Balubhai Baldevbhai Patel v. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel
2024-12-03
PRANAV TRIVEDI, SUNITA AGARWAL
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Sunita Agarwal, C.J. 1. This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is directed against the judgment and order dated 03.03.2010 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) in Civil Misc. Application No. 44 of 2005 filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short as "the Arbitration Act' 1996") 2. The challenge essentially is to the arbitral award dated 03.07.2005 whereby the dispute between the parties pertaining to the properties of deceased Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel situated in the sim of village Sanand bearing revenue Survey No.2/2, 2/3, 2/1, 1699, 2194 and agricultural field situated in village Goraj bearing Survey no. 384/1,384/2, 384/3 and other pieces of land bearing revenue Survey no.647/1, 1207/2, 1210, 1540 and 1543 and 2126, was decided. The arbitral tribunal while holding the properties in question as joint Hindu family property has distributed the properties as per the letter dated 05.11.2004 of the last wish of deceased Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. 3. The appellants on the other hand, claiming to be assigned as executants of the Will dated 07.10.2004 of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel, had claimed right to manage the properties in question as per the said Will. We may note that in the letter of last wish dated 05.11.2004, which has been relied by the arbitral Tribunal, there is a reference of the Will dated 03.11.2004. 4. The challenge to the award passed by the arbitral tribunal before the Commercial Court under Section 34 and in the present appeal under Section 37 is on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide on the issue of validity and legality of the Will, which is only within the jurisdiction of the probate court in accordance with the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The submission is that even with the consent of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be vested with the learned Arbitrators to adjudicate upon the question of validity or proof of the Will. It was not open for the learned Arbitrators to raise any dispute about the genuineness of the Will dated 07.10.2004 executed in favour of the appellants and, moreover, at the time when the award under challenge was passed, the probate proceedings were pending before the competent court.
It was not open for the learned Arbitrators to raise any dispute about the genuineness of the Will dated 07.10.2004 executed in favour of the appellants and, moreover, at the time when the award under challenge was passed, the probate proceedings were pending before the competent court. Further, the learned Arbitrators had erred in holding that the properties in question were joint family properties, even with respect to the properties which were self-acquired properties of deceased Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. 5. From all angles, in view of the fact that there was no challenge to the Will dated 07.10.2004 executed in favour of the appellants, it was not open for the arbitral tribunal to decide the rights of the parties in the properties in question holding them as ancestral properties. 6. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. vs. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. [ (2024) 6 SCC 357 ] to submit that when the award suffers from patent illegality apparent on the face of the award, the power under Section 34 to set aside the award ought to have been exercised by the Commercial Court. As this has not been done, the appellant was constrained to file the present appeal challenging the arbitral award as also the order of rejection of application under Section 34 passed by the Commercial Court. The submission is that the award being in breach of the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, which confers jurisdiction on the court to decide on the question of validity or genuineness of the Will, the arbitral award suffers from fundamental breach of the principles of law and is liable to be set aside being patently illegal. 7. Further reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of D.S. Lakshmaiah vs. L. Balasubramanyam [ (2003) 10 SCC 310 ] to argue that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. 8.
The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. 8. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in P. Radhakrishna Murthy vs. National Building Construction Corporation [ (2013) 3 SCC 747 ] to argue that when the award itself is erroneous, suffering from the grave error of law, the High Court would be well within its power to set aside the same. Interference by the High Court in an erroneous award is held to be a perfectly justified action being in accordance with law. 9. Reliance is placed on the decision in Radhamma and Ors. vs. H.N. Muddukrishna [ (2019) 3 SCC 611 ] to argue that it is permissible for a coparcener to dispose of whole or any portion of his undivided coparcenery interest in the Mitakshara coparcener property by Will by virtue of Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel, thus, was qualified to execute the Will dated 07.10.2004 bequeathing his undivided share even in the joint family properties by a Will, though as per the claim of the appellants, the properties in question with respect to which Will dated 07.10.2004 was executed, were self-acquired properties of the testator, namely Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. 10. The Judgment of the Apex Court in Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka vs. Jasjit Singh & Ors. [ (1993) 2 SCC 507 ] was pressed into service to argue that the probate court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the question of genuineness or validity of the Will in terms of the provisions of the Succession Act and the arbitrator does not get jurisdiction, even if the parties consented to adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the Will propounded by the executrix. 11. The decision in Rattan Singh & Ors. vs. Nirmal Gill & Ors.[ (2021) 15 SCC 300 ] has been pressed into service to argue that there is a presumption of the genuineness of a registered document. A registered document prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who seeks to rebut the presumption. 12.
vs. Nirmal Gill & Ors.[ (2021) 15 SCC 300 ] has been pressed into service to argue that there is a presumption of the genuineness of a registered document. A registered document prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who seeks to rebut the presumption. 12. Lastly, the decision of the High Court of Madras in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. S. Khader Khan [(2008) 300 ITR 157] has been placed to submit that any confession or admission of a person before the income tax authorities cannot be said to be conclusive and the statement recorded under Section 133A has no evidentiary value. With the aid of the said decision, it was sought to be argued that the learned arbitrators have erred in relying upon the written statement submitted by Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel before the income tax authority to hold that the properties in question were not self-acquired properties of the executrix. 13. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. vs. State of Goa [ (2024) 1 SCC 479 ] to rebut the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that the award suffers from patent illegality. About the scope of challenge to the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act' 1996. With the aid of the said decision, it was submitted that the position of law is well-settled that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and the limited scope of interference under Section 34 on merits of the award is as provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii). And in case of domestic award, it can be challenged on the ground of being vitiated by patent illegality apparent on the face of the award under Section 34(2A), which is an additional ground added by the Amendment Act, 2015 to Section 34. The patent illegality appearing on the face of the award refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law. Re-appreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
Re-appreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. A judicial intervention on account of interfering on the merits of the award would not be permissible. It is only in a case where arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take or the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not referred to him, the award can be interfered holding that the arbitrators has committed error of jurisdiction. A finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at a decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. If an arbitrator takes into account something irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at, the decision would necessarily be perverse. 14. A good test of perversity noted by the Apex Court in Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], as extracted in Reliance Infrasturcture Ltd. (supra), the decision relied by the learned counsel for the respondents, is relevant to be noted hereinunder :- “7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” 15. The Apex Court in Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. vs. DMRC [ (2022) 1 SCC 131 ], had underscored the pertinent features and scope of the expression "patent illegality" while reiterating that the Courts does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Relevant paragraphs of the said decision as extracted in Reliance Infrasturcture Ltd. (supra), are relevant to be noted hereinunder :- “26. A cumulative reading of the Uncitral Model Law and Rules, the legislative intent with which the 1996 Act is made, Section 5 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act would make it clear that judicial interference with the arbitral awards is limited to the grounds in Section 34.
A cumulative reading of the Uncitral Model Law and Rules, the legislative intent with which the 1996 Act is made, Section 5 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act would make it clear that judicial interference with the arbitral awards is limited to the grounds in Section 34. While deciding applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, Courts are mandated to strictly act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34, refraining from appreciation or reappreciation of matters of fact as well as law. (See Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd. [Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC 455 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 570] , Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. [Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 75 : (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 374] and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran [Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, (2012) 5 SCC 306 ] .) *** 28. This Court has in several other judgments interpreted Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on the restraint to be shown by Courts while examining the validity of the arbitral awards. The limited grounds available to Courts for annulment of arbitral awards are well known to legally trained minds. However, the difficulty arises in applying the well-established principles for interference to the facts of each case that come up before the Courts. There is a disturbing tendency of Courts setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention and thereafter, dubbing the award to be vitiated by either perversity or patent illegality, apart from the other grounds available for annulment of the award. This approach would lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the endeavours made to preserve this object, which is minimal judicial interference with arbitral awards. That apart, several judicial pronouncements of this Court would become a dead letter if arbitral awards are set aside by categorising them as perverse or patently illegal without appreciating the contours of the said expressions. 29. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root of the matter. In other words, every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression “patent illegality”.
29. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root of the matter. In other words, every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression “patent illegality”. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of law not linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope of the expression “patent illegality”. What is prohibited is for Courts to reappreciate evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as Courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible grounds for interference with a domestic award under Section 34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one, or interprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which no fair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters not allotted to them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findings would make itself susceptible to challenge on this account. The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Also, consideration of documents which are not supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity falling within the expression “patent illegality”. 30. Section 34(2)(b) refers to the other grounds on which a court can set aside an arbitral award. If a dispute which is not capable of settlement by arbitration is the subject-matter of the award or if the award is in conflict with public policy of India, the award is liable to be set aside. Explanation (1), amended by the 2015 Amendment Act, clarified the expression “public policy of India” and its connotations for the purposes of reviewing arbitral awards. It has been made clear that an award would be in conflict with public policy of India only when it is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in violation of Section 75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act, if it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or if it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. *** 42.
*** 42. The Division Bench referred to various factors leading to the termination notice, to conclude that the award shocks the conscience of the Court. The discussion in SCC OnLine Del para 103 of the impugned judgment [DMRC v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6562] amounts to appreciation or reappreciation of the facts which is not permissible under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Division Bench further held [DMRC v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6562] that the fact of AMEL being operated without any adverse event for a period of more than four years since the date of issuance of the CMRS certificate, was not given due importance by the Arbitral Tribunal. As the arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence, the task of being a Judge on the evidence before the Tribunal does not fall upon the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34. [State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd., (1994) 6 SCC 485 ] On the basis of the issues submitted by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal framed issues for consideration and answered the said issues. Subsequent events need not be taken into account.” (emphasis supplied) 16. It may further be noted that it is also a settled position of law that the scope of appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act' 1996 is further narrower, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of the arbitrator and the Court under Section 34. The Court under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 and cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. In case where an arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34, the Court in an appeal under Section 37 must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb the concurrent findings (of the Arbitrator and then of the Court). 17.
In case where an arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34, the Court in an appeal under Section 37 must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb the concurrent findings (of the Arbitrator and then of the Court). 17. Keeping in mind the scope of the interference to an arbitral award in the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act' 1996, when the Court under Section 34 has refused to set aside the award, we may proceed to deal with the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants with more circumspection while dealing with the arguments of the arbitral award suffering from patent illegality. 18. We may note that the main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants to assail the arbitral award being suffering from patent illegality is the plea that the arbitral tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction in testing and commenting upon the validity of the Will set up by the appellants. The said Will being a registered document, its execution being valid in the eye of law, was established. The Will has never been challenged in any Court of law nor has been declared invalid. The arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to hold that the testator has no authority to execute the Will for the properties in question being joint family properties. The disposal of the joint family properties, even if assumed, by execution of the Will is to the extent of the share of the executrix, which could not be disputed by the respondents before the Arbitrators. 19. Dealing with all these arguments of the learned counsels for the parties, we may go through the impugned award and note that two member arbitral tribunal was constituted with the consent of the contesting parties by executing a deed dated 12.04.2005 in writing. The said deed records that the decision given by both the arbitrators regarding the dispute of the parties after consideration of the evidence and their submission shall be binding on both the parties. 20. The arbitral award records that the arbitrators were appointed in respect of the dispute arising between the parties out of two Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004 and the letter of the last wish dated 05.11.2004 after demise of the testator late Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel on 12.05.2005.
20. The arbitral award records that the arbitrators were appointed in respect of the dispute arising between the parties out of two Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004 and the letter of the last wish dated 05.11.2004 after demise of the testator late Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel on 12.05.2005. The arbitral tribunal after its constitution, with the consent of the parties, gave repeated opportunities of hearing and representation to both the parties and considered their submissions, documentary and oral evidence, as also took into consideration the circumstantial evidence and on perusal of the evidence, reached at the conclusion that :- (i) The respondent Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel is the brother of late Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel who had no wife or children. Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel is, thus, the direct heir of late Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. (ii) There was a Will of the father of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel and Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel, namely Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel dated 21.09.1960, which was presented before the arbitrators by the respondent, namely Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel. The said Will remained undisputed. (iii) According to the Will dated 21.09.1960, the properties of Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel were given to Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel and Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel with the condition that neither of them were entitled to transfer any of the properties and would have right only to enjoy the property, which would be later inherited by their children. (iv) There is a finding of fact in the arbitral award that the properties acquired by Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel in his name were purchased out of the yield of the joint family property, i.e. from the income of the joint family and some survey numbers were held in the name of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. (v) Based on the Will dated 21.09.1960, all the properties were acquired by both the brothers for use and since other properties were also purchased from the income of the joint Hindu family, none of the brothers, viz. Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel or Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel had the right to make a Will. (vi) All the right over these properties would devolve to the heirs of both the brothers after their death. The arbitral tribunal, thus, reached at the conclusion that both the Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 31.11.2004 are liable to be cancelled according to law.
Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel or Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel had the right to make a Will. (vi) All the right over these properties would devolve to the heirs of both the brothers after their death. The arbitral tribunal, thus, reached at the conclusion that both the Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 31.11.2004 are liable to be cancelled according to law. (vii) After saying so, the arbitral tribunal had referred to a letter dated 05.11.2004 showing the last wish of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel wherein he had expressed his wish regarding the administration of the trust in the memory of his father. The content of the letter shows that out of two brothers, only Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel is having a son named as Mr. Nipendra Jamnadas Patel, who is held to be entitled to all these properties and to be appointed as a chief trustee for the administration of the trust and resultantly, all subsequent meetings of the trust regarding the trustees are liable to be cancelled. (viii) Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel was in no way entitled to make a Will such as Will dated 07.10.2004 as the properties, subject matter of the Will, belong to a joint Hindu family and the undivided property inherited by Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel, which he was entitled to enjoy during his lifetime only, could not have been bequeathed. Many of the properties stated to be self-acquired properties were obtained from the proceeds of the joint family property inherited from the Will of Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel (father of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel) and, as such, cannot be said to be self-acquired property of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. (xi) The arbitral tribunal has taken note of the written statement filed by Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel as Karta of Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel HUF for the year 1980-81 (appended at page 98' of the paper book) wherein while describing himself and Mr.Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel as members of Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel HUF, it was stated that both these persons are the only coparceners of Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel HUF and they are jointly cultivating the lands at Sanand and use the income derived therefrom for their benefits. The investments were made out of the savings from the income of cultivating the land wherein mainly tobacco was cultivated. It was stated that Dr.
The investments were made out of the savings from the income of cultivating the land wherein mainly tobacco was cultivated. It was stated that Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel was a social worker of Sanand and had no individual income liable to tax and, as such, no return of his individual income had been filed. (x) The arbitral tribunal, thus, reached at the conclusion that from the written statement of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel before the income tax authority (as noted hereinabove), it is clear that many of the properties in dispute are ancestral and the properties which are shown to be acquired are jointly settled, the evidence with regard to which had been adduced. (xi) Other evidence appreciated by the arbitral tribunal are affidavits of three persons, namely Krushnalal Dahyabhai Patel, Govindbhai Maganlal Patel and Baldevbhai Vithalbhai Patel to record that Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel had no personal income of his own. The Tribunal has also taken note of the statement made in the biography of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel in "Amrit Mahotsav 1994" to the effect that Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel had no personal income. 21. It was, thus, concluded by the learned Arbitrators that :- 1) The stand of the appellants viz. Balubhai Baldevbhai Patel and others based on the Will dated 07.10.2004 that they are entitled to the properties of Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel mentioned in the Will is liable to be rejected. 2) The arbitral tribunal has further noted that Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel stated to have given all his properties to Samarpan Trust in his Will and there are five trusts under the leadership of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel, but only in the trust in which Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel is not a trustee, the statement of the Will giving the properties to the executants, raises doubts. The properties mentioned in the Will dated 07.10.2004 set up by Balubhai Patel and others (appellants herein) being joint property of Hindu undivided family and not a coparcener property, could not have been disposed off by way of Will by Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. Both the Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004 were, thus, disbelieved. 3) The arbitral tribunal, thus, held that :- (a) As per the Will dated 21.09.1960 of Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel, most of the properties are inherited indisputably. Amongst the disputed properties, certain properties were running in the name of Dr.
Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. Both the Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004 were, thus, disbelieved. 3) The arbitral tribunal, thus, held that :- (a) As per the Will dated 21.09.1960 of Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel, most of the properties are inherited indisputably. Amongst the disputed properties, certain properties were running in the name of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel, who managed the joint properties after the death of Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel (his father), but from the evidence presented by Mr.Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel, it is clear that those properties are joint properties. All the properties in dispute belonged to the joint Hindu undivided family and as stated, the right in those properties would devolve to the heirs of Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel and Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel. Mr. Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel being the direct heir of Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel, the right to acquire these immovable properties belong to Mr.Jamnadas Trikamlal Patel and his heirs. (b) It was, thus, held that both the brothers and their heirs will have 50% share in the properties acquired by Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel from the proceeds of the joint family property after death of their father, viz. Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel. It was further decided that 50% of such properties which are in the name of Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal patel shall go to the Trust as per his last wish expressed in the letter dated 05.11.2004 and shall be dealt with by the trustees legally after creation of the Trust. 22. Taking note of these findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal, suffice it to record that the arbitral tribunal had adjudicated upon the nature of the properties, subject matter of dispute between the parties. A finding of fact has been returned by the arbitral tribunal that the properties, subject matter of Will dated 07.10.2004 set up by the applicants, were joint family properties. A categorical finding of fact has been recorded to the effect that there was a nucleus formed from the income of the joint family properties, which were devolved upon two brothers jointly by way of Will dated 21.09.1960 of their father, namely Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel. A further categorical finding of fact has been recorded that the properties held by Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel in his own name which were acquired after the death of his father late Mr.
Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel. A further categorical finding of fact has been recorded that the properties held by Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel in his own name which were acquired after the death of his father late Mr. Trikamlal Vrajlal Patel were settled out of the yield of the joint family property, i.e. the income of the family nucleus. Evidence was led by the respondents before the arbitral tribunal that the testator, viz. Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel had no separate income of his own and whatever income was that of the yield of agricultural lands where tobacco was the main produce. 23. Once it was established by the respondents that there was a family nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired and that Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel had no separate income of his own, there would be a presumption of the properties acquired by Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel in his name being joint family properties and the onus would shift on the appellants who claim such properties to be self-acquired properties of Dr.Shantilal Trikamlal Patel. The appellants were required to prove that Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel had purchased the property, subject matter of the Will dated 07.10.2004, with his income/funds and not out of the joint family nucleus that was available. The appellants having failed to do so, the findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal cannot be said to be perverse so as to attach any patent illegality to the award. 24. Coming to the next submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the arbitral tribunal has exceeded in its jurisdiction to decide on the question of validity of the Will dated 07.10.2004, suffice it to say that the observations made by the arbitral tribunal about the Will being made without any right with the testator to make a Will and the same are liable to be cancelled according to law, would not amount to cancellation of the Will or any adjudication on the genuineness or validity of the Will. Rather, the arbitral tribunal has adjudicated on the question of right of the testator about the properties, which are subject matter of Will dated 07.10.2004 set-up by the appellants, and held that the properties, subject matter of both the Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004 being joint Hindu family properties to which testator Dr.
Rather, the arbitral tribunal has adjudicated on the question of right of the testator about the properties, which are subject matter of Will dated 07.10.2004 set-up by the appellants, and held that the properties, subject matter of both the Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004 being joint Hindu family properties to which testator Dr. Shantilal Trikamlal Patel had no right to transfer, could not have been disposed by way of Will and as such, both the Wills are liable to be cancelled. This finding in no way can be said to be beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, which was set up with the consent of the parties to decide on the question of right of the testator to the properties in question, subject matter of Wills dated 07.10.2004 and 03.11.2004. 25. As regards the validity or genuineness of the Will, the matter is pending before the probate court and as transpired to us, the probate case is still pending. It is open for the appellants to prove the genuineness of the Will in the said proceeding. 26. Before parting, we may note that the question of genuineness of the Will and the question of right of the testator to dispose off the properties by way of Will are two separate questions, inasmuch as, even if the Will is proved to be a genuine document, the grant of probate with a copy of the Will annexed would establish conclusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of the Will. The grant of probate does no more than establish the factum of the Will and the legal character of the executor. Further, the Probate court does not decide any question of title or of the existence of the property itself. The grant of a probate by a court of competent jurisdiction, thus, is conclusive as to the due execution and validity of the Will, but it does not bind the party who asserts the title or the right of the testator as to the property itself. The said question has to be decided by the competent civil court and in the present case, the same has been decided by the two member arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties. 27.
The said question has to be decided by the competent civil court and in the present case, the same has been decided by the two member arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties. 27. In the above facts and circumstances of the present case, having exhaustively gone through the arbitral award, we do not find any perversity in the award so as to hold it having suffering from patent illegality under Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration Act' 1996. The Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act' 1996 has, thus, committed no error in refusing to set aside the award. 28. The appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act' 1996 is accordingly, dismissed being devoid of merits. No order as to costs.