Order : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. 1. The present writ petition was initially filed for the following reliefs: (i) For quashing the Resolution as contained in Memo No. 454 dated 05.02.2019 issued under the signature of the respondent no. 2 – the Joint Secretary, Department of School Education & Literacy, Government of Jharkhand, whereby it was decided to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner with further direction to serve her Memo of Charges mentioned in “Prapatra-Ka”. (ii) For quashing of the Notification as contained in Memo No. 345 dated 25.01.2019 issued by the respondent no. 2, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been suspended in contemplation of the decision to initiate departmental proceeding against her. 2. During pendency of the present writ petition, the respondent no. 2 passed final order in the departmental proceeding vide Notification as contained in memo no. 1447 dated 21.07.2020 and as such, the petitioner has also prayed for quashing the said Notification, whereby the order of ‘removal from service with immediate effect’ has been passed against the petitioner. 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that vide Notification as contained in memo no. 345 dated 25.01.2019, the petitioner was suspended in contemplation of decision to initiate departmental proceeding against her. Thereafter, vide Resolution as contained in memo no. 454 dated 05.02.2019 issued under the signature of the respondent no. 2, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and Memo of Charges mentioned in “Prapatra-Ka” containing altogether seven charges in relation to her tenure of posting as District Education Officer, Palamau, was directed to be served upon her. The said charges levelled against her, are as under: (i) continuous violation of the established procedure in relation to disposal of departmental work. (ii) promoting financial irregularity and working with complete disinterest in the departmental works related to the welfare of students. (iii) stopping the salary of the sub-ordinate employees and harassing them without any reason. (iv) Pending the payment of contractors after completion of the civil construction work. (v) Not disposing the complaints received from Mukhyamantri Jan Samvad and showing apathetic attitude towards complaints of common people. (vi) violating the Government orders. (vii) committing dereliction of duty and irregularity, which is violation of the rule 3(1)(i) & (ii) of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Government Servant’s Conduct Rules, 1976. 4. (v) Not disposing the complaints received from Mukhyamantri Jan Samvad and showing apathetic attitude towards complaints of common people. (vi) violating the Government orders. (vii) committing dereliction of duty and irregularity, which is violation of the rule 3(1)(i) & (ii) of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Government Servant’s Conduct Rules, 1976. 4. The petitioner submitted her reply to the concerned conducting and enquiry officer on 01.03.2019 denying the charges levelled against her, however, the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report to the respondent no. 1 observing that the charges levelled against her were proved. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 –disciplinary authority issued second show cause notice to the petitioner vide letter no. 1777 dated 29.05.2019 which was communicated to the petitioner by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi vide letter no. 809 dated 17.06.2019. The petitioner submitted reply to the second show cause notice on 01.07.2019 highlighting the biasness prevailing against her in the departmental proceeding which was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and the procedure established under law. However, the respondent no. 2 being the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order of ‘removal from service’ against the petitioner vide Notification as contained in memo no. 1447 dated 21.07.2020, in purported exercise of the power under Part-V, rule-14(x) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016. 5. In course of argument, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner confines his argument to the extent of quantum of punishment and submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not grave enough to impose shockingly disproportionate punishment of removal from service. It is further submitted that the petitioner had been in continuous service since 08.12.1988 and had been serving the department with utmost honesty and sincerity. The impugned order of punishment of removal from service has been passed without considering her unblemished past service. It is also submitted that the impugned order of punishment has been passed against her when she was at the verge of retirement i.e., January, 2021. 6. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner were serious in nature and as such, the disciplinary authority passed the order of removal from service against her which needs no interference of this Court. Moreover, the impugned order of punishment has been passed after due compliance of the principles of natural justice. 7. Moreover, the impugned order of punishment has been passed after due compliance of the principles of natural justice. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557 , wherein it has been held as under: 21. -------- The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 8. Before coming to the merit of the arguments made by learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “ State of Meghalaya Vs. 8. Before coming to the merit of the arguments made by learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “ State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak ” reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580 , wherein it has been held as under: - 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 15. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental enquiry, the court should also take into consideration, the mental set-up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. 16. The respondent belonged to a disciplined force. He was supposed to carry out instructions given to him by his superior. Not only did he flout the instructions, but conducted himself in such a manner that he caused loss of part of pay to be deposited with the exchequer and loss of service revolver with ammunition which could be misused. When a statute gives discretion to the administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Not only did he flout the instructions, but conducted himself in such a manner that he caused loss of part of pay to be deposited with the exchequer and loss of service revolver with ammunition which could be misused. When a statute gives discretion to the administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The proved charges clearly established that the respondent, who was a police officer failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the exchequer and society. 9. In the case of “ UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli Vs. Gulabhia M. Lad ” reported in (2010) 5 SCC 775 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 14. The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority, and/or on appeal the appellate authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of the court/tribunal. The exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works. Ordinarily the court or a tribunal would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts. 10. Thus, the High Courts, in exercise of power conferred under Article 226, are not supposed to interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the order of punishment appears shocking to the conscience of the court and the same is found disproportionate to the charges. The exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he/she works. 11. On perusal of the charges levelled against the petitioner, it transpires that none of the charges is grave, rather general in nature. 11. On perusal of the charges levelled against the petitioner, it transpires that none of the charges is grave, rather general in nature. No charge of embezzlement of public money has been levelled against her. The main charges levelled against the petitioner appear to be “showing dis-interest in the departmental work” and “showing disobedience against her senior”. The said charges are not so grave in nature which entail major penalty of removal from service. Moreover, the impugned order of punishment has been passed against her at the fag end of service ignoring the fact that her entire service tenure was unblemished. This Court is of the view that for the charges levelled against the petitioner, she could have been imposed any other lesser punishment than removal from service which is certainly shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against her and hence, needs to be interfered by this Court in exercise of the power of judicial review conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned Notification as contained in memo no. 1447 dated 21.07.2020 issued under the signature of the respondent no. 2 – the Joint Secretary, Department of School Education and Literacy, Government of Jharkhand, is set aside. The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority i.e., the respondent no. 2 to take appropriate decision on the point of quantum of punishment upon the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 13. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.