JUDGMENT : J.C. DOSHI, J. 1. With the consent of learned advocates for both the sides, the present Revision Application is taken up for final hearing at admission stage. 2. This Revision Application under section 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (for short “the Rent Act”) challenges the judgment and finding arrived at in Regular Civil Suit No. 20 of 2004, whereby, learned Additional Civil Judge, Devgadhbaria by judgment and decree dated 31.12.2013 while allowing the suit of the landlord directed tenant to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of suit premises within 90 days on the ground that tenant has acquired suitable accommodation. In Regular Civil Appeal No. 49 of 2017 filed before learned Additional District Court, Limkheda at Dahod, the Revisionist-tenant lost appeal. Learned Appellate Court by judgment and order dated 17.05.2021 confirmed and approved judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the concurrent findings arrived by learned Courts below, tenant is before this Court by way of present Revision Application. 4. The Revisionist/defendant is tenant and respondent is landlord-plaintiff. They are referred as tenant and landlord hereinafter. 5. Facts of the case are as under: 5.1. The Room No. 3 having area of 56 meter of Panchayat House No. 2236 in City Survey No. 657, which is located in the chawl near Ranchhodji Temple in Devgadh Baria village in Devgadh Baria Taluka is the disputed room in the suit. The plaintiff has filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against the defendant to obtain possession of the disputed room. However, plaintiff’s suit is dismissed on holding that defendant does not hold the possession as a trespasser. Hence, he has accepted the defendant in the matter as a tenant and stated that there is no alternative but to accept the defendant as a tenant. The plaintiff further states in this suit that the defendant has managed to get a house with good amenities for residential purpose in Devgadh Baria and enjoys ownership-possession right of the house. The defendant has accepted this fact in her deposition on oath in the earlier suit. The defendant has built a house with good amenities for herself and her children for the purpose of residing. The defendant has accepted this fact in her deposition on oath in the earlier suit. The defendant has built a house with good amenities for herself and her children for the purpose of residing. Therefore, since the defendant has lost the right as a tenant, the plaintiff has issued a notice to the defendant on 01-01-2004 for vacating the house. As the defendant did not vacate the house and thus did not comply with the notice, the plaintiff has cited this reason for filing the suit and requested to grant relief as mentioned in the Para No. 12 of the present suit. 6. Learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi for the Revisionist raised singular point in the matter that learned Courts below have committed serious error in passing decree of eviction. She would further submit that learned Courts below failed to consider the issue of greater hardship. It is further submitted that even landlord was holding more than one premises, whereas, tenant has only one premises, where, her mother is living. It is further submitted that learned Courts below failed to consider this legal issue and also committed serious error while not discussing the issue of greater hardship in the concurrent findings. It is submitted that landlord, apart from having disputed premises also hold two storyed building and yet this issue though has been contended in written statement as well as raised before the learned Court below, it is not considered on its merits. It is manifest error on the part of learned Trial Court and it is large before the learned Appellate Court, as appeal is also dismissed. It is further submitted that proper comparison of greater hardship is made or greaterness is found or assessed, it is found that tenant suffers greater hardship than landlord but since this issue has not tackled properly by the learned Trial Court as well as appellate Court, the Revision Application deserves consideration and requires to be allowed. 6.1. Upon above submissions, learned advocate Ms. Joshi for the Revisionist would submit to allow this Revision Application. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Kharadi for the landlord would submit that ground of comparing greater hardship is defined in section 13(2) of the Rent Act and it is available only when landlord seeks eviction of tenant on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Kharadi for the landlord would submit that ground of comparing greater hardship is defined in section 13(2) of the Rent Act and it is available only when landlord seeks eviction of tenant on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act. In the present case, learned Trial Court has passed eviction decree on the ground of availability of alternative accommodation to the tenant defined in section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act. It is submitted that while considering such ground learned Trial Court was required to stick with basic aspect that whether tenant has acquired alternative accommodation, if answer is yes, no option left with Court except to pass order of eviction of tenant. Learned Trial Court has found that tenant has acquired alternative accommodation and even found that mother of the tenant is living elsewhere and not in the premises owned by the tenant and therefore, learned Trial Court has rightly passed decree for eviction and confirmed by learned Appellate Court. He takes this Court through reasons and finding qua issue no. 2 recorded by the learned Trial Court along with evidence on record and confirmed by learned Appellate Court to submit that it is undeniable aspect that tenant has acquired alternative suitable accommodation and therefore, tenant was rightly burdened to evict the rented premises. He submitted that learned Courts below have not committed any error much less error of understanding provision of law or facts and therefore, present Revision Application being sans of merits, deserves to be dismissed at admission stage. 8. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and perused Record and Proceedings on record. At the outset, if we take up submission canvassed by learned advocate Ms. Joshi for the Revisionist-tenant, mainly it is contended that both the Courts below have failed to understand principle of greater hardship and has not applied while passing order of eviction. She criticized impugned judgment and decree on the ground the Courts below have not examined this issue on merits and therefore, impugned judgments are bad in law. In this regard, if we examine suit of the plaintiff, sole ground raised by the landlord for eviction of tenant is on the ground that tenant has acquired suitable accommodation and therefore, liable to evict rented premises. This ground is covered under section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act. In this regard, if we examine suit of the plaintiff, sole ground raised by the landlord for eviction of tenant is on the ground that tenant has acquired suitable accommodation and therefore, liable to evict rented premises. This ground is covered under section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act. It is reproduced as under: “13(1)........ (a) to (k) xxx xxx xxx (l) that the tenant after the coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence.” 8.1. Section 13(2) of the Rent Act speaks of greater hardship. Since sole contention raised by learned advocate Ms. Joshi is about non consideration of principle of greater hardship, let refer section 13(2) of the Act, which reads as under: “13(2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-section (1) if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. Explanation - For the purposes of clause (g) of sub-section (1): (a) a person shall not be deemed to be a landlord unless he has acquired his interest in the premises at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the first day of January, 1964, whichever is later, or if the interest has devolved on him by inheritance or succession, his predecessor in title had acquired the interest at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the first day of January, 1964, whichever is later. (b) the expression “landlord” shall not include a rent-farmer or rent-collector.” 9. Plain reading of provision of law makes it abundantly clear that issue/principle of greater hardship can be considered only while landlord is seeking eviction of rented premises on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement defined in section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act. (b) the expression “landlord” shall not include a rent-farmer or rent-collector.” 9. Plain reading of provision of law makes it abundantly clear that issue/principle of greater hardship can be considered only while landlord is seeking eviction of rented premises on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement defined in section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act. Principle of greater hardship would be applied only in circumstances where landlord has preferred suit under section 13(1)(g) of the Act and seeking eviction of tenant on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement. In the present case, landlord had sought eviction of tenant on the ground of suitable accommodation by tenant defined under section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act and therefore, issue of greater hardship would never come into picture for consideration. This submission of learned advocate Ms. Joshi is hopeless, therefore, does not stand. 10. Learned Trial Court upon pleading of parties framed following issues: “(1) Whether the present suit is barred by principle of estoppel and waiver? (2) Whether plaintiff proves that defendant have acquired alternate suitable accommodation? (3) Whether plaintiff is entitled to relief prayed for? (4) What order and decree? (5) Whether the plaintiff proves that plaintiff is owner of suit premises? (6) Whether the plaintiffs proves that the defendant is a tenant of the suit premises at a monthly rate of Rs. 25?” 10.1 Issue No. 2 had been framed on the issue of acquisition of alternative accommodation. Learned Trial Court in Para 8 of the impugned judgment discussed the finding of issue no. 2 which reads as under (it is in Gujarati, for better understanding, it is translated in English): “This issue is raised by the defendant for purchasing a house with amenities and the burden of proving the same has been put on the plaintiff. Upon seeing the formulation of this issue, first of all the plaintiff should prove that, the defendant has purchased alternative property and thereafter, it should be proved that, whether the said property has residential amenities or having more amenities than property in question. To prove this issue, the plaintiff has deposed vide Exhibit-73, wherein, evidence regarding this issue is provided that, Manjulaben is serving as a Teacher and she has a house with more amenities than the house in question, situated exact opposite of the room in question bearing City Survey No. 636 and Municipality No. 504/04. To prove this issue, the plaintiff has deposed vide Exhibit-73, wherein, evidence regarding this issue is provided that, Manjulaben is serving as a Teacher and she has a house with more amenities than the house in question, situated exact opposite of the room in question bearing City Survey No. 636 and Municipality No. 504/04. Thus, the defendant herein has constructed a house with good amenities for the purpose residence of herself and her children and in this manner the defendant has lost their right to reside as our tenant.” Thus, considering the aforesaid evidence of the plaintiff, as stated by the plaintiff, the defendant herein has built a house with good amenities, as compared to the property in question for the purpose of residence of herself and her children and therefore the defendant has lost her right of residing as a tenant in the property in question. Moreover, the plaintiff has stated that, they have served notice to the defendant for vacating the property in question on 01/01/2004. Moreover, he has also stated in his plaint that, he has served the notice on 01/01/2004 to the defendant for vacating the house and despite the service of such notice, the defendant has not vacated the house and therefore the cause of the suit has arisen. But, the plaintiff has not produced such notice. Further, in order to prove their aforesaid fact, plaintiff (ISc.) defendant has produced copy of the property card of City Survey No. 63 at Exhibit-70, wherein it is revealed that, the ownership of the said Survey Number is of the defendant. Further, Akarani Patrak of Property No. 504/4 in Devgadh Baria Municipality is produced vide Exhibit-71, but it appears that, the ownership of this property is in the name of the defendant. In the suit reply filed by the defendant for the decision of this issue, the defendant has stated that, her mother has purchased property as described by the plaintiff and she is residing there by constructing the house. Moreover, as loan was required for purchase of the land and house, the said loan was availed in the name of the defendant and the installments of the loan is deducted from the salary of the defendant and her mother repays the amount of the installment from her savings and pension. Moreover, as loan was required for purchase of the land and house, the said loan was availed in the name of the defendant and the installments of the loan is deducted from the salary of the defendant and her mother repays the amount of the installment from her savings and pension. Moreover, the defendant has produced certified copy of the Registered Sale Deed bearing No. 344/1999, dated 14/12/1999 vide Exhibit-137. Upon reading the same, it is revealed that, the defendant has purchased the open land from her mother namely Dahiben Bhikhabhai Sikligar, bearing City Survey No. 636, Plot No. 34 admeasuring 69- 49-16 sq.m., situated at opposite of tower, on the way from tower to the water tank, at Devgadh Baria of Dahod District. The affidavit in form of examination in chief is produced by the defendant vide Exhibit-130, therein too, the defendant has admitted the fact that, she has purchased the plot from her mother through Registered Sale Deed. In her cross examination too, the defendant has admitted the fact that, the property is in her name. Therefore, on the basis of the produced evidence, the ownership of the Municipality property bearing No. 504/4 situated in City Survey No. 636 at Devgadh Baria is with the defendant. But, the contention of the present suit is that, the defendant has constructed house with more amenities than that of the property in question for herself and her children. Whereas, the submission of the defendant is that, the plot at the said property was purchased by her mother, but as her mother required a loan for construction in the plot and as her mother could not avail loan, the defendant has purchased the Property No. 504/4 of Devgadh Bariya Minicipality situated in City Survey No. 636 with the purpose of only getting loan and her mother has done construction in the said plot and her mother resides in the said property. Therefore, it is proved that, the plaintiff has acquired property on his (her) name. Now, for the resolution of the present issue, it is also necessary to make decision regarding the other facts that, the defendant has purchased the Property No. 504/4 of Devgadh Bariya Municipality situated in City Survey No. 636 through the Sale Deed from her mother with the purpose of only availing loan and her mother has done construction in the said plot. In connection with the same, if we see the produced statement, on the basis of the documents produced by the defendant, it is indisputable that, the property said to be purchased by the defendant for her residence has been purchased by the defendant from her mother. Now, upon reading the certified copy of the Registered Sale Deed No. 344/1999 dated 14/12/1999 produced vide Exhibit-137, it is found that, the mother of the defendant has sold the open land of private plot No. 34 in Survey No. 36 admeasuring 69-49-16 sq. m. to the defendant in consideration amount of Rs.30,000/- and in this manner has transferred all the ownership rights of this property in favour of the defendant. In addition, it is revealed from the document at Exhibit-138, that on the basis of the aforesaid Deed at Exhibit-137, title clearance certificate has been obtained from Mr. K.T. Chauhan with the intention of availing loan for the purpose of construction of house on the said plot. But, it is not proved anywhere on the basis of these Deeds that, the said property is purchased with the only intention of availing loan. Moreover, it is stated by the defendant that, the installments of the loan are deducted from the salary of the defendant and her mother pays back the amount of this installment from her savings and pension. But, the defendant has not produced any evidence in this regard and has not examined her mother Dahiben Bhikhabhai Sikaligar. Certified copy of deposition on oath of the defendant is produced vide Exhibit-9 in the R.C.S. No. 409/92. In Para No. 2 of the same, on Page 18, the defendant has admitted that, she has purchased the Property No. 504/4 of Devgadh Baria Municipality situated in City Survey No. 63 because there is no residential amenities in the property in question and has also admitted that, she has constructed this house by availing loan on this property and all these facts have been admitted on oath by the defendant. Although it is the responsibility of the defendant to prove that, the said property is not under her ownership but under the ownership of her mother, the defendant has failed to prove so. Although it is the responsibility of the defendant to prove that, the said property is not under her ownership but under the ownership of her mother, the defendant has failed to prove so. Now, if we see other important facts of this issue, it is proved that, the defendant herein has acquired property, but it has also to be proved that, this property has the residential amenities or has more residential amenities than the property in question. In connection with the same, if we consider the pleadings and documentary evidence produced during adjudication of this suit, the plaintiff in his plaint has stated that, the property in question is a small room of 56 meters which is Room No. 3 of the Municipality House No. 2236 in City Survey No. 676 of Devgadh Baria and this fact has also been admitted by the defendant. The defendant has admitted the facts in her cross examination at Exhibit-130 that, the property purchased by her is situated opposite of the present property in question and that this property has two rooms and a kitchen. Further, the defendant has also admitted the facts in her cross examination that, the rental room has no amenities such as light, water faucet, toilet and bathroom and the Municipality House No. 504/4 has the amenities of water faucet, bathroom, light and toilet. Therefore, it is proved that, the property purchased by the defendant has more amenities than the property in question. Therefore, answer to the issued No. 2 is given in affirmative.” 11. At this stage, Para 10 of the judgment delivered by learned Appellate Court which address the very same issue deserves to be perused. It is reproduced as under (it is in Gujarati, for better understanding, it is translated in English): “(10) Issue no. 2 is discussed by the subordinate court at para-8 of its Judgment. Accordingly, the plaintiff has successfully proved that the respondent possesses another house with amenities. In that regard, the present appellant has submitted the sale deed at Exh-137 regarding purchase of land of private plot no. 34 of Survey no. 636, measuring 36-49-16 sq.m. from her mother in consideration of Rs.30,000/- for building house on it. Moreover, title clearance certificate is also submitted vide Exh-138 which was obtained by appellant’s advocate Mr. Kiritsinh T. Chauhan by issuing Public Notice on 04/04/2000. 34 of Survey no. 636, measuring 36-49-16 sq.m. from her mother in consideration of Rs.30,000/- for building house on it. Moreover, title clearance certificate is also submitted vide Exh-138 which was obtained by appellant’s advocate Mr. Kiritsinh T. Chauhan by issuing Public Notice on 04/04/2000. The aforesaid fact was mentioned by the present appellant at Para-7 in his written statement submitted vide Exh-50 that she has purchased land from her mother and built the house by availing loan. Further, she has stated that aforesaid house was built by her mother and the sale deed was executed in order to avail loan. The installments for the aforesaid loan were debited from my salary and the same was paid to me by my mother from her savings and pension. However, no documentary evidence was submitted in that regard by the appellant in this case. Neither her mother nor brother have been examined in order to prove the facts and they have not corroborated to appellant’s facts. The appellant has submitted her evidence affidavit vide Exh-130. In her cross-examination, she has admitted that the property purchased by her in her name, on behalf of her mother, is situated towards south of the road, opposite to the rented property. The property registered in my name is an R.C.C. construction and it has two rooms, a kitchen and two rooms, a kitchen on the first floor. I have seen the house registered in my name. The house registered in my name at city survey office bears Property no. 636 and the aforesaid plot was registered in my mother’s name which was transferred in my name. There is no facility of light, tap, toilet-bathroom in the rented house, while the Muni house no. 504/4 has the facilities of light, tap, toiletbathroom. In order to build the aforesaid house, I had availed loan from the bank upon declaring that I have to purchase house for myself. House no. 2236/5 is owned by Dahiben who is my mother, it is located opposite to the house no. 504/4. My mother and my brother Kanubhai resides in the aforesaid house. I do not know as to in whose name the house located on its other side is registered. House no. 2236/5 is owned by Dahiben who is my mother, it is located opposite to the house no. 504/4. My mother and my brother Kanubhai resides in the aforesaid house. I do not know as to in whose name the house located on its other side is registered. Thus, on the basis of documentary evidence, written statement and the cross-examination of her evidence affidavit, she has stated that she has purchased plot from her mother and built the house with better amenities than that of the suit property which is located opposite to it and she had executed the said documents only to avail the loan. However, she has not been able to prove the aforesaid facts. All the documents are registered in her name. She has not submitted any documentary evidence indicating that her mother paid her the amount of installments of the loan. Her mother or brother have not submitted any evidence corroborating to the facts of the appellant. Thus, all the documentary evidence are against the appellant and there is no documentary or oral evidence submitted by the appellant to refute them. Further, the fundamental principle regarding evidence is such that the party shall submit written evidence, if available because it is the best evidence for the facts mentioned in it. Therefore, if documentary evidence is taken on record then oral evidence is not tenable to refute the same. In this case, it transpires from the documentary evidence, statement of the appellant, her examination in chief and statement during her cross-examination that the aforesaid house was purchased in her name by registered sale deed; that loan was availed on it; that appellant paid the installments of the loan and the Title clearance certificate was also obtained for the same through Ld. Advocate and the appellant has not submitted any documentary evidence on record to refute the aforementioned facts. Moreover, her mother or brother have not been examined. In such circumstances, I believe that the subordinate Court has concluded in the discussion of issue no. 2 that the respondent has succeeded in proving that the aforesaid house was purchased by the appellant for herself and thus the issue was resolved in affirmative in just and reasonable manner, as discussed above and no reasonable or just reason appears to make any changes in that.” 12. 2 that the respondent has succeeded in proving that the aforesaid house was purchased by the appellant for herself and thus the issue was resolved in affirmative in just and reasonable manner, as discussed above and no reasonable or just reason appears to make any changes in that.” 12. As referred herein above, there are more than ample evidence on record, which indicates that tenant has purchased plot no. 34, survey no. 636 from her mother (Exh.137) for the purpose of building residential house thereon. In her cross examination, the tenant has admitted that she has constructed house, which consists of two room, kitchen on ground floor and two room, kitchen on first floor with RCC construction and it is newly build house. Apart from that what appears that mother of the tenant is living in some other premises viz. house no. 2236/5. Defence raised by the tenant was to the effect that plot is purchased by her mother. However, it is transferred in her name for the purpose that she could avail loan, as she was serving as teacher. However, this defence has not been substantiated and has no locus. Even otherwise, contention of benami transaction would not be available to the tenant. Noticeably, tenant has acquired alternative suitable accommodation. Learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi could not point any error in the finding of learned Trial Court or learned Appellate Court regarding acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant. 13. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Srinivas Vaman Karve vs. Chandanben Jayantilal Dalal, 1973 GLR 257 in Para 1 and 2 held as under: “1. The next contention relates to the interpretation of clause (1) It was urged relying upon the word residence in clause (1) that the landlord in order to succeed in a suit falling under clause (1) should establish that the vacant possession of another house was acquired by the tenant with the intention of having his permanent abode in that house. If this intention was not there, clause (1) would not be applicable. It was pointed out that the words residence is used in clause (1) and not the words residential premises. If this intention was not there, clause (1) would not be applicable. It was pointed out that the words residence is used in clause (1) and not the words residential premises. According to the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioners if the latter words were used then mere act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable premises would entitle the landlord to a decree for ejectment irrespective of the question of intention with which vacant possession was acquired by the tenant. It was pointed out by way of an illustration that a tenant may be doing business of purchasing and selling residential premises-vacant or otherwise In such a case he has no intention to go and reside in the vacant premises purchased by him. His intention in the act of purchase and in the act of acquiring vacant possession of the premises is to sell the same and earn profit. It is urged to such a case the provisions of clause (1) would not be made applicable because to do so would virtually prevent a tenant from carrying on that business. On the question of intention it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that there is no finding by the court below to the effect that the intention of defendant No 1 in purchasing the two galas was to go and reside there with his family and to make the same his place of permanent abode. The next contention on the construction of clause (I) was that the relevant date with regard to the operation of clause (1) must be the date of filing of the suit and the passing of the decree. In this connection the words has.....acquired vacant possessions of occurring in clause (1) were relied upon. According to the learned advocate for the petitioners the present perfect tense of the verb acquire would show that the act of acquisition of vacant possession must continue upto the date of the filing of the suit in any case. These are the only contentions as regards interpretation of clause (I) and we will first deal with the contention as regards the intention of the tenant in purchasing and acquiring vacant possession of the suit premises. Sec. 13(1)(l) for this purpose may be reproduced: 13. Nothwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. These are the only contentions as regards interpretation of clause (I) and we will first deal with the contention as regards the intention of the tenant in purchasing and acquiring vacant possession of the suit premises. Sec. 13(1)(l) for this purpose may be reproduced: 13. Nothwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied: (1) that the tenant after the coming into operation of this Act has got built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. (2) Now the scheme of the Act and in particular the scheme underlying the provisions of secs. 12 and 13 of the Act has been made clear on more than one occassion by the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this court. Under the general law of landlord and tenant a landlord on validly terminating the tenancy of a tenant or on termination thereof in accordance with other modes described in the Transfer of Property Act becomes immediately entitled to possession of the rented premises. Sec. 12 of the Act places an embargo upon this right of the landlord. It confers protection on the tenant from being evicted from rented premises notwithstanding the fact that the contractual tenancy between him and the landlord has been terminated. But the Legislature in enacting the provisions relating to protection conferred on the tenants under the Act also wanted to balance the interest of the landlords so that they may not virtually be deprived of the enjoyment of their property Therefore sec. 13 was enacted and the opening portion of sub-sec. (1) of that section which has been reproduced above itself shows that once to the court is satisfied that any of the events mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) had happened the embargo imposed by sec. 12 is lifted and the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession of the rented premises. Therefore it is the decision of the court as regards the happening of one of the events contemplated in clause (1) which is determinative of the matter and not the intention of the tenant in bringing about the happening of that event. 12 is lifted and the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession of the rented premises. Therefore it is the decision of the court as regards the happening of one of the events contemplated in clause (1) which is determinative of the matter and not the intention of the tenant in bringing about the happening of that event. If the court is satisfied that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence as in this case the question of intention of the tenant in acquiring such vacant possession is not relevant. To import intention of the tenant as a necessary ingredient in clause (1) would virtually leave the landlord (and as a necessary consequence others who need rented premises) to the vagaries of a tenant who having acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence would say that he had no intention to go to reside there nor did he entertain that intention at the date of institution of the suit. The intention of the Legislature in enacting clause (1) is to see that residential premises are made available to those who are in greater need of them than those who acquire vacant possession of suitable residential premises. The tenant who acquires such vacant possession of a suitable residence has to hand over possession of the rented premises to the landlord so that others who need the rented premises from which he is sought to be evicted may get them. Therefore it is the act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable residence which inter alia is determinative of the operation of clause (1). The other acts which are determinative of this question are the act of building a suitable residence or the act of a third party or agency of allotting suitable residence to the tenant. The illustration given by the learned advocate for the petitioners of a person doing business of purchasing and selling residential houses would not be a governing factor on the construction of clause (1) looking to the object underlying the said clause stated earlier. Such a person would be better placed financially as compared to others in need of rented residential accommodation. Such a person would be better placed financially as compared to others in need of rented residential accommodation. There is no reason why such a person should not vacate the rented premises and shift to the residential premises which he has built or which has been allotted to him or of which he has acquired vacant possession It is obvious that under the provision relating to restriction of rent the landlord even after obtaining possession of this residential premises cannot charge higher rent from other tenants. The very fact that sec. 13 provides for recovery of possession of rented premises from the tenant by the landlord on grounds other than present need of the landlord to occupy those premises personally is suggestive of the intention of the Legislature to make rented premises available from time to time to other needy persons as and when the events specified in clauses (a) to (f) and (hh) to (1) occur. In this view of the matter the contention based on intention of the tenant in acquiring vacant possession is not a relevant consideration for the purpose of clause (1). As observed earlier it is the act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable residence which forfeits the protection given to the tenant under sec. 12 of the Act and entitles the landlord to obtain possession of the rented premises from such a tenant. In growing cities and towns most of which are now covered by the Act more and more persons would be in need of residential premises. The Legislature by lifting the embargo on the landlords right to recover possession under sec. 12 on grounds other than the need of the premises by the landlord himself for his occupations has tried to provide for these helpless persons who come to growing cities and towns.” 14. At this stage, I refer to the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Lilavatiben Kanjibhai Patel vs. Mansukhlal Amrutlal Joshi, 2015 (1) GLR 152 . Relevant Para 5 to 8 reads as under: “5. The only point falls for consideration is whether ground under Section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act is made out. Under Section 13(1)(l) the tenant incurs liability to be evicted from the rented premises he is shown to have acquired or allotted alternative suitable accommodation. Relevant Para 5 to 8 reads as under: “5. The only point falls for consideration is whether ground under Section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act is made out. Under Section 13(1)(l) the tenant incurs liability to be evicted from the rented premises he is shown to have acquired or allotted alternative suitable accommodation. The provision reads as under: “13(1)(l) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied. That the tenant after the coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence.” 5.1 In view of above provision, the landlord is entitled to seek a decree for possession of the premises if the Court is satisfied that the tenant, after coming into operation of the Act, has built or acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence or has been allotted such residence. 5.2 Also may be noticed at the outset the following observations on the applicability of Section 13(1)(l) of the Act, from decision in Dolatrai Harjivan Bibodi vs. Dr. Kantilal Sukhlal Shah, 1977 GLR 848 , this Court observed thus, “In the present context, however, the dispute is as regards those provisions where the landlord is given a right to eject the tenant on the specific ground enacted under sec. 13(1) (l) of the Bombay Rent Control Act that the tenant after the coming into operation of the Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. The tenant's protection was, therefore, deemed to come to an end because he no longer required the original premises for his residential purpose and therefore, the Legislature accommodated this limited right of the landlord to get back his property, once it is proved that the tenant after the coming into operation of the Act had built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. The tenant could never be expected to sit tight on his premises even after he has acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted other suitable residence. The tenant could never be expected to sit tight on his premises even after he has acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted other suitable residence. A just balance of the competing right is achieved by the Legislature by enacting this right of the landlord when this necessary statutory condition is fulfilled of acquisition of vacant possession or allotment of suitable residence by the tenant by this own building the same or otherwise after the Act has come into operation.” 6. Before proceeding further, the reasoning of the lower appellate court that the ground under Section 13(1)(l) was after institution of the suit and it was inserted by amending the plaint may be adverted to. A direct answer to this comes from decision of this Court in Jayalakshmi (supra). In that case, the landlord had instituted the suit initially on the ground of non-user under Section 13(1) (k) and the ground under Section 13(1)(l) was added by way of amendment. This Court held that it was permissible. In Paragraph 22, the Court ruled that in a suit for possession between the landlord and tenant, the cause of action arises on service of notice terminating the tenancy and the rest are only the grounds for possession as required by Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. It was observed that adding one more ground to the same cause of action cannot be said to be a change of cause of action. The Court further held that, “it is now well settled that pending suit between a landlord and tenant for possession after the notice terminating tenancy, any number of grounds can be added if they are based on subsequent events which had occurred after the filing of the suit.”. Thus the reasoning of the lower appellate court on the said count does not hold good in law and the plaintiff incorporating a ground of tenant having acquired alternative accommodation on the basis of such subsequent event is permissible and it would not have any debilitating effect. It was permissible to the landlord to plead and establish the same. This is clear from a literal reading and plain meaning of Section 13(1)(l) of the Act, as it provides that if a tenant acquires alternative suitable accommodation at any time after the Rent Act has come into force, it becomes a ground to seek decree of eviction for the landlord. This is clear from a literal reading and plain meaning of Section 13(1)(l) of the Act, as it provides that if a tenant acquires alternative suitable accommodation at any time after the Rent Act has come into force, it becomes a ground to seek decree of eviction for the landlord. 6.1 In Champaklal Chhotalal vs. Parvatiben Kuberbhai, 1994 (1) GLR 713 , the Court observed that in the Bombay Rent Act there are certain provisions which give right to the landlord for getting a decree for possession on happening of certain events. It was stated that Section 13(1)(e) is one such provision when the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the premises. Section 13(1)(k) is also a provision which comes into play in the event the tenant does not occupy the suit premises without any reasonable cause for a period of six months. Once these events contemplated as ground for eviction occur, it is not considered necessary that they should continue till the time of passing the decree. The Court then stated that similar would be the case under Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. In that case, point was similar as it was urged that the quarter acquired by the tenant had been already surrendered by him. 7. Turning now to the facts on record, there was no gainsaying that the government quarter described above was allotted to the defendant-tenant. The tenant was a government servant serving as Dresser, In-charge Medical Officer, Workmen State Insurance Scheme. By virtue of order dated 04th August, 1998 (Exh.39), he was allotted the quarter. On record was a possession receipt (Exh.40) bearing out the fact that he had obtained the possession of the said government quarter. The possession receipt dated 10th August, 1998 (Exh.40) contained the signature of the defendant who received the possession as well as of the officer who handed over possession. It appears that the quarter was sealed on 08th September, 1999. It was due to recovery notice issued to the tenant. It was stated that the recovery notice was challenged by the tenant in the Court and the outcome was in his favour. But then he afterwards handed over back possession of the quarter (Exh.41). 7.1 The plaintiff gave his evidence (Exh.46) and spoke about the tenant having acquired suitable alternative accommodation being government quarter. It was stated that the recovery notice was challenged by the tenant in the Court and the outcome was in his favour. But then he afterwards handed over back possession of the quarter (Exh.41). 7.1 The plaintiff gave his evidence (Exh.46) and spoke about the tenant having acquired suitable alternative accommodation being government quarter. The plaintiff got produced from the competent officer the allotment letter (Exh.39), possession letter (Exh.40) and possession receipt (Exh.41). The defendant in his evidence (Exh.56) accepted the factum of allotment and having received the possession. He further stated that they were using the said quarter for temporary purpose and occasionally for staying overnight. However he asserted that they had never gone to reside there. He further stated that said quarter was later sealed; on 16th August, 1999 he complained that it was wrongly sealed behind his back and that the household materials were lying in the quarter. The tenant did not get the possession thereafter and ultimately on 28th January, 2002 the possession was given back. The receipt (Exh.41) showing giving back of the possession mentioned amongst other details that the possession was voluntarily handed over. The facts on record were suggestive that as the conduct on part of the tenant in not going to reside in the allotted quarter was self-willed, his handing over possession was also voluntary. Defendant further stated in his evidence that it was not possible to accommodate his large family even in the rented premises, which was an insufficient accommodation. 7.2 Posing here, it may be noted that the government quarter allotted had one drawing room, one bed room, a kitchen and facility of latrine-bathroom with furniture and fixtures. This was not in dispute and was accepted by the tenant in his cross-examination (Exh.56). On the other hand, the rented possession comprised of a single room of the size of 8” X 6” an Osri, and a kitchen, as was admitted by the tenant (Exh.56). Therefore, the allotted quarter was having better facilities and convenience in terms of accommodation compared to the rented premises. The contention on behalf of the tenant that the allotted quarter was not a suitable accommodation therefore could not be countenanced. 8. A ground under Section 13(1)(l) stands established once it is shown that the tenant has acquired suitable residence. Therefore, the allotted quarter was having better facilities and convenience in terms of accommodation compared to the rented premises. The contention on behalf of the tenant that the allotted quarter was not a suitable accommodation therefore could not be countenanced. 8. A ground under Section 13(1)(l) stands established once it is shown that the tenant has acquired suitable residence. As already noted, it is not necessary that at the time of passing of decree in the suit, he must be continued to be in possession. It is the event of a tenant acquiring suitable alternative accommodation creates a liability in law for him to be evicted from the rented premises, correspondingly giving right to the landlord to obtain possession. Whether the acquisition of alternative accommodation is temporary or that the same was not permanently acquired is also not a valid defence to resist decree for eviction once the factum of acquisition is established on evidence. 8.1 The government quarter allotted to the defendant-tenant was an accommodation available to him where he could have gone to stay. What is important is that the alternative accommodation is acquired by the tenant of his own right and that the same was available to be occupied by him. Intention of the tenant not to go to reside to the alternative suitable residence acquired is irrelevant. What matters is the factum of alternative accommodation acquired or allotted, which is suitable, and the event of such acquisition or allotment. This Court in Pranjivandas Khusaldas vs. Dhanuben Wd/o Devchand Jamnadas, 2001 (4) GLR 3157 held that shifting to alternative accommodation is not the requirement of Section 13(1) (l). It held that even acquisition of possession is not necessary. 8.2 In the present case, the ingredient of suitability of the alternatively acquired accommodation stands satisfied on facts. In Champaklal Chhotalal (supra), examining the said aspect, the Court observed that the tenant must have acquired suitable accommodation and that the word “residence” used in the provision of Section 13(1)(l) means the resident where the tenant can settle down. The Court, however proceeded to observe, “These observations are good and are made in the background of the facts of that case. Even applying those principles here also, when the quarter is allotted to the railway employee by the railway he acquires a right to possess. The Court, however proceeded to observe, “These observations are good and are made in the background of the facts of that case. Even applying those principles here also, when the quarter is allotted to the railway employee by the railway he acquires a right to possess. His possession cannot be taken away without following the procedure as contemplated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Therefore, the defendant No. 2 has a right to occupy the said quarter. Not only that, he did occupy and used the same for a period of four years. It is the case of defendant No. 2 that he used it only whenever he returned from duty during midnight. Assuming that to be correct, what is to be seen is whether the quarter which was allotted to defendant No. 2 was suitable for his residence alongwith his family or not. If that is so, he has acquired the possession of the suitable residence. The test would be that whether it has been done with the object of settling down. When a person is serving he has to settle down there and, therefore, when the residence is provided by the master or the employer it is with a view to see that the employee settles down there for his employment. When the quarter was given to defendant No. 2 at Udhna it was for the purpose of his settling down at Udhna.” 8.3 Another decision of this Court in Chandrakanta M. Deshpande vs. Vasantrao B. Toke, 1996 (1) GLR 248 also answer the issue in its following observations: “However, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that allotment of quarter by the employer or master is only for a limited period of service and therefore, the tenant who has been allotted quarter as an employee in connection with his employment will have to vacate the same on termination of service or on attaining the age of superannuation. It, is therefore, contended that such an allotment to tenant by the master is not a protected tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act and therefore, such an allotment by the employer to the employee for a limited purpose of service could not be said to be a suitable residence allotted to the tenant warranting rigours of the provisions of Sec. 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. This submission runs counter to the spirit of Sec. 13(1)(l). Therefore, it cannot be accepted.” 8.4 The Court in Chandrakanta Deshpande (supra) stated on the object of the provision that the Legislature intended that the tenant should not have two accommodations available. He cannot be allowed to stick to two premises simultaneously. The Court stated that if the existing tenant acquires the rented premises, it could be made available to a needy one. It was observed that if the intention of the Legislature was to emphasise that the acquisition or allotment of the alternative accommodation was not permanent, then the Section 13(1)(l) would have been enacted with a different phraseology. It was observed that the only emphasise was on the suitability of the premises and not on the permanency.” 15. In case on hand, without doubt, it is established that Revisionist/tenant has acquired alternative accommodation of two storey building. It is also suitable to her need as she also is living in the rented premises. Ms. Sneha Joshi, learned advocate did not make a single submission to deny this fact, rather she started her argument with admission that Revisionist/tenant has her home, but argued that since it is smaller one and did not cater the need of Revisionist/tenant, if Revisionist/tenant is ordered to evict rented premises, she will suffer greater hardship. As observed herein above, greater hardship defined in section 13(2) of the Rent Act comes into play only when eviction is sought under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act, on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of rented premises. In view of above, said argument canvassed by learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi bearing on wrong assumption and belief does not survive. Since it is proved on record that Revisionist/tenant has acquired alternative accommodation, grant of eviction under section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act is proved and established. Thus, Revisionist/tenant has to evict the rented premises. No alternative left even for Court except to pass order of eviction. In view of that, learned Court below have rightly passed eviction decree and upheld by learned Appellate Court. Hence, no interference is called. 16. Since in this Revision Application, concurrent finding of learned Trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court is challenged, scope of interference is very limited. In view of that, learned Court below have rightly passed eviction decree and upheld by learned Appellate Court. Hence, no interference is called. 16. Since in this Revision Application, concurrent finding of learned Trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court is challenged, scope of interference is very limited. At this stage, reference is made to findings and observation of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Patel Valmik Himatlal v. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai (Dead) through LRs. 1998 (7) SCC 383 . While examining the ambit and scope of Section 29 of the Rent Act, Honble Supreme Court has observed as under: “5. The ambit and scope of the said section came up for consideration before this Court in Helper Girdharbhai vs. Saiyed Mohamad Mirasaheb Kadri and Ors. JT 1987 (2) SC 599 and after referring to a catena of authorities, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. drew a distinction between the appellate and the revisional jurisdictions of the courts and opined that the distinction was a real one. It was held that the right to appeal carries with it the right of rehearing both on questions of law and fact, unless the statute conferring the right to appeal itself limits the rehearing in some way, while the power to hear a revision is generally given to a particular case is decided according to law. The Bench opined that although the High Court had wider powers than that which could be exercised under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet its revisional jurisdiction could only be exercised for a limited purpose with a view to satisfying itself that the decision under challenge before it is according to law. The High Court cannot substitute its own findings on a question of fact for the findings recorded by the courts below on reappraisal of evidence. Did the High Court exceed its jurisdiction. 6. The powers under Sec. 29(2) are revisional powers with which the High Court is clothed. It empowers the- High Court to correct errors which may make the decision contrary to law and which errors go to the root of the decision hut it does not vest the High Court with the power to rehear the matter and re-appreciate the evidence. The mere fact that a different view is possible on re-appreciation of evidence cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.” 17. The mere fact that a different view is possible on re-appreciation of evidence cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.” 17. In view of above, this Court finds no substance in the present Revision Application. Accordingly, present Revision Application is dismissed. Notice is discharged. Interim relief granted earlier, if any, stands vacated.