JUDGMENT : RAJESH SHANKAR , J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the communique as contained in Memo no.100/ES-1/JKD- LA/01/2021 dated 06.12.2021 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) issued under the signature of Principal Secretary, Election Commission of India (ECI)-respondent no.2, whereby the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 03.11.2021 having not been found satisfactory, the State Government has been directed to initiate disciplinary proceeding for major penalty against the petitioner by issuing memo of charge against him with further direction to immediately remove him from the post of Deputy Commissioner-Cum-District Election Officer, Deoghar and not to post him as DC/DEO or on any other election duty without prior permission of the ECI. 2. The brief facts of the case as emanating from the writ petition is that the petitioner was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar during bye-election of Madhupur Legislative Assembly Constituency held in the month of April, 2021. The petitioner being the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Election Officer informed the Chief Electoral Officer, Jharkhand vide letter dated 15.04.2021 citing various incidents of violating Model Code of Conduct, disturbing communal harmony and intimidating of voters as well as spreading racial hatred among them by Dr. Nishikant Dubey, Member of Parliament from Godda Loksabha Constituency during the election campaign of the said by-election. 3. A complaint dated 19.04.2021 was received by the ECI from Dr. Nishikant Dubey, M.P., Godda via email wherein it was alleged that the petitioner being the DEO, Deoghar and the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar were working as agents of a political party during the aforesaid by-election and requested to conduct enquiry against them. Thereafter, the ECI removed the petitioner from the position of DEO-cum-DC, Deoghar vide letter no. 100/ES-1/JKD-LA/1/2021 dated 26.04.2021 and appointed one Nancy Sahay in his place. 4. The process of election was completed on 02.05.2021. Thereafter the petitioner was again posted as D.C, Deoghar vide notification no.2381 dated 3.05.2021 and he assumed the charge on 04.05.2021. The petitioner vide letter dated 28.05.2021 and few other letters called for a report regarding the action taken against Dr. Nishikant Dubey, MP for violating Model Code of Conduct during the said by-election and on finding that no action was taken pursuant to the said letter dated 15.04.2021, he vide letter dated 23.10.2021 directed the concerned authorities to take legal action against said Dr. Nishikant Dubey, MP for violating Model Code of Conduct during the said by-election and on finding that no action was taken pursuant to the said letter dated 15.04.2021, he vide letter dated 23.10.2021 directed the concerned authorities to take legal action against said Dr. Nishikant Dubey and to send report within two days. The Chief Electoral Officer, Jharkhand vide letter no.2472 dated 26.10.2021 informed the petitioner that his complaint/letter dated 15.04.2021 with respect to the offences allegedly committed by Dr. Nishikant Dubey was already sent to the ECI vide letter dated 18.04.2021 for necessary action. 5. The ECI also received a report from Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), Jharkhand on 26.10.2021 mentioning inter alia that five F.I.Rs. had been lodged against Dr. Nishikant Dubey under various sections of the Indian Penal Code for violating Model Code of Conduct during the by-election. It was further reported by the CEO, Jharkhand that neither any intimation was received from the petitioner before/after lodging of the FIRs. nor any direction was issued from the CEO office in this regard. The CEO Jharkhand thus sought guidance of ECI for taking further action. 6. The ECI vide letter dated 3.11.2021 addressed to the CEO, Jharkhand, Ranchi called explanation from the petitioner on the following points:- A. What was the reason for lodging of FIRs. against Dr. Nishikant Dubey, M.P. (Lok Sabha) after a delay of more than six months from the date of alleged commission of offence by him? B. Why multiple FIRs against Nishikant Dubey were lodged for the same cause of action? C. Why verbal orders were given by the DEO to the Block Development Officers of Devipur and Sarath for lodging FIRs. against Dr. Nishikant Dubey, MP (Lok Sabha)? D. Why FIR was lodged with respect to an incident where Model Code of Conduct (MCC) was not in force that too in the area of a police station, which was located outside the boundary of the aforesaid constituency? E. Why the Election Commission of India was not informed prior to lodging of the FIRs., even though the State Government was informed by the DEO vide his letter dated 26.10.2021 sent to the Principal Secretary, Department of Cabinet Secretariat and Vigilance, Government of Jharkhand? 7. The petitioner replied the letter of ECI vide letter no. 1131 dated 11.11.2021 explaining that the incidents were already reported to the ECI vide letter dated 15.04.2021. 7. The petitioner replied the letter of ECI vide letter no. 1131 dated 11.11.2021 explaining that the incidents were already reported to the ECI vide letter dated 15.04.2021. It was further stated that FIRs. were lodged not only for election related offences but also for the offences under Indian Penal Code. It was also stated that under Indian law. "Crime never dies" is the prevalent concept and as such delay in lodging the FIRs cannot be fatal in all cases, rather the accused is required to prove the prejudice. The petitioner further stated that the FIRs. were registered with the same statements as were reported to the CEO/ECI vide letter dated 15.04.2021 and there was no change/improvement in the prosecution version. Thus, no prejudice was caused to the accused due to delay in lodging the FIRs. Moreover, all five FIRs. were registered in respect of different offences, different places and dates of occurrences etc. and there was no multiplicity of FIRs. with respect to the single incident. However, the ECI issued the directions as contained in the impugned letter dated 6.12.2021. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent-ECI at the outset raises an objection with respect to maintainability of the present writ petition by contending that the averments made in different paragraphs of the writ petition, reply to the counter affidavit and the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner suggest that the petitioner has approached this Court in an independent capacity as an IAS Officer, against whom the impugned directions as contained in letter dated 06.12.2021 i.e. initiation of Disciplinary Proceeding for major punishment has been issued and as such in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261, he should have approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ranchi at the first instance. 9. The learned counsel for ECI also puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Another Vs. Subhas Sharma reported in (2002) 4 SCC 145 , wherein the employees of Kendriya Vidyalaya had filed two writ petitions before Jammu and Kashmir High Court as certain disputes had arisen regarding their service conditions. Subhas Sharma reported in (2002) 4 SCC 145 , wherein the employees of Kendriya Vidyalaya had filed two writ petitions before Jammu and Kashmir High Court as certain disputes had arisen regarding their service conditions. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan filed two separate applications in the said writ petitions for transfer of the same to the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the said Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act, 1985’) had the jurisdiction to decide the disputes, however the applications filed by the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan were dismissed by the High Court. The matter having travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, their Lordships held that the Central Administrative Tribunal had the jurisdiction concerning service matters of the employees of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan in view of sub-clause (iii) of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, 1985. 10. The learned counsel for ECI puts further reliance on the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court in the case of Prabhat Ranjan Deo Vs. Union Public Service Commission & Others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Del 738 , wherein it has been held that judgment of L. Chandra Kumar (supra.) and Section 14(1) of the Act, 1985 make it clear that in relation to service matters covered under the said Act, there is an ouster of jurisdiction of the High Court as a court of “first instance” and the Tribunal is not an “alternative”, but is the “only” forum available to the petitioner. It has further been held that it is neither a matter of “choice” for the petitioner to approach the Tribunal, nor a matter of discretion with this Court to entertain the petition. It has also been held that there cannot be a doubt on the proposition that jurisdiction conferred on High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an inviolable basic framework of the Constitution of India, however, with respect to service matters of the employees covered under the Act, 1985, High Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction at the first instance. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent-ECI also puts reliance on the judgment rendered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Jagat Bandhu Mahapatra Vs. State of Jharkhand & Others reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Jhar 330 . 11. The learned counsel for the respondent-ECI also puts reliance on the judgment rendered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Jagat Bandhu Mahapatra Vs. State of Jharkhand & Others reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Jhar 330 . In the said case, the Bench while framing issue no.1 as to whether the petitioner of the said case being a member of Indian Police Service can directly approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has answered the said issue by referring to the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that the High Court cannot permit an aggrieved person to bypass the remedy of moving the Administrative Tribunal at the first instance and thus cannot entertain the writ petition questioning the validity/legality of transfer order of the petitioner, which is covered under the expression “any other matter whatsoever” appearing in Section 3(q)(v) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. It has also been held that the petitioner cannot, therefore, be permitted to bypass the remedy of approaching the Administrative Tribunal and prefer writ petition at the first instance under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 12. Per Contra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the power of judicial review of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India over the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunals has been kept intact by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (Supra.) . The question of maintainability of the present writ petition as raised by the respondent-ECI is liable to be rejected primarily for the reason that the same has been filed quite belatedly. It is further submitted that the present writ petition was filed on 18.11.2022 and was admitted for hearing on 10.02.2023. Thereafter, it was also heard on different dates i.e. on 21.08.2023, 20.09.2023 and 05.01.2024. On 05.01.2024 and a Bench of this Court was pleased to fix the matter on 19.01.2024 under the heading “For Final Disposal” and only thereafter the respondent-ECI for the first time raised the issue of maintainability. It is also submitted that raising the issue of availability of alternative remedy after admitting the writ petition for hearing as well as exchange of pleadings is highly improper and hence bound to be rejected. 13. It is also submitted that raising the issue of availability of alternative remedy after admitting the writ petition for hearing as well as exchange of pleadings is highly improper and hence bound to be rejected. 13. It is further submitted that the present writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned letter dated 06.12.2021 issued by the ECI in exercise of powers under Section 20-A r/w 28-A of the Representation of People's Act, 1951 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘Act, 1951’) which is only recommendatory in nature. Since the said impugned letter has been issued much after declaration of result of the said by-election, the ECI did not have the jurisdiction to even recommend initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in view section 28-A of the Act, 1951 and hence the same is without jurisdiction. The ECI, after conclusion of the election process, does not have any authority whatsoever over a Deputy Commissioner of a district designated as District Election Officer and therefore cannot exercise any power regulating the service condition of the said officer or can have any supervision over him. 14. It is also submitted that there is no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the ECI. Otherwise also, the impugned communique dated 06.12.2021 cannot be said to have been issued under the Service Rules governing the terms and conditions of the petitioner's service. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 801 , wherein it has been held as under:- “25. While a High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This principle has been crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and Harbanslal Sahni v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.. Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh a two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh a two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court has observed: “28. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The principle of alternate remedies and its exceptions was also reiterated recently in the decision in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Limited. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The principle of alternate remedies and its exceptions was also reiterated recently in the decision in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Limited. In State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. This Court observed: “23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [ (1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33 ] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.” 27. The above principle was reiterated by a three-judge Bench of this Court in Executive Engineer v. Seetaram Rice Mill. In that case, a show cause notice/provisional assessment order was issued to the assessee on the ground of an unauthorized use of electricity under Section 126(1) of the Electricity Act 2003 and a demand for payment of electricity charges was raised. The assessee contended that Section 126 was not applicable to it and challenged the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities to issue such a notice, before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The High Court entertained the writ petition. The assessee contended that Section 126 was not applicable to it and challenged the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities to issue such a notice, before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The High Court entertained the writ petition. When the judgment of the High Court was appealed before this Court, it held that the High Court did not commit any error in exercising its jurisdiction in respect of the challenge raised on the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. This Court made the following observations: “81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given case. We are of the considered view that interest of administration of justice shall be better subserved if the cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the Act. 82. It is argued and to some extent correctly that the High Court should not decline to exercise its jurisdiction merely for the reason that there is a statutory alternative remedy available even when the case falls in the above stated class of cases. It is a settled principle that the courts/tribunal will not exercise jurisdiction in futility. The law will not itself attempt to do an act which would be vain, lex nil frustra facit, nor to enforce one which would be frivolous-lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia- the law will not force anyone to do a thing vain and fruitless. In other words, if exercise of jurisdiction by the tribunal ex facie appears to be an exercise of jurisdiction in futility for any of the stated reasons, then it will be permissible for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction. This issue is no longer res integra and has been settled by a catena of judgments of this Court, which we find entirely unnecessary to refer to in detail…” (emphasis supplied) 16. This issue is no longer res integra and has been settled by a catena of judgments of this Court, which we find entirely unnecessary to refer to in detail…” (emphasis supplied) 16. Heard the learned counsel for the parties on the point of maintainability of the present writ petition and perused the materials available on record. 17. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the question of maintainability of the writ petition cannot be raised by the respondent-ECI at this stage is concerned, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fatma Bibi Ahmed Patel Vs. State of Gujarat & Another reported in (2008) 6 SCC 789, wherein it has been held as under:- “21. This Court, in a matter like the present one where the jurisdictional issue goes to the root of the matter, would not allow injustice to be done to a party. The entire proceedings having been initiated illegally and without jurisdiction, all actions taken by the court were without jurisdiction, and thus are nullities. In such a case even the principle of res judicata (wherever applicable) would not apply. 23. Where a jurisdictional issue is raised, save and except for certain categories of the cases, the same may be permitted to be raised at any stage of the proceedings.” 18. It would also be appropriate to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N.D.P. Sakhayogam Vs. Kerala Atmavidya Sangham & Others reported in (2017) 8 SCC 830 , wherein it has been held as under: - “17. Be that as it may, in our considered view, the issue of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the case, if found involved has to be tried at any stage of the proceedings once brought to the notice of the Court.” 19. Thus, the jurisdictional issue which goes to the root of the matter can be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, the jurisdictional issue which goes to the root of the matter can be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Since the respondent-ECI has raised question with respect to jurisdiction of this Court to hear the present matter contending that the same is amenable to the jurisdiction of Central Administrative Tribunal at the first instance, this Court is of the view that the said issue goes to the root of the matter and in view of the legal principle laid down in the aforesaid judgments, finds no merit in the said objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. Now, the question before this court is as to whether the impugned communique dated 6.12.2021 issued by the respondent no.2 is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) constituted under the Act, 1985. 21. The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has been enacted to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of the disputes and complaints with respect to recruitments and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of article 323A of the Constitution of India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 22. Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 speaks of the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. As per Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, 1985, on and from the appointed day, all service matters concerning a member of any All-India Service will lie before the CAT. 23. 22. Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 speaks of the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. As per Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, 1985, on and from the appointed day, all service matters concerning a member of any All-India Service will lie before the CAT. 23. “Service matters” in relation to a person is defined under section 3(q) of the Act, 1985 and it means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matter whatsoever. 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (Supra.) has held as under:- “90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. 93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.” 25. It may thus be construed that the Tribunals are also competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned and their decisions are subject to scrutiny before the Division Bench of the respective High Courts. However, the Tribunals cannot entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. It is not open for the litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal, is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. 26. In the case in hand, the communique as contained in Memo No. 100/ES-1/JKD-LA/01/2021 dated 06.12.2021 has been issued by the respondent no. 2 in purported exercise of the power conferred under section 20-A of the Act, 1951 and the State Government has been directed to initiate disciplinary proceeding for major penalty against the petitioner with a further direction to immediately remove him from the post of DC-cum-CEO, Deoghar and not to post him as Deputy Commissioner/District Election Officer or on any other election duty without prior permission of the Commission. 27. Article 324 of the Constitution of India delineates that the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of President and Vice-President held under this Constitution shall be vested in the Election Commission of India. 28. 28. The Act, 1951 has been promulgated for the conduct of elections to the Houses of Parliament and to the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State, the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of those Houses, the corrupt practices and other offences at or in connection with such elections and the decision of doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with such elections. 29. Section 20-A of the Act, 1951 speaks of the general duties of District Election Officer. Sub-section (1) of Section 20-A provides that the District Election Officer shall co-ordinate and supervise all works in the district or in the area within his jurisdiction in connection with the conduct of all elections to the Parliament and the Legislature of the State subject to superintendence, direction and control of the Chief Electoral Officer. Further, Sub-section (2) provides that the District Election Officer shall also perform such other functions as may be entrusted to him by the Election Commission of India and the Chief Electoral Officer. 30. Section 28-A of the Act, 1951 provides that the returning officer, assistant returning officer, presiding officer, polling officer and any other officer appointed under this Part, and any police officer designated for the time being by the State Government for the conduct of any election, shall be deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for the period commencing on and from the date of the notification calling for such election and ending with the date of declaration of the results of such election and accordingly, such officers shall, during that period, be subject to the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission. 31. Thus, the Election Commission of India exercises the power of superintendence and control relating to the affairs of election of Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and the elections to the offices of President and Vice-President. 31. Thus, the Election Commission of India exercises the power of superintendence and control relating to the affairs of election of Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and the elections to the offices of President and Vice-President. The returning officer, assistant returning officer, presiding officer, polling officer and any other officer appointed under this Part and any police officer designated for the time being by the State Government are deemed to be on deputation of the Election Commission from the date of notification of calling for election till ending the election by declaration of result and during that period, the Election Commission becomes the employer of those persons who have been assigned the election duty and as such exercises disciplinary power against them. 32. In the case of Pon Paramaguru, Director General of Police Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 311 , the Division Bench of Madras High Court has held as under:- “65. Mr. R. Viduthalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. A. Raja in W.P. No. 8126 of 2006, while supplementing the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Shanthi Bhusan, has also raised the question of maintainability of the Writ Petitions on the anvil of the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case. He has contended that the question relating to validity of transfer of a police officer belonging to Indian Police Service can be raised before the Central Administrative Tribunal and not directly before the High Court and only when the matter is decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal, a Writ Petition can be filed against such decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal and, therefore, the Writ Petitions filed either by the State Government or by the three former Directors General of Police are not maintainable. 66. In our considered opinion, there is a short, but not necessarily sweet answer to this. The question in issue in the present case is not regarding transfer of any official as such, but regarding jurisdiction of the Election Commission to issue any direction regarding transfer of an officer. What is in issue in the present case is the legality or validity of the direction issued by the Election Commission and not the legality or the validity of any transfer order as such. What is in issue in the present case is the legality or validity of the direction issued by the Election Commission and not the legality or the validity of any transfer order as such. As a matter of fact, transfer order, if any, is to be passed by the State Government and no transfer order has been passed as yet. Moreover, the direction is being challenged by the State Government and not by the officer concerned. In such view of the matter, it cannot be said that the question could have been raised before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The observation made by Justice K.G. Balakrishnan of the Kerala High Court, as His Lordship then was, in T.V. Madhusoodanan v. Chief Election Commission and another, 1995 Labour IC 682, repelling a similar contention in that case is appropriate.” 33. In the case of T.V. Madhusoodanan Vs. Chief Election Commission and Another reported in 1994 SCC OnLine Ker 579 , a Bench of Kerala High Court also declined to accept the argument of the counsel for the Election Commission of India to the effect that the writ petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution and the remedy, if any, available to the petitioner was to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Bench held that in the original petition, a direction given by the Chief Election Commissioner to cancel the appointment of the petitioner as DG and IGP and to maintain status quo ante as on the date of declaration of the by-election was sought to be quashed. However, such direction was not in respect of posting, promotion or other service conditions of the petitioner of the said case. The Bench thus held that the petitioner was definitely entitled to seek a judicial review of the same under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 34. In the present case also, legality and validity of the direction of the respondent no.2 with respect to taking disciplinary action against the petitioner is under challenge. The Bench thus held that the petitioner was definitely entitled to seek a judicial review of the same under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 34. In the present case also, legality and validity of the direction of the respondent no.2 with respect to taking disciplinary action against the petitioner is under challenge. The primary argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of section 28-A of the Act, 1951, the Election Commission of India exercises disciplinary power against the returning officer, assistant returning officer, presiding officer, polling officer and any other officer appointed under Part-IV of the Act, 1951, and any police officer designated for the time being by the State Government for conducting any election, shall be deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for the period commencing on and from the date of the notification calling for such election and ending with the date of declaration of the results of such election. However, since the result of the said by-election was already declared much prior to the issuance of impugned communique dated 06.12.2021, there was no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the respondent no.2 by that time. That apart, the impugned communique dated 06.12.2021 is, in fact, in the nature of a recommendation to the State Government to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and pursuant to the direction of the respondent no.2, no order has yet been passed by the State Government. Had there been any order passed by the State Government pursuant to the impugned Communique dated 06.12.2021, the same would have been a different situation. This Court finds substance in the said argument and thus agrees with the view taken by the Madras High Court and Kerala High Court in the aforesaid cases. 35. This Court is of further view that as per the scheme of the Act, 1985, any service matter arising out of direct relationship between the employer and the employee will lie before the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the said Act. However, in the present case, the petitioner has put challenge to the communique dated 06.12.2021 issued by the respondent no.2 not under any service law, rather the same has been issued in exercise of the power conferred under section 20-A of the Act, 1951. 36. However, in the present case, the petitioner has put challenge to the communique dated 06.12.2021 issued by the respondent no.2 not under any service law, rather the same has been issued in exercise of the power conferred under section 20-A of the Act, 1951. 36. For the reasons as aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the objection raised by the respondent-ECI with respect to maintainability of the present writ petition. I.A. No.1539 of 2024: 37. The petitioner by filing the present interlocutory application has stated that the present writ petition was initially filed with the nomenclature-W.P.(C), as the petitioner put challenge to the impugned communique dated 06.12.2021 being recommendatory in nature and no service rule or any provision of service code was involved in the matter. However, pursuant to the defect pointed out by the stamp reporter, the same was converted into W.P.(S). The petitioner thus prays to correct and thereby change the nomenclature of the present writ petition from W.P.(S) to W.P.(C). 38. This Court is also of the view that the present matter should have the nomenclature W.P.(C) and not W.P.(S), as no service dispute is involved in the same. 39. Moreover, the impugned order has been passed in purported exercise of the power under section 20-A of the Act, 1951 and not under any service rules governing the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner. 40. Thus, it is held that the present writ petition is maintainable before this Court, however, not under the nomenclature of W.P.(S), rather as W.P.(C). 41. I.A No.1539 of 2024 is, accordingly, allowed. 42. Office is directed to change the nomenclature of the present writ petition from W.P.(S) to W.P.(C) and to place it before appropriate Bench as per the roster.