JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant-State of Gujarat under Section 378 (1)(3)of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 2.4.2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Dhanghdhra (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Sessions Case No. 6 of 2007, whereby, the trial Court has acquitted the original accused-respondents herein for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 323, 337, 504 of Indian Penal Code (“I.P.C.” for short), Section 3(1)(10) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“Atrocity Act” for short) and Section 135 of Bombay Police Act, now Gujarat Police Act. 2. The appeal was filed against 11 accused persons, out of them during pendency of the appeal, accused No. 4 was died and therefore, present Appeal was abated qua accused No. 4 vide order dated 25.4.2023. Further, in view of amendment in Section 15A(5) of the Atrocities Act, notice was issued to original complainant , however the notice issued by this Court was returned with an endorsement that the original complainant passed away on 12.10.2021. The copy of death certificate dated 21.10.2021 issued by the Competent Authority along with notice were brought on record of the Appeal. 3. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant Kanubhai Talashibhai, residing at Chhatrot, belonging to schedule caste community, registered FIR being I-CR No-00012 of 2007 before Dasada Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 323, 337 and Section 504 of I.P.C. and Section 3 (1) (10) of Atrocities Act and 135 of BP Act, now Gujarat Act, stating that the complainant residing with joint family, and he was doing labour work. On 19.03.2007, about 7:00 hours in the evening, the complainant was sitting outside of his house. At that time, the accused Daja Kesha and other 11 persons residing at village Chhatrot, came there and gave filthy abuses in public by saying why he was take “Kala” in his farm, and accused persons got angry on complainant and rushed on complainant with deadly weapons like Dhariya, Sword, and Stone, and attacked on complainant, and accused no. 9 Soramben, accused no. 10 Nimuben and accused no. 9 Soramben, accused no. 10 Nimuben and accused no. 11 Valiben also came there and throw the stone on complainant and because of that the complainant got injury on his body. 3.1 On hearing the shout of the complainant, his father mother, and his brother came there and rescued him. The accused persons while going from there, have uttered filthy abuses relating to his caster and beaten him. 3.2 Accordingly, complaint was filed against the accused respondents for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 323, 337 and Section 504 of I.P.C. and Section 3 (1) (10) of Atrocities Act and 135 of BP Act, now Gujarat Act. Thereafter, after collecting necessary evidence and after following all the necessary procedures, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet. Upon production of the accused respondents, the learned Magistrate handed over all the necessary police papers to the respondents. 3.3 However, as the case was exclusively sessions triable, the learned Magistrate as per Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. committed the said case to the Sessions Court, Surendranagar. The accused were charged for the offences punishable under aforesaid Sections by the Trial Court. The accused persons denied about their involvement in the offence and requested for trial. 3.4 To prove its case, the prosecution has examined 12 witnesses and produced 6 documentary evidences before the trial Court. After completion of examining witnesses and producing documentary evidences, the prosecution has filed closing pursis. 3.5 Upon filing of closing pursis by the prosecution, the the trial Court, as per Section 313 of Cr.P.C. recorded further statements of the accused respondents, wherein also they have stated that they have been implicated falsely in the offences. The trial Court after hearing the parties vide judgment and order dated 2.4.2008 passed in Special Case No. 6 of 2007 has acquitted the accused-respondents of the offences with which they were charged. 3.6 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the trial Court, the appellant State has preferred present appeal. 4. Heard Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State of Gujarat and Mr. Yogendra, learned Counsel for the respondents. 5. Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State has submitted that the witnesses i.e. complainant, his wife, his father and mother along with PW-6 have supported the case of the prosecution. 4. Heard Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State of Gujarat and Mr. Yogendra, learned Counsel for the respondents. 5. Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State has submitted that the witnesses i.e. complainant, his wife, his father and mother along with PW-6 have supported the case of the prosecution. She has submitted that the injury was also corroborated by the medical certificate and the deposition of the doctor at PW-7 Exh.41, however without considering all these facts, the trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its true and proper spirit, while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and therefore, the same is illegal, unjust and deserves to be quashed and set aside. She has further submitted that the accused are assailants and the incident was taken place near the house of the complainant original informant PW-3 and this fact was corroborate from the panchnama of place of occurrence at Exh.30 and also from evidence of PW-5 and 6, however, the trial Court has completely overlooked and ignored the evidence of those witnesses, while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and thus, the present Appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.1 Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State has further submitted that the respondents accused No. 1 and 2 along with the others have uttered an abusive language against the complainant and his family members by their caste and humiliate them and thereby they have committed an offence under Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act, however the trial Court has not considered these facts, merely on the ground that the witnesses have not supported the version of the complainant that the accused persons have committed the offence under Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act and failed to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses in its true and proper spirit, while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is illegal, unjust and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.2 Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State has submitted that evidence of the witnesses are fully corroborated to each other however, the same was not properly considered and appreciated by the trial court while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 5.2 Ms. Megha Chitlia, learned APP for the appellant State has submitted that evidence of the witnesses are fully corroborated to each other however, the same was not properly considered and appreciated by the trial court while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 5.3 In view of the above submissions, Ms. Chitlia, learned APP urges before the Court that present Appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal may be quashed and set aside. 6. Per contra, Mr. Yogendra Thakore, learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that in fact the story put forward by the prosecution is absolutely unbelievable, as the case of the prosecution is that the incident, as mentioned in the FIR, was occurred due to the fact that the complainant along with other was illegally collected the cotton from one Pravinbhai’s agriculture field and that cause itself is not supported by any cogent and material evidence. He has further submitted that the prosecution has not recorded the statement of so called Pravinbhai, whose agriculture field was in dispute. 6.1 Mr. Thakore, learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that neither the statement of Pravinbhai was recorded nor any material to effect that whether Pravinbhai was holding any agriculture land in his name was produced on record and thereby the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident. Mr. Thakore, learned Counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the prosecution was also unable to establish the allegations against the present respondents, mainly the version of the complainant was not corroborated by his own wife. He has submitted that from the evidence of the complainant, it has come on record that his wife has not seen the incident and wife of the complainant has stated that when the incident started, she immediately rushed to the house of the father-in-law to call for the help. He has submitted that in fact from the deposition of the father in law and mother-in-law it appears that they have informed by her sister-in-law and it was not informed by the wife of the complainant. He has submitted that in fact from the deposition of the father in law and mother-in-law it appears that they have informed by her sister-in-law and it was not informed by the wife of the complainant. He has submitted that all the four material witnesses have given a contradictory version before the trial Court and even the exaggeration and omission were also proved on record and the contradiction was also proved from the deposition of the concerned Investigating Officer and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 6.2 Mr. Thakore, learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that it is the case of the prosecution that all the accused persons in connivance with each other, have committed an offence but in fact from consistence evidence of the witnesses, it appears that only two person i.e. accused no. 1 and 2 went to the place of informant and rest of the accused were one after another joined in the incident, with a view to involved maximum number of accused persons and their family members in the alleged incident and therefore, under such circumstance, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order and no interference is required to be called for. 6.3 Mr. Thakore, learned Counsel for the respondent has further contended that the FIR was registered after 24 hours after incident and the explanation rendered before the Court that due to fear of their lives, they have not reached to the concerned police station within time and that explanation given before the Court was not supported by the evidence of the witnesses. He has submitted that the explanation made before the Court was not even stated to the concerned police while recording the statement and that fact was come on record and was proved through the evidence of the concerned witnesses and therefore, the false story put forward by the prosecution, itself is unbelievable and the prosecution has got up the case against present accused persons and therefore, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 7. I have perused the material available on record as well as the documents appended thereto. I have also gone through the record of the Appeal and impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. 7. I have perused the material available on record as well as the documents appended thereto. I have also gone through the record of the Appeal and impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. I have also examined the evidence recorded by the trial Court. 8. It appears that the trial Court has framed the issues that: Whether the fact that all the accused persons have formed unlawful assembly for their common intention to cause the injury to the informant and his family members, proves by the prosecution by producing cogent and material evidence or not? Whether the prosecution proves the case that all the accused persons involved in the incident were present at the time of incident and to satisfy their common intention, causes the injury as mentioned by the informant? Whether the prosecution proves that at the relevant point of time there was a prohibitory notification with relates to carrying the deadly weapon in open? Whether the prosecution proves that the informant was belongs to the Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribes community? Whether the prosecution proves that the accused persons have committed an offence under Sections 3(1) (10) of the Atrocities Act? 9. The trial Court has answered negative in four questions and has answered positive in one question i.e. Whether the prosecution proves that the informant was belongs to the Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribes community? and after considering facts of the case and after going through evidence of the witnesses and the decision produced before the Trial Court, the trial Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the accused persons. 10. In fact, it also appears from the record that all the four material witnesses have given a contradictory version before the trial Court and even the exaggeration and omission were also proved on record. Further, even there is material contradiction between the informant-complainant and his wife's deposition and therefore, under such circumstance the trial Court has rightly discarded the evidences of those witnesses, while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses and rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and there is no any infirmity or any irregularity committed by the trial Court and therefore, I am of the opinion that present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11. 11. After careful examination of the deposition of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced before the trial Court, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Even, the prosecution has not recorded the statement of so called Pravinbhai, whose agriculture field was in dispute. After examining the evidence placed on record and after going through the material placed on record, the trial Court has answered four issues in negative, which shows that the prosecution has failed to establish the case before the trial Court and therefore, the trial Court has after applying its mind passed the impugned judgment and order which, in my view, is not required to be disturbed. 12. Now, so far as the Appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the order of acquittal is concerned, the Appellate Court has ample power to reexamine, reevaluate and re-look the evidence of the witnesses and if ultimately the appellate court found that there was any illegality or any perversity in the judgment recorded by the Special Court, then the appellant court can certainly exercise the jurisdiction and reverse the findings recorded by the Special Court. However, in the present case there is no any illegality or any perversity found in the judgment and order of the trial Court. 13. It is also now well settled that while exercising powers under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. if the trial/Special Court while passing the order has committed any illegality or any perversity or has exceeded the jurisdiction, unless and until such facts come on record, the Court is very slow while dealing with an acquittal appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court has in a series of judgments enunciated the principles while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is inasmuch as reappreciate the evidence, view or re-consider the evidence and if the Court finds that there is any illegality or any irregularity in the judgment then in that case only, the Court has power to entertain the appeal and interfere with the order of acquittal. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 : (2024) 8 SCC 149 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court. 14. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-20 and 21 as under: “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42........ (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 15. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 15. The Court has framed general guild lines and principles while exercising the power under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order of the acquittal and under the general guild lines issued by the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that present appeal does not deserve to be entertained and the same requires to be dismissed. 16. Further, on perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has taken into consideration all the facts while acquitting the accused. It also appears from the impugned judgment and order that the trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in its true perspective and has come to the right conclusion in acquitting the accused. 17. At this stage, it is also appropriate to take in to account the observations made by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shajan Skaria vs. State of Kerala and another, AIR 2024 SC 4557 which read as under: “56. It is relevant to note that Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is similarly worded as the erstwhile Section 3(1) (x) of the Act, 1989 which was in force prior to its substitution with effect from 26.01.2016. 58. We say so for the reason that all insults or intimidations to a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. There is nothing in the transcript of the uploaded video to indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by the appellant only on account of the fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. From the nature of the allegations made by the appellant, it appears that he is at inimical terms with the complainant. His intention may be to malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the reason that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. 59. From the nature of the allegations made by the appellant, it appears that he is at inimical terms with the complainant. His intention may be to malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the reason that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. 59. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma (supra). The relevant observations are reproduced below: “13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste. xxx xxx xxx 17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. (2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC Online SC 1104, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.” (Emphasis supplied) 60. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community. In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. We say so because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status: (a) Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of castebased humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables” the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’ etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989. 62. We would like to refer to the observations of this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon the idea of “humiliation” as it has been used under the Act, 1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a separate category as they arise from the practice of ‘untouchability’ and thus the Parliament was competent to enact special laws treating such offences and offenders as belonging to a separate category. Referring to the Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation. 70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members. 73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult to attract the offence under erstwhile Section 3(1) (x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1) (r) of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. Relevant observations is extracted herein-below: “18. [.......] The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks.....” 18. Considering the above referred decisions and considering the facts of the present case, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 2.4.2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Dhanghdhra in Sessions Case No. 6 of 2007, is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, furnished by the respondents accused stands cancelled. 19. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.