JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant-State of Gujarat (original complainant) under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 29/08/2009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Deesa-Camp court Deodar (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Special Case No. 12 of 2007, whereby, the learned Special Judge has acquitted the original accused respondents herein for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”) read with the provisions of Section 3(1)(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1981 (for short “the Atrocities Act”). 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that, the complainant Visaji Dungraji Gohil, Residing at: Khimna-Vas, Ta: Vav, registered a complaint against present respondents accused with Vav Police Station, which was registered as I-CR No. 24 of 2005 for the offences punishable Under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504 and 506(2) of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act. It is the case of the prosecution that present respondents accused, on 12/06/2005, at about 9.00 hours, at Viillage: Khimna-Vas, formed an unlawful assembly by holding deadly weapons like knifes and sticks, remained present in the meeting of Rilechi Group Seva Sahkari Mandali and because of prior dispute, respondent No. 1 snatched resolution book from the complainant, abused him against his mother and sister and against his caste, gave reason of provocation to the complainant with an intention to breach the public peace, threatened the complainant and witnesses to kill and also put them in danger by saying “Temni Pase License Vali Banduk Che, Je Meetingma Aado Aavse To Janthi Mari Nakhish” and respondent No. 1 inflicted knife blow on the left hand of Dhengabhai, accused Govindji inflicted bottom part of knife on Pathubhai and other accused persons attacked on them with sticks. Therefore, complaint was lodged by the complainant. 2.1 On the basis of the said complaint, investigation was initiated and as there was sufficient evidence against the present respondents-accused, charge sheet was filed against them before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Vav. Therefore, complaint was lodged by the complainant. 2.1 On the basis of the said complaint, investigation was initiated and as there was sufficient evidence against the present respondents-accused, charge sheet was filed against them before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Vav. As the offences committed by the accused persons were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions as per the provisions of 209 of Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Judge committed the case to the Court of Sessions and the case was transferred and placed for trial before the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Deesa-Camp court Diyodar, which was numbered as Special Case No. 12 of 2007. Thereafter, charge was framed at Exh.6 by the learned Sessions Judge against the respondent-accused for the offence punishable Under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504 and 506(2) of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act. The respondents accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution therefore, laid evidence. 2.2 In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 11 witnesses as well as produced 12 documentary evidences on the record of the case, which are as under: (A) Oral Evidence: 1 Exhibit-16 Dr. Girish Amichand Sharma, Doctor giving treatment 2 Exhibit-25 Witness - Visaji Dungaraji Gohil, Complainant 3 Exhibit-33 Witness - Dhengabhai Versibhai, eye-witness of the incident 4 Exhibit-38 Panch - Vanaji Mahadevji Solanki 5 Exhibit-41 Panch - Ganeshbhai Dharmabhai Ven 6 Exhibit-46 Panch - Dhengabhai Naranabhai 7 Exhibit-49 Witness - Pathubhai Vanabhai, eye-witness to the incident 8 Exhibit-55 Witness - Ishwargiri Raghunathgiri, eyewitness to the incident 9 Exhibit-67 Witness - Parmabhai Hirabhai, P.S.O. 10 Exhibit-74 Witness - Ravibhai Nathabhai Patel, P.S.I. Investigating Officer, who registered the complaint. 11 Exhibit-77 Witness - Gunvantgiri Lalugiri Goswami, Dy. 11 Exhibit-77 Witness - Gunvantgiri Lalugiri Goswami, Dy. S.P. Investigating Officer (B) Documentary Evidence: 1 Exhibit-17 Medical Certificate of witness - Pathubhai Vanaji 2 Exhibit-18 Medical Certificate of witness - Dhengabhai Versibhai 3 Exhibit-19 Police Yadi 4 Exhibit-26 Complaint 5 Exhibit-27 Resignation of the complainant 6 Exhibit-28 Apology letter of the complainant 7 Exhibit-39 Panchnama for the recovery of arms 8 Exhibit-42 Panchnama for the place of offence 9 Exhibit-68 Extract of the Station Diary 10 Exhibit-69 List 11 Exhibit-70 Report for serious offence 12 Exhibit-78 Caste Certificate of the complainant 2.3 At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Deesa-Camp court Diyodar, acquitted all the respondents accused from the charges levelled against them. 2.4 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order of acquittal dated 29/08/2009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Deesa-Camp court Deodar in Special Case No. 12 of 2007, the appellant-State of Gujarat has filed the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. Heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Yuvraj Brahmbhatt, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State and learned advocate Mr. Suraj Matida, appearing on behalf of Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate for the respondents-original accused. 4. Learned APP Mr. Brahmbhatt has taken this Court to the relevant evidence of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced before the trial court and submitted that the trial court has committed a serious error of law and on facts while appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the respondents accused. He has submitted that though there was sufficient evidence and the witnesses have corroborated the case of the prosecution and through their oral evidence, the prosecution has established the case before the trial court, however, the trial court has failed to appreciate the same while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. He has submitted that though there was sufficient evidence and the witnesses have corroborated the case of the prosecution and through their oral evidence, the prosecution has established the case before the trial court, however, the trial court has failed to appreciate the same while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. He has also further submitted that in fact, the offence is under special Act i.e. under the provisions of Atrocities Act and therefore, on registration of the FIR on 12/06/2005, the very next day i.e. on 13/06/2005, the investigation was handed over to the concerned Deputy Superintendent of Police as the same was required to be investigated by an officer not below the rank of Police Inspector/Deputy Superintendent of Police and it is an admitted fact that the offence was investigated by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, however, the trial court has not properly appreciated this fact in its true and proper spirit. He has also further submitted that though the complainant has supported the case of the prosecution, however, the trial court has not considered the same while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal merely on the ground that the case was not supported by the independent witnesses and the medical evidence has also not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, the trial court has committed a serious error on law and on facts while appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution. 4.1 Learned APP Mr. Brahmbhatt has drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that the evidence of the concerned witnesses, whose evidence was not believed by the trial court merely on the ground that they had not supported the case of the prosecution and declared hostile, however, from their cross-examination the prosecution was able to cull out relevant material, however, the trial court has not appreciated the same in its true and proper spirit while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is bad in law, erroneous, illegal and unjust and the same is required to be quashed and set aside and the present appeal be allowed by convicting the respondents accused for the alleged offence. 5. As against that, learned advocate Mr. Suraj Matida, appearing on behalf of learned advocate Mr. 5. As against that, learned advocate Mr. Suraj Matida, appearing on behalf of learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate for the respondents accused, has submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the respondents accused and therefore, the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. He has submitted that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident as there was a cross criminal complaint filed by the respondents accused prior in point of time against the present appellant complainant, however, the prosecution has not explained the said fact while proceeding the case against the respondents accused by referring the relevant documents of the cross FIR, wherein, it was stated that the informant of the cross complaint had sustained injuries and for that an FIR was registered under Section 323, 506(2), etc. by Sarangji Vaghaji Solanki Rajput and others which was registered as Sessions Case No. 64 of 2007 and both the cases were tried together, and in that FIR also, all the accused were ordered to be acquitted and therefore, after considering the evidence of the witnesses, the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the present respondent accused. He has also submitted that the medical evidence has not supported the case of the prosecution at all as the injury referred by the informant and the witnesses was not supported by the medical expert and there was no evidence worth the name with regard to the injury as mentioned in the FIR, in fact, PW-1 Dr. Girish Amichand Sharma being the medical officer, who has deposed before the trial court that both the injured sustained the injuries which are simple in nature which is likely to be caused by a hard and blunt substance and not by a knife. He has submitted that it was also deposed by PW-1 that though he has not mentioned age of the injury but, looking to the injuries, within a week the same will be recovered and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. He has submitted that it was also deposed by PW-1 that though he has not mentioned age of the injury but, looking to the injuries, within a week the same will be recovered and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. Soni has drawn the attention of this Court to Exh.27, the pardon prayed by the informant, wherein, the informant has specifically mentioned that since on the day of incident, he was not carrying relevant resolution book and other relevant register at the time of meeting and therefore, the Panchayat has passed appropriate resolution against him for seeking a pardon for his irregularities in the administration of the village panchayat since he was holding a charge of Secretary of the village panchayat and from this documentary evidence at Exh.27, it is crystal clear that the incident as narrated by the informant in the FIR actually did not happen, and therefore, under such circumstances, the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the present respondent accused. He has further submitted that so far as the charge under Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act is concerned, the concerned witnesses referred and relied upon by the prosecution has not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and has not committed any error while appreciating the evidence led before it. Learned advocate Mr. Soni has therefore, urged that the present appeal be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal be confirmed. 6. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the material placed on record. Both the advocates have led this Court through the oral evidence recorded by the trial court and also through the Record and Proceedings. It appears from the record that, the evidence of the informant PW-2 itself speaks volume about the case and his depositions in examination-in-chief and cross-examination has completely washed away the case of the prosecution. Even PW-3 Dhengabhai Vershibhai (Exh.33), who had sustained injuries in his wrist by knife, has also not supported the case of the prosecution and declared hostile, even from his cross-examination, the prosecution was unable to cull out any relevant material to prove the charge against the respondent accused. Even PW-3 Dhengabhai Vershibhai (Exh.33), who had sustained injuries in his wrist by knife, has also not supported the case of the prosecution and declared hostile, even from his cross-examination, the prosecution was unable to cull out any relevant material to prove the charge against the respondent accused. It is also relevant to note herein that there were cross complaints filed by the either sides and all the accused of both the FIRs were ordered to be acquitted, and therefore, considering all these aspects, this Court is of the opinion that the trial court has rightly considered the evidence of the witnesses and rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. There is no any irregularity or any infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. 6.1 The learned trial Judge has considered all the relevant material produced by the prosecution and after going through the evidence of the witnesses, the trial court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and order acquitting the present respondents accused. It is also now well settled that while exercising powers under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. if the trial court while passing the order has committed any illegality or any perversity or has exceeded the jurisdiction, unless and until such facts come on record, the Court is very slow while dealing with an acquittal appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court has in a series of judgments enunciated the principles while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is inasmuch as can re-appreciate the evidence, review or re-consider the evidence and if the Court finds that there is any illegality or any irregularity in the judgment then in that case only, the Court has power to entertain the appeal and interfere with the order of acquittal. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court. 6.2 It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 : (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-37 to 40 as under: “37. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. as follows: “8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 6.3 It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under: “Head Note (B) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S.378 - Appeal against acquittal - General principles regarding the power and duty of the appellate court, reiterated-Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, S.419 20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42............. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 7. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 29/08/2009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Deesa-Camp court Deodar in Special Case No. 12 of 2007 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the respondents accused stand cancelled. 7.1 Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.