Naresh Katoch v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board
2024-03-26
AJAY MOHAN GOEL
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DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this petition, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs: “(i) A Writ in the nature of writ of certiorari, quashing Annexure P17 dated 13th July, 2012 being contrary to law, consequently holding the petitioner entitled for grant of second time bound promotional scale w.e.f. 28th July, 2005. (ii) That a writ in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the respondent to pay the interest on the increments, which were due and payable to the petitioner w.e.f. the year, 2007 onwards, which were paid in the year, 2010. (iii) That the petitioner be granted all consequential benefits along with interest @ 12% per annum from the due date, holding the petitioner entitled for giving fresh option for new pay scales.” 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of present petition are that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Engineer with the respondent-Board on 28.07.1989. In terms of the Policy in vogue in the respondent-Board, qua which there is no dispute, an incumbent who had served the Department against a post without any promotion, was entitled to time bound promotional scale after completion of nine years of service and second time bound promotional scale after completion of sixteen years of service on the post concerned. As the petitioner stagnated against the post of Assistant Engineer after his appointment, accordingly on 28.07.2005, on completion of sixteen years of service, he became eligible for the grant of second time bound promotional scale. 3. The petitioner felt aggrieved when other persons similarly situated as the petitioner were granted the second time bound promotional scale w.e.f. 24.07.2005, but he was ignored. He made a representation in this regard, which was rejected vide Annexure P17, i.e. order dated 13.07.2012, on the ground that he was not absolved of the charges levelled against him, which amounted to violation of the Conduct Rules and further as the petitioner was held guilty and penalised in the departmental proceedings and a criminal case charge sheet was pending against him for his actions prior to July, 2005, therefore, he was not entitled for the grant of second time bound promotional scale. 4.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the denial of second time bound promotional scale to the petitioner is completely arbitrary and discriminatory, for the reason that as on the date when the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) was met for considering the names of the eligible candidates for conferment of second time bound promotional scale, the petitioner was not suffering from any of the ineligibilities, on account of which, sealed cover procedure could have been adopted. 5. Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court to Annexure P9, which is communication dated 14.02.2000, addressed by the Secretary of the respondent-Board to all the Chief Engineers on the subject “Vigilance Clearance Certificate in respect of Gazetted/ non-Gazetted Officers/officials of the Board for the purpose of Promotion/Confirmation” and submitted that in terms of said communication, the instructions issued by the Department of Personnel, to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, were adopted in verbatim by the respondent-Board and a sealed cover procedure could have been followed only on account of existence of either of the three eventualities, i.e. (i) the Government servant is under suspension; (ii) the Government servant to whom a chargesheet has been issued and disciplinary proceedings are pending against him; and (iii) the Government servant in respect of whom prosecution for criminal charge is pending in a Court, which incidentally were not existing in the case of the petitioner. Accordingly, he has prayed that the present petition be allowed and the respondents be directed to grant the second time bound promotional scale to the petitioner w.e.f. 28.07.2005 after quashing Annexure P17. 6. The petition has been opposed by the respondent-Board. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board has drawn the attention of the Court to the reply filed by the respondent-Board in general and preliminary submissions thereof in particular and submitted that as the Disciplinary Authority of the Board in its 327th Meeting held on 23.06.2005, copy whereof is appended with the petition as Annexure RAII, had approved initiation of departmental action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 against the petitioner, therefore, the DPC rightly kept the case of the petitioner in a sealed cover.
He further submitted that as the petitioner was later found guilty of the charges levelled against him in the departmental inquiry conducted against him and further as the petitioner was also convicted, therefore, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also carefully gone through the pleadings as well as documents appended therewith. 8. Few facts which are necessary to be reiterated at this stage are that the DPC which met to consider the eligible candidates for the grant of second time bound promotional scale was held on 16.08.2005 and Minutes of said meeting have been placed on record by the petitioner alongwith CMPT No.1917 of 2019. Alongwith this miscellaneous application, order dated 24.08.2005 has also been appended, in terms whereof, the respondent-Board allowed the time bond promotional scale after completion of nine/ sixteen years service to the officers named therein. The name of the petitioner does not find mentioned in the said Office Order, but in the Minutes of the meeting held on 16.08.2005, the name of the petitioner is referred at serial No.32 in Annexure-B appended thereto with the remarks “Vigilance case. Assessment kept in sealed cover”. The stand of the respondent-Board justifying its act of denying the second time bound promotional scale to the petitioner is primarily based on the contention that the petitioner was held guilty in the departmental proceedings initiated against him and further, at the relevant time he was facing a criminal trial. 9. The date on which the Disciplinary Authority held the petitioner guilty of the charges made against him in the departmental inquiry is 26.08.2009 (Annexure RAIV appended with the reply). 10. Another fact which requires to be mentioned at this stage is that the departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner vide memo dated 19.01.2006 (Annexure P18), i.e. after the holding of the DPC. 11. In this background, the issue which the Court has to decide is as to whether in said circumstances, the act of the respondent-Board of keeping the case of the petitioner in a sealed cover was justified? 12. It is settled law that the case of an incumbent can be kept in a sealed cover in case he is suffering from any of the prescribed infirmities as on the date when the DPC takes place.
12. It is settled law that the case of an incumbent can be kept in a sealed cover in case he is suffering from any of the prescribed infirmities as on the date when the DPC takes place. In the present case, the petitioner was not under suspension as on the date when the DPC met. Similarly, no charge sheet stood issued to him with regard to any disciplinary proceedings, nor any disciplinary proceeding was pending on the date when the DPC met. Even with regard to the criminal prosecution, as on the date when the DPC met, no charges were framed against the petitioner by a Court of Law. 13. These facts have not been disputed by the respondent-Board, though learned counsel for the respondent has hastened to add that subsequently the petitioner was convicted by the learned Trial Court, against which an appeal is pending. 14. This Court in CWP No.3466 of 2021, titled as Rajeshwar Dayal Janartha vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others, decided on 22.08.2022, after placing reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India vs. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 Supreme Court Cases 109, has held as under: “16. The unamended Clause 6.4 of the Vigilance Manual of the Government of Himachal Pradesh was as under: “6.4. The vigilance clearance certificate will not be issued by the Vigilance Department or the competent authority as the case may be in respect of a Government servant if (1) His name figures in the list of officers of doubtful integrity, or (2) Regular department action against him has been advised by the Vigilance Department, or (3) A case of vigilance nature is pending against him in a court of law, or But the vigilance clearance certificate will be issued by the competent authority or the Vigilance Department as the case may be in respect of Government servant in all other cases.” 17. After the amendment was carried out in Clause 6.4 vide Annexure P20, now the same reads as under: “6.4 “The vigilance clearance certificate will not be issued by the Vigilance Department or the competent authority as the case may be in respect of a Government servant if 1. He/she is under suspension; or 2. In respect of whom a charge sheet has been issued and the disciplinary proceedings are pending; or 3.
He/she is under suspension; or 2. In respect of whom a charge sheet has been issued and the disciplinary proceedings are pending; or 3. Against whom prosecution for a criminal charge is pending. Note: As, regards the stage when prosecution for a criminal charge can be stated to be pending, the Rule9(6)(b)(i) of CCS(Pension) Rules, 1972 shall be followed which provides as under: “(b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted (i) In the cases of criminal proceedings, on the date on which the complaint or report of a Police Officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made” But the vigilance clearance certificate will be issued by the competent authority or the Vigilance Department as the case may be in respect of a Government servant in all other cases.” 18. Clause 3 of the amended para 6.4 has to be read down to mean that a criminal charge has to be construed to be pending against an incumbent only after charges stands framed against him by the competent Court of law and thereafter charge sheet stands issued to him. By no stretch of imagination, it can be held that judicial proceedings can be deemed to be pending against an incumbent on the date on which an investigation report is submitted the officer in terms of the provisions of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court would again like to lay stress on the fact that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in K.V. Jankiraman’s case (supra) has categorically held while answering question No. 1 “as to when for the purpose of sealed cover procedure, disciplinary proceedings can be said to have commenced”, that the same can be said to have been commenced only when a charge sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee. Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld the findings of the learned Tribunal that sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only when a charge sheet is issued. 19. Chapter-XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, deals with information to the Police and their powers to investigate. Section 173 of the same provides for report of the Police Officer on completion of investigation. This section is reproduced herein below: “Report of police officer on completion of investigation. (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.
Chapter-XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, deals with information to the Police and their powers to investigate. Section 173 of the same provides for report of the Police Officer on completion of investigation. This section is reproduced herein below: “Report of police officer on completion of investigation. (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay. (2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, weather with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170. (ii) The officer shall also communicate, In such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. (3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to make further investigation, (4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit. (5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section 170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate alongwith the report (a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; (b) the statements-recorded under section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his reasons for making such request. (7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to in subsection (5). (8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under subsection (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of subsections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under subsection (2).” 20. Thus a carful perusal of Section 173 demonstrates that the same provides that as soon as the investigation is completed, the officer incharge of the Police Station shall forward to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report “a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating— (a) The names of the parties; (b) The nature of the information; (c) The names of the persons who appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) Whether any offence appears to be have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) Whether the accused has been arrested; (f) Whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) Whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170; (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under section 376, 376A, 376B, 376C [Section 376D or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)] 21. Now incidentally, Section 173 nowhere uses the word ‘charge sheet’.
Now incidentally, Section 173 nowhere uses the word ‘charge sheet’. Word ‘charge’ finds mention in Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which Chapter contains Sections 211 to 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 211 of the Code deals with the contents of charge and the same reads as under: “211. Contents of charge. (1) Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. (2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific-name, the offence may be described in the charge by that name only. (3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (4) The law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge. (5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. (6) The charge shall be written in the language of the Court. (7) If the accused, having been previously convicted of any offence, is liable, by reason of such previous conviction, to enhanced punishment, or to punishment of a different kind, for a subsequent offence, and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which the Court may think fit to award for the subsequent offence, the fact, date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge; and if such statement has been omitted, the Court may add it at any time before sentence is passed. Illustrations (a) A is charged with the murder of B. This is equivalent to a statement that A' s act fell within the definition of murder given in sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ); that it did not fall within any of the general exceptions of the said Code; and that it did not fall within any of the five exceptions to section 300, or that, if it did fall within Exception 1, one or other of the three provisos to that exception applied to it.
(b) A is charged under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), with voluntarily causing grievous hurt to B by means of an instrument for shooting. This is equivalent to a statement that the case was not provided for by section 335 of the said Code, and that the general exceptions did not apply to it. (c) A is accused of murder, cheating, theft, extortion, adultery or criminal intimidation, or using a false property-mark. The charge may state that A committed murder, or cheating, or theft, or extortion, or adultery, or criminal intimidation, or that he used a false property-mark, without reference to the definitions of those crimes contained in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); but the sections under which the offence is punishable must, in each instance, be referred to in the charge. (d) A is charged under section 184 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) with intentionally obstructing a sale of property offered for sale by the lawful authority of a public servant. The charge should be in those words.” 22. Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with commencement of proceedings before Magistrates and close scrutiny of the provisions of Section 204 to 210 also demonstrates that in none of these statutory provisions, the word ‘charge sheet’ is used. Section 207 of the Code also provides for supply to the accused of copy of police report and other documents in any case where the proceedings have been instituted on a police report. This Section also does not the word ‘charge sheet’. Therefore, a criminal charge can be stated to be pending against an incumbent only when a charge sheet is served upon the accused and which obviously will follow the framing of the charge and thus by no stretch of imagination it can be held that a prosecution for criminal charge can be said to be pending against an employee before the charges are framed. Clause 3 of the amended para 6.4 of the Himachal Pradesh Vigilance Manual is thus read down as above.
Clause 3 of the amended para 6.4 of the Himachal Pradesh Vigilance Manual is thus read down as above. Meaning thereby that the Vigilance Clearance Certificate cannot be withheld in respect of a government servant against whom charges have not yet been framed in a criminal case and the said certificate cannot be withheld only on the ground that the police report stands filed before the Magistrate concerned under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If we apply the above discussion to the facts of the present case, it is abundantly clearly that adopting of sealed cover procedure in the case of the present petitioner was totally uncalled for because Vigilance Clearance Certificate could not have been denied in favour of the petitioner as it is not in dispute at all that as on the date when the Vigilance Clearance Certificate was requisitioned or when the DPC met for consideration of eligible candidates for promotion to the post of Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner, charges had yet not been framed in the criminal case against the petitioner.” 15. When one applies these principles to the facts of the present case, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the sealed cover procedure that has been followed by the DPC in the case of the petitioner is totally unjustified. 16. As on the date when the DPC met, in view of the fact that neither the petitioner was under suspension nor any charges were framed against him by any Court of Law, nor any departmental charge sheet stood issued to him or disciplinary proceedings were pending against him, the case of the petitioner could not have been kept in a sealed cover. Further, the stand of the respondent- Department that because the disciplinary authority of the Board had decided to initiate the departmental action against the petitioner, therefore, the Board was justified in keeping the case of the petitioner in a sealed cover is also not worth any merit, for the reason that this decision of the Disciplinary Authority was an intra Board decision, to which the petitioner was not privy to, and until and unless a charge sheet stood issued to him or departmental proceedings were pending against him on the date when the DPC met, sealed cover procedure could not have been adopted. 17. Accordingly, in view of the above findings, this Writ Petition is allowed.
17. Accordingly, in view of the above findings, this Writ Petition is allowed. Annexure P17 is hereby quashed and set aside as the Competent Authority erred in not appreciating that subsequent events were not to be taken into consideration to decide as to whether as on the date when the DPC met, the case of the petitioner deserved to be kept in a sealed cover or not. The respondents are directed to forthwith open the sealed cover and if the petitioner has been otherwise declared eligible for grant of the second time bound promotional scale, the same be granted to him w.e.f. 28.07.2005 upto the date when the same was later on granted to him, with all consequential benefits. 18. The petition stands disposed of in above terms. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any also stand disposed of accordingly.