Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 2080 (GUJ)

Jorjibhai Bhurabhai Makwana Decd. Thro'his Heirs v. Shantilal @ Satishkumar Bhogilal Damor

2024-11-27

J.C.DOSHI

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. In claim petition No.1225 of 1988, by judgment and award dated 27.2.2001, learned MACT, Panchmahal @ Godhra assessed compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- with proportionate cost and running interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till realization only against the driver and owner of the offending truck, and exonerated the insurance company. Being aggrieved by exoneration of the insurance company from liability to pay compensation, the appellants – original claimants have preferred this First Appeal u/s 173 of the MV Act. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under:- 2.1 On 10.11.1988 at about 11:15 a.m. near Tandi crossing on Limkheda Jhalod Highway with motor truck No.GRY 4634 due to rash and negligent driving driving of the original opponent No.1 turned turtle and due to which, deceased Jorjibhai Bhurabhai, who was travelling in said truck with their goods, died. 3. Learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi for the appellants would submit that the learned Tribunal has grossly erred in exonerating the insurance company. She would further submit that the learned Tribunal has incorrectly applied the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Mallawwa Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 589 . She would further submit that the learned Tribunal rather was required to apply the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Satpal Singh, AIR 2000 SC 235 . She would further submit that the learned Tribunal after believing that the incident took place because of the negligency of the driver of the offending vehicle i.e. truck bearing registration No.GRY 4634 and held the driver and owner of the offending vehicle liable to pay compensation, erroneously exonerated the insurance company on the ground that vehicle involved in the road accident is goods carriage vehicle and the deceased was travelling in said vehicle as a gratuitous passenger. She would further submit that since there is no cavil on the fact that the insurance policy was in existence on the date of the road accident, which was covering risk of the offending vehicle having been comprehensive in nature, the insurance company was vicariously liable to pay compensation by indemnifying the risk of the owner, more particularly, when the deceased was third party. 3.1 Alternatively, it is argued by learned advocate Ms. 3.1 Alternatively, it is argued by learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi that in case if it is believed that the deceased was travelling as gratuitous passenger in the goods carriage vehicle, the learned Tribunal ought to have passed order of pay and recover. She pressed into service judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Fatmaben Ismailbhai and others rendered in First Appeal No.1915 of 2006 and judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Baljit Kaur, 2004(2) GLR 1071 . She would further submit that in the situation on hand, whether the Act amended in 1994 would come into picture or whether the old Act would apply to the facts of the present case has been addressed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Meraman Dana Harijan and others, rendered in First Appeal No.1736 of 2007, the decision arrived therein equally applies to the case on hand. She would further submit that when in the claim petitions, the evidence was recorded, the amended Act has come into force and in view of section 147 of the MV Act, 1988 came in force from 14.11.1994, if a person is travelling in a goods vehicle along with belongings, the insurance company cannot escape from liability to pay compensation. She would further submit that all these issues are not properly appreciated by the learned Tribunal. 3.2 Upon above submissions, learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi prays to allow this First Appeal and the fasten the liability upon the insurance company in addition to liability of driver and owner of the offending vehicle to pay compensation. 4. Contra-wise, learned advocate Mr. Kashyap Joshi appearing for the insurance company would submit that the road accident, in which the deceased has lost his life, took place on 10.11.1988. At the relevant time, old MV Act, 1939 was in force. Section 95 of the said Act was the governing provision and it does not allow the insurance company to cover the risk of the passenger traveling in the goods carriage vehicle. Taking this Court through the facts of the case, learned advocate Mr. Kashyap Joshi would submit that the deceased was standing near Limdi Bus Station with the intention to attend “Gay Gauri Mela” at Jhalod on an unfortunate day along with 20 other people. Taking this Court through the facts of the case, learned advocate Mr. Kashyap Joshi would submit that the deceased was standing near Limdi Bus Station with the intention to attend “Gay Gauri Mela” at Jhalod on an unfortunate day along with 20 other people. Meanwhile, the offending truck was passing from there and was going to Jhalod. Thus, the deceased along with others boarded in the truck to go to Jhalod. During the transit near village Tandi, since the road was curvy, the driver could not properly handled the steering of the truck resulted into truck being capsized. He would further submit that due to this road accident, the people sitting in the truck received injuries and some persons being pedestrian also received injuries, but unfortunately, Hirkabhai Jorjibhai could not bear the injuries and succumbed to it. He would further submit that the evidence placed on record clearly established that the deceased along with other persons were travelling in the goods carriage vehicle as gratuitous passenger and considering section 95 of the MV Act, 1939, the insurance company cannot be compelled to take risk of the person travelling in the goods carriage vehicle as gratuitous passenger and therefore, he submits that the learned Tribunal having rightly believed the judgment in case of Mallawwa (supra) and exonerated the insurance company. He would further submit that as far as judgment of Satpal Singh (supra) is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a later case in New India Assurance Company Limited Versus Asha Rani, 2003 (2) SCC 223 , did not approve the ratio of case of Satpal Singh (supra) and therefore, the case would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 4.1 Upon above submission, learned advocate Mr. Kashyap Joshi prays to dismiss the First Appeal. 5. I have heard learned advocates for both the sides at great length and also perused the R & P of the case. 6. Needless to state that undisputedly, the accident took place on 10.11.1988 and the MV Act, 1988 is amended w.e.f. 14.11.1994. Therefore, in the case on hand, provisions of old MV Act would apply. The fact drawn from the R & P as well as impugned judgment and award does expose that deceased Hirkabhai Jorjibhai was standing near Limdi Bus Station with the intention to attend “Gay Gauri Mela” at Jhalod on an unfortunate day along with 20 other people. Therefore, in the case on hand, provisions of old MV Act would apply. The fact drawn from the R & P as well as impugned judgment and award does expose that deceased Hirkabhai Jorjibhai was standing near Limdi Bus Station with the intention to attend “Gay Gauri Mela” at Jhalod on an unfortunate day along with 20 other people. Meanwhile, the offending truck was passing from there and was going to Jhalod. Thus, the deceased along with others boarded in the truck to go to Jhalod. This fact indicates that all 20 persons were travelling as passengers in the goods carriage vehicle. It also indicates and proves that the truck, which was goods carriage vehicle, had no capacity to take passengers for travelling. At the cost of repetition, it is to be reminded that the case is governed under the old Act and section 95 is the governing provision. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of National Insurance Company Limited Versus V.Chinnamma, 2004 (8) SCC 697 , addressed the issue and followed the ratio laid down in case of Asha Rani (supra). Para 9 to 17 discussing entire issue vis-avis section 147(1) of the MV Act, 1988 and section 95(1) of the MV Act, 1939 are relevant, which reads as under:- “9. Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in pari materia with the provisions of section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In the year, 1994, section 147 was amended by reason of Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994 in terms whereof the words "including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle" were added after the words "against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person". 10. In Asha Rani (supra), this Court overruling its earlier decision in Satpal Singh (supra) observed: "9. In Satpal Singh's case (supra) the Court assumed that the provisions of section 95(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred." One of us in a supplemental judgment in Asha Rani (supra) opined: "25. Section 147 of 1988 Act, inter alia, prescribes compulsory Coverage against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of "public service vehicle". Proviso appended thereto categorically states that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in a goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It does not speak of any passenger in a 'goods carriage'. 26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words "any person" must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. 'a third party'. Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 27. Furthermore, sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of section 147 speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas sub-clause (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service, vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. 28. 28. An owner of a passenger carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers. If a liability other than the limited liability provided for under the Act is to be enhanced under an insurance policy, additional premium is required to be paid. But if the ratio of this Court's decision in New India Assurance Co. V/s. Satpal Singh [JT 1999 (9) SC 416] is taken to its logical conclusion, although for such passengers, the owner of a goods carriage need not take out an insurance policy, they would be deemed to have been covered under the policy wherefor even no premium is required to be paid. 29. We may consider the matter from another angle. Section 149(2) of the 1988 Act enables the insurers to raise defences against the claim of the claimants. In terms of clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of section 149 of the Act one of the defences which is available to the insurer is that the vehicle in question has been used for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. Such a statutory defence available to the insurer would be obliterated in view of the decision of this Court in Satpal Singh's case (supra)." 11. Asha Rani (supra) was followed by this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Devireddy Konda Reddy and Others holding: "10. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that provisions of the Act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability therefore." 12. Yet again in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajit Kumar and Ors. this Court held: "11. The difference in the language of "goods vehicle" as appearing in the old Act and "goods carriage" in the Act is of significance. A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that the legislative intent was to prohibit goods vehicle from carrying any passenger. This is clear from the expression "in addition to passenger" as contained in definition of "goods vehicle" in the old Act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used is "goods carriage" is solely for the "carriage of goods". Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the Act. This is clear from the expression "in addition to passenger" as contained in definition of "goods vehicle" in the old Act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used is "goods carriage" is solely for the "carriage of goods". Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the Act. There is no provision similar to clause (ii) of the proviso appended to section 95 of the old Act prescribing requirement of insurance policy. Even section 147 of the Act mandates compulsory coverage against death of or bodily injury to any passenger of "public service vehicle". The proviso makes it further clear that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited to liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (in short 'WC Act'). There is no reference to any passenger in "goods carriage". 13. The effect of 1994 amendment came up for consideration before a 3-judge bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Baljit Kaur and Others wherein again it was held: "19. In Asha Rani (supra), it has been noticed that sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorised representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise. 20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. 20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor was any premium paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people." (Emphasis supplied) 14. An insurance for an owner of the goods or his authorized representative travelling in a vehicle became compulsory only with effect from 44.11.1994, i.e., from the date of coming into force of amending Act 54 of 1994. 15. Furthermore, a tractor is not even a goods carriage. The "goods carriage" has been defined in section 2(14) to mean "any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods" whereas "tractor" has been defined in section 2(44) to mean "a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load (other than equipment used for the purpose of propulsion); but excludes a road-roller". The "trailer" has been defined in section 2(46) to mean "any vehicle, other than a semitrailer and a side-car, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle". 16. A tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not answer the definition of goods carriage contained in section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The tractor was meant to be used for agricultural purposes. The trailer attached to the tractor, thus, necessarily is required to be used for agricultural purposes, unless registered otherwise. It may be, as has been contended by Mrs. K. Sharda Devi, that carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would lead to an inference that the tractor was being used for agricultural purposes but the same by itself would not be construed to mean that the tractor and trailer can be used for carriage of goods by another person for his business activities. The deceased was a businessman. K. Sharda Devi, that carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would lead to an inference that the tractor was being used for agricultural purposes but the same by itself would not be construed to mean that the tractor and trailer can be used for carriage of goods by another person for his business activities. The deceased was a businessman. He used to deal in vegetables. After he purchased the vegetables, he was to transport the game to market for the purpose of sale thereof and not for any agricultural purpose. The tractor and trailer, therefore, were not being used for agricultural purposes. However, even if it be assumed that the trailer would answer the description of the "goods carriage" as contained in section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the case would be covered by the decisions of this Court in Asha Rani (supra) and other decisions following the same, as the accident had taken place on 24.11.1991, i.e., much prior to coming into force of 1994 amendment. 17. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. This appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 8. Occasion was also arisen for the Coordinate Bench of this Court to decide the same issue in case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited Versus Sarojben Atmaram Nathalal Patel, 2011 (5) GLR 4037 . Para 9 and 10 are relevant, which reads as under:- “9. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties and after taking into consideration the decision of Three-Judges-Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Devireddy Konda Reddy and others (supra), I find substance in the contention of Mr.Meena that Insurance Company cannot have any liability in respect of a third party insurance when the claimant was admittedly travelling in the selfsame vehicle as the owner or representative of the owner of the goods. In my view the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 will have no application to the facts of the present case as the accident took place prior to coming into operation of the 1988 Act and thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the award of the Tribunal directing the Insurance Company to pay the amount cannot be supported. 10. 10. I also do not find any substance in the other contention of Mr.Shah that the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Devireddy Konda Reddy and others (supra) should be treated to be prospective. It is now settled law that whenever any law is laid down by Supreme or the High Court, the same should be treated to be the law from the very beginning unless in the said decision it is specifically indicated that the decision will be prospective in nature. In the case of Devireddy Konda Reddy and others (supra), the Supreme Court has not indicated that the said view taken by the Supreme Court should be applied prospectively.” 8.1 Again the issue has come up before this Court in case of United India Insurance Company Limited Versus Vechata Bhuniya Rathwa(Minor), 2019 (2) GLR 1305 . Para 9 and 10 are relevant, which reads as under:- “9. The liability of the Insurance Company in the case of gratuitous passengers has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani and others, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 223 . While dealing with this question, in para - 8 and 9, it has been held as under: [8] Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the requirements of policies and limits of liability had been provided in Section 95. Proviso to Section 95(1) of the said Act unequivocally states that the policy shall not be required in case of a goods vehicle for passengers being carried in the said vehicle. In Mallawwa v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (supra), while approving the earlier decision of the Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd., 1977 (2) SCC 745 , the Court construed the provisions of section 95(1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and held that while the expression any person and the expression every motor vehicle are in wide terms but by proviso (ii) it restricts the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, therefore, the vehicle had to be a vehicle in which passengers are carried. The Court further held that the goods vehicle cannot be held to be a passenger vehicle even if the vehicle was found to be used on some stray occasions for carrying passengers for hire or reward. Undoubtedly, Mallawwa case (supra), was dealing with a situation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. [9] In Satpal case (supra), the Court assumed that the provisions of section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994, it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46, by which the expression injury to any person in the original Act stood substituted by the expression injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle, the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994 even if the widest interpretation is given to the expression to any person it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existing expression injury to any person is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand, it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal case (supra), therefore, must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury." 10. Our own High Court, while deciding the similar question in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chandrakant Revashankar Bhatt, since deceased Thro. Mahendra Revashankar Bhatt, reported in 2016 ACJ 557 , in para-55, has held as under: "55. Our own High Court, while deciding the similar question in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chandrakant Revashankar Bhatt, since deceased Thro. Mahendra Revashankar Bhatt, reported in 2016 ACJ 557 , in para-55, has held as under: "55. In the light of the above discussion, this court is of the view that the Claims Tribunal was not justified in holding the appellant - insurance companies to be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants after coming to the conclusion that the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the owner, in view of the fact that the victims were gratuitous passengers in the offending vehicle. While it is true that the Claims Tribunal has in the body of the judgment permitted the insurance company to recover the amount paid towards compensation from the owner after treating the award as a decree in favour of the insurance company, in view of the fact that the passengers were gratuitous passengers in the offending vehicle, the provisions of sub-section (4) and (5) of section 149 of the Act would not be attracted and, therefore, the Claims Tribunal had no power to issue such directions to the insurance company to first pay and thereafter recover the amount from the owner." 9. In view of above, it is no more res integra that the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Asha Rani (supra) governs the field in the issue raised in the appeal. The insurance company has no liability to pay compensation for gratuitous passengers travelling in the goods carriage vehicle in view of section 95 of old MV Act being governing provision in present case. The learned Tribunal has thoroughly discussed this issue in backdrop of the findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Mallawwa (supra). I see no reason to interfere with the findings, reasons and judgment arrived at by the learned Tribunal. Seemingly, it is an attempt on the part of the appellant, however, without hope and without backed by the provisions of law, the learned Tribunal has not committed any error and the appeal deserves only fate of dismissal. 10. Before parting with the judgment, let refer authorities relied by learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi for the appellant. 11. Seemingly, it is an attempt on the part of the appellant, however, without hope and without backed by the provisions of law, the learned Tribunal has not committed any error and the appeal deserves only fate of dismissal. 10. Before parting with the judgment, let refer authorities relied by learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi for the appellant. 11. As far as judgment relied upon by the Learned advocate for the appellant in case of Meraman Dana Harijan (supra), it rather helps the case of the insurance company. In this judgment, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has clearly held that the person is travelling in the goods carriage vehicle and as the issue is governed by the old Act, the claimant is not entitled to compensation. The Coordinate Bench of this Court has followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Asha Rani (supra) and exonerated the insurance company. 11.1 As far as judgment in case of Fatmaben Ismailbhai and others (supra) is concerned, this is a judgment under the amended Act, which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. In the case on hand, the accident took place prior thereto. In the facts of that case, the Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of gratuitous passenger travelling in the goods carriage vehicle, under the amended Act, passed the order of pay and recover. The judgment therefore, would not help the claimant. 11.2 As far as Baljit Kaur (supra) is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court having held that the gratuitous passenger is not entitled to get compensation, passed the order of pay and recover. This case was also under the Act amended in 1994 and therefore, it does not avail any assistant to the appellant claimant. 12. The case of Satpal Singh (supra) was thoroughly discussed in case of Asha Rani (supra), whereby, it was held that decision in Satpal Singh (supra) case was incorrectly rendered. This issue has been observed in para 7 of the judgment of Baljit Kaur (supra). Therefore, the argument proffered by learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi that the learned Tribunal ought to have applied judgment of Satpal Singh (supra) does not substantiate. 13. In wake of above reasons, the appeal deserves no consideration and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and award is hereby upheld. 14. Therefore, the argument proffered by learned advocate Ms. Sneha Joshi that the learned Tribunal ought to have applied judgment of Satpal Singh (supra) does not substantiate. 13. In wake of above reasons, the appeal deserves no consideration and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and award is hereby upheld. 14. R & P, if any, to be sent back to the concerned Court immediately.