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2024 DIGILAW 204 (GUJ)

M. B. Raut (Mahendrakumar Bhagwandas Raut) v. District Development Officer

2024-01-25

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. By way of present petition, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged orders dated 19/21.9.2005, 17.1.2008 and 16.11.2010 passed by the District Development Officer, District Panchayat, Valsad, Development Commissioner and Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, and prayed, inter alia, that:- "8 (A)Quash and set aside the punishment order dated 19/21.9.2005 passed by the District Development Officer, District Panchayat, Valsad, Annexure-A to this petition, and (B) Quash and set aside the order dated 17.1.2008 passed by the Development Commissioner, Annexure-B to this petition, and (C) Quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 16.11.2010 passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Annexure-C to this petition, and further be pleased to grant all the consequential benefits to the petitioner, and (D) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be stayed the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned orders dated 19/21.9.2005, 17.1.2008, 16.11.2010, Annexure-A, B and C, to this petition, and (E) Award the cost of the present petition, and (F) Grant any other relief or pass any other order which the Honourable Court may be considered as just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. The facts giving rise to present petition are that the petitioner was serving as a ‘Junior Clerk’ in the Public Health Centre at Limjar Taluka Vansada, District: Valsad and was transferred to Public Health Center at Pindval Taluka, Dharampur by way of promotion to the post of ‘Senior Clerk’, whereby the petitioner had reported for duty on 31.12.1980. Thereafter, the petitioner remained absent from his duty from 1.1.1981 to 1.6.1995, in view of the criminal complaint lodged against the petitioner under Section 409 of Indian Penal Code alleging that the petitioner has misappropriated certain amount of Diwali Festival advance of certain employees of Limjar, Public Health Centre. The said case was registered as Criminal Case No.94 of 1983. 2.1 Due to the registration of a criminal complaint against the petitioner, it had affected the moral of the petitioner and due to which petitioner was under the trauma and was demoralized. Under these circumstances, the petitioner could not attend the duties from 1.1.1981. In the said Criminal Case, after the trial, the competent Criminal Court acquitted the petitioner of the charges leveled against him by judgment and order of acquittal dated 14.2.1995. Under these circumstances, the petitioner could not attend the duties from 1.1.1981. In the said Criminal Case, after the trial, the competent Criminal Court acquitted the petitioner of the charges leveled against him by judgment and order of acquittal dated 14.2.1995. 2.2 After the acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal case, the petitioner went to report for duty, but the petitioner was not permitted to join the duty. Therefore, on 1.6.1995 the petitioner gave a letter to the authority and requested that the petitioner may be allowed to resume his duty and also produced the copy of the operative portion of the judgment and order of acquittal. Inspite of that the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duty. The petitioner thereafter, also continuously requested the respondent authority to allow him to resume his duty by submitting written representations and the petitioner had visited the office frequently and had made oral representations with a request to allow him to resume his duty. Despite repeated requests by petitioner to allow him to resume duty, as he was not allowed to resume duty, he had written a little bit strongly worded letter dated 27.2.2003. Thereafter, the respondent authority initiated disciplinary proceedings against petitioner on charges of unauthorized absenteeism on duty and other charges by issuing a charge sheet dated 22.7.2003 to the petitioner. The petitioner replied to the said charge sheet vide defense statement dated 2.9.2003. Thereafter, inquiry officer came to be appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, who conducted the departmental inquiry. Before the inquiry officer also the petitioner submitted his representation dated 13.4.2004, 17.4.2004, 19.4.2004 and a detailed brief dated 8.10.2004. Further, no evidence was recorded by Inquiry Officer nor any witness was examined during the departmental inquiry and inspite of that the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the charges leveled against the petitioner are proved. The petitioner was served with a show-cause-notice dated 3.11.2004 along with the copy of the inquiry report, whereby the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation, as to why punishment should not be awarded to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his representation dated 4.4.2005 to the Disciplinary Authority on 4.4.2005. Without considering the representation of the petitioner in its true perspective, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 19/21.9.2005, whereby the petitioner came to be dismissed from service. The petitioner submitted his representation dated 4.4.2005 to the Disciplinary Authority on 4.4.2005. Without considering the representation of the petitioner in its true perspective, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 19/21.9.2005, whereby the petitioner came to be dismissed from service. Against the said order dated 19/21.9.2005, the petitioner preferred a detailed appeal before Development Commissioner. The said appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated 17.1.2008. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal against the order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. The said Appeal came to be dismissed by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 16.11.2010. 3. In view of the aforesaid facts, the petitioner has preferred present petition praying inter alia that the orders dated 19/21.9.2005, 17.1.2008 and 16.11.2010 passed by the authorities be quashed and set aside. 4. I have heard Ms. Prachi Upadhyay for Mr. Vaibhav Vyas, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rajesh Chauhan, learned Counsel for Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned Counsel for the respondents. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER : 5. Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was serving with the respondent authority and he was not reported for duty from 1.1.1981 to 1.6.1995 because of one Criminal Case being Criminal Case No. 94 of 1983 registered against the petitioner. Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the said case was decided on 14.2.1995, whereby the petitioner came to be acquitted by the concerned competent Trial Court in said criminal case and even thereafter, the petitioner has reported to the respondent, but he was not allowed by the respondent to join the duty and therefore, the impugned order is against the principles of natural justice and in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.1 Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the petitioner was acquitted from the charges leveled against him therefore, he may be considered on duty and he may be paid all the consequential retiral benefits along with backwages. It is also contended by Ms. Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the initiation of the departmental proceedings is at very belated stage, which is also against the violation of principles of natural justice. 5.2 Ms. It is also contended by Ms. Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the initiation of the departmental proceedings is at very belated stage, which is also against the violation of principles of natural justice. 5.2 Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India and another reported in 2012 (3) SCC 178 and submitted that the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the first and second appellate authorities is bad in law and the same is required to be quashed and set side. Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that even in departmental inquiry, no proper procedure was followed by the authority and no proper inquiry was conducted against present petitioner and hence, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority in first and second appeal preferred by the petitioner, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.3 Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that so far as the charge levelled against the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner has submitted detailed reply to the charges heet issued by the department but the same was not considered by the inquiry officer, at the time of departmental inquiry and without considering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order. 5.4 Ms. Prachi Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in view of the aforesaid facts, present petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by both the appellate authorities deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner may be entitled for all the consequential benefits along with retirement benefits. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT : 6. As against the same, Mr. Rajesh Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has objected present petition. He has referred to and relied upon the Affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent and submitted that from 1.1.1981 to 1.6.1995, the petitioner was on unauthorized leave on account of one criminal case registered against him being Criminal Case No.94 of 1983 and under the wrong impression, he did not remain present during this 14 years. 6.1 Mr. He has referred to and relied upon the Affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent and submitted that from 1.1.1981 to 1.6.1995, the petitioner was on unauthorized leave on account of one criminal case registered against him being Criminal Case No.94 of 1983 and under the wrong impression, he did not remain present during this 14 years. 6.1 Mr. Rajesh Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that even thereafter, also the petitioner did not report for duty and therefore, the respondent authority has published public notice in the daily local newspaper i.e. ‘Gujarat Samachar’ on 31.3.2000. He further submitted that as per the say of the petitioner in response thereto, the petitioner has approached the respondent by way of making a written application however, he has not mentioned true and correct facts in the application and therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner is contrary to the facts of present case. 6.2 Mr. Rajesh Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the inquiry officer was appointed and after giving proper opportunity to the delinquent, the inquiry was proceeded and relying upon the said inquiry report, the disciplinary authority has passed impugned order, which is in consonance with the settled principles of law. He further submitted that thereafter, both the appellate authorities have found that the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority is in consonance with the settled principle of law and therefore, no interference was called for by the appellate authority in the departmental appeal preferred by the present petitioner. 6.3 Mr. Rajesh Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that so far as the contention raised by the petitioner about the initiation of the departmental inquiry at belated stage is concerned, the respondent has denied the said contention in his affidavit-in- reply and dealt with the said contention. He, relied upon paragraph Nos. 4 and 5 of the affidavit-in-reply whereby the respondent authority has stated as under:- “4. The respondent no.1 submits that petitioner did not report for duty after 1.1.81 and even never bothered to enter in to any correspondence and all of a sudden tried to report for duty on 14.2.95 with a copy of the last page of the judgment of the competent Criminal Court at Vansda delivered in Criminal Case No.94/83. The respondent no.1 submits that petitioner did not report for duty after 1.1.81 and even never bothered to enter in to any correspondence and all of a sudden tried to report for duty on 14.2.95 with a copy of the last page of the judgment of the competent Criminal Court at Vansda delivered in Criminal Case No.94/83. It is submitted that considering long unauthorized absenteeism for a period of 15 years it was thought fit to address him a letter dated 7.8.96 instructing to remain present with necessary record and documents but the said post was returned with an endorsement "left" and a copy of the letter dated 7.8.96 is annexed as ANNEXURE-A. The respondent No.1 most respectfully submits that another attempt was made by way of addressing a letter dated 14.2.2000 to the petitioner in that regard but it met with the same fate and a copy of letter is annexed as ANNEXURE-B. The respondent No.1 most respectfully submits that the petitioner had never bothered to enter in to any correspondence or attend the office of respondent no.1 on his own with necessary record and material till then. 5. The respondent no.1 submits that considering the facts it was thought fit to publish an advertisement in Gujarati daily "Gujarat Samachar" calling upon the petitioner to remain personally present with explanation and a copy of advertisement is annexed as ANNEXUREC. The respondent No.1 most respectfully submits that ultimately petitioner remained present on 21.4.2000 but failed to justify his unauthorized absence of nearly 20 years with any documentary evidence. The respondent no.1 submits that petitioner thereafter submitted written explanation on 16.4.03 and a copy thereof is annexed as ANNEXURE-D. Therefore, the said averment is nothing but an eye wash and therefore, this court may not entertain present petition and the same may be dismissed.” 6.4 Mr. Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has referred and relied upon the application made by the petitioner dated 16.4.2003 and emphasized upon the fact that even from the application and averments made in the earlier correspondence, the petitioner has admitted that he has his own not reported to the duty. 6.5 Mr. Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has referred and relied upon the application made by the petitioner dated 16.4.2003 and emphasized upon the fact that even from the application and averments made in the earlier correspondence, the petitioner has admitted that he has his own not reported to the duty. 6.5 Mr. Chauhan, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that in view of the aforesaid facts and in view of the fact that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authorities is in consonance with the settled legal principles, no interference is required to be called for in the present petition. 7. I have perused the material produced on record along with the relevant documents as well as the impugned orders passed by the authorities. As per settled legal principle, in the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority by appreciating the documentary evidence and which is confirmed by the appellate authority, on a doctrine of proportionality, this Court has very limited scope to interfere in the quantum of the punishment. Now, it is well settled by the number of judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court that while exercising the power under Article 16, 226 and 227, this Court has very limited scope to interfere in the punishment order passed by the authority, after taking into account the documentary evidence and after hearing the parties. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others vs. T.T. Muralibabu reported in case of (2014) 4 SCC 108 has observed as under:- “19. In Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra) this Court opined that the unauthorized absence was not a grave misconduct inasmuch as the employee had proceeded on leave under compulsion because of his grave condition of health. Be it noted, in the said case, it has also been observed that no reasonable disciplinary authority would term absence on medical grounds with proper medical certificate from Government doctors as a grave misconduct. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent has commended us to the decision in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and another to highlight that in the absence of a finding returned by the Inquiry Officer or determination by the disciplinary authority that the unauthorized absence was willful, the charge could not be treated to have been proved. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent has commended us to the decision in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and another to highlight that in the absence of a finding returned by the Inquiry Officer or determination by the disciplinary authority that the unauthorized absence was willful, the charge could not be treated to have been proved. To appreciate the said submission we have carefully perused the said authority. In the said case, the question arose whether “unauthorized absence from duty” did tantamount to “failure of devotion to duty” or “behavior unbecoming of a Government servant” inasmuch as the appellant therein was chargesheeted for failure to maintain devotion to duty and his behavior was unbecoming of a Government servant. After adverting to the rule position the two-Judge Bench expressed thus: - “16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorized absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behavior was unbecoming of a government servant. The question whether “unauthorized absence from duty” amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is willful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be willful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorized absence, but it does not always mean willful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalization, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorized absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is willful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct.” 23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a Government servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a Government servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is willful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is willful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorized absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Singla, the Court, dealing with unauthorized absence, has stated thus: - “Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 27. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Singla (supra). 28. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Singla (supra). 28. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinize whether the High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. Doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. In this regard a passage from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another v. Ashok Kumar Arora, is worth reproducing: - “At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee.” 29. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, the Court analysed the conception of proportionality in administrative law in England and India and thereafter addressed itself with regard to the punishment in disciplinary matters and opined that unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary role that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. 30. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, the Court, after analyzing the doctrine of proportionality at length, ruled thus: - “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reason for his absence by stating that he did not have intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court has considered both the issue viz. proportionality of quantum of punishment and also delay and latches in the said judgment and the said judgment is referred to and relied upon by this Court in the case of Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi vs. Surat Municipal Corporation reported in 2017 LawSuit (Guj) 9 and in Special Civil Application No. 5205 of 1995 dated 12.1.2017. 9. In present case, the respondent had tried to call the petitioner, by addressing a letter twice to remain present, considering the long unauthorized absenteeism for a period of 15 years along with necessary record and documents. 9. In present case, the respondent had tried to call the petitioner, by addressing a letter twice to remain present, considering the long unauthorized absenteeism for a period of 15 years along with necessary record and documents. The said post was returned and thereafter, the respondent had also published an advertisement in ‘Gujarat Samachar’ calling upon the petitioner to remain personally present with explanation however, when the petitioner remained present after long period, he has failed to justify his unauthorized absence. Hence, I am of the opinion that present petition, though filed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India but considering the fact that the petitioner has challenged the order of disciplinary authority which is confirmed by both the appellate authorities, so admittedly the petition is under 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the present petition is devoid of any merit and the same is required to be dismissed, as for the long period of 14 years absenteeism, there is no satisfactory reason given by the petitioner before the inquiry officer and also before the disciplinary authority. Even, in his memo of appeal also he has admitted that he has given an application but whether that leave report is approved or disapproved he is not aware and therefore, the authority has properly appreciated the contention in its true and proper spirit and hence, I am not find any fault with the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by both the Appellate Authorities. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, present petition does not deserve to be entertained and the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, present petition is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.