JUDGMENT : J.J. Munir, J. 1. This is a defendants’ second appeal arising out of a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction. 2. Original Suit No.1187 of 1991 was instituted by the four plaintiffs, Virendra Kumar, Sheo Singh, Rampal Singh Chauhan and Km. Pushpa with a case that plaintiff-respondents Nos.1 to 3 are tenants in the premises detailed at the foot of the plaint since the year 1970 on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. Defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin son of Fariduddin, arrayed as defendant No.3 to the suit, was the owner of the said premises and the land comprising it. He agreed to transfer the premises aforesaid in the plaintiff-respondents' favour, and for the purpose, executed a registered agreement to sell dated 5. 04.1990. The agreement to sell last mentioned (for short, 'the suit agreement') covenants to transfer an area of 5000 square yards, situate in Khasra No.5751M of Khewat Nos.1 and 15, Qasba Meerut (for short, 'the suit property'). The further case of the plaintiff-respondents is that they are residing in the premises under reference as tenants and now by virtue of the suit agreement have contracted a right to purchase the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-. Out of the settled sale consideration, the plaintiff-respondents have paid an earnest in the sum of Rs.4,70,000/- to defendant-respondent No.5. The plaintiff-respondents say that they were paying rent to defendant-respondent No.5 regularly up to the date of execution of the said agreement, but not later on, as was covenanted between the plaintiff-respondents and defendant-respondent No.5 at the time of execution and registration of the last mentioned agreement that no further rent shall be payable by the plaintiff-respondents to defendant-respondent No.5 for reason that a substantial part of the sale consideration had been paid at the time of registration of the suit agreement. 3. It is also the plaintiff-respondents' case that in part performance of the suit agreement, possession of the suit property has been given to the plaintiff-respondents (described in the plaint as 'remained with the plaintiffs'). The plaintiff-respondents are residing in the suit property and tethering their cattle there. The defendant-appellants have no concern with the suit property. It has never been acquired by the defendant-appellants and no proceedings for acquisition of the suit property have been taken. The plaintiff-respondents are residing in the suit property and tethering their cattle there. The defendant-appellants have no concern with the suit property. It has never been acquired by the defendant-appellants and no proceedings for acquisition of the suit property have been taken. The defendant-appellants never sent any notice to the plaintiff-respondents or defendant-respondent No.5 with regard to the suit property, or so to speak, regarding its acquisition or taking possession. The constructions standing in the suit property are old and neither the plaintiff-respondents nor defendant-respondent No.5 have raised any new construction. The plaintiff-respondents do not own any other house, except the one located in the suit property in the city of Meerut. 4. In the first week of September, 1991, the employees of the defendant-appellants attempted to take possession of the suit property and also attempted demolition of the constructions standing thereon. The plaintiff-respondents, therefore, sent a notice under Section 88 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (for short, 'the Act of 1965') to the defendant-appellants on 10.09.1991, which was received by the said defendant-appellants, but not answered. The employees of the defendant-appellants, a day before institution of the suit, attempted to demolish the plaintiff-respondents' construction and take forcible possession of the suit property. They are also said to have demanded money of the plaintiff-respondents. It was on this cause of action that the plaintiff-respondents prayed that a decree of permanent injunction be granted against the defendant-appellants, restraining them from interfering in the rights and possession of the plaintiff-respondents or user by the plaintiffs of the suit property (described as working of the plaintiffs on the premises) and from demolishing any construction of theirs on the said property, a full description of which is given at the foot of the plaint. It must be mentioned here that in the plaint, the suit property was originally described as follows: “Open land with four rooms situated at Victoria Park, Dhobighat, Jail Chungi, Meerut bounded as follows: East Plot of Rajvir Singh & others. West Victoria Park, Sports Colony, North Nala, government road and Dhobighat colony. South Rana Pratap Enclave.” 5. The suit was instituted on 20.11.1991 with the aforesaid description of the suit property, but much later on 27.03.2009, an amendment application was made, seeking to amend the boundaries. The amendment application was allowed by the Court vide order dated 28.04.2009. West Victoria Park, Sports Colony, North Nala, government road and Dhobighat colony. South Rana Pratap Enclave.” 5. The suit was instituted on 20.11.1991 with the aforesaid description of the suit property, but much later on 27.03.2009, an amendment application was made, seeking to amend the boundaries. The amendment application was allowed by the Court vide order dated 28.04.2009. The amended description of the suit property is detailed below: “Open land with four rooms situated at Victoria Park, Dhobighat, Jail Chungi, Meerut bounded as follows: South earlier Plot of Rajvir Singh & others. Now colony of Avas Vikas Parishad. North Dhobi Ghat Colony and Victoria Park Sports Colony and thereafter road. East Government road thereafter Nala. West Now construction of Avas Vikas Parishad thereafter Rana Pratap Enclave. Thereafter Abu Nala. And shown in map Annexure 1 of the Plaint by the letters ABCD .” 6. Along with the amended plaint, a plaint map is annexed, where the suit property is denoted by the letters ABCD, an area of 5000 square yards. 7. A written statement was filed on behalf of the two defendants to the suit, who are the defendant-appellants here. They are, for all practical purposes and intents, the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, queerly impleaded twice, first through the Housing Commissioner and then as defendant No.2 through the Assistant Housing Commissioner, Meerut. In the written statement, they have denied the ownership of defendant-respondent No.5 and say that, not being the owner, he had no right to execute the suit agreement, on the foot of which, no rights can accrue in the plaintiff-respondents' favour. The suit property was acquired by the Government and delivered unto the defendant-appellants, who are in possession of the same. It is the defendant-appellants' case that the suit property is a small piece of land, which was acquired by the Government for the Improvement Trust, Meerut. A scheme for Housing in Meerut, known as 'Housing Accommodation and Street Scheme No.1', was launched in an area lying between the Abu Nala Meerut, Garh Road and Kanker Road, now known as the University Road. The boundaries of the acquired land have been pleaded by the defendants in paragraph No.16 of the written statement, thus: North Khasra Plot No.5717, 5719, 5732, 5733 and 5751 part of Qasba Meerut. South Meerut-Garh Mukteshwar Road. West Abu Nala. East Kankar Road which joins Abdullahpur Chungi to Meerut Garhmukteshwar Road. The boundaries of the acquired land have been pleaded by the defendants in paragraph No.16 of the written statement, thus: North Khasra Plot No.5717, 5719, 5732, 5733 and 5751 part of Qasba Meerut. South Meerut-Garh Mukteshwar Road. West Abu Nala. East Kankar Road which joins Abdullahpur Chungi to Meerut Garhmukteshwar Road. The defendant-appellants say that later on, the name of the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, the defendant-appellants was entered in the Malikan Register on Page No.79. This entry was made in the Tehsil records on 16th of August, 1977. 8. A notification for acquisition of the land under reference was issued under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act, 1919 and published in the Gazette of Uttar Pradesh dated 22nd, 29th October, 1966 and 5th November, 1966 for information to the general public, inviting objections. It is the defendant-appellants' case that after due process of disposal of objections, the land proposed to be acquired through the earlier notifications under the Town Improvement Act was notified on 29.11.1969 under Section 32 of the Act of 1965. It is also pleaded by the defendant-appellants that upon enforcement of the Act of 1965, the Improvement Trust, constituted for the area, stood dissolved and all its assets, rights and liabilities transferred to the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, the defendant-appellants (for short, 'the defendants'). After publication of the notification in the Gazette on 29.11.1969, the entire land detailed in the written statement stood vested in the defendants and possession of the land acquired was delivered on 13.01.1972 to the defendants by the Government. The defendants say that the plaintiff-respondents and defendant-respondent No.5 are not at all entitled to raise any constructions on any part of the suit property, located in part of Khasra No.5751, without the sanction of a plan for the purpose by the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. To do otherwise, would be a contravention of Section 83 of the Act of 1965. It seems to be the alternate case of the defendants that if any constructions have been raised by the plaintiff-respondents, though not admitted, in the suit property, comprising a part of Khasra No.5751, in contravention of provisions of the Act of 1965, the plaintiff-respondents are liable to be penalized under Section 73 of the last mentioned Act. It seems to be the alternate case of the defendants that if any constructions have been raised by the plaintiff-respondents, though not admitted, in the suit property, comprising a part of Khasra No.5751, in contravention of provisions of the Act of 1965, the plaintiff-respondents are liable to be penalized under Section 73 of the last mentioned Act. The defendants are vested by statute with the right to demolish the said constructions, if any, standing on the suit property under Sections 82 and 83 of the Act of 1965. They have a right to enter in the said land under Section 84 of the last mentioned statute. 9. On the 8/9th of August, 1992, the defendants lodged a First Information Report with the jurisdictional police station against unknown anti-social elements, who were attempting to encroach the suit property, which belonged to the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. Acting on the FIR, the Police demolished the unauthorized and illegal constructions found on the spot. The defendants say that the plaintiff-respondents (for short, 'the plaintiffs') are not residing in the suit property, but live in separate residences of their own in the city, a fact mentioned in the cause title of the plaint. Defendant-respondent No.5 was never the owner of the suit property and, therefore, the suit agreement, described by the defendants as 'so called', is a nullity in the eye of law and void. In the absence of any right, title or interest and lawful possession, the plaintiffs have no cause of action to maintain the suit. The description of the suit property given in the plaint is castigated as vague and incorrect. The boundaries of Khasra No.5751, part of which was delivered into the possession of the defendants by the Government (by virtue of the acquisition), have been given in paragraph No.27 of the written statement, thus: North Pakki Nali and thereafter Dhobi Ghat and Abadi of others. South Part of Khasra No.5749 and part of Khasra No.5750. East Nala and Khasra No.5733. West Abu Nala. 10. It is also the defendants' case that though possession of the plaintiff is not admitted, but if they be found in possession, they are no more than trespassers in the suit property. Their suit, therefore, is not maintainable. The suit is barred by estoppel and acquiescence, besides the want of notice under Section 88 of the Act of 1965. 11. It is also the defendants' case that though possession of the plaintiff is not admitted, but if they be found in possession, they are no more than trespassers in the suit property. Their suit, therefore, is not maintainable. The suit is barred by estoppel and acquiescence, besides the want of notice under Section 88 of the Act of 1965. 11. On the pleadings of parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether defendant No.3 was owner of the suit property? If yes, its effect? 2. Whether plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 were tenants in the suit property from the year 1970 at the rate of Rs.300/- per month? If yes, its effect? 3. Whether defendant No.3 has executed a registered agreement dated 05.04.1990 to transfer the suit property in the plaintiffs' favour for a total sale consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-, out of which the plaintiffs have paid defendant No.3 a sum of Rs.4,70,000/- in advance? 4. Whether possession of the suit property has been delivered to the plaintiffs in part performance? If yes, its effect? 5. Whether the suit property has been acquired by the Government and its possession delivered to defendant Nos.1 and 2 as averred in paragraph Nos.7 and 16 to 20 of the written statement? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are liable to be punished under Section 73 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, as averred in paragraph No.21 of the written statement? 7. Whether the suit agreement is void and has any evidentiary value? If yes, its effect? 8. Whether in view of the averments in paragraph No.26 of the written statement, the plaint is liable to be rejected? 9. Whether the suit is barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence? 10. Whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred by Section 88 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam for want of notice? 11. To what relief is the plaintiffs entitled?” 12. The plaintiffs in support of their case filed documentary evidence, a summary of which is recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court. Apart from the documentary evidence, the plaintiffs examined PW-1 Virendra Kumar, PW-2 Rampal Singh, PW-3 Raj Kumar Sharma and PW-4 Jaipal Sharma. The defendants too filed documentary evidence, a summary whereof figures in the judgment of the Trial Court. Apart from the documentary evidence, the plaintiffs examined PW-1 Virendra Kumar, PW-2 Rampal Singh, PW-3 Raj Kumar Sharma and PW-4 Jaipal Sharma. The defendants too filed documentary evidence, a summary whereof figures in the judgment of the Trial Court. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the defendants, to wit, DW-1 Umesh Mohan Sharma and DW-2 Jeet Singh. 13. The Trial Court determined Issues Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 together. The Trial Court after considering the case and evidence of parties on the aforesaid issues remarked that the evidence shows that so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, they had in their favour the suit agreement, but no sale deed had been executed. It is remarked by the Trial Court that in Khasra No.5751, names of a number of other persons are also recorded. The plaintiffs never applied for a survey to be done in order to determine in which Khasra number the suit property was located. It is opined that on the basis of the suit agreement alone, the plaintiffs would not become owners. The Trial Court has also frowned much upon the fact that in the suit agreement, the suit property has not been properly described with reference to its location. It is described as 5000 square yards of land with its boundaries given. The agreement is of the year 1990, but no sale deed was attempted to be secured by the plaintiffs. This, in the opinion of the Trial Court, shows that the suit agreement is sham. It is more than once emphasized by the learned Trial Judge in his findings on these issues that in the absence of a survey being done, it is difficult to determine in which plot number, the suit property is located. More or less on this reasoning, the Trial Court decided Issues Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 against the plaintiffs and in the defendants’ favour. 14. Issue No.5 was decided against the plaintiffs and in the defendants’ favour, holding that the suit property had been acquired by the Government for the defendants, who have been given possession thereof. The defendants are owners in possession of the suit property. Issues Nos.8 and 11 were determined together. 14. Issue No.5 was decided against the plaintiffs and in the defendants’ favour, holding that the suit property had been acquired by the Government for the defendants, who have been given possession thereof. The defendants are owners in possession of the suit property. Issues Nos.8 and 11 were determined together. Here again, the Trial Court has emphasized the fact that the plaintiffs did not take steps to get the suit property surveyed nor did they secure execution of a sale deed in their favour from defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin. The Trial Court on these findings dismissed the suit with costs vide judgment and decree dated 16.08.2005. 15. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs appealed the decree to the District Judge of Meerut, where their appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No.181 of 2005. It was assigned to the learned Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Meerut, before whom it came up for hearing. The learned Additional District Judge by his judgment and decree dated 07.01.2010 allowed the plaintiffs' appeal with costs, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, reversed the same and decreed the suit with costs. The defendants were restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession in the suit property, denoted by letters ABCD. 16. Disillusioned by the decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, the defendants have appealed to this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the Code’). 17. The appeal was admitted to hearing on 07.04.2010, when the following substantial questions of law were formulated: 1. Whether the plaintiff-respondents can claim or maintain any rights or title over the land in question only on the basis of agreement of sale executed by Sirajuddin? 2. Whether the plaintiff-respondents who claim tenancy rights also over the land in question could contest the claim of Uttar Pradesh Awas Vikas Parishad, Lucknow to acquisition of land in question on grounds other than those to which a tenant is entitled in law? 18. On 07.08.2019, another substantial question of law was framed, which reads: Whether the lower appellate court was justified in allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent without the boundaries mentioned in the amended plaint being duly proved? 19. 18. On 07.08.2019, another substantial question of law was framed, which reads: Whether the lower appellate court was justified in allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent without the boundaries mentioned in the amended plaint being duly proved? 19. After the hearing had proceeded substantially on 28.02.2024, 29.02.2024, 01.03.2024, 04.03.2024, 05.03.2024, 7.03.2024 and 11.03.2024, on 12th of March, 2024, this Court thought it imperative to frame a further substantial question of law, to which the parties agreed. Accordingly, following substantial question of law, marked as '(iv)' was formulated. It reads: Whether the issue being if part of Khasra No. 5751 i.e. the suit property is located in Khewat Nos. 1 and 15 or Khewat No. 445, it was imperative for the Court to issue a Survey Commission or adopt the Total Station Method in order to locate the suit property? 20. This appeal was heard on 28.02.2024, and, thereafter, across a number of dates until 14.03.2024, when judgment was reserved. 21. The learned Counsel for the parties addressed the Court on Substantial Question of Law No.1, the third that was formulated on 07.08.2019, without being numbered, which shall be referred to as Substantial Question of Law No.3, and for the most part on the question that was formulated last, that is to say, Question No. (iv). Upon considering the submissions of parties on Substantial Question of Law No. (iv), the way these were addressed, this Court thought that the question was formulated on slightly different terms than those involved, which required clarification and perhaps re-formulation, on which the parties had to be heard again. Accordingly, the appeal was posted for further hearing on 06.09.2024. On the said day, learned Counsel for the parties were apprised about the terms of Substantial Question of Law No. (iv) formulated on 12.03.2024, seeking clarification about their submissions advanced earlier. The learned Counsel appearing for both parties agreed that given their submissions on the substantial question under reference, it was required to be re-formulated. Accordingly, Substantial Question of Law No.(iv), framed on 12.03.2024, was reformulated on 06.09.2024 in the following terms: (iv) Whether the issue being if the suit property is located in Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11 and 5751/12 or a part of these plots (unacquired) or Khasra No.5751/5 (acquired), all part of Khewat Nos. Accordingly, Substantial Question of Law No.(iv), framed on 12.03.2024, was reformulated on 06.09.2024 in the following terms: (iv) Whether the issue being if the suit property is located in Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11 and 5751/12 or a part of these plots (unacquired) or Khasra No.5751/5 (acquired), all part of Khewat Nos. 1 and 15, it was imperative for the Court to issue a Survey Commission or adopt the Total Station Method? 22. Before proceeding further and answering the questions involved in this appeal, it must be recorded here that in the Lower Appellate Court, extensive documentary evidence was admitted to record, a copious description of which in a summary finds record in the judgment of that Court. There are three registered agreements, apparently executed by defendant-respondent No.5, either directly or through his attorney, in favour of the plaintiffs dated 07.10.2005, 29.09.2008 and 16.09.2009, extending the life of the original registered agreement to sell dated 05.04.1990. Apart from it, there are many documents relating to acquisition by the defendants brought on record, some of which have been secured under the Right to Information Act. PW-1, Virendra Kumar, who is the first plaintiff in the suit, has testified before the Lower Appellate Court in the witness-box. 23. Heard Mr. Ramesh Upadhyaya, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Rajan Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the defendants in support of this appeal, Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant-respondent No.5 and Mr. Pushkar Mehrotra, learned Counsel appearing for plaintiffs Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4. 24. As regards the first substantial question of law, the Lower Appellate Court has extensively referred to the recorded chain of title relating to Khasra No.5751, regarding the part falling in Khewat No.1. It has been noticed that Khewat No.15 relating to Khasra No.5751, paper No.144-Ga shows the name of Sirajuddin son of Fariduddin, defendant-respondent No.5 recorded along with the other co-owners. The Lower Appellate Court has opined that a perusal of paper No.145-Ga/3 supports the fact that Shafiuddin son of Rafiuddin was recorded in Khasra No.5751M to the extent of 0.9360 hectare. Likewise, paper No.145-Ga/4 shows that in Khewat No.15, Shafiuddin son of Rafiuddin's name is recorded in Khasra No.5751M to the extent of 1.3160 hectares. Others too are recorded in the plot with their possession shown by way of abadi. Likewise, paper No.145-Ga/4 shows that in Khewat No.15, Shafiuddin son of Rafiuddin's name is recorded in Khasra No.5751M to the extent of 1.3160 hectares. Others too are recorded in the plot with their possession shown by way of abadi. It is then remarked that Khasra No.5751 also finds record in paper No.147-Ga for the Fasli Year 1410. It is also remarked by the Lower Appellate Court that paper No.142-Ga is a sale deed executed by Khan Bahadur Sheikh Wahiuddin in favour Bhuria, which is now Allah Mehar's land. This fact shows that in the opinion of the Judge in the Lower Appellate Court, Wahiuddin sold land to Allah Mehar, leaving back the remainder of his land lying towards south of that sold in Khasra No.5751M. The inference drawn by the learned Judge in the Lower Appellate Court is that the suit property, denoted by letters ABCD (in the plaint map) lies to the south of the Dhobi Ghat and belongs to the heirs of Khan Bahadur Wahiuddin, where in the Khewat, Shafiuddin son of Rafiuddin is recorded along with others. It is also remarked that in the same Khewat, defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin is also recorded as a owner. A copy of the plaint, bearing paper No.117-Ga, giving rise O.S. No.21 of 1993, Jamaluddin v. Mughisuddin and another, from the Court of the 5th Additional Civil Judge, Meerut has been noticed by the Lower Appellate Court to show that Shafiuddin son of Rafiuddin was defendant No.20 to the said suit, who had died and in his place, his heirs had been substituted as defendant Nos.20/1, Kutubuddin, 20/2, Sirajuddin and 20/3, Abdul Qadir, all sons of Sheikh Fariduddin. This has led the Lower Appellate Court to further infer that Shafiuddin, who was recorded in Khasra No.5751, Khewat No.15 to the extent of 1.3160 hectares and Khewat No.1 to the extent of 0.9360 hectare, had died, leaving behind defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin, inheriting a one-third share that he owned in the Khewat. It is also noticed that Sirajuddin was already recorded in Khewat Nos.1 and 15 as one of the owners (Malikan). From these facts, the Lower Appellate Court has inferred that defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin was owner in possession of land, comprising his share in Khasra No.5751 of Khewat Nos.1 and 15. It is also noticed that Sirajuddin was already recorded in Khewat Nos.1 and 15 as one of the owners (Malikan). From these facts, the Lower Appellate Court has inferred that defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin was owner in possession of land, comprising his share in Khasra No.5751 of Khewat Nos.1 and 15. It is then remarked by the learned Judge that defendant-respondent No.5 has not traversed the plaintiffs' claim and the suit against him had proceeded ex parte. He had executed the suit agreement, the execution of which was proved by Virendra Kumar, PW-1 and Jaipal Sharma, PW-2, who were witnesses of the agreement. A further agreement to sell and extending the term of the suit agreement, paper No.173-Ga (photostat copy of which is paper No.174-Ga) has been executed on 16.09.2009. The suit agreement has, therefore, been found to be still an enforceable contract. The suit agreement was opined by the Lower Appellate Court to be one showing the boundaries of the suit property, comprising 5000 square yards of land, contracted to be purchased for the worth of Rs.5,00,000/-, out of which a sum of Rs.4,70,000/- was paid in earnest. 25. In the opinion of the learned Judge in the Lower Appellate Court, the suit agreement shows that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property, earlier as tenants. It is remarked that the issue, whether the plaintiffs had paid the requisite sale consideration to defendant-respondent No.5 is a matter inter se the two parties, where the defendants have no locus standi to object. From the testimony of PW-1 Virendra Kumar, PW-2 Rampal Singh, PW-3 Raj Kumar Sharma and PW-4 Jaipal Sharma, in the witness-box, it has been concluded by the Lower Appellate Court for a fact that it is the plaintiffs, who are in possession of the suit property. The suit agreement affirms the fact that at the time of entering into it, the plaintiffs were in occupation of the suit property on a monthly rent of Rs.300/- since the year 1970. It has also been remarked that rent receipts have been produced and proved. 26. The question, therefore, if the plaintiffs can claim or maintain any rights or title over the suit property on the basis of an agreement to sell alone, executed by Sirajuddin, is to be answered in the affirmative. It has also been remarked that rent receipts have been produced and proved. 26. The question, therefore, if the plaintiffs can claim or maintain any rights or title over the suit property on the basis of an agreement to sell alone, executed by Sirajuddin, is to be answered in the affirmative. The reason is that inter se Sirajuddin, defendant-respondent No.5, who has been found by the Lower Appellate Court on a plausible view of the evidence on record to be the owner of the suit property and the plaintiffs, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property. Their possession commenced as tenants way back in the year 1970 and the character and nature of their rights altered to that of a vendee, holding under a contract, whose existing possession had been converted to one referable to the agreement to sell or the suit agreement here. It really means that the former tenants, to wit, the plaintiffs, are now in possession of the suit property in part performance of the suit agreement. Assuming that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit property in part performance of the suit agreement, but as tenants, properly so called, or holding over, or at sufferance, there is no quarrel about the fact that howsoever inchoate the plaintiffs’ title, it is a case for the plaintiffs, holding permissive possession of the suit property at the instance of the owner thereof, to wit, defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin. 27. Now, the other issues to what extent Sirajuddin is the owner of the suit property, vis-à-vis his co-sharers and what is the extent of his rights in the suit property, area-wise, is a matter inter se Sirajuddin and his co-sharers, and may be the plaintiffs. The fact if the plaintiffs are still tenants of some kind or in possession of the suit property in part performance, as already remarked, is also a matter between the plaintiffs on one hand, and defendant-respondent No.5, Sirajuddin on the other. It has nothing to do with the defendants unless the defendants show or establish that they have acquired title to the suit property, or so to speak, the said property through the Government under the law of acquisition. Whether they have acquired the suit property or not, is not the subject matter of this question. It has nothing to do with the defendants unless the defendants show or establish that they have acquired title to the suit property, or so to speak, the said property through the Government under the law of acquisition. Whether they have acquired the suit property or not, is not the subject matter of this question. Elsewhere, it has been held and that alone is relevant to this question that the defendants are not the owners of the suit property. If they are not, the plaintiffs, whether in possession of the suit property by permission or licence of defendant-respondent No.5, or in their right as his tenants, or by virtue of possession traceable to part performance of the suit agreement, executed by defendant-respondent No.5, are entitled to maintain the suit for an injunction against the defendants; if not on the basis of pristine title, on the basis of a well established and sound possessory title. 28. In view of the answer to Substantial Question of Law No.1, Substantial Question of Law No.2 does not arise for consideration, as rightly objected to by the plaintiffs. 29. Now, this takes us to the third question, if the Lower Appellate Court was justified in decreeing the suit without the boundaries mentioned in the amended plaint being duly proved. The Lower Appellate Court has answered the issue if the boundaries originally given in the plaint and those amended and clarified with the aid of a plaint map effect a change in the identity of the suit property. The learned Judge has remarked that the boundaries given in the plaint, originally pleaded, showed the suit property to be one abutting the Dhobi Ghat and the Government Road. The boundaries, that were earlier given in the plaint and those presently given, on all four sides are the same. The suit property on side AB to the north showed Dhobi Ghat and Sports Colony; to the south, it earlier showed the plot of Rajveer, which land has now been given into the possession of the defendants, the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. The suit property on the side AD shows the defendants and thereafter the Maharana Enclave. The suit property on side AB to the north showed Dhobi Ghat and Sports Colony; to the south, it earlier showed the plot of Rajveer, which land has now been given into the possession of the defendants, the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. The suit property on the side AD shows the defendants and thereafter the Maharana Enclave. It is then remarked that upon a perusal of the map attached to the plaint, it is clear that the north-south directions relative to the suit property are diagonally placed and for the said reason, in giving the boundaries of the suit property, some confusion had arisen. A perusal of the plaint map, annexed after the amendment, clarifies the situation of the suit property and indicates no change in its location. 30. It is remarked by the Lower Appellate Court that the submission of the learned Counsel for the defendants here that there is a change brought about to the suit property has no force. The said property, as shown in the plaint map annexed, has no confusion about its identity. Now, these are findings of fact recorded by the Lower Appellate Court upon doing a comparison of the boundaries originally pleaded in the plaint, with those amended, together with the plaint map brought in through the amendment to clarify matters. It may be noticed that the suit was instituted way back in the year 1991 and the plaint giving rise to it is a document dated 20.11.1991. The boundaries were amended pursuant to an order of the Court dated 28.04.2009, made on an amendment application dated 27.03.2009. The change in boundaries, that the plaintiffs have brought in through the amendment, is distanced in time by 18 years. This Court must observe that every amendment to the boundaries in the plaint need not be proved, provided the change brought in through the amendment on a realistic appraisal of evidence, does not bring about a change to the location and the identity of the suit property. If the change, that is brought in through the amendment, is merely clarificatory of the boundaries originally pleaded, or is necessitated by the fast-changing landscape in contemporary time, where the surroundings of a given property suffer quick change due to the fast pace of development, no proof of boundaries, the change whereof is necessitated by the changed surroundings of the property overtime may be required. In this connection, reference may be made to Naresh Kumar and others v. Smt. Chawli and others, 2020 (5) ADJ 33 , where I held: “41. The findings of the lower Appellate Court, based on appreciation of documentary and oral evidence to conclude the precise manner in which Khasra No. 113 has been subdivided to leave a residue on the eastern side of the brick-worked road, laid with permission of the plaintiff, is a flawless finding of fact. It is not for this Court to interfere with that part of the finding. This Court, however, has, within the limited scope of its scrutiny clearly indicated that on a true interpretation of the title deeds, dated 3.6.1896, 4.6.1896 and 26.3.1920, there is no interpretation to be done about identity of the suit property, where conclusions have been drawn by the lower Appellate Court from evidence based on subsequent changes to physical features, that are not contemporaneous to the sale-deeds. It is held for a principle that though boundaries given in the deeds of title are the most reliable evidence about the identity of adjoining properties, but the rule may have slender or no application to a situation where physical features about the property suffer change in course of time. In this case that change happened in 1956.” (emphasis by Court) 31. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative with the remark that given the clarificatory nature of the boundaries of the suit property brought in by amendment and depiction of changes due to development, the Lower Appellate Court committed no error in decreeing the suit without the boundaries in the amended plaint being proved. 32. Now arises for consideration the last and the most fundamental question, that is to say, the fourth substantial question of law. The question is, if it was imperative for the Court to issue a survey commission or resort to the total station method in order to locate the suit property. The dispute about the location of the suit property has arisen precisely on the issue if it is located in Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11 and 5751/12 or a part of these plots (unacquired), or Khasra No.5751/5 (acquired), all part of Khewat Nos. 1 and 15. The dispute about the location of the suit property has arisen precisely on the issue if it is located in Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11 and 5751/12 or a part of these plots (unacquired), or Khasra No.5751/5 (acquired), all part of Khewat Nos. 1 and 15. The question about the location of the suit property has been dealt with by the Lower Appellate Court in answering Issue No.5; Issues Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 together, and, lastly, Issue No.11. In answering the substantial question of law under consideration, it is not the findings of fact recorded by the Lower Appellate Court about the location of the suit property, vis-à-vis the Khasra plot number, that we are required to re-determine, but to see if the conclusion about location of the suit property in one or the other Khasra plot number, could be reached without the aid of a survey commission. There is no quarrel on facts between parties that a survey commission following the three-fixed point method was not issued at all in this case. Neither the parties made that application, either during trial or in appeal; nor did the Court consider it appropriate to issue a survey commission. This issue was raised before the Trial Court and noticed in its judgment, but no commission was indeed issued. It is required to be seen if on the state of evidence the issue of a survey commission or adoption of the total station method to locate the suit property in one Khasra plot number or the other with reference to its Khewat or otherwise was necessary. The Lower Appellate Court has noticed that the suit property is a 5000 square yards land, denoted in the plaint map by letters ABCD. According to the plaintiffs, it is a part of Khasra No.5751, which is included in Khewat Nos.1 and 15. It is also noticed that the plaintiffs' case is that the suit property has not been acquired by the Government. Rather, what has been acquired out of the said plot is the land comprising the Dhobi Ghat, belonging to Allah Mehar, which comprises an area of two bigha. 33. The plaintiffs' case further noticed is that two bigha of land belonging to Allah Mehar has constructions all over it and for the said reason, possession of this acquired land could not be taken. 33. The plaintiffs' case further noticed is that two bigha of land belonging to Allah Mehar has constructions all over it and for the said reason, possession of this acquired land could not be taken. The defendants, therefore, are attempting to take possession of land to the south of Allah Mehar's, that is part of Khasra No.5751M, included in Khewat Nos.1 and 15, but not acquired in order to make good the total area of 14 bigha 16 biswa and 6 biswansi of acquired land in Khasra No.5751. 34. The learned Judge in the Lower Appellate Court while answering Issue No.5 has remarked that the conclusions of the Trial Court on the issue were not based on evidence led by parties. The evidence led by parties on this issue has not been appreciated in its context and conclusions drawn. The learned Judge has referred to paper No.48-Ga/1, which is a possession memo. A photostat copy of the said memo has been noticed to be marked as paper No.188-Ga/2. Now, about this document, it is remarked by the Lower Appellate Court that pursuant to the notification dated 12.10.1972 under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, a total area of 66 bigha 6 biswansi was taken possession of by the defendants. The possession memo indicates the Khasra numbers of the plot and the relative area. It is remarked that Khasra No.5751, which is a big plot, has had an area of 12 bigha 5 biswa belonging to Bhabhuti and another agriculturist, taken possession of, besides an area of 2 bigha, also in the same Khasra No.5751M, belonging to Allah Mehar. Also taken possession of in Khasra No.5751M is an area of 11 biswa 6 biswansi, recorded in the name of Municipal Board. The total area of land acquired out of Khasra No.5751M works out to a figure of 14 bigha 16 biswa 6 biswansi. 35. It is remarked by the learned Judge that in the written statement in paragraph No.16, it is averred that a part of Khasra No.5751 alone has been acquired and that to the north of the acquired part of Khasra No.5751 lies the balance of unacquired land. The Judge in the Lower Appellate Court has taken particular note of the contents of the award passed in the compensation matter. This document was secured under the Right to Information Act and its veracity is not in doubt. The Judge in the Lower Appellate Court has taken particular note of the contents of the award passed in the compensation matter. This document was secured under the Right to Information Act and its veracity is not in doubt. The award has been noticed at page Nos.9 and 10 thereof to say that out of Khasra No.5751, 12-5-0 of land stood in the name of Bhabhuti and Bulaki, whereas these men hold no title to it. This land is nazul. It then figures at page No.10 of the award that Khasra No.5751/13, comprising 0-10-0 has not been acquired. Likewise, the award shows at page No.11 that land comprising Khasra Nos. 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/12, admeasuring 4 bigha 14 biswa has not been acquired. On the same page, the finding recorded by the Land Acquisition Officer in the award is that 3-19-0 land in Khasra No.5751/1, and 1-5-0 in Khasra No.5751/2, is not found included in the defendants' Housing Scheme, and a fortiori, not acquired. At page No.12 of the award, it is remarked that Sheikh Shafiuddin had said that Khasra No.5751, part of Khewat No.15, the land admeasured 5-4-0, whereas the part of Khasra No.5751 that lay in Khewat No.1, the area of land was 3-14-0. He further said that he was the tenure holder of the said land and that his father died in October, 1968. He had possession recorded in revenue records relating to the said land. Shafiuddin also credited with the statement that Khasra No.5751 is recorded as a joint holding and land acquired for Scheme No.1 includes part of land from this Khasra. Out of the said Khasra number, two bigha of land was sold by his grandfather, Wahiuddin to Mst. Bhuria vide registered sale deed dated 04.09.1949 and upon Bhuria's demise, came to be recorded in her son Allah Mehar's name in the revenue records of 1370 Fasli. Shafiuddin has further said that Allah Mehar sold the most part of his land for construction of houses. It was also said by Shafiuddin that Allah Mehar's land abuts the pucca road and Nala No.5743, and stretches across on the other side to the Dhobi Ghat constructed by him. The southern part of Khasra No.5751, by no means, is Allah Mehar's land. It was also said by Shafiuddin that Allah Mehar's land abuts the pucca road and Nala No.5743, and stretches across on the other side to the Dhobi Ghat constructed by him. The southern part of Khasra No.5751, by no means, is Allah Mehar's land. The southern part, admeasuring 2.30 bigha, which is being acquired, belongs to him (Shafiuddin) and he is entitled to claim compensation for it. He has also said that the remainder of land lies to the west. Now, all this testimony credited to Rafiuddin was recorded during proceedings of adjudication leading to the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. 36. The learned Judge has inferred from these facts that Wahiuddin was Shafiuddin's grandfather, who sold land to Mst. Bhuria vide registered sale deed dated 04.09.1949. After Bhuria's demise, her son, Allah Mehar came to be recorded in the said land by succession. The said land houses the Dhobi Ghat as well. To the south of Allah Mehar's land, admeasuring 2 bigha, is the remainder of land belonging to Shafiuddin. The learned Judge has particularly remarked that the award holds that the inference is that Shafiuddin's demand for compensation regarding Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11 and 5751/12 is not tenable because the land aforesaid is not under acquisition. Possession of the aforesaid Khasra numbers has never been taken by the defendants. It is remarked by the Lower Appellate Court that, according to the award, the defendants took possession of Khasra No.5751, part of Khewat No.445, Khata Nos.398 and 411, admeasuring 12-16-6, comprising nazul and Khasra No.5751/5, admeasuring 2-0-0 for the purpose of the Scheme. The learned Judge has remarked that from a perusal of the award, it is pellucid that Khasra No.5751, 12-16-6 land is nazul, whereas 2 bigha comprised in Khasra No.5751/5 is Allah Mehar's land. The land situate to the south of Allah Mehar's, held by Sheikh Shafiuddin, is not included in the acquired land. The award has been relied upon by the learned Judge to infer that land to the south of the part of Khasra No.5751, upon which the Dhobi Ghat is constructed, is not acquired land at all. The land situate to the south of Allah Mehar's, held by Sheikh Shafiuddin, is not included in the acquired land. The award has been relied upon by the learned Judge to infer that land to the south of the part of Khasra No.5751, upon which the Dhobi Ghat is constructed, is not acquired land at all. The possession memo, paper No.188-Ga has been noticed by the learned Judge to say that 12-5-0 land recorded in the name of Bhabhuti and another, besides Khasra No.5751M, admeasuring 0-11-6 recorded in the Municipal Board’s name, totals to an area 12-16-6, which is nazul in the award. The learned Judge has also remarked that Khasra No.5751/5, admeasuring 2 bigha is Allah Mehar's land. Thus, the total land comprising 14-16-6 is acquired land, but land to the south of Allah Mehar's, is not acquired. The learned Judge has then quoted from the award thus: ^^vYykesgj us [kljk la% 5751 dh 2&0&0 ch?kk Hkwfe ds tks tehankjh fouk'k {ks= esa iM+rh gs ds lacU/k esa eqoktk gsrq ekax i= ÁLrqr fd;k gS bUgksaus vf/kdka'k Hkwfe IykV cukdj csp nh gSA budh Hkwfe vtZu esa u gksrs gq, Hkh ;g Áfrdkj ikus dh dksf'k'k dj jgsa gSA** 37. It is then recorded by the Lower Appellate Court that in view of the said finding by the Land Acquisition Officer, Allah Mehar was not paid any compensation for the 2 bigha of his land. It is further remarked that though the land of Khasra No.5751/5 admeasuring 2 bigha is under acquisition and Allah Mehar's name is recorded over it, but in consequence of Allah Mehar selling the said land to third parties, possession of the same could not be taken. Referring to the award extensively, the learned Judge has inferred that out of the total area of land acquired in Khasra No.5751M, to wit, 14-16-6, 2-0-0, belonging to Allah Mehar, could not be taken possession of. The physical possession taken, according to the award, was noticed to be 11-19-12 i.e. short by 2-16-14. The learned Judge has opined that the defendants' case that they have taken possession of the entire area of acquired land, admeasuring 14-16-6 physically, which does not include Allah Mehar's land, that is to say, 2 bigha of the Dhobi Ghat, which was not acquired, but lay to the south of Dhobi Ghat, is incorrect. The learned Judge has opined that the defendants' case that they have taken possession of the entire area of acquired land, admeasuring 14-16-6 physically, which does not include Allah Mehar's land, that is to say, 2 bigha of the Dhobi Ghat, which was not acquired, but lay to the south of Dhobi Ghat, is incorrect. There are very detailed comparison with areas of the acquired land, old records and guesswork done on some probabilities, whether the suit property could indeed be part of the acquired land or away from it. The conclusion drawn is that the suit property, that lay to the south of Allah Mehar's land, was not included in the acquired land and that part of Khasra No.5751M was unacquired. To the same effect are the findings on Issue No.11. 38. Now, on the undisputed facts, what may not be denied are that the only land acquired, comprising Khasra No.5751M, part of Khewat Nos.1 and 15 was the one sold away by the ancestors of defendant-respondent No.5 to Mst. Bhuria vide sale deed dated 04.09.1949. In former times, Khasra No.5751 was a very large number, spread across a number of Khewat. It is also not disputed that the land of Khasra No.5751, belonging to defendant-respondent No.5 and rented out to the plaintiffs, and subsequently contracted to be sold, is located in that part of Khasra No.5751, which lies in Khewat Nos.1 and 15. The only part of Khasra No.5751 lying in Khewat Nos.1 and 15, that was acquired, is an area of 2 bigha sold to Bhuria, and, subsequently, inherited by Allah Mehar. It is also not in dispute that the suit property lies in the southern part of Khasra No.5751, part of Khewat Nos.1 and 15, owned by defendant-respondent No.5 and let out to the plaintiffs, and subsequently contracted to be sold to them. 39. The Lower Appellate Court seems to have attempted to determined the matter with reference to the findings in the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the records, the relative location of different parts of Khasra No.5751, the way they are placed direction-wise to one another, because what is not in dispute is that most of the acquired part of Khasra No.5751 lie in other Khewat numbers; not 1 and 15. At the same time, there is no quarrel, as already said, that the suit property is definitely located in that part of Khasra No.5751, which is included in Khewat Nos.1 and 15. The last fact that has led the Lower Appellate Court to decide finally and without undertaking a survey of the suit property with reference to its plot number, in which it is located, is the fact that Allah Mehar's part of Khasra No.5751, lying in Khewat Nos.1 and 15, alone has admittedly been acquired, which measures 2-0-0 with evidence there to the effect that Allah Mehar sold away his 2 bigha to third parties, of which possession could not be taken due to encroachment and constructions over it. The Lower Appellate Court moved to a quick finding that for the balance of the total area of acquired land in Khasra No.5751, to wit, 14-16-6, part of Khewat Nos.1 and 15, the defendants have attempted to encroach into the suit property, claiming it as theirs in lieu of the short area of Allah Mehar's, of which they could not take possession. 40. This Court must remark that Khasra No.5751, the part lying in Khewat Nos.1 and 15, has since come to be subdivided into Khasra Nos.5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/5, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11, 5751/12. It is no longer an undivided or minjumla number, but has definitive subdivisions, all bearing different survey plot numbers/ Khasra numbers. It is also not in dispute that the survey plot number or Khasra number of land owned by Allah Mehar is 5751/5. Abutting it to the south, are different subdivisions of Khasra Nos.5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11, 5751/12, in some of which the suit property is located. There is every possibility that the suit property might include some part or area of Khasra No.5751/5. Therefore, it is of the first importance to determine in which plot numbers precisely the suit property lies. By now, it has come to be settled for a principle that in the face of any doubt or dispute, if the suit property is located in one survey plot number or Khasra number or the other, has to be determined through a survey commission following the three fixed points method. By now, it has come to be settled for a principle that in the face of any doubt or dispute, if the suit property is located in one survey plot number or Khasra number or the other, has to be determined through a survey commission following the three fixed points method. If fixed points are no longer available, the precise location of the suit property with reference to the survey plot number or Khasra number can be done through resort to the total station method. The principle that in case of a dispute about the location of the property in one survey plot number or the other, it is necessary to issue a survey commission, has come to be well settled. 41. The principle that in case of a dispute about the location of the property in one survey plot number or the other, it is necessary to issue a survey commission, which would identify the suit property following the fixed point method, is laid down by the Supreme Court in Shreepat v. Rajendra Prasad and others, 2000 (40) ALR 534: JT 2000 (7) SC 379. It has been held in Shreepat (supra): “1. Respondent No. 1 - Rajendra Prasad had instituted a suit for declaration and possession over land bearing Khasra No. 257/3 against the Appellant on the ground that he had purchased this land-from its previous owner - Premnarayan - by a registered sale-deed. It was further pleaded that the Appellant had forcibly taken possession and was trying to construct his house. The suit was resisted by the Appellant on the grounds, inter alia, that the land in dispute was not part of Kteasra Plot No. 257/3, but was part of Khasra Plot No. 257/1 which was the Government land and over which the Appellant was in possession since long, it having been leased out to him. It was also pleaded that he had constructed the house over that land. 2. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the trial court decreed the suit. The decree was affirmed by the lower appellate court and upheld by the High Court in Second Appeal. 3. It was also pleaded that he had constructed the house over that land. 2. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the trial court decreed the suit. The decree was affirmed by the lower appellate court and upheld by the High Court in Second Appeal. 3. The principal contention raised by learned Counsel for the Appellant is that though there was a serious dispute with regard to the identity of the land in dispute, whether the land in dispute formed part of Khasra No. 257/3 or Khasra No. 257/1 (sic) courts below did not get the identity established and decreed the suit of the Respondent only on the basis of oral evidence which was not sufficient for he purpose of establishing the identity of the land in dispute at the spot. 4. In our opinion, this contention is correct. Since there was a serious dispute with regard to the area and boundaries of the land in question, especially with regard to its identity, the courts below, before decreeing the suit should have got the identity established by issuing a survey commission to locate the plot in dispute and find out whether it formed part of Khasra No. 257/3 or Khasra No 257/1. This having not been done has resulted ' in serious miscarriage of justice. We consequently allow the appeal, set side' the order passed by the courts below as affirmed by the High Court and remand the case to the trial court to dispose of the suit afresh in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law.” 42. In the fast changing landscape of the present day, fixed points sometimes disappear and are no longer available. If that be the position, to determine the Khasra number, where the suit property is located and demarcate it with reference to its plot number, an alternate method of more recent origin is the total station method. That this method can be utilized to demarcate lands/ property with regard to their location in one survey number or the other was held by the Delhi High Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Mohd. Sher Nabi Chaman and others, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7832, where it is observed: “13. At this stage, I may also deal with and dispose of an argument urged on behalf of the respondent no. Sher Nabi Chaman and others, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7832, where it is observed: “13. At this stage, I may also deal with and dispose of an argument urged on behalf of the respondent no. 1/plaintiff/ applicant/ review petitioner that the right to file objections if taken away would seriously affect the rights of the respondent no. 1/plaintiff/ applicant/ review petitioner, however, this argument conveniently ignores the fact that both the parties agreed to be bound by the fresh demarcation report to be carried out in terms of the Total Station Method. Since both the parties agreed, more so because there was a very narrow scope of the respondent no. 1/plaintiff/applicant/review petitioner existing whether in khasra nos. 22/3, 22/4, 22/8, 22/9 and 25/20/2 of village Mandoli as claimed by him or in khasra nos. 976 min., 977 min., 978 min. and 979 min. of village Mandoli which was the land of the petitioner/DDA, therefore, there is no prejudice to the respondent no. 1/ plaintiff/ applicant/ review petitioner and hence these arguments urged on behalf of the respondent no. 1/ plaintiff/applicant/review petitioner are rejected. 14. The next argument which was urged on behalf of the respondent no. 1/ plaintiff/ applicant/ review petitioner was that the revenue law does not entitle the demarcation by the Total Station Method, however, in my opinion, this is an argument of desperation because there is no bar under the revenue law not to carry out demarcation by the Total Station Method. Merely because a particular method is provided in the revenue laws which was passed many decades back, does not mean that the modern methods with respect to demarcation cannot be adopted by the revenue authorities, more so when such a method is now the only available proper method, because the traditional methods were with respect to areas and lands which were unconstructed and wherein demarcation could be done by traditional methods, but when the entire city is built up, demarcation will have to be done by the laser method i.e the Total Station Method inasmuch as which is done with respect to the fixed and specific points in terms of the revenue law. This argument urged on behalf of the respondent no. 1/ plaintiff/ applicant/ review petitioner is also therefore rejected.” 43. This argument urged on behalf of the respondent no. 1/ plaintiff/ applicant/ review petitioner is also therefore rejected.” 43. In the entire gamut of the otherwise very detailed findings recorded by the Lower appellate Court to answer for the plaintiffs, the ignorance of this principle in a dispute about location of the suit property being in one plot number or numbers, or the other or others specified, would vitiate the conclusions. In this case, the principle applies with greater force, because the controversy has, as already remarked, narrowed down to the issue if the suit property is located in Khasra No.5751/5, which is the only plot number of the subdivided plots of Khasra No.5751, located in Khewat Nos.1 and 15, that has admittedly been acquired. Other parts of Khasra No.5751 or its later subdivided plots fall in other Khewats; not Khewat No.1 or 15. The suit property, which the plaintiffs claim comprising Khasra No.5751, and now, its subdivided numbers is located in Khewat Nos.1 and 15; not the other Khewat. These issues have already been dwelt upon by the Lower Appellate Court in punctilious detail, which need not detain us. Nevertheless, the findings of the Lower Appellate Court cannot be upheld unless a survey of the contiguous Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11, 5751/12 on one hand and Khasra No.5751/5 on the other, is carried out according to the fixed points method. If survey is not possible, the location of the suit property in the precise Khasra numbers has to be determined through the total station method. 44. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, Substantial Question of Law No. (iv) is answered in the affirmative. 45. In view of the answer to Substantial Question of Law No. (iv), the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court would have to be set aside with a remit of the matter to that Court with a direction to hear and decide the appeal afresh, after causing a fixed point survey of the suit property with regard to its location in one set of plot numbers or the other. Or, failing a fixed point survey of the suit property, the location thereof with reference to its plot number/ numbers has to be undertaken, adopting the total station method. 46. Or, failing a fixed point survey of the suit property, the location thereof with reference to its plot number/ numbers has to be undertaken, adopting the total station method. 46. The result would be that the decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court would have to be set aside with a remit of the matter to that Court with the direction that the location of the suit property in one plot number or the other, and, particularly, if it is located in Khasra No.5751/5 or in the contiguous Khasra Nos. 5751/1, 5751/2, 5751/3, 5751/4, 5751/6, 5751/7, 5751/8, 5751/9, 5751/10, 5751/11, 5751/12, would have to be determined through the agency of a survey commission, who would undertake it following the three fixed points method. If the survey commission fails for the non-availability of three fixed points, a fresh commission shall be issued to a trained agency to determine the location of the suit property as aforesaid, following the total station method. Upon the submission of a report by the Survey Commissioner following the fixed point method, or the total station method, as the case may be, the parties would have a right to object and lead necessary evidence. The Lower Appellate Court will then re-hear and decide the appeal afresh, all to be done within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order. 47. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside with an order of remand in above terms. 48. The costs of this appeal shall abide by the event in the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. 49. Let the lower court's records be sent down at once.