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2024 DIGILAW 2147 (GUJ)

STATE OF GUJARAT v. DHIRUBHAI RATNABHAI SABHAD

2024-12-05

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK

body2024
JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant-State of Gujarat (original complainant) under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30/06/2010 passed by the learned Special Sessions Judge, Rajkot (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Atrocity Sessions Case No. 16 of 2009, whereby, the learned Special Judge has acquitted the original accused respondents herein for the offence punishable under Sections 324, 323, 504, 188 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”) read with the provisions of Section 3(1)(5)(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1981 (for short “the Atrocities Act”). 1.1 At the outset, it may be noted that the respondent No. 5-Maganbhai Chaturbhai Jadav (original complainant), was joined as party respondent in the present proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and notice was also issued to Maganbhai Chaturbhai Jadav, however, the respondent No. 5 Maganbhai Chaturbhai Jadav could not be served with the notice of this Court as the same returned with an endorsement that the original complainant passed away on 23/04/2022. The copy of death certificate issued by the competent authority is produced on record alongwith the report of the Bailiff of the trial court. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under: 2.1 The complainant Maganbhai Chaturbhai Jadav, belonged to the Scheduled Castes and was living at Rajkot with his family and running a rickshaw. That, on 17/12/2008, at about 7:00 P.M. one farm of complainant’s caste was forcefully took by the Bharwad Community, therefore, the complainant went there, where the other people gathered and told that the ownership of the said farm was of their community. Therefore, the accused got angry on complainant and gave filthy abuses and the complainant told them do not give abuses. Therefore, the accused nos. 1 & 2 gave kick and panch blows and other two accused took the stick and iron pipe and inflicted blows on the complainant. Thereafter, on hearing the shout of the complainant, wife of complainant, son, daughter and his son-in-law came there and rescued him from the accused. Thereafter, the accused persons went away from there. Therefore, the accused nos. 1 & 2 gave kick and panch blows and other two accused took the stick and iron pipe and inflicted blows on the complainant. Thereafter, on hearing the shout of the complainant, wife of complainant, son, daughter and his son-in-law came there and rescued him from the accused. Thereafter, the accused persons went away from there. Therefore, the complainant filed a complain before Malaviyanagar Police Station, Rajkot against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Sections 324, 323, 504, 188 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(5) (10) of the Atrocity Act, 1989. 2.2 On the basis of the said complaint, investigation was initiated and as there was sufficient evidence against the present respondents-accused, charge sheet was filed against them before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajkot. As the offences committed by the accused persons were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions as per the provisions of 209 of Cr.P.C. the learned Judge committed the case to the Court of Sessions and the case was transferred and placed for trial before the learned Special Sessions Judge, Rajkot, which was numbered as Atrocity Sessions Case No. 16 of 2009. Thereafter, charge was framed at Exh.3 by the learned Special Sessions Judge against the respondents-accused for the offence punishable under Sections 324, 323, 504, 188 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1) (5)(10) of the Atrocity Act, 1989. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution therefore, laid evidence. 2.3 In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 12 witnesses as well as produced several documentary evidences on the record of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Special Sessions Judge, Rajkot, acquitted all the respondents accused from the charges levelled against them. 2.4 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order of acquittal dated 30/06/2010 passed by the learned Special Sessions Judge, Rajkot in Atrocity Sessions Case No. 16 of 2009, the appellant-State of Gujarat has filed the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. Heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Megha Chittaliya, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State of Gujarat. Though notice is served upon the respondents-original accused, none has remained present on behalf of the respondents. 4. Learned APP Ms. 3. Heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Megha Chittaliya, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State of Gujarat. Though notice is served upon the respondents-original accused, none has remained present on behalf of the respondents. 4. Learned APP Ms. Chittaliya, after going through the record of the trial court, after going through the evidence recorded by the trial court and the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial court and the arguments advanced by the learned APP before the trial court, has tried to canvass and contend that the trial court has committed a serious error of law and on facts while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the respondents, which is erroneous, illegal and unjust. She has submitted that the trial court has examined almost 12 witnesses and from the depositions of the complainant, his wife, his daughter and son-in-law, the prosecution was able to prove the charge against the respondents accused. She has submitted that the medical evidence has also supported the case of the prosecution, however, the trial court has completely ignored and overlooked the said aspects while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has further submitted that the prosecution has proved the case against the present respondents accused by leading oral as well as written documentary evidence and also produced relevant material before the trial court, however, the trial court has failed to appreciate the same in its true and proper spirit while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has also submitted that the arguments advanced by the prosecution was not properly appreciated by the trial court and thus, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court is based upon conjuncture and surmises. Over and above the grounds agitated in the memo of appeal, learned APP Ms. Chittaliya has urged that the present appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal be quashed and set aside and the respondents accused be convicted for the alleged offence. 5. I have heard the learned APP Ms. Chittaliya, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State and perused the material placed on record. I have also personally examined and verified the evidence of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial court. 5. I have heard the learned APP Ms. Chittaliya, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State and perused the material placed on record. I have also personally examined and verified the evidence of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial court. Certain undisputed facts are required to be noted herein that, the case of the prosecution was that, on 18/12/2008, the informant because of the injuries sustained by him, was taken to the hospital, wherein, the doctor had informed the concerned police station at Malaviyanagar and on the basis of that vardhi received from the hospital, the investigation was handed over to one Shankarbhai Pitamberbhai Patel, serving as PSI at that relevant point of time. When he visited the hospital, he found that the injured Maganbhai Chaturbhai Jadav was admitted for the alleged incident of assault and had sustained injuries, he therefore, recorded the FIR in the hospital and the intimation was also sent to the concerned ACP for further investigation as the case was pertaining to the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(5)(10) of the Atrocities Act. It is also the case that, the informant was a history sheeter against whom many offences had been registered under the provisions of the Prohibition for Consumption and Selling of Liquor Act and also under the provisions of the IPC in the city of Rajkot. 5.1 The cause of quarrel/assault as advanced by the informant/prosecution that because of the barren plot of land situated in the area of Nana Mauva Road behind the Maudi Head Quarter was owned and belonging to the complainant community and the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in connivance with others wanted to grab the said land and therefore, they made an encroachment upon the said plot of land. In fact, no material had come forth on record as to whether the said plot of land was belonging to the complainant community or not and whether the respondents accused had made any encroachment upon the said plot of land or not. In fact, no material had come forth on record as to whether the said plot of land was belonging to the complainant community or not and whether the respondents accused had made any encroachment upon the said plot of land or not. So far as the offence under the provisions of Section 3(5) of Atrocities Act is concerned, from the bare perusal of the documentary evidence and the evidence of the witnesses, it appears that neither of the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution as to whether the respondents had uttered a word with an intention to humiliate or insult the whole community as provided under the statute. Under such circumstances and in view of the above referred aspects, the trial court has not considered the evidence of the witnesses as the panch witnesses had turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution, even the complainant was also declared hostile and has not supported the case of the prosecution, and therefore, the case is based only upon the evidence of the wife of the complainant namely, Ratanben (Exh.28), daughter namely, Minaben (Exh.30) and son-in-law namely, Pravinbhai (Exh.35). From the bare perusal of the evidence of PW-6 wife of the complainant namely Ratanben, it appears that she has specifically denied that she had not seen the incident in question and she had not even tried to intervene and save her husband alongwith other persons since she was informed subsequently and directly reached to the hospital where she was informed about the incident in question by her injured husband. The deposition of PW-6 is completely contradictory to the deposition of her daughter PW-7 Minaben who in turn has stated before the trial court that she alongwith her husband rushed to the place of incident and tried to save her father from the assault made by all the accused persons and thereafter, they had taken the injured to the hospital, in fact the said version of PW-7 is absolutely contrary to the deposition of her mother. PW-7 has also admitted before the trial court that the Investigating Officer had not recorded any statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. of the witnesses, except her husband and therefore, the story put forward by the prosecution is completely washed away by the deposition of PW-7. PW-7 has also admitted before the trial court that the Investigating Officer had not recorded any statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. of the witnesses, except her husband and therefore, the story put forward by the prosecution is completely washed away by the deposition of PW-7. Even considering the depositions of PW-6 and PW-8, who had stated the facts totally contrary to the facts stated by the complainant and therefore, the prosecution has not proved its case before the trial court against the respondents accused by leading cogent and material evidence beyond reasonable probability and beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the Investigating Officer being ACP of SCST Cell, Rajkot had passed away during the pendency of the trial and therefore, he had not stepped into the witnessbox and therefore, the defence side was unable to prove all the material contradictions and omissions as the concerned I.O. had not given any deposition and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has rightly discarded the evidence of the witnesses being PW-5, 6, 7 and 8 as there was material contradictions in their depositions and from the evidence, it was prima facie proved that they were interested witnesses and they were not telling truth before the trial court and therefore, their depositions cannot be considered and thus, the trial court has rightly discarded their evidence as they were not trust-worthy witnesses and after considering all the relevant material and the arguments advanced by the prosecution, the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the respondents accused. 5.2 PW-1 Vinodbhai Amarshibhai Bathwar and PW-2-Narshibhai Dahyabhai being the panch witnesses to the panchnama of the place of occurrence were declared hostile and had not supported the case of the prosecution. PW-3-Harpalsinh Mulubha Jadeja and PW-4 Yashpalsinh Bhagvatsinh being the panch witnesses to the panchnama of the arrest of the accused persons, were also declared hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. PW-5 Maganbhai Chaturbhai being the informant and injured, was also declared hostile and in his cross-examination, he has stated completely contradictory story to PW-9 being the Head constable and therefore, under such circumstances, the prosecution was merely relying upon the evidence of 3 witnesses being PW-6, 7 and 8 and they have tried to raise their case mainly on the evidence of these 3 witnesses alongwith PW-11 Dr. Narendrakumar Lakshmanbhai Patel being the treating doctor (Exh.42), who has also not supported the case of the prosecution though he has tried to corroborate the injury with the weapon but, not supported the same, in fact, there are contradictory evidence oral as well as medical come on record and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 5.3 So far as the registration of the offence is concerned, it was not proved. As per the case of the prosecution, the FIR was registered by the concerned PSI of Malaviyanagar Police Station in the hospital, however, the informant had stated before the trial court that the FIR was registered by the concerned police officer at his residence, as on the earlier day he was in hospital and he was in traumatic condition and therefore, the concerned police officer had refused to record the FIR and therefore, on the next day he had visited the house of the informant where the FIR was recorded and therefore, first and foremost fact of filing an FIR was not supported which led to fatal to the case of the prosecution, which goes to the root of the cause and therefore, after considering all the relevant aspects, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the respondents accused. So far as the injury caused to the accused persons with the respective weapons is concerned, there are clear cut exaggerations in the depositions of the witnesses, which are not supported by the medical evidence and therefore, the said evidence has also not corroborated the case of the prosecution and not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial court has rightly discarded and disbelieved the evidence of the said witnesses and thus, the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and therefore, in my opinion the present appeal being devoid of any merits deserves to be dismissed. 5.4 At this juncture, it is profitable to refer and rely upon the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in case of Shajan Skaria vs. State of Kerala and Another, AIR 2024 SC 4557 , wherein, it has been observed and held as under: “20. 5.4 At this juncture, it is profitable to refer and rely upon the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in case of Shajan Skaria vs. State of Kerala and Another, AIR 2024 SC 4557 , wherein, it has been observed and held as under: “20. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Bill, 1989 is extracted herein-below: “Statement of Objects and Reasons. 1. Despite various measures to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical, social and economic reasons. 2. Because of the awareness created amongst the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through spread of education, etc. they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights and resist practices of untouchability against them or demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self-respect or honour of their women, they become irritants for the dominant and the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of even the Government allotted land by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented and more often these people become victims of attacks by the vested interests. Of late, there has been an increase in the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities like making the Scheduled Castes persons eat inedible substances like human excreta and attacks on and mass killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the circumstances, the existing laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 have been found to be inadequate to check these crimes. A special legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and Non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore, become necessary. 3. The term ‘atrocity’ has not been defined so far. A special legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and Non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore, become necessary. 3. The term ‘atrocity’ has not been defined so far. It is considered necessary that not only the term ‘atrocity’ should be defined but stringent measures should be introduced to provide for higher punishments for committing such atrocities. It is also proposed to enjoining on the States and the Union territories to take specific preventive and punitive measures to protect the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes from being victimised and where atrocities are committed, to provide adequate relief and assistance to rehabilitate them.” 21. It is evident from the aforesaid that the purpose of the Act, 1989 is to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to provide for establishment of special courts for the trial of such offences and to make provisions for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences. 22. The Act, 1989 could be said to have been enacted to improve the social and economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been historically subjected to various indignities, humiliations and harassment besides deprivation of life and property on account of their caste identity. The legislation, thus, intends to punish the acts committed against the vulnerable sections of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community. 29. However, over a period of time, the courts across the country started taking notice of the fact that the complaints were being lodged under the Act, 1989 out of personal and political vendetta. The courts took notice of the fact that the provisions of the Act, 1989 were being misused to some extent for purposes not intended by the legislation. To overcome the bar of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, the persons against whom such complaints were being lodged started invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 30. Taking note of the aforesaid, this Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2018) 6 SCC 454 , while quashing the proceedings instituted against the appellant therein under the provisions of the Act, 1989 thought fit to issue the following directions: “79.1. Proceedings in the present case are clear abuse of process of court and are quashed. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2018) 6 SCC 454 , while quashing the proceedings instituted against the appellant therein under the provisions of the Act, 1989 thought fit to issue the following directions: “79.1. Proceedings in the present case are clear abuse of process of court and are quashed. 79.2. There is no absolute bar against grant of anticipatory bail in cases under the Atrocities Act if no prima facie case is made out or where on judicial scrutiny the complaint is found to be prima facie mala-fide. 79.3. In view of acknowledged abuse of law of arrest in cases under the Atrocities Act, arrest of a public servant can only be after approval of the appointing authority and of a nonpublic servant after approval by the SSP which may be granted in appropriate cases if considered necessary for reasons recorded. Such reasons must be scrutinised by the Magistrate for permitting further detention. 79.4. To avoid false implication of an innocent, a preliminary enquiry may be conducted by the DSP concerned to find out whether the allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the allegations are not frivolous or motivated. 79.5. Any violation of Directions 79.3 and 79.4 will be actionable by way of disciplinary action as well as contempt. 79.6. The above directions are prospective.” 55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are: (a) Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. (b) Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. (c) Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and d. Accused must do so at any place within public view. 56. It is relevant to note that Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is similarly worded as the erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 which was in force prior to its substitution with effect from 26.01.2016. 61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of castebased humiliation. 61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of castebased humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables” the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’ etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989. 62. For this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to castebased humiliation. 70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members. 72. It is clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid provision that any insult against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of “untouchability” was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act. With the passage of time, it was realised by the legislature that the Civil Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based offences and the practice of “untouchability” leading to the enactment of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for combating such practices. 73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult to attract the offence under erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. Relevant observations is extracted herein-below: “18. 73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult to attract the offence under erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. Relevant observations is extracted herein-below: “18. [.....] The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks......” 80. At the cost of repetition, the words in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are altogether different. Mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. As discussed earlier, the offence must have been committed against the person on the ground or for the reason that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. When we are considering whether prima facie materials exist, warranting arrest of the appellant, there is nothing to indicate that the allegations/statements alleged to have been made by the appellant were for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste.” 5.5 The learned trial Judge has considered all the relevant material produced by the prosecution and after going through the evidence of the witnesses, the trial court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and order acquitting the present respondents accused. It is also now well settled that while exercising powers under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. if the trial court while passing the order has committed any illegality or any perversity or has exceeded the jurisdiction, unless and until such facts come on record, the Court is very slow while dealing with an acquittal appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court has in a series of judgments enunciated the principles while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is inasmuch as can re-appreciate the evidence, review or re-consider the evidence and if the Court finds that there is any illegality or any irregularity in the judgment then in that case only, the Court has power to entertain the appeal and interfere with the order of acquittal. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court. 5.6 It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 : (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-37 to 40 as under: “37. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. as follows: “8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” 5.7 It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-20 and 21 as under: “Head Note (B) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S.378 - Appeal against acquittal - General principles regarding the power and duty of the appellate court, reiterated-Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, S.419 20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42............ (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 6. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 30/06/2010 passed by the learned Special Sessions Judge, Rajkot in Atrocity Sessions Case No. 16 of 2009 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the respondents accused stand cancelled. 6.1 Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.