STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI VIRJIBHAI VEKARIYA
2024-12-10
HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant-State of Gujarat under Section 378 (1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.3.2009 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Court, Rajkot (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”) in Sessions (G.E.B.) Case No. 6 of 2004, whereby, the trial Court has acquitted the original accused-respondents herein for the offence punishable under Sections 135 (B) and 150 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 (“the Act” for short). 2. It is the case of the complainant that accused No. 1 possessed one factory and for which he made an application before for G.E.B. LTP III connection. After getting sanction from G.E.B. he bought LTP III meter himself and by tempering meter to run it slow, committed a mischief and by helping to do so, accused no. 2 has also committed an offence punishable under Sections 135 (B) and 150 of the Act. Therefore, complaint came to be filed against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2.1 On the basis of the said complaint, after thorough investigation, as there was sufficient evidence against the present respondents-accused, charge sheet came to be filed against them. However, as the case was sessions triable by the Special Elec. Court, the same was registered as Sessions (G.E.B.) Case No. 6 of 2004. Thereafter, charge was framed against accused persons for the offences punishable under Section 135 (B) and 150 of Act. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution therefore led evidence before the Court. The Prosecution has examined number of witnesses as well as produced various documentary evidences on the record of the case. 2.2 At the conclusion of the trial and after hearing both the sides and after evaluating the evidence placed on record, the trial Court has acquitted the accused persons from the offences punishable Section 135 (B) and 150 of the Act. 2.3 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the trial Court, the appellant State has preferred present appeal. 3. Heard Ms. Megha Chitalia, learned APP for the appellant State of Gujarat. Though served respondents have chosen not to appear before this Court and therefore, the order is passed in absence of the respondents. 4. Ms.
2.3 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the trial Court, the appellant State has preferred present appeal. 3. Heard Ms. Megha Chitalia, learned APP for the appellant State of Gujarat. Though served respondents have chosen not to appear before this Court and therefore, the order is passed in absence of the respondents. 4. Ms. Megha Chitalia, learned APP for the appellant State has submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error of law and on facts both while passing the impugned order of acquittal in favour of the respondents. She has further submitted that the prosecution has produced sufficient material and through the oral as well documentary evidence of the witnesses, proved that the present respondents have committed an offence of theft of electricity. She has submitted that trial Court has not believed the said fact and completely overlooked the evidence while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has further submitted that the trial Court has completely overlooked and ignored the material fact that the meter purchased by the respondent from the open market was found tempered with by using some outside material i.e. magnate and because of that though the consumption was there, but usage was not reported in the meter and that is how the respondents have committed an offence of theft of electricity, however, the trial Court has completely ignored all these facts and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 4.1 In view of the above submissions, Ms. Chitalia, learned APP for the appellant urges before the Court that present Appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal may be quashed and set aside. 5. I have perused the material available on record as well as the documents appended thereto. I have also gone through the record of the Appeal and impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. I have also examined the evidence recorded by the trial Court. 6.
5. I have perused the material available on record as well as the documents appended thereto. I have also gone through the record of the Appeal and impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. I have also examined the evidence recorded by the trial Court. 6. From the observations made by the trial Court and from the evidence of the witnesses, the fact revels that though the complainant and the officers were aware with the fact that the meter was found not in proper condition however, the day when the trap was arranged, they have applied the very same meter at the place of the respondent No. 1 and then they have arranged the trap and thereafter, registered the case against present respondents and also issued supplementary bill for the illegal usage of electricity. They have also instituted the case against the present respondents, wherein the respondent No. 2 was joined as an accused, as he has arranged all this mechanism in the said meter for the purpose of slowing down the meter and committed offence of theft of electricity. After considering all these facts and material, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, which is in my opinion, in accordance with law and in consonance with the settled legal principle. 7. It is also relevant to note herein that in the deposition of the concerned Investigating Officer, he has admitted that he has investigated the offence but neither recorded the statement of any of the witness nor he has collected any material nor he has drawn the panchnama of place of incident. Even in the chargesheet, it was mentioned that they have not collected any material from the place of incident and they have also not produced any material before the trial Court, meaning thereby, the Investigating Officer has also not properly investigated the offence and has not produced any material before the trial Court. Further, the Investigating Officer has neither collected any material nor sent any material for testing to the laboratory. Except the evidence of the interested witnesses and an officer of the GEB, no other independent witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution.
Further, the Investigating Officer has neither collected any material nor sent any material for testing to the laboratory. Except the evidence of the interested witnesses and an officer of the GEB, no other independent witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution. Even from the cross examination of those witnesses, the fact has come on record that the officers have arranged the trap for the purpose of making out a case against present respondents and for that reason they have applied the meter at the place of the respondent No. 1 at very day and immediately on that very day, they have arranged the trap at the premises of respondent No. 1, so that they can find some alleged case of the theft of electricity and they can register the case against present respondents. 8. After careful examination of the deposition of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced before the trial Court, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal which, in my view, does not warrant any interference. 9. At this juncture, it is required to be noted herein that there are series of the judgments in connection with the Electricity Act, which reads as under: (i) State of Gujarat vs. Jyotiben Jagdishbhai Joisar, 2018 Law Suit (Guj) 1292 (ii) State of Gujarat vs. Sajidbhai Yakubbhai Pithadiya, 2015 Law Suit (Guj) 999 (iii) State of Gujarat vs. Khumansinh Ranjitsinh Jadeja, 2022 Law Suit (Guj) 7441 (iv) State of Gujarat vs. Iliyas Miyaullakhan Pathan, 2014 Law Suit (Guj) 1727 (v) State of Gujarat vs. Mariyamben Eliyasbhai Loru, 2015 Law Suit (Guj) 518 (vi) State of Gujarat vs. Chhatrasinh Chandubhai Patanvadia, 2009 Law Suit (Guj) 122 (vii) Barot Vitthalbhai Damodardas vs. Natwarbhai Umedbhai Patel and Another, 2009 (3) GLR 1974 : 2009 (2) GLH 135 10. For sake of convenience, it is appropriate to refer the observations made by this Court in case of Barot Vitthalbhai Damodardas (supra) which reads as under: “5. It is true that the essential purpose of enactment of the Act and more particularly Sec. 135 of the Act is to book the offenders, who are committing theft of electricity, but as observed earlier, there cannot be any intention of the legislature to punish the persons other than the offenders.
It is true that the essential purpose of enactment of the Act and more particularly Sec. 135 of the Act is to book the offenders, who are committing theft of electricity, but as observed earlier, there cannot be any intention of the legislature to punish the persons other than the offenders. If the property is in possession of a tenant and the theft of electricity is found, it may be reasonable for the Electricity Company to proceed on the basis that the person, who is beneciary of the alleged offence namely; the occupant could be said to have been involving in commission of offence, but it would be only wholly absurd on the part of the Electricity Company to proceed on the basis that the owner of the property since he is consumer can also be fastened with the criminal liability even if there is no material found during the course of investigation that the owner of the property, who is actually not in occupation of the premises has played any role in commission of the alleged offence of the theft under Sec. 135 of the Act. If such contention is entertained, it would result into abuse of process of law, and since in the present case, the complaint is led by the Electricity Company against the landlord on the premise that he is the owner of the property, though in the very complaint it has been mentioned that the tenant one Mr. Patel Pankajkumar Bhikhabhai is in occupation of the property, the complaint can be said as abuse of process of law and if such complaint is not quashed, it would result into miscarriage of justice.” 11. Now, so far as the Appeal under Section 378 of the Cr. PC against the order of acquittal is concerned, the Appellate Court has ample power to reexamine, reevaluate and re-look the evidence of the witnesses and if ultimately the appellate court found that there was any illegality or any perversity in the judgment recorded by the Special Court, then the appellant court can certainly exercise the jurisdiction and reverse the findings recorded by the Special Court. However, in the present case there is no any illegality or any perversity found in the judgment and order of the trial Court. 12.
However, in the present case there is no any illegality or any perversity found in the judgment and order of the trial Court. 12. It is also now well settled that while exercising powers under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. if the trial/Special Court while passing the order has committed any illegality or any perversity or has exceeded the jurisdiction, unless and until such facts come on record, the Court is very slow while dealing with an acquittal appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court has in a series of judgments enunciated the principles while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is inasmuch as reappreciate the evidence, view or re-consider the evidence and if the Court finds that there is any illegality or any irregularity in the judgment then in that case only, the Court has power to entertain the appeal and interfere with the order of acquittal. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 : (2024) 8 SCC 149 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court. 13. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-20 and 21 as under: “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42.........
At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42......... (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad vs. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused.
It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 14. The Court has framed general guild lines and principles while exercising the power under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order of the acquittal and under the general guild lines issued by the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that present appeal does not deserve to be entertained and the same requires to be dismissed. 15. Further, on perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has taken into consideration all the facts while acquitting the accused. It also appears from the impugned judgment and order that the trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in its true perspective and has come to the right conclusion in acquitting the accused. 16. Considering the above referred decisions and considering the facts of the present case, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.3.2009 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Court, Rajkot in Sessions (G.E.B.) Case No. 6 of 2004, is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, furnished by the respondents accused stands cancelled. 17. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.