JUDGMENT : Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and award dated 19/08/2013 rendered in MACP No.919 of 1999 by the MACT, Bhavnagar, the appellant – insurance company has filed the present appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act. 2. The facts, emerges from the record of the case are that on 19-08- 1999, the minor-son of applicants was playing nearby their society at Bhavnagar. At about 3.00 pm, the opponent No.1 came there by driving a four-wheeler vehicle bearing No.GJ-4.T 6461 rashly and negligently, in full speed and dashed his vehicle with the minor-son of the applicant. As a result thereof, he sustained (1) fracture in the forehead, (2) fracture behind the head, (3) serious injuries in the brain and so that, suffered internal haemorrhage due to which, (4) his right part of the body suffered permanent paralysis, (5) right hand and right leg became oblique, (6) eyes also became oblique and (7) lost memory power and thereby, suffered permanent neurological disability. It is further submitted that at the relevant time, the minor-victim was aged about 5 years and studying in Standard 2nd. Thus, due to the above accidental injuries, the minorvictim has suffered serious injuries and thereby, disfigurement and permanent disability and hence, not able to do all the regular and routine work as was doing earlier and is facing great hardships and difficulties in doing the same. A huge amount behind the treatment and medicines has been spent. Moreover, due to long treatment and taking rest as per the advice of the doctor, his study has suffered a lot. Under these circumstances, the petitioners have prayed the claimed amount as compensation on various grounds Initially, the claim was filed for Rs.5,00,000/-, but subsequently, vide an application-Ex.68, the applicants moved an application under the provisions of Order-6, Rule-17 to enhance the claim from Rs.5 lacs to Rs.15 lacs which came to be allowed. 3. The learned tribunal after full-fledged trial and considering the oral and documentary evidence led before it was pleased to award the compensation of Rs.6,82,500/- to be recovered from the opponents jointly and severally together with interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a. and proportionate costs from the date of Claim Petition till its realization. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Majmudar for the appellant – insurance company and learned advocate Mr.Bhat, for the respondents no.1 and 2. 5. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Majmudar for the appellant – insurance company and learned advocate Mr.Bhat, for the respondents no.1 and 2. 5. Learned advocate for the appellant Mr.Majmudar assailed the impugned judgment and award mainly on the ground of non-involvement of the offending vehicle. He would submit that FIR and charge-sheet of the accident was filed but since the complainant has entered into compromise with the accused which has resulted into acquittal of the driver of the offending vehicle from the road accident and this fact is apparent from Exh.72 as the learned JMFC delivered the judgment in the criminal case acquitting the accused/driver upon the compromise with the complainant. He would therefore submit that looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case on record, it is a case established before the tribunal that offending vehicle was not involved in the road accident but the driver was subsequently arraigned to make out the case under the MV Act. In other words, it is argued that vehicle is implicated as it brings the case within the ambit of MV Act. By making these submissions, he would submit to allow this appeal and to quash and set aside the judgment and award delivered by the tribunal. 6. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr.Bhatt for the claimants would submit that documents on record are sufficient to indicate that the accident took place; even vehicle is also involved in the road accident however the driver was acquitted on the ground of non-establishment of the negligence. He would further submit that judgment passed by the criminal court acquitting the accused is not binding to the MACT while deciding the claim petition under Section 163-A or 166 of the MV Act. He would therefore submit that there is no substance in the argument advanced by learned advocate for the appellant – insurance company. 6.1 Learned Advocate Mr.Bhatt has also quarreled with the impugned judgment on the ground that the tribunal has not granted the future prospect while considering the grant of just and fair compensation and also not granted compensation under other pecuniary and non-pecuniary head while properly appreciating the evidence and he would therefore submit to enhance the awarded amount. 7. 6.1 Learned Advocate Mr.Bhatt has also quarreled with the impugned judgment on the ground that the tribunal has not granted the future prospect while considering the grant of just and fair compensation and also not granted compensation under other pecuniary and non-pecuniary head while properly appreciating the evidence and he would therefore submit to enhance the awarded amount. 7. I have heard learned advocates appearing for both the sides and perused the R & P. Let us address the first issue of involvement of the offending vehicle as argued by learned advocate Mr.Majmudar. In this regard, the finding of the tribunal is required to be referred to which is at paragraph 11 and 12 which reads thus: “11. So long as the occurrence of such incident, involvement of the alleged vehicle in such incident and the resultant injuries to the minor- victim are concerned, in order to prove such contentions, the petitioner No.1-complainant- father of the minor-victim has adduced oral evidence by filing an affidavit-cum-deposition under Order-18, Rule-4 of the Civil Procedure Code vide Ex.26 and further affidavit of deposition qua enhanced claim amount vide Ex.68 which is nothing, but altogether repetition of the facts and averments, made in the Petition and hence, for the sake of convenience, they are not reiterated again. It is pertinent to note that at the time of accident, this witness was neither present nor had seen the accident, but he heard such fact from others. Such fact is also admitted by him in his cross-examination. 12. However, in this context, looking to the FIR- Ex.33 and Charge-sheet-Ex.37, they clearly go on to show the occurrence of such unfortunate incident at the relevant place by the alleged offending vehicle and pursuant thereto, filing of FIR in the concerned Police Station on the same day. It is pertinent to note here that the petitioners have not produced the Panchnama of place of accident in the matter which is the material evidence for deciding the negligence aspect as to who is responsible for causing the accident. It is pertinent to note here that the petitioners have not produced the Panchnama of place of accident in the matter which is the material evidence for deciding the negligence aspect as to who is responsible for causing the accident. However, petitioners have filed a pursis vide Ex.70 to the effect that they applied to the learned Trial Court for obtaining the very evidence from the record of the Criminal Case of that incident, but such case was disposed of and the relevant papers of that case were destroyed by the learned Trial Court and, therefore, for proving the negligence aspect, they have produced the order, passed below a Compromise Pursis vide Ex.72 based thereupon, the order below that pursis and the judgment, delivered in that Criminal Case bearing No.7385 of 1999 73. Looking to Ex.72, it clearly transpires that on 09-04-2003, by mutual understanding, the compromise took place between the parties particularly for section-337 of the Indian Penal Code, etc. The very document bears the signatures of complainant i.e. the petitioner No.1-father of the minor-victim as himself and on behalf of minor-victim as well as signature of the accused i.e. opponent No.1-Driver herein of the alleged offending vehicle. Accordingly, to that effect admitting that compromise, under section-320(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, order was passed by the learned Trial Judge, Bhavnagar below that pursis acquitting the accused i.e. the opponent No.1-Driver herein from the charge, levelled against under section-337 of the IPC and with further direction to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law under section-279 of the IPC and sections-171, 184, 134 of the MV Act. Moreover, looking to Ex.73 which is the judgment, delivered by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhavnagar for the remaining charge under section-279 of the IPC and sections-177, 184, 134 of the MV Act. It clearly transpires that aforestated facts regarding the compromise between the parties were mentioned in it. It is held that "it is fact that the accident has taken place", but no evidence has come on record that such incident took place due to the negligence, occurred on behalf of the accused i.e. the opponent No.1-Driver herein and hence, in the absence of anything contrary to the accused, he was acquitted from the above charges. It is held that "it is fact that the accident has taken place", but no evidence has come on record that such incident took place due to the negligence, occurred on behalf of the accused i.e. the opponent No.1-Driver herein and hence, in the absence of anything contrary to the accused, he was acquitted from the above charges. However, the fact remains to be taken into account is that it is observed in unambiguous and clear term by the learned Trial Judge that since the compromise has taken between the parties, the complainant (the opponent No.1-Driver herein) seems to have no interest to put forward evidence against the accused. This clearly amounts to negligence on the part of opponent No.1- Driver. For the sake of convenience, if it is believed for a moment that the alleged offending vehicle was neither involved in the accident nor it was driven by the opponent No.1-Driver nor the opponent No.1 was negligent and he was innocent, the opponent No.1-Driver who was the accused in the aforestated Criminal Case might never entered into such compromise with the complainant i.e. petitioner No.1-father of the minor-victim. Before arriving at such a compromise, there might be some understanding between the parties. Keeping this point aside, if it is presumed that the Panchnama of the place of accident is produced on record, it is proved fact in this case that after the accident, the offending vehicle ran away from the place and therefrom also, nothing would be found and so, the Tribunal would have to draw adverse inference against the opponents. No doubt, the Panchnama of place of the accident being a material evidence in an accident case, necessary evidence in the cases of this nature, but looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, even otherwise, the nonproduction of the Panchnama of the place of accident does not affect fatal to the case of petitioners, because the Charge Sheet against he driver of the offending vehicle clearly states the vehicle number driven by him during the alleged incident. Thus, the position, comes out from the very document clearly corroborates and supports the averments and version of the petitioner. Thus, the position, comes out from the very document clearly corroborates and supports the averments and version of the petitioner. The Tempo, being a big vehicle, while driving it, the driver of such vehicle, ought to have driven the vehicle more carefully keeping a safe distance with the other vehicles and pedestrians, passing on the road, but in the present case, the opponent-Driver has failed to do so. Had he been cautious, such an incident could be avoided. Besides, the driver and owner of the vehicle have not remained present to examine themselves before the Tribunal and hence, an adverse inference should be drawn against them. Thus, though the Panchnama of the place of accident is not produced on record, in view of the very position, comes out from the above evidences i.e. the Compromise Pursis and judgment of the learned Trial Court, it is evident that such unfortunate accident took place with the minor-victim at the relevant time and place by the offending vehicle due to the rash and negligent driving of the opponent No.1- Driver and hence, I hold him solely responsible him for causing the accident. Accordingly, I answer issue No.1 in the affirmative.” 8. It is evident that the FIR of the road accident is filed at Exh.33. Charge-sheet is filed at Exh.37. It is not in dispute that criminal case was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle which was tried before the learned JMFC and since the charge levelled against the accused/driver of the offending vehicle was under Section 337 of the IPC, which is compoundable offence, pursis at Exh.72 was placed before the learned JMFC to compound the offence which is permissible under Section 320(2) of the Cr.PC, after recording compromise between the parties acquitted the accused qua offence under Section 337 of the IPC. Albeit trial was conducted against the accused – driver of the offending vehicle for other charge being offence under Sections 279 of the IPC and under Sections 171, 184 and 134 of the MV Act, ultimately on appreciation of evidence driver came to be acquitted at the end of the trial. To be noted that as per catena of decisions the judgment rendered in the criminal court is not binding to the MACT. What deserves and requires to be noticed that the fact of the accident has not been denied. To be noted that as per catena of decisions the judgment rendered in the criminal court is not binding to the MACT. What deserves and requires to be noticed that the fact of the accident has not been denied. Filing of charge-sheet subsequent to investigation upon FIR, against driver of the errant vehicle is sufficient to prove involvement of errant vehicle and degree of carelessness and negligence of driver required to prove under Section 166 of the MV Act. There is stark difference in the nature of evidence in criminal trial and trail under MV Act. To prove case under former one, evidence in nature of beyond reasonable doubt is required; but to prove case under later statute, evidence in nature of preponderance of probabilities or sans time even less than it is suffice. Whether criminal negligence in causing road accident was issue to be decided by the learned JMFC and said finding bear less consideration to the learned tribunal while deciding the claim petition under MV Act or not. 9. Worth reference can be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of United India Insurance Company Limited Versus Geetaben Wd/o.Decd. Natvarlaljayantilal Modi [2024 (0) GUJHC 11658] wherein in paragraph 6.1 it has been held thus: “6.1 The claimants had stated about the accident supported by the FIR and the panchnama. The claimants had also examined Paras Shukla as an eye witness to the incident. While opponent nos.1 and 2 have not challenged the deposition of the eye witness, though they had led their written statement, nor has the insurance company examined the driver as the witness, to contradict the say of the claimants or to prove the eye witness as false. In absence of any contradictory evidence or countering evidence from the side of the insurance company, and when on investigation the charge sheet had been led against the driver of the involved vehicle, there is no reason to doubt the involvement of the vehicle. Hence, on that count, the appeal of the insurance company would not be sustainable.” Thus the issue which was pressed by the insurance company becomes insignificant and deserves rejection. 10. In Mangla Ram Versus Oriental Insurance Company Limited [ 2018 (5) SCC 656 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 has held as under: “21. Hence, on that count, the appeal of the insurance company would not be sustainable.” Thus the issue which was pressed by the insurance company becomes insignificant and deserves rejection. 10. In Mangla Ram Versus Oriental Insurance Company Limited [ 2018 (5) SCC 656 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 has held as under: “21. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to interfere in the First Appeal filed by respondent Nos.2 & 3, was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST-4701 was driven rashly and negligently by respondent No.2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming respondent No.2. This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina Fernandes (supra), noted that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the judgments already adverted to by us, filing of chargesheet against respondent No.2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in respect of motor accident cases by the Tribunal. Reliance placed upon the decisions in Minu B Mehta (supra) and Meena Variyal (supra), by the respondents, in our opinion, is of no avail. The dictum in these cases is on the matter in issue in the concerned case. Similarly, even the dictum in the case of Surender Kumar Arora (supra) will be of no avail. Reliance placed upon the decisions in Minu B Mehta (supra) and Meena Variyal (supra), by the respondents, in our opinion, is of no avail. The dictum in these cases is on the matter in issue in the concerned case. Similarly, even the dictum in the case of Surender Kumar Arora (supra) will be of no avail. In the present case, considering the entirety of the pleadings, evidence and circumstances on record and in particular the finding recorded by the Tribunal on the factum of negligence of the respondent No.2, the driver of the offending jeep, the High Court committed manifest error in taking a contrary view which, in our opinion, is an error apparent on the face of record and manifestly wrong. 22. In Kaushnuma Begum (supra), whilst dealing with an application under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, this Court expounded that negligence is only one of the species for compensation in respect of the accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action. After observing this, the Court adverted to the principle expounded in Rylands Vs. Fletcher, (1861- 73) All ER Rep 1. It may be useful to reproduce paragraphs 12-14 which read thus: "12. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident- This question depends upon how far the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher can apply in motor accident cases. The said rule is summarised by Blackburn, J., thus: '[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.' 13. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.' 13. The House of Lords considered it and upheld the ratio with the following dictum: 'We think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.' 14. The above rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by courts in England and abroad. Wineld on Tort has brought out even a chapter on the "Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher". At p. 543 of the 15th Edn. of the celebrated work the learned author has pointed out that 'over the years Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied to a remarkable variety of things: re, gas, explosions, electricity, oil, noxious fumes, colliery spoil, rusty wire from a decayed fence, vibrations, poisonous vegetation'. He has elaborated seven defences recognised in common law against action brought on the strength of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. They are: (1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria. (2) Common benet i.e. where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape. (3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise. (3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise. (5) Act of God or vis major i.e. circumstances which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility. (6) Default of the plaintiff i.e. if the damage is caused solely by the act or default of the plaintiff himself, the rule will not apply. (7) Remoteness of consequences i.e. the rule cannot be applied ad infinitum, because even according to the formulation of the rule made by Blackburn, J., the defendant is answerable only for all the damage 'which is the natural consequence of its escape'. " And again, the Court, after adverting to the decisions in Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 , Union Carbide Corpn. Vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 and Gujarat SRTC Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987) 3 SCC 234, in paragraphs 19 & 20, observed thus: "19. Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. 20. 'No fault liability' envisaged in Section 140 of the MV Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former, the compensation amount is xed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permit that compensation paid under "no fault liability" can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permit that compensation paid under "no fault liability" can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the MV Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them." 23. Be that as it may, the next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in concluding that the appellant was also negligent and had contributed equally, which finding rests only on the site map (Exh. 2) indicating the spot where the motorcycle was lying after the accident- We find substance in the criticism of the appellant that the spot where the motor vehicle was found lying after the accident cannot be the basis to assume that it was driven in or around that spot at the relevant time. It can be safely inferred that after the accident of this nature in which the appellant suffered severe injuries necessitating amputation of his right leg above the knee level, the motorcycle would be pushed forward after the collision and being hit by a high speeding jeep. Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court has found that the spot noted in the site map, one foot wrong side on the middle of the road was the spot where the accident actually occurred. However, the finding is that as per the site map, the motorcycle was found lying at that spot. That cannot be the basis to assume that the appellant was driving the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road at the relevant time. Further, the respondents did not produce any contra evidence to indicate that the motorcycle was being driven on the wrong side of the road at the time when the offending vehicle dashed it. That cannot be the basis to assume that the appellant was driving the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road at the relevant time. Further, the respondents did not produce any contra evidence to indicate that the motorcycle was being driven on the wrong side of the road at the time when the offending vehicle dashed it. In this view of the matter, the finding of the Tribunal that the appellant contributed to the occurrence of the accident by driving the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road, is manifestly wrong and cannot be sustained. The High Court has not expressed any opinion on this issue, having already answered the issue about the non-involvement of the offending vehicle in favour of respondent Nos.2 & 3. 24. In other words, we are inclined to hold that there is no title of evidence about the motorcycle being driven negligently by the appellant at the time of accident. The respondents did not produce any such evidence. That fact, therefore, cannot be assumed. Resultantly, the argument of the respondents that the appellant did not possess a valid motorcycle driving licence at the time of accident, will be of no significance. Thus, we hold that there is no legal evidence to answer the issue of contributory negligence against the appellant. 25. The next question is about the quantum of compensation amount to be paid to the appellant. The Tribunal noted the claim of the appellant that he was getting Rs.1500/- per month towards his salary and Rs.600/- per month towards food allowance from Bhanwar Lal. The fact that the appellant had possessed heavy transport motor vehicle driving licence has not been doubted. The driving licence on record being valid for a limited period, cannot be the basis to belie the claim of the appellant duly supported by Bhanwar Lal, that the appellant was employed by him on his new truck. Besides the said income, the appellant claimed to have earning of Rs.1000/- per month from farming fields. In other words, we and that the Tribunal has not analysed this evidence in proper perspective. The Tribunal, however, pegged the loss of monthly income to the appellant at Rs.520/- per month while computing the compensation amount on the finding that there was no convincing evidence about complete non-employability of the appellant. Further, no provision has been made by the Tribunal towards future prospects. The Tribunal, however, pegged the loss of monthly income to the appellant at Rs.520/- per month while computing the compensation amount on the finding that there was no convincing evidence about complete non-employability of the appellant. Further, no provision has been made by the Tribunal towards future prospects. The Tribunal, therefore, should have computed the loss of income on that basis. Additionally, the appellant because of amputation of his right leg would be forced to permanently use prosthetic leg during his life time. No provision has been made by the Tribunal in that regard. On these heads, the appellant is certainly entitled for enhanced compensation.” 11. In Sunita Versus Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation [ 2020 (13) SCC 486 ], it has been held in paragraph 21 as under: “21. In the present case, we find that the Tribunal had followed a just approach in the matter of appreciation of the evidence/materials on record. Whereas, the High Court adopted a strict interpretation of the evidence on the touchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt to record an adverse finding against the appellants and to reverse the well considered judgment of the Tribunal in a cryptic manner.” 12. In view of above explanation of law, apt to note that argument of learned advocate Mr.Majmudar that since driver of vehicle is acquitted on the ground of compromise, involvement of errant vehicle is highly doubtful does have no subsisting value and accordingly rejected. 13. What could be further noticeable that killer road accident has incapacitated the manner on both the count physically as well as mentally and he becomes 100% functional disability. It is noticeable by reading various documents on record at Exh.44 to 51 and 55 and tribunal has discussed thoroughly to believe that on account of the injury suffered from road accident victim became 100 % disable for entire life and he requires continuous assistance from other person. 14. At this stage, a beneficial reference can be made to a decision in case of Miss Rushi @ Ruchi Thapa, Through Her Father, Sri Dhan Bahadur Thapa Versus M/s.Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. [ 2024 (0) INSC 837 ] wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in similar such circumstances has held in paragraph 8 thus: “8. 14. At this stage, a beneficial reference can be made to a decision in case of Miss Rushi @ Ruchi Thapa, Through Her Father, Sri Dhan Bahadur Thapa Versus M/s.Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. [ 2024 (0) INSC 837 ] wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in similar such circumstances has held in paragraph 8 thus: “8. At this stage, we may note that this Court had occasion to consider a similar case involving a twelve year-old child in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and others, (2020) 4 SCC 413 . In that case, the child had suffered 90% permanent disability due to the accident. The argument before this Court was that as the child was just twelve years of age, notional income of Rs.15,000/- per annum should be adopted. However, this Court rejected this argument and adopted the minimum wages payable to a skilled workman for quantifying the notional loss of earnings of the child. In the case on hand, the High Court adopted the minimum wages payable to unskilled labour, i.e., Rs.169 per day, but there is no justification for the same as the appellant was a school-going child at the time of her accident. The minimum wages payable to a skilled workman, as per the Notification dated 01.03.2013 of the Government of Assam, stood at Rs.175 per day, which is more acceptable. On that basis, the notional loss of income of the appellant would work out to Rs.5,250/- per month and the multiplier applicable would be 15, considering her age at the time of the accident. In effect, the notional loss of earnings would work out to Rs.9,45,000/- (Rs.5250X12x15). The High Court failed to consider the loss of future prospects @ 40% of the monthly salary, in terms of the law laid down by this Court in Kajal (supra). Therefore, a further sum of Rs.3,78,000/- (Rs.2100X12x15) would be payable to the appellant under that head. The sum of Rs.3 lakh computed by the High Court for pain, suffering and loss of amenities is just and warrants no interference. Similarly, the compensation of Rs.3 lakh for loss of marriage prospects is sufficient. However, though the High Court calculated compensation for future medical treatment as Rs.3 lakh, we are of the opinion that the same would be deficient, given the nature of the permanent disability suffered by the appellant. Similarly, the compensation of Rs.3 lakh for loss of marriage prospects is sufficient. However, though the High Court calculated compensation for future medical treatment as Rs.3 lakh, we are of the opinion that the same would be deficient, given the nature of the permanent disability suffered by the appellant. She would be entitled to Rs.5 lakh under this head, as claimed by her in her computation statement. Further, attendant charges would also have to be considered as the appellant would be helpless without assistance. In Kajal (supra), this Court opined that the multiplier method would be the most realistic and reasonable method for this purpose. The monthly expense for one attendant was quantified as Rs. 5,000/-. Adopting the same, the appellant would be entitled to 9 lakh under this head. Though, the claim for Rs.13 lakh towards the expenses incurred for treatment and hospitalization is reiterated, the fact remains that the appellants father could produce bills only for Rs.84,771/-. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept this claim without proof. In effect, the appellant is held entitled to the following compensation:” 15. Another judgment of Apex Court with profit can be referred in the case of Master Ayush Versus Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance Co.Ltd. [ 2022 (7) SCC 738 ] wherein paragraph 8 being relevant is reproduced herein under: “8. Hence, as per the above extract, the minimum wages payable to a skilled workman in 2010-11 is to the tune of Rs. 3708.70. In this view, the minimum wages as on the date of accident is rounded off to Rs.3700/-. The compensation, therefore, is to be assessed on the basis of the said minimum wages on the assumption that the appellant would have been able to earn after attaining majority.” 16. Learned Advocate Mr.Bhatt for the claimant submits that the tribunal has routinely passed the order of compensation which is not befitting to the doctrine of just and fair compensation and therefore he would urge to enhance the compensation. The issue arises as to whether in absence of any cross-objection or cross appeal on behalf of the claimant, whether in the appeal filed by the insurance company the appellate Court can enhance the compensation granted by the tribunal. The issue arises as to whether in absence of any cross-objection or cross appeal on behalf of the claimant, whether in the appeal filed by the insurance company the appellate Court can enhance the compensation granted by the tribunal. O.41 R.31 of CPC r/w O.41 r/w O.22 read with decision in case of Surekha W/o Rajendra Nakhate Versus Santosh S/o Namdeo Jadhav [ 2021 (16) SCC 467 ] would rescue the situation. Needless to say that principle of just and fair compensation applies at every stage of proceedings. The duty is casted upon the MACT to assess, calculate and grant just and fair compensation at every stage regardless of filing of appeal. Therefore, it is clear that even in absence of cross-objection or cross appeal the appellate Court holds jurisdiction to enhance the compensation. 17. It could be noticed that income of the minor is considered at Rs.15,000/- as he was less than 10 years at the time of accident. Obviously, no data is available for the income of the claimant and therefore tribunal has taken notional income of Rs.15,000/-; but did not apply the principle of granting 40% future prospect. Even application of multiplier of 15 is also incorrect and thus arriving at Rs.2,25,000/- under the head of future loss of income which would not come under the criteria of just and fair compensation. Thus, considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Shethi reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the future prospect would be added at 40% while applying multiplier of 18 is required to be considered which comes to Rs.3,78,000/- (Rs.15,000/- + 40% (future prospect) x 18) . To be noted further that considering the multiple injuries suffered by the victim and medical bills produced on record, amount awarded towards the medical expenses is on lower side and it is enhanced to Rs.1,50,000/-. Likewise, the amount awarded against the food, diet and transportation is also on lower side and enhanced to Rs.50,000/- as well as the amount awarded towards the future expenses of treatment is enhanced to Rs.1,00,000/-. 18. Therefore, total compensation would be as under, which the claimant is entitled to get. Likewise, the amount awarded against the food, diet and transportation is also on lower side and enhanced to Rs.50,000/- as well as the amount awarded towards the future expenses of treatment is enhanced to Rs.1,00,000/-. 18. Therefore, total compensation would be as under, which the claimant is entitled to get. Particulars Amount (Rs.) Future Loss of Income 3,78,000/- Medical Expenses 1,50,000/- Food, Diet and Transportation 1,50,000/- Attendant Charges 1,00,000/- Future Expenses for treatment 1,00,000/- Pain, Shock and suffering 2,00,000/- Loss of Amenities, etc., 1,00,000/- Loss of Expectation and Marital life 1,00,000/- Total… 12,78,000/- Less: compensation already awarded 6,82,500/- Additional amount which is awarded 5,95,500/- 19. Therefore, I hold that the claimant/s are entitled to get the enhanced compensation of Rs.5,95,500/-with 7,5% p.a. interest from the date of filing the claim petition till its realization, which would meet the ends of justice. Rest of the direction(s) of the Tribunal remain same. 20. For the reasons recorded above, the following order is passed. 20.1 The present appeal is partly allowed. 20.2 The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced amount with interest as stated herein above within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 20.3 The Tribunal shall disburse the entire awarded amount lying in the FDR and/or with the Tribunal, with accrued interest thereon, if any, to the claimants, by account payee cheque/NEFT/RTGS, after proper verification and after following due procedure. 20.4 While making the payment, the Tribunal shall deduct the courts fees, if not paid, in accordance with rules/law. 20.5 Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Tribunal, forthwith.