was passed by the Apex Court on the same line and the Miscellaneous Civil Application no.489 of 1983 was restored to its original file. Thereafter, upon remand In Miscellaneous Civil Application no.489 of 1983, this Court, accepting the arguments of the State Government, observed that “when the Supreme Court itself has set aside the order dated 19.04.1983, stating that the High Court had proceeded on the basis that the option was not exercised at the appropriate stage although Annexure-A dated 22.12.1976 clearly showed that the option was exercised”. The Division Bench, while considering the directions of the Apex Court, allowed the review application reviving the writ petition being Special Civil Application no.148 of 1980 leaving it open to the Division Bench to deal with the direction of the Apex Court in accordance with law. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are set out hereinbelow for ready reference: “2. This matter was called out before us some time ago and a controversy appeared as to what was sought to be imported by the Supreme Court by its order. It was at that stage though that it will be in the interest of both the parties to have the point cleared up and so the matter was adjourned for eight weeks to enable the State Govt. to move the Supreme Court for clarification. Ultimately, the learned Govt. Pleader Mr Vin stated that as the Special Leave Petition was against the order rejecting the review application, this High Court should re-examine the question whether review should be now allowed or not. When the Supreme Court itself has set aside this High Court’s order stating that the High Court had proceeded on the basis that the option was not exercised at the appropriate stage although Annexure A dated 22.12.76 clearly showed that the option was exercised, we understand that the order passed by this High Court refusing to review has been set aside and because of this we take up the review application today. 3. As per the direction of the Supreme Court, we allow this review application. 3. As per the direction of the Supreme Court, we allow this review application. With the result that the main Special Civil Application stands reviewed and as observed by the Supreme Court itself, all points on the question of option will remain open, including the effect and validity of Annexure A dated 22.12.76 before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench before which now the main Special Civil Application No. 148 of 1980 stands reviewed, will deal with the same in accordance with law.” 20. Apropos the above-referred order, the Division Bench heard the matter and vide its oral judgment dated 22.04.1991 allowed the writ petition. It is left to be guessed as to whether the State Government, was represented and heard more particularly, when the validity of the provision of the Amendment Act of 1972 was in question, for, neither in the cause title nor in the body of the judgment there is a reference of either the appearance or submissions recorded of the State Government. Fact also remains that State Government has not challenged the judgment and has accepted it. Be that as it may. Contentions were raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner and one of which was that the holder had eight members in the family, namely, wife, mother, minor daughter, minor son etc. and it was sought to be argued that provision of sub-section (3B) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act of 1972 would be violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it does not include minor daughters and that there is a discrimination between the minor son and minor daughter on the ground of sex. Validity of the said section was also touched; and the same, was upheld holding that sub-section (3B) of Section 6 is not violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Another contention was entitlement of one minor son and benefit provided as per sub-section (3B) of Section 6. Division Bench while referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Jat Laxmanji Talasji reported in AIR 1988 SC 825 : (1988) 2 SCC 341 , held that the finding of the Tribunal was incorrect and erroneous. The Division Bench, therefore, while allowing the writ petition, in paragraphs 5 to 9 observed thus: “5. It was vehemently contended by Mr. The Division Bench, therefore, while allowing the writ petition, in paragraphs 5 to 9 observed thus: “5. It was vehemently contended by Mr. Jadeja the learned advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner had 8 members in his family including two minor daughters sons and if section 6, sub-section 3B in interpreted to mean that a person would be entitled to the benefit of sub-section 3B of section 6 only if the family consist the members belonging to all or any of the categories specified therein, then the provisions of sub-section 3B of section 6 of the Act would be violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as the said provisions do not include minor daughters and there is discrimination between minor son and minor daughter on the ground of sex. 6. The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (Gujarat Act XXVII of 1961) was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India. Thereafter, the Act of 1960 was amended by the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) act 1972 (Gujarat Act of 1974) and Sub-section 3A to 3D were inserted in Sec. 6 of the Act. Again, the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Gujarat Act of 1974) was added to the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India by Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974. 7. Article 31B of the Constitution of India provides that none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provisions is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III. In view of this, the challenge to the validity of sub- section 3B of Section 6 of the Act, on the ground that it violates Article 14 cannot be entertained. 8. In the case of Hasmukhlal Dahyabhai and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. Page 2316, the Supreme Court was concerned with questions involving the interpretation of Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution of India in relation to the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act XXVII of 1961. 8. In the case of Hasmukhlal Dahyabhai and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. Page 2316, the Supreme Court was concerned with questions involving the interpretation of Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution of India in relation to the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act XXVII of 1961. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India considered the question whether apart from variations in the ceiling area imposed by statute, there can be a deprivation of rights of individuals holding property separately, in exercise of their separate individual rights, by grouping them as members of the family so as to compel them to take only one unit of land in such a way that their total holding does not exceed the ceiling limit which is the same for both individuals as well as families as defined by the Act with some allowances for large families and held that Article 31B of the Constitution provides a complete answer to any attack directed against the provisions of an Act based upon an alleged violation of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and both Articles 31A(1) and 31B are intended to operate as protections against consequences of what could otherwise be breaches of the Constitution. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, we do not find any substance in the first contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner that sub- section 3B of Sec. 6 of the Act is violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has eight members in his family, which also includes one minor son and therefore, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit, provided by sub- section 3B of Sec. 6 of the Ceiling Act. On this point, the Tribunal has held that there is one minor son, who belongs to the categories of members specified in sub-section 3B of Sec. 6 of the Ceiling Act and other members do not fall within the specified categories and therefore, as the petitioner's family does not exceed five, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit provided by sub- section 3B of Sec. 6 of the Act. So far as this point is concerned, the point is concluded by the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Jat Laxmanji Talasji, reported in AIR 1988 825, In the above referred case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in order to avail of the benefit of Sec. 6 sub-sec. 3B of the act, two conditions must be satisfied namely (1) the family should consist of more than five members and (2) it should have amongst it, the categories of members mentioned in the three sub clauses. It is further held that the benefit of enlargement of the Ceiling area will ensure to only that family where the total number of members is more than five and amongst them are members belonging to the categories mentioned therein. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, we hold that the finding of the Tribunal that there is only one minor son, who belongs to the categories of members mentioned in sub- Sec. 3B of Sec. 6 of the Ceiling Act and the number of specified members of categories of the petitioner's family does not exceed five and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of sub- sec. 3B of Sec.6 is erroneous in law and is hereby set aside. However, from the judgment of the Tribunal it appears that there is discrepancy as to whether there was one minor son on the specified date i.e. on 1.4.76. There is no clear finding of fact that there was one minor son in the family of the petitioner on the specified date. In view of this, the matter will have to be remanded to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Lodhika for deciding the question as to whether on the specified date, i.e. on 1-4-76 there was any minor son in the family of the petitioner or not. The parties would be entitled to lead evidence before the Tribunal on this issue and if the Tribunal after appreciation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that there was one minor son in the family of the petitioner on the specified date, then for the said minor son, the petitioner would be entitled to 1/5th of the ceiling area in addition to one unit.” 21. Contention was raised as regards interpretation of sub-section (3B) of Section 6, it being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as it did not include minor daughter, discriminating minor son and minor daughter. This Court, considering the fact that the Act of 1960 having been included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India and it having been amended by the Amendment Act of 1972 and insertion of sub-sections (3A) to (3D) in Section 6, also having been added to Ninth Schedule, as per Article 31B of Constitution of India, none of the Acts and Regulations specified therein shall be deemed to be void, inter alia, on the ground of it being inconsistent with or taking away or abridging any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III of the Constitution of India. This Court, held and observed that challenge to the validity of sub-section (3B) of Section 6 on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertained. 22. Another contention raised, was about the family of petitionerholder comprising 8 members including one minor son and his entitlement to the benefit provided by sub-section (3B) of Section 6. The Division Bench, while referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Jat Laxmanji Talasji, pointed out that the finding of the Tribunal that there is only one minor son who belongs to the categories of members mentioned in sub-section (3B) of Section 6 of the Act of 1960 and the number of specified members of categories of the petitioner’s family does not exceed 5, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of sub-section (3B) of Section 6, is erroneous. The Division Bench, therefore, held and observed that there is discrepancy in the judgment of the Tribunal and observed that there was no clear finding of fact as regards one minor son in family of the petitioner-holder on the specified date i.e. 01.04.1976. On this limited ground, the Division Bench remanded the matter to Mamlatdar & ALT for deciding the question: “...as to whether on the specified date i.e. on 1.4.1976, there was any minor son in the family of the petitioner or not” 23. On this limited ground, the Division Bench remanded the matter to Mamlatdar & ALT for deciding the question: “...as to whether on the specified date i.e. on 1.4.1976, there was any minor son in the family of the petitioner or not” 23. Evidently, the petition was directed against the orders of the Tribunal and the authorities but the said orders were not disturbed and parties were allowed to lead evidence before the Tribunal only on the aforesaid limited issue. Remaining issues decided by the Tribunal and the authorities stood confirmed. The judgment dated 22.04.1991 of the Division Bench has attained finality inasmuch as, neither the State Government nor the holder i.e. the petitioner have challenged the same. The direction contained in this judgment is binding to both; the petitioner-holder and the State Government including the authorities and it would be impermissible either for the authorities or the holder-petitioner to travel beyond this direction. Re: Judgments on remand 24. At this juncture, the scope and ambit of direction of remand is required to be taken note of. 25. In the case of Shivshankara and Anr. vs. H.P. Vedavyasa Char (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed that Court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to the order of remand is contrary to law. Relevant excerpts from paragraph 7 are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “7………There can be no doubt with respect to the settled position that the Court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to the order of remand is contrary to law. In other words, an order of remand has to be followed in its true spirit.” Apt would also be the judgment in the case of Bai Jasud Wd/o. Kantilal @ Fulchand Anupchand (Decd.) vs. Ratilal Anoopchand Shah (supra). Reference has been made to the judgment in the case of K. Veerabasappa v. District Judge, Chitradurga reported in AIR 1979 Karnataka 40 wherein, it has been held and observed that, when a superior Court has passed a restricted order of remand pertaining to a particular issue and none of the parties had urged for open remand it is not open to any of the parties or for any Court to enlarge the scope of the remand order that too by a side window. If such a course is permitted, it is destructive of all judicial discipline and will strike at the very root of the efficacy and binding nature of an order of a superior Court on the parties to a dispute and the necessity of a subordinate Court to faithfully implement an order of the superior Court. 26. This Court, is therefore of the opinion that the issues stood concluded and the judgment inter se parties having attained finality would be binding. Traveling beyond the scope of the remand would be strictly impermissible. Allowing to do so, would not only create a chaos but would nullify the proceedings and the judicial pronouncement on the facts as well as on law. It is well recognized principle that it would be impermissible for the parties to reopen the concluded judgment of the Court as it would not only tantamount the abuse of process of law but would have far reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice. In the case on hand, in the first instance, the matter traveled upto the Apex Court and as stated herein above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, remanded the matter with a specific direction to decide “the question of option according to law.” Point of question of option was left open including the effect and validity of Annexure ‘A’. The Division Bench, after hearing the writ petition, directed to decide the issue as to whether as on 1.4.1976 there was any minor son in the family of the petitioner. This was the only limited issue to be decided and nothing else. If at all the petitioner-holder had any grievance about the orders being nullity or without authority and jurisdiction, the judgment dated 22.04.1991 ought to have been challenged and set at naught. Once having accepted and it having attained finality, the petitioner-holder now cannot turn around and raise additional pleas in view of the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court. 27. Moving further, the matter was then heard by the Mamlatdar & ALT who passed an order dated 14.12.1992 which was challenged before the Deputy Collector and the Deputy Collector remanded the matter back with a specific direction to hear the parties and allow them to produce documents. The Deputy Collector also directed to keep in mind the order dated 22.04.1991 passed by the Division Bench. The Deputy Collector also directed to keep in mind the order dated 22.04.1991 passed by the Division Bench. Upon remand, the Mamlatdar & ALT passed an order dated 16.08.1993 declaring acres 234 and 10 gunthas of land as a surplus and the holder, was directed to retain acres 101-39 gunthas including acres 49 – 28 gunthas of the land in question as per the map submitted by the holder together with his reply dated 27.05.1983 of the land situated from east to west. The holder and the State Government both, clearly understood and accepted the limited direction of the Division Bench and acted accordingly. 28. The Mamlatdar & ALT was conscious of the fact, that he has to decide as to whether on the specified date i.e. on 01.04.1976, there was any minor son in the family of the holder or not. After taking oral as well as documentary evidence, the issue of the minor son Himanshusinh was considered. The Mamlatdar & ALT, considering the provisions of sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of Section 6 so also the judgment in the case of 1985 GLR 824 and 1982 GLR 317 , was of the opinion that it is only when the holder is given one unit, he will be entitled to 1/5th unit. As the holder has already been given two units, he is not eligible for additional 1/5th unit. With this, the said issue was answered in negative. The Mamlatdar & ALT also considered the aspect about non-disclosure of the lands of village Jaswantpura and Pal and after considering the same, it concluded that the lands are to be considered in the holdings of the holder. Acres 234 and 10 gunthas of land was declared as a surplus and the holder was allowed to retain acres 101 and 39 gunthas including acres 49 and 28 gunthas of the land in question. 29. Notably, the Mamlatdar & ALT was only to decide limited issue and could not have travelled beyond it; however, it also considered the non-disclosure of the lands of two villages Jaswantpura and Pal by the holder. The judgment was challenged before the Assistant Collector who, vide order date 09.12.1993 rejected the appeal and confirmed the order date 16.08.1993 of the Mamlatdar & ALT. Revision was filed before the Tribunal by the holder. 30. The judgment was challenged before the Assistant Collector who, vide order date 09.12.1993 rejected the appeal and confirmed the order date 16.08.1993 of the Mamlatdar & ALT. Revision was filed before the Tribunal by the holder. 30. The Tribunal, agreeing with the submissions made by the learned advocate, pointed out that the holder was given two units i.e. one for himself and one for the major son. Claim of the holder for 1/5th unit for his minor son, would be as per the provisions of sub- section (3B) of section 6 which speaks about the entitlement of the family to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of 1/5th of the ceiling area for each member in excess of 5. So, however, the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area. It held that provisions of sub-sections (3B) and (3C) of Section 6 are independent and the restriction is only attached to sub-section (3B) of Section 6 and hence, the holder is entitled to get 1/5th unit for his minor son Himanshusinh. Relevant would be the provisions of subsection (3B) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act of 1972 and the judgment on the point. Relevant would be the provisions of subsection (3B) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act of 1972 and the judgment on the point. “(3B) Where a family or a joint family consist of more than five members comprising a person and other members belonging to all or any of the following categories, namely:-- (i) minor son, (ii) widow of a pre-deceased son, (iii) minor son or unmarried daughter of a predeceased son, where his or her mother is dead, such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of one-fifth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five, so how- ever that the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area and in such a case, in relation to the holding of such family, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area : Provided that if any land is held separately also by any member of such family, the land so held separately by such member shall be grouped together with the land to such family for the purpose of determining the total holding of such family : Provided further that where, in consequence of any member of such family holding any land in any other part of India outside the State, the ceiling area in relation to the family is reduced as provided in subsection (3A) the one-fifth of the ceiling area as aforesaid shall be calculated with reference to the ceiling area as would have been applicable had no such land been held by such member in any other part of India.” Sub-section (3B) of Section 6 states that the family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of 1- 5th of the ceiling area for each of the member in excess of five, where, a family or a joint family consists of more than 5 members comprising a person and other members belonging to categories specified therein. The issue is no longer res integra. Sub-section (3B) of Section 6 had fallen for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Jat Laxmanji Talasji (supra). In paragraphs 8 and 9, it has been held thus: 8. The issue is no longer res integra. Sub-section (3B) of Section 6 had fallen for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Jat Laxmanji Talasji (supra). In paragraphs 8 and 9, it has been held thus: 8. Having regard to this definition it can be safely concluded that the land-holder, his wife and his offspring consisting of three minor sons and three minor daughters would certainly constitute a family even if the mother of the land holder is excluded from consideration. Thus in any view the family of the land holder consisted of 8 members including himself, his wife, three minor sons and three minor daughters. The Tribunal was therefore clearly in error in taking the view that the family consisted of not more than 5 members. Learned counsel for the appellant however contended that in applying the test whether or not the family consisted of 5 members regard must be had only to the members of the family belonging to the specified category namely minor sons in so far as the composition of the family of the land holder in the present case is concerned. In other words the contention is that the land holder, his wife and his three minor sons are the only five persons of the family for the purposes of Section 6(3B). In our opinion there is no warrant for reading Section 6(3B) in this artificial and truncated manner. On a plain reading, Section 6(3B) is attracted where a family consists of more than 5 members "comprising a person and other members belonging to all or any one of the following categories viz. (i) minor son ....." In the present case the family of the land holder consists of more than 5 members. The family also includes persons of one of the specified categories viz. the minor sons. Thus, all the ingredients of Section 6(3B) are satisfied. In order to claim benefit of Section 6(3B) the test which must be satisfied is a two fold test. First, whether the claimant's family consists of more than five persons. In the present case the answer to this test is in the affirmative. the minor sons. Thus, all the ingredients of Section 6(3B) are satisfied. In order to claim benefit of Section 6(3B) the test which must be satisfied is a two fold test. First, whether the claimant's family consists of more than five persons. In the present case the answer to this test is in the affirmative. The second test that is required to be answered in favour of the person who claims the benefit of Section 6(3B) is that such family must also comprise of one individual and other members besides himself who must belong to all or any of the three specified categories. This test is also answered in favour of the respondent inasmuch as the family does comprise of the respondent and other members and from out of the other members, three belong to one of the specified categories viz. 'minor son'. In otherwords access to Section 6(3B) is barred by two doors. In order to secure entry the family must consist of more than 5 persons. If there are more than 5 persons including the land holder himself, the first door will be opened and the land holder will be entitled to have an access provided the second door does not bar his entry inside the beneficial area. The second door will also be opened provided that some of the other members meaning thereby members other than individual land holder belong to one of the three categories specified in the section. The second door would be opened provided he has got minor sons. Admittedly, the respondent has three minor sons. Therefore both the doors which bar the access of the land holder to the benevolent provisions are opened. It is not possible to accede to the submission that in ascertaining whether or not the pre-condition is satisfied only the members of the specified category should be taken into account. For, to do so would be to kill the letter as well as the spirit of the concerned provision. We are therefore not prepared to uphold the plea of the appellant-state that the High Court has not correctly interpreted the relevant provision in the case giving rise to the present appeal. 9. Under the circumstances the appeal deserves to fail. For, to do so would be to kill the letter as well as the spirit of the concerned provision. We are therefore not prepared to uphold the plea of the appellant-state that the High Court has not correctly interpreted the relevant provision in the case giving rise to the present appeal. 9. Under the circumstances the appeal deserves to fail. But before we conclude we must set aright an inadvertent error made by the High Court in making computation of the extent of the additional land which the respondent was entitled to hold in excess of the prescribed ceiling in the context of section 6(3B). Computation in this behalf must be made by applying the formula embodied in Section 6(3B) viz. that the family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of "one fifth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five" subject to the rider that the total area does not exceed twice the ceiling area. It needs to be clarified that on a true interpretation of the provision "each member in excess of five" must of logical necessity mean each 'such' member of the specified handicapped category. In the present case there were 3 members in the family and it comprised of three members of the specified category viz. 3 minor sons. Under the circumstances for each minor son in excess of the five members the holder was entitled to 1/5th of the ceiling area in excess of the prescribed ceiling. That is to say he was entitled to 3/5th of the prescribed ceiling over and above the ceiling area subject to the rider that the total retainable holding of the family did not exceed twice the ceiling area. This aspect was lost sight of by the High Court in making the computation. ……... " The Tribunal, in sync with the provisions of sub-section (3B) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act of 1972 and the above referred principle, allowed 1/5th unit for the minor son Himanshusinh. This, was precisely in tune with the direction issued by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 22.04.1991. 31. Another ground raised, was about impermissibility on the part of the Mamlatdar & ALT to have conducted an inquiry into the land of village Pal. This, was precisely in tune with the direction issued by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 22.04.1991. 31. Another ground raised, was about impermissibility on the part of the Mamlatdar & ALT to have conducted an inquiry into the land of village Pal. Specific contention of the holder and recorded in paragraph 11 was, that “Mamlatdar was only to find out whether the holder was entitled to get 1/5th unit for the minor son or not and addition of survey no.89/4 and 89/5 of village Raiya, cannot be computed in the holding of the applicant as the total holding is made final by the High Court”, and it reads thus: 11. Learned Advocate Shri. Munshaw has challenged the further inquiry held by the Mamlatdar, Lodhika in holding that the applicant was also holding agricultural land at Pal. The Mamlatdar was not entitled to hold this type of inquiry as he had to follow the directions given to him by Their Lordships in the judgment dated 22-4-91. By this judgment, the learned Mamlatdar had only to find out whether the applicant was entitled to get 1/5th unit for the minor son or not. Hence, the addition of S. No. 89/4 and 89/5 of village Raiya on which houses are standing. cannot be computed in the holding of, the applicant as the total holding is made final by the High Court. The Mamlatdar, has held that the applicant had not shown 23 acres 33 gs. agricultural land of village Jashwantpur and Pal which he added and brought the total agricultural land to 334 acres 30 gs. instead of 311 acres 5 gunthas. Learned advocate Shri Munshaw has argued that when once the total holding is made final by the Hon'ble High any Court and that the State has not filed any appeal against the judgment and order passed by the lower courts, the Mamlatdar now cannot add any other land in the holding of the applicant. I fully agree with the arguments advanced by learned advocate Shri Munshaw. The Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to reopen the whole case but he was bound by the directions given to him by the Hon'ble High Court in its judgment dated 22-4-91. Hence, I hold that the total holding was 311- acres 5 gs. On 1-4-76.” 32. I fully agree with the arguments advanced by learned advocate Shri Munshaw. The Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to reopen the whole case but he was bound by the directions given to him by the Hon'ble High Court in its judgment dated 22-4-91. Hence, I hold that the total holding was 311- acres 5 gs. On 1-4-76.” 32. Another submission was totally beyond the scope of the proceedings i.e. about the entitlement of the mother to claim one unit i.e. 51 acres of land. Contention was also raised that land of village Raiya is shown in the form filed by the holder under the provisions of ULC Act and as it is covered under the Central Act, it cannot be touched. Contentions, namely, entitlement of the mother and applicability of the ULC Act to the land in question were rejected. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment of the Tribunal read thus: 12. Learned advocate Shri Munshaw has further argued that the mother of the applicant was alive on 1-4-76, hence, she is also entitled to claim one unit, hence 51 acres of land should be given to her towards one unit. In my opinion, even if she is entitled to claim one unit, I will not be able to help learned advocate Shri Munshaw in this respect. because I am bound by the directions given by the Hon'ble High Court by its judgment, Admittedly the litigation was contested upto Supreme Court but nowhere the applicant claimed one unit for his mother. Hon'ble High Court has given directions for the points to be determined and I cannot to beyond that, Hence,this question can not be raised at this stage before me. I therefore, do not consider the question of one unit for the mother. 13. Learned advocate Shri Munshaw has further argued that 200- A of land situated in village Raiya is shown in the from filled in by the applicant under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act, He has, therefore, argued that when the land situated in village Raiya is covered under the Central Act, the same land cannot be touched under the State Act. I do not agree with this argument also advanced by learned advocate Shri. Munshaw. The land situated at village Raiya is bid lnd which was shown in the holding of the applicant as Agricultural land. I do not agree with this argument also advanced by learned advocate Shri. Munshaw. The land situated at village Raiya is bid lnd which was shown in the holding of the applicant as Agricultural land. Even it is shown in the form filed by the applicant under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural lands Ceiling Act will not be affected and or disturbed. The holding of 200 acres of agricultural land at Raiya remains in the holding of the applicant and it is to be dealt with under the Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act. Even this point cannot be raised by learned advocate Shri Munshaw as we have to consider the case only for the purpose for which it was remanded by the Hon'ble High Court by its judgment. 14. In the result, this revision application is partly allowed, The Judgment and order passed by the lower court not allowing 1/5th unit to the applicant for his minor son Himanshu is set aside. The finding of the lower courts about 23 acres 33 gs. additional land of village Jashwantpur and Pal is set aside. It is held that the applicant is entitled to one unit for himself, one unit for his major son Amarsinh and 1/5th unit for his minor son Himanshu. The applicant will be entitled to 112- Aces 8 gs. towards 2-1/5th unit. The applicant has already shown his choice for 101 acres 39 gs. The case is now sent to the Mamlatdar, Lodhika, for giving choice to the applicant for remaining 10 acres 9 gs. from the surplus land. The applicant show his choice within one month from the date of the notice issued to him by the Mamlatdar. Order accordingly.” 33. Pertinently, the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the holder before the Tribunal were blowing hot and cold. In paragraph 11, it has been pointed out that the lands of Jaswantpura and Pal could not have been considered in view of the judgment dated 22.04.1991, that is the limited remand and the Mamlatdar & ALT was obliged to conduct only a limited inquiry as to the 1/5th unit for the minor son of the holder. In paragraph 11, it has been pointed out that the lands of Jaswantpura and Pal could not have been considered in view of the judgment dated 22.04.1991, that is the limited remand and the Mamlatdar & ALT was obliged to conduct only a limited inquiry as to the 1/5th unit for the minor son of the holder. When it was clearly understood by the parties, that the Mamlatdar & ALT was to consider only the limited issue, it was impermissible for the learned advocate for the holder to have raised additional contentions as regards the claim of additional one unit for mother i.e. 51 acres and applicability of ULC Act to the land in question. The Tribunal, rightly concluded that it was bound by the direction given by the High Court in its judgment dated 22.04.1991 and did not accept the said submissions. In the considered opinion of this Court, the judgment of the Tribunal, was strictly in conformity with the directions contained in the oral judgment dated 22.04.1991 and no error can be said to have been committed by it in passing the judgment date 12.10.1994 so as to warrant interference in exercise of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 34. By the judgment of the Tribunal, the parties, namely, the State Government and the holder, both were aggrieved and hence, respective writ petitions were filed. 35. The learned single Judge, noted that merely because the Division Bench has directed the Tribunal to find out whether on the specified date there was any minor son in the family of the holder or not, the claim of the holder to have one unit for his mother cannot be turned down on the ground that the said question cannot be reopened. The learned single Judge proceeded to declare that as per the settled law, the mother of the holder is entitled to have her own separate unit. This finding of the learned single Judge is erroneous inasmuch as, the said observation, would amount to traveling beyond the order passed by the Apex Court so also the Division Bench. The learned single Judge simply referred to the proceedings before the Apex Court, without discussing anything further and disregarding the past proceedings, has decided the issues as if they were raised for the first time. This exercise, in the opinion of this Court, was impermissible. 36. The learned single Judge simply referred to the proceedings before the Apex Court, without discussing anything further and disregarding the past proceedings, has decided the issues as if they were raised for the first time. This exercise, in the opinion of this Court, was impermissible. 36. While adverting to the issue of the land in question, namely, whether it could have been decided under the provisions of ULC Act notwithstanding the fact that the land is a bid land and the holder is shown as holding the agricultural land, the learned single Judge proceeded to consider the provisions of the ULC Act including Section 42 and the exemption applied for under Section 21. The learned single Judge has considered that the land in question in the Master plan, has been included in the residential zone and it cannot be deemed to be an agricultural land, though it may have been mainly used for agricultural purpose. With this finding, the learned single Judge, concluded that the provisions of Act of 1960 are not applicable to the land in question and the ULC Act is applicable and allowed the writ petition of the holder and dismissed the writ petition of the State Government. 37. Discernibly, the petitioner-holder to save his land, has tried to raise varied contentions. It is not to suggest that it cannot be raised but in view of the sanctity attached to the finality to the judicial orders it was impermissible to the petitioner to take advantage of the remand and expand and improvise the scope of challenge and that too, at each and every stage of the proceedings including before this Court in the captioned appeal. Pertinently, the order of remand in the first instance by the Apex Court, was restricted only qua the option which was followed by the Division Bench while allowing the review application. Thereafter, the Division Bench, vide judgment dated 22.04.1991, remanded the matter only to decide as to whether on the specified date i.e. on 01.04.1976, there was any minor son in the family of the petitioner or not and on that limited issue, the parties were entitled to lead evidence and the Tribunal to decide the same. All these orders, clearly suggest that the challenge by the holder was narrowed down. All these orders, clearly suggest that the challenge by the holder was narrowed down. Considering the limited and specific scope of remand and the authorities having decided accordingly, it was not open to the learned single Judge to have opened up additional issues in such a manner, nullifying the effect of the judicial orders having attained finality inter se between the parties. The issues stand crystallized and it would be impermissible to reopen the same. Re: Article 227 judgments 38. It is well recognized principle that power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is one of the judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts, however erroneous they may be. It is only when the conclusions are perverse or against the weight of evidence that the High Court, can interfere. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is limited to seeing that an inferior court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct any error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. Power under Article 227 is one of the judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset the conclusions of facts, however, erroneous they may be. Apt would be the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. (supra). In paragraph 5, it has been observed thus: “5. The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution is well-settled. Power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however erroneous those may be. It is well-settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and Another v. Amarnath and Another(1) where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows "This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee(2) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". The same view was reiterated by another Constitution Bench of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora & Another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others. (3) Even recently in Bathut mat Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta and Another, (4) dealing with a litigation between a landlord and tenant under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court relying on its earlier decisions observed as follows :- "If an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts".” In the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra), it has been held and observed that supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In the opinion of this Court, there was nothing so grossly wrong, unjust and shocking so as to warrant the interference by the High Court. The Tribunal did not commit any error in deciding the issue as directed by this Court and therefore, in absence of any error apparent on the face of the record or perversity pointed out, the learned single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order and decided the issue on a fresh canvass. Re.: Judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Manoharsinhji Pradumansinhji Jadeja (supra) 39. In peculiar facts of the case, other contentions raised are not required to be gone into. However, for the sake of completeness of the judicial determination of those contentions, they are briefly dealt with herein below. 40. Re.: Judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Manoharsinhji Pradumansinhji Jadeja (supra) 39. In peculiar facts of the case, other contentions raised are not required to be gone into. However, for the sake of completeness of the judicial determination of those contentions, they are briefly dealt with herein below. 40. Contention is raised that the Apex Court has declared the Amendment Act of 1972 to be a stillborn Act and hence, null and void. Consequently, the proceedings initiated by the Mamlatdar & ALT under the Amendment Act of 1972 and the orders passed are nullity. As against this, it is the stand taken by the State Government that the Apex Court, has not given any declaration that the Amendment Act is unconstitutional, void and without jurisdiction. While dealing with the said contention, reference to the brief facts before the Apex Court, is necessitated. In the ceiling case, order was passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, holding land to an extent of 587 acres and 35 gunthas in excess of the ceiling limit and the respondent was entitled to retain 51 acres. Proceedings were initiated and having faced rejection, the holder preferred a writ petition before this Court challenging the judgment of the Tribunal, raising contention that his lands are covered by the ULC Act and were not governed by the Act of 1960. Accepting the stand of the holder, the learned single Judge quashed and set aside the order of the Tribunal. The State, lost in Letters Patent Appeal and hence, approached the Apex Court. Submissions and counter submissions were made and considering the statutory provisions of the Act of 1960, the Amendment Act of 1972 and other enactments as referred to in paragraph 32, the Apex Court, examined the following broad legal principles: “i) Whether ‘Bid Land’ would fall within the definition ‘Land' read along with the definition of ‘Agriculture’ as defined under Sections 2(17) and 2(1) of the Act of 1960 ? ii) In order to ascertain the nature of description of ‘Bid Land’ can the definition of the said expression under the earlier statutes viz. Act No.XXV of 1951, Act No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.III of 1952 can be imported ? iii) What is the implication of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 vis-à-vis the Act of 1960 in respect of ‘Bid Land’ ? Act No.XXV of 1951, Act No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.III of 1952 can be imported ? iii) What is the implication of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 vis-à-vis the Act of 1960 in respect of ‘Bid Land’ ? iv) Whether the Amendment Act of 1974 which came into effect from 01.04.1976 and the definition of ‘Bid Land’ under the said Amendment Act of 1974 can be applied for the purpose of deciding the issue involved in this litigation ? v) Whether the ratio decidendi of this Court in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra) can be applied to the facts of this case ? vi) Whether the orders of the authorities under the Act of 1960 impugned before the High Court were hit by the principles of Res Judicata ? vii) What is the effect of the repealing of the Urban Land Ceiling Act over the Act of 1960 ?” 40.1 The issue, was whether the ‘bid land’ would fall within the definition of ‘land’ as indicated in the definition of ‘agriculture’ as defined in Sections 2(17) and 2(1) of the Act of 1960. Contention was raised that bid lands were duly covered within the said expression of ‘land’ and the 1974 Amendment Act only sought to remove doubt as regards the character of the bid lands. The Apex Court, in paragraph 61, has held and observed that the concept of bid land was not a new phenomenon to the Act of 1960 in view of the definition of ‘bid land’ under the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952, Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 and the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951. The Apex Court, therefore, held that examining the definition of the expression ‘agriculture’ under subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Act of 1960 uninfluenced by the 1974 Amendment Act, it includes the land used for raising of grass, crops or garden produce, the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or part thereof for grazing. The Apex Court, while further discussing, in paragraph 61 held and observed that; “...The apparent intention of the legislature in including the land used for grazing or for raising grass as per the definition of ‘agriculture’ under the 1960 Act is quite explicit, inasmuch as, the use of cattle in farming operation was inseparable at the relevant point of time. The Apex Court, while further discussing, in paragraph 61 held and observed that; “...The apparent intention of the legislature in including the land used for grazing or for raising grass as per the definition of ‘agriculture’ under the 1960 Act is quite explicit, inasmuch as, the use of cattle in farming operation was inseparable at the relevant point of time. Therefore, when the legislature thought it fit to include the land for raising grass and used for grazing as a part of definition of ‘agriculture’ there is no need to seek succour from any other definition which was sought to be introduced at any later point of time by way of amendment under the 1974 Amendment Act.” 40.2 In paragraph 68, while accepting the submissions of the respondent therein, the Apex Court held that invocation of the 1974 Amendment Act cannot be made having regard to its subsequent emergence, namely, 01.04.1976, i.e. after the coming into force of ULC Act as from 17.02.1976. The consideration by the Apex Court was confined to the position that prevailed under the unamended Act of 1960. The Apex Court, was also of the opinion that endeavour was only to find out whether the Act of 1960 is applicable in respect of the lands held by the respondent for the purpose of its enforcement or otherwise. In paragraph 70, the Apex Court, dealt with the question whether the 1974 Amendment Act which was notified as from 01.04.1976 does in any way affect the application of Act of 1960 as it originally stood having regard to the enforcement of the Amendment Act. Paragraphs 68 to 70 are extracted herein below: “68. We shall deal with the object of the Amendment Act 1974, namely, for removal of doubts a little later. For the present, inasmuch as, we have to a very large extent accepted the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the invocation of the Amendment Act of 1974 cannot be made having regard to its subsequent emergence, namely, 01.04.1976 i.e. after the coming into force of Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976, we confine our consideration to the position that prevailed under the unamended Act of 1960. After all our endeavour is only to find out whether the 1960 Act is applicable in respect of the lands held by the respondent for the purpose of its enforcement or otherwise against the respondent. 69. After all our endeavour is only to find out whether the 1960 Act is applicable in respect of the lands held by the respondent for the purpose of its enforcement or otherwise against the respondent. 69. One other submission of the learned senior counsel for the respondent was that the respondent was once a Ruler cannot be held to be an ‘agriculturalist’, inasmuch as, the definition of ‘agriculturist’ under Section 2(3) means a person who cultivate the land personally. We were not impressed by the said submission, inasmuch as, the definition of an ‘agriculturist’ is not merely confined to Section 2(3) alone. The said definition has to be necessarily considered along with the definition “to cultivate” as defined under Section 2(11), as well as, the expression “to cultivate personally” as defined under Section 2(12) of the Act. Those expressions considered together make the position clear that even a person cultivating the lands by ones own labour or by any other member of one’s family or under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of ones’ family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind would nonetheless fall within the four corners of the expression “agriculturist”. Therefore, the expression “agriculturist” used in the definition Clause 2(3) or “agriculture” under Section 2(1) is wide enough to include the respondent who though was once a ‘Ruler’ and was not tilling the land by himself would still fall within the definition of ‘agriculturist’ when such agricultural operation namely cultivation of land is carried out with the support of any one of his family members by supervising such operation or by engaging any labour to carry out such cultivation. We are therefore of the firm view that the ‘Bid land’, the nomenclature of which was categorically admitted by the respondent and having regard to its nature and purpose for which it was put to use would squarely fall within the definition of ‘agriculture’ as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1960 as it originally stood unaffected by the coming into force of the Act, 1976 as well as the Amendment of 1974. In the result, its application to those ‘Bid lands’ held by the respondent cannot be thwarted. 70. In the result, its application to those ‘Bid lands’ held by the respondent cannot be thwarted. 70. We shall now deal with the question whether the amendment Act of 1974 which was notified as from 01.04.1976 does in any way affect the application of 1960 Act as it originally stood having regard to the enforcement of the Amendment Act by drawing a clear distinction as between the position which was existing prior to the specified date namely 01.04.1976 and after the said date.” 40.3 Contention was raised by the respondent that the definition of ‘land’ under sub-section (17) of Section 2 after the amendment, i.e. 01.04.1976 seeks to differentiate between the nature of land which would be governed by the provisions of the Act of 1960 i.e. one prior to the specified date and thereafter. Reference was also made by the respondent to sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (17) of Section 2 and it was contended that but for such inclusion of bid lands in the amended definition there was no scope to proceed against such bid lands held by Girasdars and Barkhalidars as well as the Rulers of erstwhile State. Not accepting the submission of the respondent, the Apex Court, in paragraph 74, held and observed thus: “74. We too are not inclined to go by the argument based on the objects and reasons in relation to a ‘Bid land’. We have considered the definition of ‘agriculture’ under Section 2(1), the definition of ‘agriculturist’ under Section 2(3) along with the expressions ‘a person who cultivates land personally’ and the definition of ‘land’ under Section 2(17) of the unamended Act. Having examined the nature of description of those expressions contained therein, we are convinced that the legislature intended and did include ‘lands’ held by ‘agriculturist’ where grass is raised or used for grazing purposes as part of agricultural land which was in the possession of agriculturist. Such lands where grass is grown or used for grazing purpose are always known as ‘Bid land’. Such ‘Bid land’ was ultimately brought within the definition of ‘land’ under Section 2(17) of the Act of 1960. Such lands where grass is grown or used for grazing purpose are always known as ‘Bid land’. Such ‘Bid land’ was ultimately brought within the definition of ‘land’ under Section 2(17) of the Act of 1960. Therefore, even by keeping aside the implication of the wider definition which was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1974 in regard to ‘Bid lands’ and going by the definition of ‘agriculture’ and ‘land’ under Section 2(1) and 2(17) of the Act of 1960, we have no difficulty in taking a definite conclusion that such definition contained in the Act as it originally stood did include ‘Bid lands’ which lands were exclusively meant for cutting grass for cattle or used for grazing purposes. Therefore, there was no necessity for this Court to draw any further assistance either from the Objects and Reasons or from the provisions of the Amended Act of 1974 in order to hold that ‘Bid lands’ were part of agricultural land governed by the provisions of the Act of 1960.” The Apex Court held and observed that even by keeping aside the implication of the wider definition which was introduced by the 1974 Amendment Act in regard to ‘bid lands’; going by the definition of ‘agriculture’ and ‘land’ under Sections 2(1) and 2(17) of the 1960 Act, it did include, ‘bid lands’ which lands were exclusively meant for cutting grass for cattle or used for grazing purposes and therefore, there was no necessity to draw any further assistance either from the objects and reasons or from the provisions of the Amendment 1974 Act in order to hold that ‘bid lands’ were part of agricultural land governed by the provisions of the 1960 Act. 40.4 Reference was also made to the decision in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar vs. State of Gujarat (supra). The Apex Court, accepting the submission of the State, held and observed that a close reading of paragraph 20 is clear pointer that irrespective of the definition of ‘bid land’ under the 1974 Amendment Act, having regard to the definition of ‘bid land’ under Saurashtra Estate Acquisition Act, such land would fall within the definition of ‘agricultural land’ as defined in sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act of 1960. 40.5 In paragraph 82, the Apex Court, while dealing with the submission related to the supervening effect of the ULC Act in the State of Gujarat on and after 17.02.1976 which according to learned senior counsel has made the Act of 1974 a ‘stillborn child’ and also the submission that after the coming into force of the ULC Act, there was no authority to invoke the Act of 1960 in order to acquire the lands of the respondent, observed that it had refrained from relying upon the 1974 Amended Act while approving the action of the appellant in seeking to proceed against the respondent for acquiring the surplus lands of the respondent under the Act of 1960. The Apex Court, observed that there is no necessity to deal with the said contention in extenso. For submission relating to concept of eclipse, the Apex Court, considered the Constitutional Bench judgment in the case of M.P.V. Sundararamier. It has been held and observed that once the ULC Act, came to be repealed whatever constitutional embargo that was existing on the Act of 1960 as well as the 1974 Amendment Act ceased to exist and the Act would operate in full force. Paragraph 82 reads thus:- “82. The next submission of learned counsel for the respondent related to the supervening effect of the Act, 1976 in the State of Gujarat on and after 17.02.1976 which according to learned senior counsel has made the Act of 1974 a ‘still born child’ and also the submission that after the coming into force of the Act, 1976 there was no authority in the respondent to invoke the 1960 Act in order to acquire the lands of the respondent. As we have refrained from relying upon the Amended Act of 1974 while approving the action of the appellant in seeking to proceed against the respondent for acquiring the surplus lands of the respondent under the Act of 1960, we do not find any dire necessity to deal with the said contention in extenso. The formidable submission raised on behalf of the respondent related to the supremacy of the Act, 1976 over the 1960 Act. The formidable submission raised on behalf of the respondent related to the supremacy of the Act, 1976 over the 1960 Act. The learned counsel pointed out that the respondent filed its return under the provisions of the Act, 1976 on 13.08.1976, that the said return was considered by the competent authority by passing its Order dated 21.05.1983 which was thereafter considered by the Tribunal in its order dated 08.09.1989 and that the appellant/State while dealing with the respondent and the Act, 1976 themselves have mentioned in the reply affidavit in paragraph 4.1 that the lands in Survey No.111/2-3 situated in Madhopur village was reserved for site and service project meaning thereby that they were not agricultural lands. The learned counsel would, therefore, contend that while on the one hand when it came to the question of determining the surplus lands under the provisions of the Act, 1976 the appellant would contend that the lands held by the respondent were not classified as agricultural land and thereby not entitled for exclusion under the said Act, when it came to the question of applicability of 1960 Act they contend that such lands are to be treated as agricultural lands.” 40.6 This Court, is in complete agreement with the contention of Ms Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Additional Advocate General inasmuch as, broad issues which have been considered by the Apex Court, do not suggest that there was any challenge to the Amendment Act of 1972. Contention was definitely raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent to the effect and recorded in paragraph 24 “that the 1974 amendment to the 1960 Act was a ‘stillborn child’ inasmuch as, it came into effect only from 1-4-1976 whereas the 1976 Act was brought into force on 17-2- 1976 itself and was holding the field”. The said contention has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the following words. “we have to a very large extent accepted the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the invocation of the Amendment Act of 1974 cannot be made having regard to its subsequent emergence, namely, 1-4-1976 i.e. after the coming into force of Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976”. With this, the Apex Court, confined the consideration to the position that prevailed under the unamended Act of 1960. With this, the Apex Court, confined the consideration to the position that prevailed under the unamended Act of 1960. 40.7 In paragraph 74, the Apex Court, while considering the issue whether the Amendment Act of 1972 in any way affect the application of Act of 1960 as it originally stood, held and observed that “therefore even by keeping aside the implication of the wider definition which was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1974 in regard to ‘Bid lands’ and going by the definition of ‘agriculture’ and ‘land’ under Sections 2(1) and 2(17) of the Act of 1960, we have no difficulty in taking a definite conclusion that such definition contained in the Act as it originally stood did include ‘Bid lands’ which lands were exclusively meant for cutting grass for cattle or used for grazing purposes”. 40.8 Relevant in this behalf would also be judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra). In the said case, the challenge was to the judgment and order dated 17.02.2004 of this Court passed in Special Civil Application no.1145 of 1991 and other allied matters. The challenge was against the acquisition of bid lands as surplus lands on two grounds, namely, (i) Act being not applicable to the bid lands and (ii) the provisions being ultra vires the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of this Court, turned down the challenge in view of the protective umbrellas of Article 31-A and 31-C being available to the Act of 1960 and the Amendment Act of 1972.The Apex Court in the said case observed that the Act of 1974 is included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India by thirtyfourth Amendment Act and the challenge was given up in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2007 (2) SCC 1 . Paragraph 2 of the judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra), reads thus:- “2. At the outset, we may state that writ petitions were filed in the High Court inter alia challenging the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act (2 of 1974) as violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Paragraph 2 of the judgment in the case of Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra), reads thus:- “2. At the outset, we may state that writ petitions were filed in the High Court inter alia challenging the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act (2 of 1974) as violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. We may state that Amending Act 2 of 1974 has been included as Item 71 in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Thirtyfourth Amendment) Act. That inclusion was challenged before the Constitution Bench of this Court on the ground that the Thirtyfourth Amendment to the Constitution violated the basic structure of the Constitution which challenge has now been given up in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Tamil Nadu.” 40.9 In absence of any challenge to the validity and in view of the observation made by the Apex Court in paragraph 2, contention of the respondent that the Amendment Act of 1972 was declared as null and void, cannot be accepted. Besides, unlike in the present case, the proceedings were ongoing and arising out of the orders of the authorities, followed by the orders passed by the High Court and challenge pending before the Apex Court. Whereas, in the present case, there are the orders passed, issues were concluded and decided and matter was remitted for limited adjudication qua the minor son. Thus, in view of the peculiar facts of the case on hand, the judgment in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinh Jadeja (supra), would not apply to the facts of the present case. Re.: Other Contentions and conclusion 41. Various other submissions have been raised, namely, (i) erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of the Court cannot clothe that court with jurisdiction where it has none; (ii) right of the party raising challenge; (iii) no estoppel against the statute; (iv) authority lacking jurisdiction and orders being nullity; (v) question of law can be raised any time, cannot be gone into for, the judgment dated 22.04.1991 has attained finality inter se between the parties and is binding. 42. 42. In view of the above discussion, this Court, therefore, is of the considered opinion that the learned single Judge, in absence of any error apparent on the face of the record, could not have interfered with the judgment of the Tribunal under challenge. Hence, the impugned CAV judgment, is hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment of the Tribunal is hereby confirmed. Parties to act accordingly. 43. Thus, the Letters Patent Appeal no.2111 of 2009 in Special Civil Application no.13065 of 1994 is hereby allowed while, the Letters Patent Appeal no.2108 of 2009 filed by the State Government in Special Civil Application no.10235 of 1996 does not deserve to be interfered with and is rejected. Letters Patent Appeal no.2111 of 2009 in Special Civil Application no.13065 of 1994 having been allowed, no further orders are required to be passed in Letters Patent Appeal no.2004 of 2009 in Special Civil Application no.5174 of 1996 and is accordingly disposed of. 44. In view of the above, no further orders are required to be passed in respective civil applications and the same are hereby disposed of. No order as to costs. 45. While concluding, it is required to be put on record that civil proceedings being Special Civil Suit no.186 of 2010 was filed with respect to the land in question by the plaintiff Kantilal Patel through his power of attorney – Dolly Patel vs. Nakulan Paniker and others. The suit was decree by judgment dated 04.07.2012 against which, Nakulan Paniker and Siddhi Infrastructure & Developers – defendants therein, have preferred First Appeal nos.2238 of 2012 and 2239 of 2012. 46. This Court, on 25.06.2018 in First Appeal no.2238 of 2012, has passed the following order: “Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties This appeal together with Letters Patent Appeals No.2111/2009 with 2004/2009 with 2108/2009 shall be listed for final hearing on 19.07.2018. Mr. Pratik Jasani, learned advocate states that he had intimated the respondent No.1.3 - Chhayaben Kantilal Patel that he is retiring from the matter for his personal reasons. A copy of the letter has been placed on record. Mr. Pratik Jasani, learned advocate states that he had intimated the respondent No.1.3 - Chhayaben Kantilal Patel that he is retiring from the matter for his personal reasons. A copy of the letter has been placed on record. Under the circumstances, the respondent No.1.3 – Chhayaben Kantilal Patel shall make necessary arrangements before the next date of hearing failing which, the matter(s) shall be proceeded further ex-parte.” During the pendency of the First Appeals, the heirs of the deceased plaintiff, including Dolly Patel, have preferred Civil Application (for withdrawal) no.1 of 2024 in First Appeal no.2238 of 2012 and Civil Application (for withdrawal) no.2 of 2024 in First Appeal no.2239 of 2012, which have been decided by the CAV judgment of even date and the applications have been allowed and the Special Civil Suit no.186 of 2010 have been permitted to be withdrawn. FURTHER ORDER 47. After the pronouncement, Mr Mihir H. Joshi and Ms Trusha K. Patel, learned Senior Counsel, so also Mr Salil M. Thakore, learned advocate appearing for the respective parties, have prayed for stay of the operation and implementation of the CAV judgment. 48. Request is vehemently opposed by Ms Manisha Luvkumar Shah, learned Additional Advocate General on the ground that as one of the Letters Patel Appeals is now allowed, let the possession of the land in question be handed over to the State Government. The State Government, at the most, will not allot it to somebody else. 49. As the parties are desirous of approaching the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the operation and implementation of the CAV judgment, is hereby stayed for a period of four weeks’.