JUDGMENT : Kshitij Shailendra, J. 1. Heard Shri Arun Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri V.K. Ojha, Advocte holding brief of Shri Mukesh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The instant appeal arises out of a suit for cancellation of two registered sale deeds dated 28.11.1989 and 09.01.1991. 3. The first sale deed was executed by plaintiff in favour of the defendant no. 1 whereas, the second sale deed was executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2. 4. The plaint case was that execution of sale deed was a result of fraud in as much as on the date of execution of the sale deed, the defendant No. 1 had taken the plaintiff to the Registry office for the purposes of execution of a gift deed in favour of appellant's daughter Seema and under the garb of execution of the said gift deed, the sale deed was also got executed. Plaintiff alleged him as an illiterate rustic villager and also stated that no sale consideration was paid by the vendee to the vendor. The defence was that both the documents were lawfully executed and no fraud was committed with the plaintiff. 5. The trial court decreed the suit observing that there was contradiction in the statements of witnesses as regards payment of sale consideration. It also observed that considering the family condition of the plaintiff as well as the relationship between the parties to the lis, it could not be believed that plaintiff could execute a sale deed in favour of the defendant and since title did not pass to the defendant no. 1 subsequent sale made by him in favour of defendant no. 2 was also invalid. 6. The first appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and held execution of the sale deed as lawful. 7. The instant second appeal was admitted on the following two substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the court of first appeal had approached the matter from the right angle without looking to the fact that the plaintiff was an illiterate villager and defendant no. 1 was in a position to exercise undue influence on him and as such the burden of proof regarding the passing of consideration lay on the defendant? 2. Whether the court of first appeal had approached the matter from the right angle without looking to the fact that the plaintiff was an illiterate villager and defendant no. 1 was in a position to exercise undue influence on him and as such the burden of proof regarding the passing of consideration lay on the defendant? 2. Whether the first appellate court had met the reasons advanced by the Trial Judge in reversing the decree of the Trial Judge? 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that as the plaintiff appellant was a rustic villager and an illiterate person, the burden to prove due execution of sale deed would lay upon the defendant-respondent which was not discharged in the present case and therefore, the first question of law should be answered in favour of the appellant. He also submits that since, sale consideration was admittedly not paid before the Sub Registrar, oral testimony was to be looked into and there was contradiction in the statements of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 as regards payment of sale consideration and therefore, the trial court rightly declared the sale deed as void. He further submits that no point for determination was framed by the first appellate court and findings of the trial court having not been reversed, the judgment is unsustainable. 9. Per contra, it is contended from the respondent side that witnesses to the sale deed and the gift deed were the same and even scribe was produced as D.W. 4. Learned counsel further submits that though sale consideration was not paid before the Sub Registrar, the alleged contradiction in the statements of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 was only with regard to the exact time of payment of sale consideration and whereas one defence witness stated payment having been made at 6.00 am, the other stated payment having been made at 7.00 am and such a minor contradiction not being fatal to the defence, the first appellate court has rightly dismissed the Suit. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find that if the plea of illiterate and rustic villager is examined, certainly the burden to establish due execution of sale deed would lay upon the defendant. However, in order to succeed on such plea, it has to be established beyond doubt that defense evidence was not sufficient to dislodge the plaint case. 11. However, in order to succeed on such plea, it has to be established beyond doubt that defense evidence was not sufficient to dislodge the plaint case. 11. In the instant case, the trial court has, while deciding issues nos. 1 and 2, observed that since the plaintiff was aged about 80 years and had only one daughter, namely, Seema, his condition was pitty. It also observed that since plaintiff was in job of a Sugar Mill, he was having sufficient money left with him and, therefore, it cannot be believed that he would be in further need of money and, hence, execution of sale deed appears to be doubtful. The trial court, after discussing the statements of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 observed that since both of them had differently stated about the exact time of payment of sale consideration and at the time of making payment, the wife of the plaintiff was not alive nor was any other person present, the statement of payment of sale consideration was not believable. It also observed that the defendant has not brought on record any receipt regarding sale of sugarcane or withdrawal of money from the Bank and hence the defense could not establish its case. 12. The first appellate court has elaborately discussed all the facts and circumstances including the age of the plaintiff-appellant, his financial status, service rendered by him, death of his wife, the only daughter left by him and also testimony of the witnesses as well as scribe to the sale deed. It discussed the oral testimony of D.W.s and P.Ws. and found that minor contradiction in the statements as regards exact time of making would not mean that the sale consideration was not paid. In fact it was paid in the morning on the date when both the documents were executed in the Sub Registrar Office. 13. Although, no specific point for determination had been framed by the first appellate court, however, the Court finds that the due or undue execution of the sale deed of 1989 has been examined and discussed from all the possible angles i.e. execution thereof, presence of persons at that time and also as regards those events that had taken place just prior to execution of the sale deed. The view taken by the first appellate court setting aside the findings of the trial court appears to be reasonable and more elaborate and therefore, this Court is not in a position to observe that any undue influence was exercised by the defendants on the plaintiff at the time of execution of the sale deed or that burden of proof was not properly discharged by the defense. 14. In Laliteshwar Prasad Singh and others vs. S.P. Srivastava (Dead) thru. Lrs. (2017) 2 SCC 415 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while affirming the aforestated principles, observed that it is well settled that the mere omission to frame the points for determination would not vitiate the judgment of the first appellate Court, provided that the first appellate Court recorded its reasons based on the evidence adduced by both parties. 15. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. In this regard, useful reference may be made to G. Amalorpavam and others vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others (2006) 3 SCC 224 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- '9. The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.' 16. In view of above discussion, the first question is answered in favour of the defendant-respondent and against the plaintiff-appellant and it is held that plaintiff appellant did not establish by cogent evidence his status as that of an illiterate person so as to dislodge the sale deed and exercise of undue influence having not been proved and the burden having been sufficiently discharged by the defendant as regards due execution of sale deed, no infirmity is found in the first appellate court judgment. 17. 17. As regards second question, though specific point for determination has not been framed however, in view of the above referred judgments of the Supreme Court if the disputed questions involved in the lis have been elaborately dealt with, the judgment of the first appellate court cannot be set aside only for want of framing points for determination. 18. Considering the elaborate judgment of the first appellate court, the second question is also answered in favour of the defendant-respondent and it is held that non framing of specific point would not dislodge its judgment and the trial court's decree was rightly reversed by the first appellate court. 19. The findings recorded by the first appellate court being pure findings of fact and even if two views could be possible and one has been taken by the first appellate court after making cogent analysis of oral and documentary evidence, this Court is of the opinion that interference in the first appellate court's judgment would not be justified in the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. 20. In Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram (2001) 5 SCC 311 , the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the finding reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil, (2004) 5 SCC 762 , the Supreme Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. is not justified in interfering with the findings of fact and that it is the obligation of the courts of law to further clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same and where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 21. 21. Similar view has been taken in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 by observing that disturbance in findings of fact would be contrary to limitations imposed by section 100 C.P.C. The Supreme Court again reminded in Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments vs. P. Shanmugama (2005) 9 SCC 232 that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the findings of fact. The Apex Court, in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi (2005) 10 SCC 139 reiterated the same principle by observing that by such interference, the High Court would go beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22. In Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai (2005) 10 SCC 553 , the Supreme Court observed that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. In Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh (2005) 12 SCC 270 , the Apex Court, with anguish, observed that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness to perform part of contract in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. 23. The view taken in the aforesaid decisions has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Gurdev Kaur and others vs. Kaki and others, 2007 (1) SCC 546 . 24. Second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. 25. Office is directed to return the records of both the courts below to the District Judge, Gorakhpur for being preserved and maintained in accordance with the provisions of General Rules (Civil), 1957.