JUDGMENT : M. K. THAKKER, J. 1. The present petition is filed under Article 14, 16 and 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the award passed by the learned labour court in reference (LCA) D No.21 of 1999 dated 08.04.2003 and the order passed in Miscellaneous Application No.156 of 2015 in Miscellaneous Application No.250 of 2004 in reference (LCA) D No.21 of 1999 dated 19.03.2009. 2. The petitioner Municipality has challenged the award passed in favour of the respondent workman by which the directions were issued to regularise the services of the respondent from the date of their initial appointment as a sweeper. The aforesaid award is passed on 30.12.1999. During the proceedings of the hearing before the learned labour Court the learned labour Court has issued notice to the present petitioner however, no one remained present either during the conciliation or for the hearing before the learned labour Court. Before the learned labour Court the workman was examined namely Jasuben Galiyal who deposed in her chief examination that she was serving with the petitioner Gram Panchayat since last 7 years from the date of filing of reference. Her working hours were morning 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and noon 2:00 p.m. to evening 6:00 p.m. The work is of perennial in nature and the other employees who are similarly situated were regularised. They are getting the salary of Rs.3,000/- however, the deponent is getting the salary of Rs.1,000/- and the demand was raised to regularise the service through the Union. Likewise the aforesaid witness Jasuben, other 3 persons were also member of the Union. As no one has represented the present petitioner despite having given sufficient opportunity, therefore exparte order came to be passed by the learned labour court and the reference was allowed qua 13 employees and one of the employee namely Puniben Jerambhai died during the pendency of the reference therefore, same was rejected qua her. The petitioner has filed an application being Miscellaneous Application No. 240 of 2004 before the learned labour Court for quashing and setting aside the ex-parte award under Rule 26A of the I.D.Act. After hearing to the parties it was rejected by the learned labour Court vide order dated 19.03.2009. The petitioner has filed an application being Miscellaneous Application No. 240 of 2004 before the learned labour Court for quashing and setting aside the ex-parte award under Rule 26A of the I.D.Act. After hearing to the parties it was rejected by the learned labour Court vide order dated 19.03.2009. Thereafter, another application was filed being MCA No. 156 of 2015 in MCA No. 250 of 2004 in reference LCA D No.21 of 1999 with a prayer to condone the delay in preferring the quashing and setting aside the ex-parte judgement and award. The aforesaid application was permitted to be withdrawn, thereafter, workman has approached this Court by way of filing writ petition being SCA No.16559 of 2022 praying to issue direction to the Municipality to implement the judgement and award dated 08.04.2003 passed in reference (LCA) D No.21 of 1999 which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 24.06.2024 with a direction to approach before the appropriate Court for execution of the award. As the petitioner came into knowledge with regard to the above petitions the present petition came to be filed on 04.12.2023 challenging the award passed in the main reference dated 08.04.2003 and order dated 19.03.2009 passed in Miscellaneous Application No.156 of 2003 refusing to condone the delay. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi for the petitioner. 3.1. Learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi submits that the award passed to regularise the service of the present petitioner is against the provisions of law. Learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi submits further submits that workman was daily wagers they are not entitled to be regularised as they have been appointed without following the recruitment process. To substantiate his argument reliance was placed on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal Vs Prantiya Sinchai Avam Bandh Yogana Shramik Mahaparishad 2007 (12) SCC 483 and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Vs Dan Bahadur Singh reported in 2007 (6) SCC 207 as well as the decision of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1785 of 2009 reported in 2010 2 GLR 1616 . 3.2. Learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi submits that not filing the application within a prescribed time under Article 26A of the ID Act was not out of deliberate act or due to lack of diligence. 3.2. Learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi submits that not filing the application within a prescribed time under Article 26A of the ID Act was not out of deliberate act or due to lack of diligence. Due to absence of learned advocate for the petitioner before the learned labour Court has allowed the reference without examining the fact that no evidence was led by the workman to show that he has completed 240 days in any of the year. Therefore in rejecting the application for condonation of delay in restoration of the reference with cost learned labour Court has committed grave error. In support of above submissions learned advocate has relied on the decision rendard by this Court in SCA No.12293 of 2004 and SCA No.228 of 2015 as well as SCA No.1312 of 2017 and in the case arising from this same Municipality in similar facts decision rendered by this Court in SCA No.2994 of 2016. 3.3. At the end learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi submits that petitioner is required to be given an opportunity to put his case before the learned labour court by awarding special cost and with the direction to conclude the proceeding within prescribed time limit. However, not doing the same learned labour Court has committed error and therefore, also this petition is required to be allowed. Learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi has relied on the decision rendered by this Court in SCA No.8261 of 2016 and submitted that petition be allowed and the reference be restored to its original file. 4. Having considered the submissions made by the learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi and the decisions relied thereon folowing are undisputed facts emerges from record: a) Workers have approached through Union to the learned labour Court seeking regularisation of service as they were serving on the post of sweeper from 1993 onwards. The aforesaid reference was registered before the learned labour court in the year 1999. It is contended before the learned labour Court that the service which was provided was for more than 8 years is of perennial in nature and other similarly situated persons who are serving on regular post and doing same work are getting more wages than the present respondent. It is contended before the learned labour Court that the service which was provided was for more than 8 years is of perennial in nature and other similarly situated persons who are serving on regular post and doing same work are getting more wages than the present respondent. b) Despite having served the notice no one has represented the present petitioner, therefore, award came to be passed on 08.04.2003 directing the present petitioner to regularise the service within a period of 30 days from the date of award. c) The application being MCA No.250 of 2004 came to be filed for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application on 13.10.2004. The aforesaid application came to be dismissed by the learned labour Court with observation that no sufficient explanation has been given for condonation of delay of 380 days in filing the restoration of main reference on 19.03.2009. d) Again the application was preferred after 6 years i.e Miscellaneous Application No.156 of 2015 on 23.07.2015 praying to condone the delay in filing the application for restoration of award under Rule 26A of the Industrial Disputes Act (Gujarat Rules). It is required to be noted herein that this application was filed without being challenged the order passed by the learned labour court dated 19.03.2009 rejecting the application for condonation of delay. e) The aforesaid application being MCA No. 156 of 2015 came to be withdrawn vide order dated 30.06.2016 as the petitioner was not able to serve the Union. f) Thereafter, petitioner remained idle till the year 2023 i.e 01.12.2023 when the present petition was registered before this Court. 5. It transpires from the record that the petitioner was not suddenly awake but present petition filed only after filing the petition before this Court being SCA No.16559 of 2022 by one of the workman praying to implement the award passed in the year 2009 and on getting the notice which was issued by this Court vide order dated 26.08.2022. If petition was not filed by workman before this Court probably the petitioner might be under the impression that they can fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed the limitation. If petition was not filed by workman before this Court probably the petitioner might be under the impression that they can fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed the limitation. Unfortunately, instead of filing the recovery proceedings the workman has approached this Court by filing the above petition which also came to be disposed of vide order dated 24.06.2024 directing the respondent to approach before the appropriate forum for execution of the award. In that background, the reliance which was placed on various decisions by the learned advocate Mr.Lakhpatsinh Dabhi submitting that the learned labour Court has committed error by directing the present petitioner to regularise the service and the ex-party award is required to be set aside with a view to give opportunity to the present petitioner to contest before the learned labour court by restoring the reference which was filed in the year 1999 is misconceived. The workman who despite having succeeded before the learned labour court and which remained unchallenged for 25 years could not reap the fruits and in that scenario no relief can be granted to present petitioner. 6. This Court has considered the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others versus Jahangir Mehramji DJ bhav reported in SLP No.21096 of 2019 Following observations are required to be referred which are reproduced hereinbelow: “26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 28. At this stage, we would like to quote few observations made by the High Court in its impugned order pointing towards lack of bona fides on the part of the appellants. The observations are as under:- “9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted hereinabove shows that on oath, solemn statement is made that notice of Darkhast No.16 of 2014 for execution of the decree issued by the executing Court was received by the Department on 25.02.2019. As against this, in paragraph 3 of the additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is stated that the averments made in paragraph 4 as regards service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019 is factually incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. The error in the application is out of inadvertence for which he tendered unconditional apology. It is further stated that inadvertent mistake on facts as to knowledge of execution proceedings was purely because of oversight in the light of possibilities of issuance of possession warrant by the executing court and requirement of expeditious urgency of moving before this Court to save the proceeding in litigation since 1981 which otherwise would have got frustrated. He stated that the same is nothing beyond human error. x x x x 12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are bereft of any particulars and are totally vague. He stated that the same is nothing beyond human error. x x x x 12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are bereft of any particulars and are totally vague. In fact the solemn statement made in paragraph 4 that notice of Darkhast for execution of the decree issued by the executing Court was received by the Department on 25.02.2019, to put it mildly, is incorrect statement. In view of paragraph 3 of the additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is evident that notice of Darkhast was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. It is material to note that no particulars are given as to when the Department sought legal opinion. There is also no explanation as to why Department did not instruct lawyer in the High Court to apply for restoration of the Petition and why the Department defended execution proceedings. It is worthwhile to note that execution proceedings were filed by the respondents only because Writ Petition was dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored, automatically the execution proceedings would have been stayed by the executing Court. Instead of adopting appropriate proceedings, the defendants unnecessarily went on defending the execution proceedings. In paragraph 4(b) though it is stated that Department was regularly following up with its panel lawyer till 2003, this statement is also not substantiated by producing any document. Even if I accept that the Department was regularly following up with its panel lawyer till 2003, there is no explanation worth the name as to why the Department did not follow up the matter between 2003 and 2006 when the Petition was dismissed in default. That apart, equally, there is no explanation as to why no follow up action was taken by the officers between 2006 and 2016 when Department acquired knowledge about dismissal of Writ Petition on 18.03.2016. 13. It is no doubt true that while considering the application for condonation of delay, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ has to be liberally construed. It, however, does not mean that without making any sufficient cause, the Court will condone the delay regardless of the length of the delay. In the present case, the delay is of 12 years and 158 days. A perusal of the application as also the additional affidavit hardly indicates any sufficient cause for condoning the unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.” 29. In the present case, the delay is of 12 years and 158 days. A perusal of the application as also the additional affidavit hardly indicates any sufficient cause for condoning the unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.” 29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459 , this Court rejected the application for condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an application to set aside an exparte decree on the ground that the explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to be not satisfied. 30. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563 , this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court dealt with the scope of ‘sufficient cause’ and held as follows: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201 (Del)] as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 31. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of Andhra Pradesh & others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 , this Court made the following observations: “20. In N. Balakrishnan, [ (1998) 7 SCC 123 ] this Court again reiterated the principle that: (SCC p. 127, para 11) “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that [the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly.” 21 to 27......… 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 32. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & others, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , this Court held as follows: “19. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat [ (1981) 1 SCC 495 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 184] this Court observed: (SCC p. 497, para 6) “6. … it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause.” (emphasis supplied) This judgment squarely applies to the facts in hand. x x x x 21. Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel relying on the decision of this Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [ (1998) 7 SCC 123 ] submitted that length of delay is no matter and acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. It was submitted that if the explanation offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as a part of dilatory tactics, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The very said decision upon which reliance has been placed holds that the law of limitation fixes a lifespan for every legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The very said decision upon which reliance has been placed holds that the law of limitation fixes a lifespan for every legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. The decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or application as the case may be. On the other hand, in the said judgment it is said that court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It was observed: (SCC p.128, para 11) “11. … It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 22. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 361 ] this Court held that: (AIR pp. 363-65) “In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. It is further necessary to emphasise that even if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration.” (emphasis supplied) 23. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration.” (emphasis supplied) 23. On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise courts' discretion in its favour.” 33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , this Court made the following observations: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 7. Considering the above law if explanation which have been offered in the present petition for not challenging the award for 25 years is to be examined then not a single word is mentioned except the contention that the papers were not traceable. Whether this can be said to be a sufficient explanation for challenging the impugned award after a lapse of 25 years in the opinion of this Court is answered in negative form. The explanation which is offered appears to be an excuse and therefore, impression in the minds of the government departments that they are under the special status is required to be removed. The government departments are also under the special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. The workers though they have succeeded prior to 25 years could not get the fruits is nothing but a mockery of justice and therefore, this Court is of the view that this petition is required to be dismissed with cost of Rs.15,000/- which shall be recovered from the accounts of the erring officers as the petitioner money is of public exchequer. 8. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed and the petitioner is directed to deposit the cost of Rs.15,000/- with the Registry of this Court within a period of 2 weeks from the receipt of this order. 9. On depositing the above amount, same be remitted to the learned labour Court who shall in turn disburse the amount in the favour of the respondent-Union. 10. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed.