ORDER : The petitioner is the wife of the detenue viz., Periyavan @ Murugan, aged about 44 years. The detenue has been detained by the second respondent by his order in P.D.No.69/2023, dated 25.11.2023 holding him to be a "Goonda", as contemplated under Section 2(f) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. The said order is under challenge in this Habeas Corpus Petition. 2. We have heard Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.S.Ravi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. We have also perused the records produced by the Detaining Authority. 3. The detenue was the fourth accused in FIR in Crime No.708 of 2023 registered by the Thiruvidaimaruthur Police Station, Thanjavur, under Sections 25(1A) and 25(1B)(a) of Arms Act, 1959 altered to Sections 294(b), 353 and 506(i) IPC read with Sections 25(1A) and 25(1B)(a) of Arms Act, 1959. 4. We are conscious of the fact that this is the second Habeas Corpus Petition filed by the petitioner herein. Earlier, a petition filed in H.C.P. (MD) No. 1596 of 2023 had been dismissed by a Coordinate Division Bench of this Court by order dated 29.02.2024. 5. Mr.S.Ravi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor had placed reliance on (i) the judgment reported in 2006 (2) MLJ (Crl) 699 , Geetha -vs- State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by Secretary to Government and another , for the proposition that a detenue cannot raise second Habeas Corpus Petition, a point which was available but not raised during the hearing of the first Habeas Corpus Petition and (ii) the judgment reported in 2009 (2) CIJ 197 , Mohan @ Mohan Reddy -vs- Commissioner of Police and another , for the proposition that a second Habeas Corpus Petition can be filed only on new grounds that were not available at the time when the first Habeas Corpus Petition was dismissed. 6. It had been however held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there is no bar in filing a second Habeas Corpus Petition. It had also been held that the earlier order will not act as res judicata. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ghulam Sarwar -vs- Union of India and others, [reported in AIR 1967 SC 1335] , in paragraph No.9, had observed as follows:- “.... It had also been held that the earlier order will not act as res judicata. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ghulam Sarwar -vs- Union of India and others, [reported in AIR 1967 SC 1335] , in paragraph No.9, had observed as follows:- “.... in India the person detained can file original petition for enforcement of his fundamental right to liberty before a court other than the High Court, namely, this Court. The order of the High Court in the said writ is not res judicata as held by the English and the American Courts either because it is not a judgment or because the principle of res judicata is not applicable to a fundamentally lawless order. If the doctrine of res judicata is attracted to an application for a writ of habeas corpus, there is no reason why the principle of constructive res judicata cannot also govern the said application, for the rule of constructive res judicata is only a part of the general principles of the law of res judicata, and if that be applied, the scope of the liberty of an individual will be considerably narrowed. The present case illustrates the position. Before the High Court the petitioner did not question the constitutional validity of the President's order made under Article 359 of the Constitution. If the doctrine of constructive res judicata be applied, this Court, though it is enjoined by the Constitution to protect the right of a person illegally detained, will become powerless to do so. That would be whittling down the wide sweep of the constitutional protection .” [Emphasis Supplied] 7. While examining the order in the earlier petition, we are constrained to note that the Division Bench had observed as follows:- “10. The ground case against the detenue [husband of the petitioner] and others reveals that during the vehicular check, the detenue Periyavan @ Murugan and his associates tried to escape from screening and after a chase, they were subjected to search and from them, deadly weapons were recovered attracting the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959. A safety guard pin of a pistol was recovered from the two wheeler tank cover...” 8. This statement of fact is unfortunately contrary to the records presented. The detenue was not available at the time of the vehicular check-up. He was actually in the hospital. A safety guard pin of a pistol was recovered from the two wheeler tank cover...” 8. This statement of fact is unfortunately contrary to the records presented. The detenue was not available at the time of the vehicular check-up. He was actually in the hospital. The other three accused were detained and from the pocket of one of them, a safety guard pin of a pistol was recovered. It was not recovered from the two-wheeler tank cover. 9. The Division Bench had also observed in paragraph No.12 that there are 38 cases pending against the detenue and in the order, a list of cases had also been given. We are again constrained to point out that except for three adverse cases in FIR Crime No.291 of 2018 registered by the Thiruvidaimaruthur Police station under Section 399 IPC on 27.12.2018; FIR in Crime No.1570 of 2020 registered by Kumbakonam Taluk Police Station under Sections 294(b), 353, 506 (ii) IPC read with Sections 26 and 27 of the Indian Arms Act, 1959 on 05.11.2020 and FIR in Crime No.72 of 2023 registered by Kumbakonam Taluk Police Station under Sections 4(1)(aaa) read with 4(1-A) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 (Transport) and 328 IPC on 01.02.2023, the Detaining Authority had not relied on any of the other cases to come to the subjective satisfaction that a preventive detention order had to be passed against the detenue herein. 10. In the course of the detention order, the Detaining Authority had also stated that the detenue is a 'History Sheet Offender' and that a 'Rowdy History Sheet' had been opened in Thiruvidaimaruthur Police Station in History Sheet No.569 of 2007 dated 22.08.2007. It must be noted that this particular History Sheet had been opened even before the filing of the three adverse cases relied on by the Detaining Authority which, as aforesaid were dated 27.12.2018, 05.11.2020 and 01.02.2023. Even while noting the History Sheet Number, the Detaining Authority had not given the list of cases which were pending against the detenue as on 2007 to force the opening of the Rowdy History Sheet as against the detenue. 11. We are further constrained to note that this Court cannot take over the role of the Detaining Authority and uphold the detention order on grounds which were not relied on by the Detaining Authority. 11. We are further constrained to note that this Court cannot take over the role of the Detaining Authority and uphold the detention order on grounds which were not relied on by the Detaining Authority. This Court will have to examine whether the detention order had been passed in accordance with the procedure and in accordance with law. Therefore, the Court cannot place reliance on the list of cases given in a counter-affidavit by the respondents which, the records reveal, were not mentioned in the detention order. In view of the above reasons, we are of the firm view that in the instant case, the second Habeas Corpus Petition is maintainable and entertainable by us. 12. The Detaining Authority had observed in the detention order, after noting that the detenue had been granted bail by a learned Single Judge of this Court even in the ground case, that if he is released on bail on executing sureties, “he will indulge in further activities, which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order and Public Peace”. It is to be noted that there is no statement made by the Detaining Authority that normal criminal procedure would not be sufficient to take action against the detenue. If the bail had been granted on grounds which the Detaining Authority is of the opinion are questionable then, the proper course would be to file an application seeking cancellation of the bail or to impress upon the Court which granted such bail to impose necessary conditions to ensure that the detenue does not have the opportunity to breach public order and public peace. This reason advanced by the Detaining Authority is all the most startling since at the time when bail was granted, the detenue was actually in hospital and therefore, there can be no possibility of him violating peace or acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order and public peace. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Nenavath Bujji etc. -vs- State of Telangana and others, [reported in 2024 SCC Online 367] , which judgment was delivered on 21.03.2024, after the judgment delivered by the Division Bench in the earlier Habeas Corpus Petition and therefore could never had been considered by the earlier Division Bench, in paragraph No.32 had observed as follows:- “The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenue were prejudicial to public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, ' Public order' has a narrower ambit, and could be affected by only such contravention, which affects the community or the public at large . Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree and extent of the reach, of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. In other words, the true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society . Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. [See: Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda , (2004) 3 SCC 75 .]” [Emphasis Supplied] 14. In the instant case, a learned Single Judge had, on considering the facts and circumstances, granted bail to the detenue. The fact was that the detenue was in hospital at that particular point of time. Therefore, there was no possibility of the detenue acting in a manner which would affect public order and public peace. Grant of bail itself would indicate that the offence committed by the accused would fall within the realm of 'Law and Order', not affecting public order. Therefore, there was no possibility of the detenue acting in a manner which would affect public order and public peace. Grant of bail itself would indicate that the offence committed by the accused would fall within the realm of 'Law and Order', not affecting public order. Therefore, we are of the view that the Detaining Authority had not taken into consideration the impossibility of the detenue creating disturbance to public order when he was actually admitted in hospital. On this ground, we hold that there has been no application of mind by the Detaining Authority while passing the detention order. We have no hesitation in quashing the detention order on this ground. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the detention order is also liable to be quashed on the ground that the detenue was furnished with illegible copies of the 'Confession Statement, Rough Sketch, List of Property Sent To Magistrate – Form No.91' relied on by the Detaining Authority, more particularly at Page Nos.55, 57, 64, 70 and 71 of the booklet. Hence, it is submitted that the detenue was deprived of making effective representation. 16. On a perusal of the Booklet, it is seen that Page Nos.55, 57, 64, 70 and 71 of the Booklet, which is the 'Confession Statement, Rough Sketch, List of Property Sent To Magistrate – Form No.91', furnished to the detenue, is illegible. This furnishing of illegible copy of the vital document would deprive the detenue of making effective representation to the authorities against the order of detention. Even though it could be argued that these documents relate to the adverse cases, still, a duty was cast on the Detaining Authority to ensure that copy of every document furnished to the detenue is legible, readable and understandable. 17. In this context, it is useful to refer to the Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Powanammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1999) 2 SCC 413 , wherein the Apex Court, after discussing the safeguards embodied in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, observed that the detenue should be afforded an opportunity of making a representation effectively against the detention order and that, the failure to supply every material in the language which can be understood by the detenue, is imperative. The relevant portion of the said decision is extracted hereunder: ''9. The relevant portion of the said decision is extracted hereunder: ''9. However, this Court has maintained a distinction between a document which has been relied upon by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention and a document which finds a mere reference in the grounds of detention. Whereas the non-supply of a copy of the document relied upon in the grounds of detention has been held to be fatal to continued detention, the detenue need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. This is because the non-supply of such a document would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. But it would not be so where the document merely finds a reference in the order of detention or among the grounds thereof. In such a case, the detenue's complaint of non-supply of document has to be supported by prejudice caused to him in making an effective representation. What applies to a document would equally apply to furnishing a translated copy of the document in the language known to and understood by the detenue, should the document be in a different language. ... ... 16. For the above reasons, in our view, the nonsupply of the Tamil version of the English document, on the facts and in the circumstances, renders her continued detention illegal. We, therefore, direct that the detenuee be set free forthwith unless she is required to be detained in any other case. The appeal is accordingly allowed.'' 18. We find that the above cited Powanammal 's case applies in all force to the case on hand as we find that non-furnishing of legible copy of the document relied on by the Detaining Authority at Page Nos.55, 57, 64, 70 and 71 of the Booklet. This furnishing of illegible copy to the detenue, has impaired his constitutional right to make an effective representation against the impugned preventive detention order. To be noted, this constitutional right is ingrained in the form of a safeguard in Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, have no hesitation in quashing the impugned detention order on this ground also. 19. To be noted, this constitutional right is ingrained in the form of a safeguard in Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, have no hesitation in quashing the impugned detention order on this ground also. 19. No doubt these documents related to adverse cases but they had been relied on by the Detaining Authority and he had taken a conscious decision to rely on these particular cases and not on a string of other cases which had been registered against the detenue. 20. In the result, the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed and the order of detention in P.D.No.69/2023 dated 25.11.2023, passed by the second respondent is set aside. The detenue, viz., Periyavan @ Murugan, aged about 44 years, son of Kittappa, is directed to be released forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other case.