JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated 09.08.2017 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna (Circuit Bench at Ranchi) in O.A./051/00104/2016 whereby and whereunder the original application preferred by the respondent-original applicant was allowed directing the writ petitioner-SAIL to consider the claim of the respondent-original applicant for appointment on compassionate ground treating the death of the father of the respondent-original applicant under ‘medical invalidation’ and further set aside Clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011 being arbitrary and irrational and anti- employee in the larger interest of justice and equity 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, reads as under: 3. The father of the respondent-original applicant was appointed as Assistant Canteen Junior Technician in the Department of Personnel & Administration (Dept. P&A), Meghahatuburu Iron Ore Mines (RMD), Kiriburu, West Singhbhum, Jharkhand. While working as such, the father of the respondent-original applicant was admitted and treated in many SAIL hospitals for his treatment of Chronic Liver Disease and Chronic Kidney disease along with Septicaemia and Hepatic/Renal Failure but his condition was getting worse. Thereafter a Medical Board constituting three doctors referred his case to Sr. Dy Director (M), RMD, Kolkata to refer to Apollo Hospital, Kolkata for further review on 05.01.2015. 4. It is the case of the respondent-original applicant that his father has come to know about his medical condition on 17.01.2015 that he would not be recovered any more, as such he has given representation from Apollo Hospital itself on 21.01.2015 for declaration of ‘medical invalidation’ and also for employment to his elder son (respondent herein) but during treatment his father died on 09.02.2015 in harness before being declared ‘medically invalid’ by the duly constituted committee. 5. It is further case of the respondent-original applicant that the writ petitioner-authority did not take any decision for employment as such the respondent-original applicant approached the Tribunal by filing Original Application seeking direction upon the authority concerned for appointment on compassionate ground, which was allowed, directing the writ petitioner-SAIL to consider the claim of the respondent-original applicant for appointment on compassionate ground treating death of the father of the respondent-original applicant under ‘medical invalidation’ and further set aside Clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011. 6. 6. It is evident that the father of the applicant-respondent, while serving under the writ petitioner-SAIL became ill, as such was admitted in several SAIL hospitals for his treatment of his ailment but his condition was deteriorated. Thereafter he was referred to Apollo Hospital, Kolkata. It is the case of the appellant that the doctor treating the respondent-employee under whom the employee was under treatment had given certificate of his medical invalidation on 17.01.2015. Pursuant thereto, the father of the appellant submitted representation for employment of his elder son, the respondent herein. Thereafter, the father of the original applicant-respondent has again given application for ‘medical invalidation’ and application for employment of his elder son (respondent herein) to the General Manager (Mines), SAIL, RMD, Meghahatuburu Iron Ore Mines (MIOM) in prescribed format. The same was forwarded to the higher authority on the same day to comply with the prescribed procedure of the scheme and even the opinion of the medical in-charge was received on 03.02.2015 wherein the doctor recommended the case of Makhmal Pan (father of the respondent) for consideration of medical invalidation on account of his suffering from the debilitating disease as per the provision of said scheme. However, before taking decision regarding ‘medical invalidation’ of said Makhmal Pan (father of the respondent), the concerned employee died on 09.02.2015 as such admittedly there was no report on the ‘medical invalidation’ by the duly constituted committee, as required under the provision of Clause 2.0 and 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011. 7. It is also admitted fact that the original applicant, Gangadhar Pan, who claims to be the nominee of the deceased employee had opted for ‘Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] of SAIL and has given an undertaking on 07.09.2015 that since he opted for Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS], he or his any of dependent shall not claim for the employment in SAIL on compassionate ground in future upon the sad demise of his father, namely, Makhmal Pan. But even after furnishing such undertaking the applicant has made application for consideration of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground in terms of Clause 2.0 and Clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011 on the ground of ‘medical invalidation’ of concerned employee. But even after furnishing such undertaking the applicant has made application for consideration of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground in terms of Clause 2.0 and Clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011 on the ground of ‘medical invalidation’ of concerned employee. The said grievance having been not redressed, the applicant approached the tribunal by taking the ground that even though the undertaking has been furnished opting the scheme, namely, ‘Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] of SAIL, but his father had submitted application for consideration of his case for medical invalidation however before any decision could have been taken father of the applicant died on 09.02.2015, hence opinion could not come giving a declaration with regard to ‘medical invalidation’ of the deceased employee. 8. Further contention was raised that since no laches lies on the part of applicant since it is the respondent-writ petitioner herein who has not taken decision and in the meanwhile the employee since has died for which the dependent of the deceased-employee cannot be made to suffer. 9. The writ petitioner-SAIL has appeared and filed written statement taking the ground that since the applicant has applied for getting the benefit under EFBS scheme by furnishing undertaking therefore he is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. Further ground has been taken by referring to Clause 2.0 and 2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011, which clarify that the date of consideration under the Scheme will be the date on which the Committee declares an employee as medical invalid and if employee dies due to disease or otherwise before declaration of medical invalidation of the committee then such death shall be considered as ‘natural death’, that since before the death of the father of the applicant the ‘medical invalidation’ could not be declared by the duly constituted committee of the management, the applicant is not entitled for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground. 10. The learned tribunal, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, has allowed the original application with the following direction: “The OA is allowed. 10. The learned tribunal, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, has allowed the original application with the following direction: “The OA is allowed. The respondents are directed to consider the claim of the applicant for compassionate employment treating death of the father under medical invalidation and Clause-2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011 treating such death is natural merely because the medical invalidation was not by the Committee, being arbitrary and irrational and anti-employee, the said provision is hereby quashed in the larger interest of justice and equity.” 11. The writ petitioner-SAIL has assailed the order passed by learned tribunal by filing the instant writ petition on following grounds: I. That the tribunal has erred in passing the order merely on the ground that since the employee has furnished undertaking opting for Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] to the effect he or his any of dependent shall not claim for the employment in SAIL on compassionate ground in future upon the sad demise of his father, namely, Makhmal Pan, therefore contrarily later on the applicant cannot claim for appointment on compassionate ground taking aid of Clause 2.0 and 2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011 which provides appointment on compassionate ground only in a case of ‘medical invalidation’ certificate of the employee concerned. But the aforesaid undertaking has been given complete go by the tribunal giving the finding that it has been taken by coercion by the employer. II. Ground has been taken by referring to the statement made in the Original Application no pleading regarding coercion having been meted out to the original applicant [the signee of the undertaking] has been made therein and as such the said observation/finding given by the tribunal is contrary to the pleading made by the original applicant in the original application. Therefore, the said finding is absolutely perverse. III. The learned tribunal has also not appreciated the provision as contained under clause 2.0 and 2.3 of the said circular whereby and whereunder it has been decided by way of policy decision that compassionate appointment shall be considered in respect of one of the dependent family members of an employee on his/her ‘medical invalidation’ by a duly constituted committee but herein there is no ‘medical invalidation’ certificate since before medical invalidation’ could be issued the concerned employee died. It has been stated that whatever may be the reason the ‘medical invalidation’ certificate since was not issued by the duly constituted committee therefore as per Clause 2.3 of the scheme if the employees dies before declaration of ‘medical invalidation’ by the committee then such death shall be considered as ‘natural death’ and dependent family member shall not be considered for compassionate ground however may avail benefits under ‘Employees Family Benefit Scheme’. 12. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the order passed by the learned tribunal requires interference by this Court. 13. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the original applicant-the respondent herein has defended the order passed by learned tribunal on the following grounds: I. That the tribunal has not erred in passing such order taking into consideration the intent of the scheme which is purely beneficial in nature. It has been contended that a beneficial piece of legislation has been formulated by the employer which is to be given benevolent spirit and not to be taken a hyper technical approach. II. The contention has been raised that when the deceased employee has suffered serious ailment and the same has been taken note of by the management based upon the report of doctors as also process for medical invalidation was initiated but before taking final decision regarding ‘medical invalidation’ the employee died and matter remained pending on the side of management for which the dependent of deceased employee cannot be made to suffer. The tribunal has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and going with the spirit of beneficial piece of legislation has rightly come to the conclusion negating the ground taken by the employer that the undertaking since has been furnished therefore the claim of appointment on compassionate ground could not be considered. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent-original applicant based upon these grounds has submitted that the order passed by learned tribunal requires no interference by this Court and as such the instant writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned tribunal in the impugned order. 16. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned tribunal in the impugned order. 16. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of parties, is of the view that following issues are required to be answered:- I. Whether clause 2.0 and 2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011 issued by SAIL (Raw Materials Division) Kolkata confers any right upon the original applicant to have appointment on compassionate ground? II. Whether the undertaking dated 07.09.2015 so furnished by the original applicant-respondent while opting the other benefits can be said to be non est in eye of law so as to claim the benefit under clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011? III. Whether the finding recorded by the tribunal to the effect that such undertaking has been taken by the employer under coercion even though there is no pleading to that effect in the original application can be said to suffer from perversity? IV. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the tribunal is correct in quashing Clause-2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011 being arbitrary and irrational and anti-employee, in the larger interest of justice and equity? 17. This Court, before proceeding to discuss the issues framed as above, deems it fit and proper to refer the admitted factual aspect involved in this case for adjudication of lis: 18. The father of the applicant-respondent was appointed as Assistant Canteen Junior Technician in the Department of Personnel & Administration (Dept. P&A), Meghahatuburu Iron Ore Mines (RMD), Kiriburu, West Singhbhum, Jharkhand and while working as such, the father of the original applicant-respondent became seriously ill for which he underwent treatment in many SAIL hospitals but his condition got deteriorated day by day. 19. Thereafter a Medical Board constituting three doctors referred his case to Sr. Dy Director (M), RMD, Kolkata to facilitate further his case to Apollo Hospital, Kolkata. 20. It is the case of the appellant that the doctor treating the respondent-employee under whom the employee was under treatment had given certificate of his medical invalidation on 17.01.2015. Pursuant thereto, the father of the original applicant-respondent submitted representation for employment of his elder son, the respondent herein. 20. It is the case of the appellant that the doctor treating the respondent-employee under whom the employee was under treatment had given certificate of his medical invalidation on 17.01.2015. Pursuant thereto, the father of the original applicant-respondent submitted representation for employment of his elder son, the respondent herein. However, before ‘medical invalidation’ certificate could be issued by the duly constituted committee of writ petitioner-authorities, the father of the petitioner died on 09.02.2015. 21. Therefore, it is admitted fact that there is no ‘medical invalidation’ certificate giving a declaration with regard to ‘medical invalidation’ of the deceased employee by the duly constituted committee. The reason for requirement of such ‘medical invalidation’ certificate was the requirement as per clause 2.0 and 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011 which has been brought in force for the purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground on account of death of the employee concerned in harness as per clause 2.0 and 2.3 for the purpose of considering the case for appointment on compassionate ground on the ground of ‘medical invalidation’ as available under clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011. 22. For ready reference, clause 2.0 and 2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011 issued by SAIL (Raw Materials Division) Kolkata are quoted as under: 23. quote 24. This Court is not considering clause 2.0 rather the Clause 2.3 is under question which requires consideration in order to answer the issues, as framed above, and the claim of the original applicant. 25. Clause 2.3 stipulates that the policy decision has been taken to provide appointment on compassionate ground on the ground of ‘medical invalidation’ which is to be given by duly constituted committee. 26. The admitted fact herein is that ‘medical invalidation’ certificate of the deceased employee could have been issued by the duly constituted committee before that the concerned employee has died. 27. The question herein is that when the policy decision has been taken by way of circular dated 25.03.2011 for consideration of case of appointment on compassionate ground in case of declaration of ‘medical invalidation’ of one or the other employee whether there can be deviation from the said policy decision in any circumstance. 28. 27. The question herein is that when the policy decision has been taken by way of circular dated 25.03.2011 for consideration of case of appointment on compassionate ground in case of declaration of ‘medical invalidation’ of one or the other employee whether there can be deviation from the said policy decision in any circumstance. 28. The answer of this Court is in negative due to the reason that if any policy decision or rule or regulation, if formulated by the legislature, the same is strictly to be followed by giving its adherence to content of such policy decision/rule/regulation/circular etc., as per ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., (2005) 1 SCC 368 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” 29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Direction ESIC Hyderabad & Ors. (in Civil Appeal No.5138-40/2007), (2015) 7 SCC 690 , at paragraph 14 held as under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” 30. It is evident from the case laws cited above that things is to be done strictly in accordance with the statutory provision and there cannot be any deviation from the statutory command or the policy decision so taken for that purpose by the competent authority concerned. 31. It is evident from the case laws cited above that things is to be done strictly in accordance with the statutory provision and there cannot be any deviation from the statutory command or the policy decision so taken for that purpose by the competent authority concerned. 31. Herein, in the instant case, admittedly the ‘medical invalidation’ certificate as required for consideration of case for appointment on compassionate ground was not issued by the duly constituted committee and as such if there will be any deviation from such policy decision/rule/regulation/circular etc., as made in the policy decision dated 25.03.2011 the same will be giving relaxation to the party concerned in providing appointment on compassionate ground in absence of any medical invalidation’ certificate and hence if the same provided in favour of the concerned the same will amount to deviating from policy decision as under Clause 2.3 of circular dated 25.03.2011. 32. This Court based upon the principle laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court that there cannot be any deviation from the statutory command or the policy decision, as laid down in the judgment referred herein above, is of the considered view that in absence of any ‘medical invalidation’ certificate there cannot be appointment on compassionate ground to the dependent of the medically invalid employee so as to achieve the object and intent of the said scheme by strictly adhering to the same. 33. 33. So far as the submission which has been made that said policy decision that since it is a beneficial piece of legislation it is to be given liberal approach is concerned, we are not disputing the same but beneficial piece of legislation does not mean that there should be deviation from the policy decision otherwise in case of deviation from policy decision with regard to ‘medical invalidation’ certificate, the same will amount to giving relaxation to one or the other which is not permissible in the eye of law since the power of relaxation is also to be stipulated in the policy decision or the rules/regulation and in absence thereof if any relaxation will be granted the same will be contrary to the said policy decision as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of J.C. Yadav v. State of Haryana, [ (1990) 2 SCC 189 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 218], wherein, it has been held as under:- “The relaxation of the Rules may be to the extent the State Government may consider necessary for dealing with a particular situation in a just and equitable manner. The scope of Rule is wide enough to confer power on the State Government to relax the requirement of Rules in respect of an individual or class of individuals to the extent it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. The power of relaxation is generally contained in the Rules with a view to mitigate undue hardship or to meet a particular situation. Many a time strict application of service rules create a situation where a particular LPA No.126/2022 & analogous cases individual or a set of individuals may suffer undue hardship and further there may be a situation where requisite qualified persons may not be available for appointment to the service. In such a situation the Government has power to relax Requirement of Rules. The State Government may in exercise of its powers issue a general order relaxing any particular rule with a view to avail the services of requisite officers. The relaxation even if granted in a general manner would ensure to the benefit of individual officers.” 34. The learned counsel for the respondent-original applicant has referred to the judgment rendered by co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in Ankit Tiwari Vs. The relaxation even if granted in a general manner would ensure to the benefit of individual officers.” 34. The learned counsel for the respondent-original applicant has referred to the judgment rendered by co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in Ankit Tiwari Vs. The Steel Authority of India Limited & Ors [W.P.(S) No. 1665 of 2017] wherein the same circular was the subject matter and it has been laid down therein that the said scheme since is beneficial piece of legislation so the same is to be given a generous approach and not a hyper-technical approach. We have gone across the said judgment and have found therefrom that the case of said Ankit Tiwari was that before medical invalidation since the employee concerned has died therefore, the direction was given by taking into consideration the fact that the death is not within the control of human being, hence if the death is there the provision as contained under Clause 2.3 cannot be said to be redundant due to natural death before the medical invalidation of the employee concerned. But it is settled position of law that judgment is to be tested on the basis of the fact governing each case and there is no universal applicability of the judgment as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 75 , in particular paragraph-47 which reads as under: “47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 35. This Court is of the view that on the facts of the present case, the judgment upon which the reliance has been placed i.e., in the case of Ankit Tiwari (supra) it is not applicable in the case at hand due to the reason that in that case there was no option having been opted by way of undertaking not to claim appointment on compassionate ground. 36. 36. In this regard, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has argued that once benefit under Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] of SAIL has been availed provision as contained under Clause 2.3 cannot be allowed to be availed coupled with the reason that the medical invalidation report is not there. 37. This Court, taking into consideration the rival submission on the issue, is of the view that in the present the claim has been denied not only on the ground of having no ‘medical invalidation’ report, but in addition thereto ground has been made of option having been exercised by way of undertaking by the dependent/nominee of the deceased employee opting for Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] to the effect he or his any of dependent shall not claim for the employment in SAIL on compassionate ground in future upon the sad demise of his father, namely, Makhmal Pan, therefore, on fact the judgment rendered in the case of Ankti Tiwari (supra) is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 38. This Court, based upon the aforesaid principle as laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case as referred hereinabove, is of the view that what has been argued by the original applicant that considering the policy decision to be beneficial piece of legislation the hyper technical approach is not fit to be adopted is having no substance, is not fit to be adopted. 39. Further admitted fact is that the original applicant himself has furnished an undertaking opting for Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] to the effect that he or his any of dependent shall not claim for the employment in SAIL on compassionate ground in future upon the sad demise of his father, namely, Makhmal Pan. 40. The said option given by the original applicant is very much specific and has not been denied and hence according to our considered view once option has been exercised by way of giving undertaking the original applicant cannot deviate from such undertaking so as to claim consideration of his case for compassionate ground as provided under Clause 2.3 of the policy decision otherwise very purpose of the policy decision even in absence of medical invalidation certificate will be there and in that view of the matter the policy decision will be meaningless. 41. 41. Further, it is settled position of law that the Court exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is having no power to give relaxation contrary to the policy decision rather power vested to the writ Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to maintain the legal position so as not to get deviation therefrom. 42. This Court having discussed the aforesaid fact and coming to the impugned order has found therefrom that the learned Tribunal has not accepted the ground of negating the claim of appointment on compassionate ground only because the undertaking which has been said to be given at the time of adopting scheme by way of circular dated 25.03.2011 has been considered to be the outcome of coercion given by employer. 43. This Court in order to come to the conclusion regarding propriety of the said finding has directed learned counsel for the writ petitioner to bring on record the copy of original application so as to scrutinize as to whether such pleading was made before the learned tribunal or not. 44. The writ petitioner in pursuant to the aforesaid direction has brought on record the copy of original application along with the copy of the written statement. 45. We, after scrutinizing the copy of original application, have found that no pleading has been taken therein regarding coercion being made to the original application to furnish undertaking to opt for Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] to the effect he or his any of dependent shall not claim for the employment in SAIL on compassionate ground in future upon the sad demise of his father, namely, Makhmal Pan. 46. The question thus will be whether the learned tribunal in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can deviate from the pleading by giving a finding which is not available in the pleading made by the party concerned. 47. 46. The question thus will be whether the learned tribunal in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can deviate from the pleading by giving a finding which is not available in the pleading made by the party concerned. 47. The law is well settled that the High Court or the tribunal while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to strictly go by the pleading and there cannot be any deviation by moulding the prayer by giving finding as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Another v. Kedia Great Galeon Limited and Another reported in (2017) 13 SCC 836 , wherein at paragraph 38 it has been held as under:- “38. … … … We are, thus, of the considered opinion that the something which the writ petitioner never intended or prayed for cannot be looked into in this appeal.” 48. This Court based upon the aforesaid principle and after going through the pleading made by the original applicant before the tribunal, is of the view that in absence of any pleading to the effect that the original applicant was subjected to coercion such finding of coercion recorded by the tribunal, according to our considered view, suffers from perversity. Such finding is arrived by this Court taking into consideration the very meaning of perversity, which means that finding recorded contrary to the pleading or pleading has erroneously been considered the same will amount to perversity, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arulvelu and Another v. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 ] at paragraph 27, which is quoted hereunder :- “27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 49. The Hon’ble Apex Court in yet another judgment rendered in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Others [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 ] has held under paragraph 9 and 10 which reads as under :- “9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and - no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 50. Further, the meaning of “perverse” has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and Others v. M/s Gopi Nath & Sons and Others [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] wherein, at paragraph 7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under :- “7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court to reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness—as distinguished from the legal permissibility—of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” 51. Thus, it is evident that the perversity means if a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 52. This Court is further of the view that even though the learned tribunal in absence of any prayer made to the effect that the entire provision as contained under clause 2.3 is erroneous and bad in the eye of law and in absence of any pleading to that effect has quashed the said provision, which according to our considered view cannot be said to be proper in absence of any prayer and pleading made to that effect. 53. 53. It is also not in dispute that the tribunal has got power to look into the validity and constitutionality of the provision but the same must be based upon the pleading and prayer made therein and in absence thereof if such decision is taken the same will amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction. 54. This Court, on perusal of the impugned order and as has been pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner-SAIL that even though there was no pleading and prayer in the original application for quashing policy decision which contains a condition stipulated under Clause 2.3 therein, Clause 2.3 of the circular dated 25.03.2011 has been quashed, is of the view that while quashing the same the learned tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction for the reason that there was no such pleading or prayer made in the original application, as has been referred hereinabove, which is evident from perusal of the original application. 55. Therefore, this Court on the basis of discussion made hereinabove, so far as the fact and law is concerned, is of the view that it is a fit case wherein the order passed by the tribunal needs interference by this Court in exercise of power conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of power of judicial review. 56. Accordingly, the order dated 09.08.2017 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna (Circuit Bench at Ranchi) in O.A./051/00104/2016 is hereby quashed and set aside. 57. In the result, the instant writ petition stands allowed. 58. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondent-applicant has submitted that the respondent is ready to accept the benefit of ‘Employees Family Benefit Scheme [EFBS] of SAIL, upon which, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-SAIL has submitted that they are still ready to provide the benefit of said scheme. 59. In view thereof, let benefit of such scheme be extended in faovur of the dependent(s) of the employee concerned within the stipulated period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 60. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of.