JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Learned advocate appearing for the respondent no.1 waives service of rule. 2. By filing instant writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and under Order XLI, Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the writ petitioner has challenge the order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Botad in Civil Misc. Application No.9 of 2024, whereby the application preferred by the petitioner for condonation of delay caused in preferring Civil Misc. Application has been rejected. 3. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Rajabhai Gogda for the petitioner and learned advocate, Mr. Nisarg Shah for the respondent no.4. 4. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present application are as under, 4.1 The respondent no.1 herein had filed Regular Civil Suit No.14/2010 against the petitioner herein before the court of learned Principal Civil Judge, Gadhada inter alia praying for recovery of the license fees and/or rent. 4.2 On filing of the suit, notice was issued, which was eventually served upon the petitioner and in pursuance thereto, the petitioner had appeared through advocate and filed his written statement. 4.3 Thereafter, the suit was proceeded further and both the parties had led their oral as well as documentary evidence. 4.4 Ultimately at the end of trial, learned Civil Judge, Gadhada, by judgment and order dated 30.12.2021, was pleased to allow the said suit in favour of the respondents – original plaintiffs and decree thereof came to be drawn on 03.01.2023. 4.5 However it is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was not aware about passing of the judgment and order in the suit preferred by the respondents and it is only when the notice came to be issued upon them pursuant to filing of the Execution Petition, the petitioner came to know about the same and on service of the notice, the petitioner made inquiry and, thereafter, applied for certified copy on 02.02.2024 and on receipt of the certified copies, the petitioner had immediately filed Civil Misc. Appeal challenging the judgment and order passed in suit. 4.6 However as there was delay of 371 days caused in preferring the said appeal, separate application for condonation of delay being Civil Misc. Appeal challenging the judgment and order passed in suit. 4.6 However as there was delay of 371 days caused in preferring the said appeal, separate application for condonation of delay being Civil Misc. Application No.9/2024 had been filed explaining the delay, however without properly considering the facts of the case, the learned Principal District Judge, Botad, by impugned order dated 19.03.2024, reject the said delay application. 5. Learned advocate, Mr. Gogda submitted that as stated above, suit was preferred by the respondents inter alia praying for recovery of the licence fee/rent, which had been allowed in favour of the respondents but the said fact was not well within the knowledge of the petitioner and it is only when the notice in the execution proceeding had been served upon him, the passing of decree came to the knowledge of the petitioner and immediately thereafter, inquiry was made and certified copies were applied and, thereafter, appeal has been preferred before the learned Appellate Court and as there was delay in preferring the said appeal, an application for condonation of delay was also preferred, which was rejected by impugned order. Learned advocate submitted that however at the time of passing impugned order rejecting an application for condonation of delay, the learned Judge has observed that the applicant is a huge company having sufficient manpower and machinery and with such assistance cannot be expected to sit silent for almost 371 days in preferring appeal. Learned advocate submitted that it is also observed that the applicant has not provided any details as to on which date, the applicant came to know about the judgment and order passed in the suit, therefore, the grounds mentioned in the application cannot be considered and rather it is improbable to believe that the applicant was not aware about the judgment and order and subsequent decree drawn in the suit. Learned advocate also submitted that issue with regard to maintainability of the suit was raised by the appellant in the written statement in view of the fact that agreement was executed between the parties, wherein specific clause of arbitration was there, therefore, the learned civil court has got no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and secondly, territorial jurisdiction to sue the parties is mutually decided at Ahmedabad, therefore, the suit filed before the court at Gadhada cannot be said to be competent to entertain the suit and at the time of suit proceedings, right to make submission was also closed by the court concerned, however all above aspects have not been properly considered by the learned Judge while passing impugned order. Learned advocate submitted that in fact, the learned Judge ought to have taken particular stand because only on the basis of technical ground, meritorious matter cannot be thrown out at threshold and cause of justice be defeated. Learned advocate, at this stage, has put reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors., delivered in Civil Appeal No.460 of 1987 on 19.02.1987 and submitted that the case of the petitioner has squarely covered by the said decision. It is, therefore, urged that the present petition may be allowed. 6. On the other land, learned advocate, Mr. Nisarg Shah appearing for the respondent no.4 has objected the present petition with a vehemence and submitted that findings given and conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge while passing impugned order are just and proper and based on sound principle of law, which do not require any interference. Learned advocate submitted that while passing impugned order, the learned Judge has taken into consideration all aspects of the matter and on the strength of it, the said application for condonation of delay has been rejected. Learned advocate submitted that suit had been dismissed on 31.12.2021 and appeal was preferred on 07.02.2024 and thus, there is gross delay of more than 1000 days. Learned advocate submitted that suit had been dismissed on 31.12.2021 and appeal was preferred on 07.02.2024 and thus, there is gross delay of more than 1000 days. Learned advocate submitted that before the suit proceedings, the appellant had appeared through his counsel and also filed written statement and, thereafter, witnesses as well as defence witnesses were also examined by the appellant in their defence, therefore by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the suit had been decided ex parte because on each and every date, they had appeared and raised their objection, therefore, they were well aware about the outcome of the proceedings and at the time of preferring the delay application, they have not produce any material to substantiate their claim that they were not aware about the disposal of the suit on particular date, however after considering all facts of the case, the delay application preferred by the petitioner had been rightly rejected by the learned Judge. It is, therefore, urged that the present petition may be rejected. 7. To counter the submission canvassed by learned advocate for the respondent no.4, learned advocate submitted that suit had been decreed on 31.12.2021 and decree had been drawn on 03.01.2023 and as per the provision of Section 2(2) of the CPC, decree can be challenged by preferring appeal and as stated above, suit had been decreed on 31.12.2021 and decree had been drawn on 03.01.2023, therefore, it can safely be said that there was delay of 371 days caused in preferring the said appeal. Learned advocate at this stage submitted that it is true that written statement had been filed and witnesses have been examined and cross-examined and subsequently, he has already led evidence but as per the settled proposition of law, when the substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice requires to be preferred for other side. It is, therefore, urged that considering above facts, the present petition may be allowed. 8. In view of the rival submissions canvassed by learned advocates for the parties and having considered the documents produced on record, it is found out that the present application is preferred by the applicant against the impugned order, by which, an application for condonation of delay caused in filing appeal has been rejected. 8. In view of the rival submissions canvassed by learned advocates for the parties and having considered the documents produced on record, it is found out that the present application is preferred by the applicant against the impugned order, by which, an application for condonation of delay caused in filing appeal has been rejected. It is found out from the impugned order that suit had been decreed on 31.12.2021 and decree had been drawn on 03.01.2023 and it is at the time when the notice issued in the execution proceeding was served upon the petitioner, it came to the notice about the same and immediately thereafter, certified copies were applied and on getting it, appeal was preferred along with an application for delay, which was rejected by the learned Appellate Court. 9. At this stage, it is required to be noted that in such matters of condonation of delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Hon’ble Court has time and again issued guidelines for considering such case and observed that the Court should bear in mind the following principles, as reiterated by the Supreme Court time and again, while considering the plea for condonation of delay: [1] Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. [2] Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. [3] "Every day's delay must be condoned" does not mean that a pedantic unpragmatic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. [4] When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. [5] There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. The presumption would be just the other way round. [6] It is unreasonable to adopt the approach of a school master using his rod to discipline the student. One need not bend backwards in such matters. [5] There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. The presumption would be just the other way round. [6] It is unreasonable to adopt the approach of a school master using his rod to discipline the student. One need not bend backwards in such matters. The attitude must be one informed with greatest awareness for the cause of justice. [7] It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and expected to do so. 10. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment in case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , has laid down in detailed the principles applicable to an application for condonation of delay. They are as follows: "21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 25.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 25.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 25.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 25.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 25.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 25.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 25.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 25.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 25.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 11. In a matter filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the law is well settled so far as jurisdiction which to be exercised by Court having power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by way of supervisory power, is concerned that the same has very limited scope and same can only be exercised if there is error apparent on the face of record or there is flagrant violation of statutory rule. This Hon’ble Court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got limited jurisdiction as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. This Hon’ble Court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got limited jurisdiction as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 holding therein regarding the scope of Article 227, which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limit less power, which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. 12. Considering the above, now I am proceeding to examine the factual aspect. It needs to refer herein what should be constituted as “sufficient cause” so that the court may come to the conclusion by going through the cause shown to be sufficient cause in the delay condonation application for the purpose of condoning the delay but before coming to the aforesaid legal position, it would be apt to have glimpse of Order XLI, Rule 3A of the CPC, which reads as under, “3A Applications for condonation of delay. — (1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. — (1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. (2) If the Court sees no reason to reject the application without the issue of a notice to the respondent, notice thereof shall be issued to the respondent and the matter shall be finally decided by the Court before it proceeds to deal with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13, as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made under subrule (1), the Court shall not make an order for the stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the Court does not, after hearing under rule 11, decide to hear the appeal.” 13. It is evident from the aforesaid statutory provision that the appellate court has been conferred with the power to condone the delay but for that a conclusion is to be arrived at based upon the sufficient cause in condoning the delay. Therefore, the parameters for accepting the reason for filing the appeal on some delay are the sufficient cause to here in the delay condonation application. 14. It is required to be noted that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for extension of prescribed period for filing an application under any provision except Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 thereby giving powers to the Court to admit the application by condoning the delay after the prescribed period of limitation. At this stage, I would like to refer to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under, "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 15. On perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ is a necessary condition for the extension of the prescribed period under the Act. Therefore, person concerned needs to satisfy the Court that there arose ‘sufficient cause’ for delay in not preferring the petition/application within the prescribed time. The term ‘sufficient cause’ as mentioned in the provision has been interpreted in different manner by different Courts and it is well settled that the question of what constitutes sufficient delay cannot be laid down by hard and fast rule, rather the same is to be decided by the courts on facts of the intervening circumstances of each case. It is trite that in a delay application, sufficient cause is the paramount consideration and if sufficient cause is shown, the Court should generally condone the delay. However, if the sufficient cause is imbibed with the laxity on the part of the delayer despite due knowledge, then Court should restrain itself from encouraging such practice and condone the delay. 16. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of “sufficient cause.” The consideration. The consideration of meaning of “sufficient cause” has been made by. The consideration the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph Nos. 9 to 15 hereunder:- "9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [ AIR 1964 SC 1336 ] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [ (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 ], Parimal v. Veena [ (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 ] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [ (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ].) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ].) 12. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ].) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 510 ] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701 ] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." 17. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again in number of decisions has held that the expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal. The consideration interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. A useful reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 , wherein it has been observed in Paragraph No.12 as under, “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." 19. However if the fact of present case are examined coupled with the impugned order, in that event, it is found out that suit had been decreed on 31.12.2021 and decree had been drawn on 03.01.2023, however only on 03.01.2023, the petitioner came to know about the decree passed and subsequently decree drawn and immediately thereafter, certified copies were applied on, which was made available only on 02.02.2024 and, thereafter, remedy was availed by the petitioner. Therefore having considered the facts of the case coupled with the findings given and conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge, it is found out that the learned Judge concerned has failed to take into consideration the object of benevolent act and is always required to decide the application on merits. Over and above that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Hon’ble Court have time and again in number of decisions have observed that the case should be decided on merits ignoring the technical aspect. Over and above that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Hon’ble Court have time and again in number of decisions have observed that the case should be decided on merits ignoring the technical aspect. Further, refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. It is required to be noted that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties and they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Further, the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Therefore considering the above facts of the case, the present application deserves to be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order. 20. Accordingly, this petition is allowed partly. The impugned order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Botad in Civil Misc. Application No.9 of 2024 is hereby quashed and set aside. The application being Criminal Misc. Application No.9/2024 is hereby restored to its original file. Therefore, the learned Principal District Judge, Botad is hereby directed to here and decide the said application for condonation of delay caused in filing appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order on its own merits without being influenced by the present order after providing ample opportunity to both the parties. It is needless to say that no any unnecessary adjournments would be sought for before the Court concerned and both the parties would cooperate with the said application without any further delay. 21. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.