JUDGMENT : M. K. Thakker, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr.U.T Mishra waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent no.3. 2. The present petitions are arising out of identical issue and therefore, a common order is passed. The facts of the SCA No.10607 of 2024 are taken for consideration. 3. The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 18.06.2024 passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Vadodara under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 rejecting the waiver application filed by the present petitioner regarding depositing the requisite amount of gratuity as awarded by the learned Controlling Authority. 3.1. The facts enumerated in the present petition is that petitioner company is registered as Asset Reconstruction Company with RBI under the provisions of section 3 of SARFAESI Act and respondent No.4 had availed loan facilities from various banks including ICICI Bank, Central Bank of India, Development Credit Bank, State Bank of India, Industrial Development Bank, Union Trust of India etc. Respondent no.4 and its obligatory failed to comply with the repayment of obligation and therefore, loan account was classified as non-performing assets by the original lenders in accordance with the guidelines issued by the RBI. Subsequently, the original lenders assigned the loan account along with security interest, guarantee, title and interest arising out of the same in favour of the petitioner vide multiple register assignment agreement and thereby, the present petitioner has authorized to recovery outstanding dues owned by the respondent no.4. 3.2. In addition to the above obligations, the petitioner has also sanctioned additional loan of Rs.10,00,00,000/- to respondent no.4 as a part of reconstruction of its extension unit. Respondent no.4 executed various loan documents in furtherance of the same and due to non payment of outstanding dues the proceedings were initiated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai. The respondent no. 4 had approached the petitioner for settlement of dues with a request letter on 04.09.2021 which was accepted by the present petitioner for the payment of Rs.30,15,00,000/-. The settlement sanction letter was issued on 15.09.2021 and thereafter, the account of the respondent No. 4 is closed and petitioner has issued No Due Certificate on 12.10.2021. The respondent No. 3 filed application No. 286 of 2023 under the Payment of Gratuity Act against the respondent No. 4, 5 and the present petitioner before the learned Controlling Authority. The settlement sanction letter was issued on 15.09.2021 and thereafter, the account of the respondent No. 4 is closed and petitioner has issued No Due Certificate on 12.10.2021. The respondent No. 3 filed application No. 286 of 2023 under the Payment of Gratuity Act against the respondent No. 4, 5 and the present petitioner before the learned Controlling Authority. Out of the above respondents, only the petitioner appeared before the learned Controlling Authority and submitted his reply stating that no order can be passed against the present petitioner as the present petitioner was secured creditor of respondent no.4 and not responsible for the alleged dues of respondent no.4. As respondent No. 3 has taken over the charge of respondent No. 4 no application or no relief can be prayed against the present petitioner. Learned Controlling Authority after hearing the parties has allowed the application vide order dated 30.03.2024 directing all the respondents including the petitioner to pay amount of gratuity of Rs.58,253/- within 30 days along with simple interest of 10% per annum. The petitioner has preferred an appeal before the appellate authority challenging the above order along with application of waiver of deposit of amount. Learned appellate authority after hearing the parties has rejected the application seeking waiver of pre-deposit vide order dated 18.06.2024 which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 4. Heard learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi with learned advocate Mr.Anip Gandhi for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra for the respondent. 4.1. Learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi submits that learned Controlling Authority and the learned appellate authority has passed an order without considering the fact that there is no employer employee relationship between the present petitioner and respondent No. 3 and though the account was closed and No Due Certificate was issued prior to filling of application on 12.10.2021 the petitioner cannot be held a liable for payment of gratuity of the workers of respondent No. 4 company. Learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi submits that learned appellate authority has committed error in rejecting the waiver application of pre-deposit by observing that petitioner was in control over the affairs of the establishment i.e respondent No. 4 without considering the fact that petitioner was never involved in the management, control and affairs of respondent No. 4 company. Learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi submits that learned appellate authority has committed error in rejecting the waiver application of pre-deposit by observing that petitioner was in control over the affairs of the establishment i.e respondent No. 4 without considering the fact that petitioner was never involved in the management, control and affairs of respondent No. 4 company. Learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi submits that if any person is aggrieved by the measures taken by the secured creditors under the SARFAESI Act then the appropriate remedy is before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under section 17 of the Act. However, after closing of the account almost on lapse of 2 years the workers have preferred the application before the learned Controlling Authority which was allowed by the learner controlling authority without appreciating the fact that there was no privity of contract and there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent No. 3. Learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi relied on the provisions of section 7 of Payment of Gratuity Act and submitted that present petitioner cannot be termed as an employer and therefore, as per the provision of sub-section 7 of section 7 of Payment of Gratuity Act the petitioner cannot be held liable for payment of gratuity and there cannot be insistence of pre-deposit of amount before the learned appellate authority. By further drawing the attention of this Court to sub-section 4A of section 7, learned senior advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi submitted that the word ‘dispute’ as referred to in the sub-section in relation to the payment of gratuity payable to the employee by the employer including the admissibility of such claim and entitlement to receive the same. In absence of any relationship of employer-employee being established, the order passed by the learned Controlling Authority as well as learned appellate authority directing present petitioner is erroneous and therefore, petition is required to be allowed and order passed by learned Court in application for pre-deposit is required to be set aside. 4.2. This petition was vehemently opposed by learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra appearing for the respondent and submitted that the appeal which is filed challenging the order passed by the learned Controlling Authority is not maintainable if awarded amount is not deposited before learned appellate authority as per sub-section 7 of section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. 4.2. This petition was vehemently opposed by learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra appearing for the respondent and submitted that the appeal which is filed challenging the order passed by the learned Controlling Authority is not maintainable if awarded amount is not deposited before learned appellate authority as per sub-section 7 of section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra submits that as Payment of Gratuity Act is Central legislature and SARFAESI Act is State legislature, the Central Act shall prevail over State Act. Learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra submits that respondent no.4 did not repaid the loan amount and therefore, on 17.09.2024 respondent no.4 entered into sale agreement with the petitioner and sold out the entire property including land and machinery to the present petitioner. Respondent No. 4 did not pay legal dues of the workers including petitioner who worked for more than 14 years with the respondent No. 4 employer. Learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra has relied on section 529 of the Companies Act and submitted that workman rights are at par with that of secured creditors and therefore, workmen have rightly claimed the gratuity amount against the present petitioner and if the present petitioner wants to challenge the order passed by the learned Controlling Authority then as per sub-section 7 of section 7 of Payment of Gratuity Act deposit of awarded amount is condition precedent and therefore, learned appellate authority has rightly rejected the application filed by the present petitioner. Learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra submits that learned appellate authority has assigned detailed reasons while rejecting withdrawal application of pre-deposit therefore no interference in required and petition is required to be dismissed. 5. Considering the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties following facts remain un-challenged: (I)The respondent No. 3 workman was working with respondent No. 4 who was terminated from the services on 01.03.2020. (II) The application is filed being gratuity case No. 286 of 2023 claiming that he was getting salary last drawn wages of Rs.7,200/- therefore he is entitled for gratuity amount of rupees 58,153/- and the aforesaid application is filed against the employer, petitioner and the purchaser i.e the present respondent No. 5. (II) The application is filed being gratuity case No. 286 of 2023 claiming that he was getting salary last drawn wages of Rs.7,200/- therefore he is entitled for gratuity amount of rupees 58,153/- and the aforesaid application is filed against the employer, petitioner and the purchaser i.e the present respondent No. 5. (III) The present petitioner who has been registered as assets reconstruction company under the provisions of section 3 of SARFAESI Act has only contested before the learned controlling authority by submitting that he is neither necessary or proper party as from the averments made in the application it transpires that there is no employer employee relationship between the present petitioner and respondent No. 3. (IV) It is also undisputed that respondent No. 4 has availed financial facilities from various banks and therefore, present petitioner was authorized to recover the loan by the ICICI Bank, State Bank of India and Development Credit Bank. (V) Recovery proceedings were filed by the present petitioner before Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai being O.A No. 618 of 2017 for the recovery of Rs.32,51,17,610/- along with further interest of and cost. (VI) Respondent No. 4 approached to the petitioner for settlement which was accepted for the amount of Rs.30,15,00,000/-. (VII) Thereafter, account of the respondent No. 4 was closed and the petitioner has issued No Due Certificate on 12.10.2021. At that point of time, petitioner was not aware about the claim of the present respondent workman as the same was agitated after 2 years from the date of issuance of No Due Certificate. (VIII) The petitioner has auctioned the property in favour of the respondent No. 5 and thereafter, received the sale proceeds and account was closed. (IX) Learned Controlling Authority has passed an order to pay amount of gratuity Rs.58,153/- within a period of 30 days along with 10% simple interest. (X) The petitioner has preferred an appeal before the learned appellate authority which was registered before the appellate authority with an application seeking waiver of pre-deposit of award amount. Learned appellate authority while rejecting the application has not disputed the facts that there is no employer and employee relationship between the present petitioner and respondent No. 3 however, learned appellate authority has come to the conclusion under sub-section 7 of section 7 of Payment of Gratuity Act the learned appellate authority cannot wave pre-deposit and therefore, the application came to be rejected. 5.1. 5.1. The moot question arising before the Court is that there being no employee employer relationship between the petitioner on one hand and the respondent no.3 on the other, pre-deposit of awarded amount under section sub-section 7 of section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act is mandatory? Before further discussing on the case the relevant provisions are required to be referred which are reproduced during below: Sub-section 4(a) of Section 7 of Payment of Gratuity Act: (4)(a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. Sub-section 7 of Section 7 of Payment of Gratuity Act: (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under subsection (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.] Section 2(e) of the Act defines Employee as under: (e) "employee" means any person (other than an apprentice) employed on wages, [3] [***] in any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop, to do any skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, [4] [and whether or not such person is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity]. Section 2(f) of the Act defines Employer as under: "employer" means, in relation to any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop – 6. Considering the above provisions, the word ‘any person’ in sub-section 7 of section 7 is wide enough to mean and include even a third party. The same cannot be restricted to the employee or employer nor can a restrictive meaning be given to the same. The present petitioner, a third party, has arraigned as party in the proceedings before the learned controlling authority and therefore, petitioner has right and remedy to prefer an appeal under sub-section 7 of section 7 within a prescribe time. However, the proviso of sub-section 7 regarding pre-deposit conditions where the word is used is ‘no appeal by employer’. Sub-section 4(A) of section 7 if referred where it is stated that if there is dispute as to amount of gratuity payable to employer under this Act or in relation to an employee for payment of gratuity. Subsection (B) provides that dispute with regard to any matter and matters specified in (A) the employer, employee or any person raising dispute may make an application to the Controlling Authority. Subsection (B) provides that dispute with regard to any matter and matters specified in (A) the employer, employee or any person raising dispute may make an application to the Controlling Authority. At this stage the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji Vs State of Gujarat and Anr reported in (2004) 6 SCC 672 is required to be referred, to understand the purpose of addition of proviso, which is reproduced herein below: “10.The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey, [1880] 5 QBD 170, (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR (1961) SC 1596 and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR (1965) SC 1728); when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. "If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso." Said Lord Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co., [1897] AC 647 HL. Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. 14. Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. 14. A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into the enacting part something which is not there, but where the enacting part is susceptible to several possible meanings it may be controlled by the proviso (See Jennings v. Kelly, [1940] A.C. 206) 16.It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. 17.Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse and Anr. AIR (1998) SC 74. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, [1846] 6 Moore PC l, Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., JT (1998) 2 SC253). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., [1978] l AII ER 948 HL. Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, [1910] AC 445 HL, quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR (1962) SC 847). 18.The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981.” 7. This Court has considered the decision of the Apec Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union of India and Ors reported in (2005) 6 SCC 281 , wherein it is held that; “16. As observed in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat, [2004] 6 SCC 672, Unique Butle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors., [2003] 2 SCC 455 and Padma Sundara Rago (dead) and Ors. v. State, [2002] 3 SCC 533. while interpreting a provision, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of Law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.” 8. This Court has considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sangeeta Singh Vs Union of India and Ors. Reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484 wherein it is held that; “6.Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr. ( AIR 1998 SC 74 ). Reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484 wherein it is held that; “6.Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr. ( AIR 1998 SC 74 ). The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.( AIR 1962 SC 847 ). 9.While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain ( 2000 (5) SCC 511 ). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.” 9. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain ( 2000 (5) SCC 511 ). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.” 9. In view of the above settled law, if facts of the instant case is examined, then it is undisputed that petitioner is not an employer, when appeal under sub-section 7 of section 7 is to be filed against the order passed under sub-section 4 of section 7 the word used by the legislature is “any person aggrieved”. These provisions provide that within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order passed under sub-section 4 of section 7 appeal is to be filed by the aggrieved persons. However, the second proviso under which deposit is provided the word used “no appeal by employer”. By using the above words in the opinion of this Court the intention of the legislature is to create exception for the deposit of the amount awarded by the learned Controlling Authority. The proper function of proviso is to except and deal with the case which would otherwise fall within general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify and create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stated a general rule the main provision i.e sub-section 7 giving the powers to prefer appeal by any aggrieved persons against order passed under sub-section 4 of section 7. By using the words employer in second proviso to deposit the amount, intention of the legislature is to create exception of sub-section 7. The word appellant is used in the second proviso in the contest of employer. Therefore, this court is of the view that if appeal is filed by the employer under sub-section 7 then the pre-condition of deposit at the time of preferring appeal made mandatory and in absence of the same it prohibits the admission of appeal. However, when the appeal is filed by the person who is not an employer then in the opinion of this Court second proviso excludes from the condition of pre-deposits. However, when the appeal is filed by the person who is not an employer then in the opinion of this Court second proviso excludes from the condition of pre-deposits. 10. In view of the same, the impugned order passed by the learned appellate Authority dated 18.06.2024 rejecting the application of the waiver of pre-deposit requires to be set aside. The learned appellate Authority is directed to decide the appeal on its own merits without being influenced by any observations made by this Court. 11. Resultantly, this petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. ORDER IN CIVIL APPLICATION NO . 1 of 2024 In view of the order passed in SCA No.10607 of 2024, this application is disposed of.