JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant-original complainant under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31/07/2007 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bharuch (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Criminal Case No. 10502 of 2005, whereby, the learned Judge has acquitted the original accused respondent No. 1 herein for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the N.I. Act”). 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that, the appellant complainant had advanced an amount of Rs.60,000/- to the respondent accused on 15/01/2004, against which, the respondent accused had given an advance cheque in favour of the appellant being cheque no. 13370 dated 28/02/2005 drawn on Bharuch District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vejalpur branch alongwith a prescribed form no. 8, wherein, certain terms and conditions of loan were also enumerated and therefore, the appellant had accepted the said cheque. It is the case of the appellant that, as the respondent had not refund the loan amount therefore, the appellant had deposited the cheque in his account on 12/03/2005, which returned with an endorsement ‘Funds Insufficient’ and therefore, the appellant had issued a statutory legal notice to the respondent accused on 18/03/2005, which was served upon the respondent accused on 23/03/2005, however, neither the respondent accused had given any reply to the notice nor he had made payment of the loan amount as demanded by the appellant and therefore, the appellant had filed a criminal complaint in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Bharuch, which was numbered as Criminal Case No. 10502 of 2005. On receipt of the summons, the respondent accused appeared before the trial court. After considering the relevant material and after considering the arguments advanced by both the sides, the trial court has acquitted the respondent accused from the charges levelled against him vide impugned judgment and order dated 31/07/2007. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 31/07/2007, the appellant has preferred present Criminal Appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Shaili Kapadia, appearing on behalf of the appellant- original complainant and learned APP Ms. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 31/07/2007, the appellant has preferred present Criminal Appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Shaili Kapadia, appearing on behalf of the appellant- original complainant and learned APP Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2-State of Gujarat. 4.1 This Court had issued notice to the respondent No. 1-original accused at the time of admission, however, it seems that till date, there is no progress with regard to service of notice upon the respondent accused. On last occasion also, this Court had issued fresh notice and also allowed the appellant to serve through direct service, however, it seems that there is nothing further came on record and therefore, the present appeal is proceeded in absence of the respondent accused and decided on merits. 5. Learned advocate Ms. Kapadia has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is erroneous, illegal and unjust as it was against the facts and settled principles of law and therefore, the trial court has committed a serious error of law and on facts while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has submitted that the trial court has not properly appreciated the facts of the case while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has submitted that the trial court has not properly appreciated the evidence adduced by the appellant complainant before the trial court in its true and proper spirit and rejected the case of the complainant only on the ground that the officer who had initiated the proceedings was not an authorized officer and no evidence was produced on record and the issuance of proceedings was time barred and on that count also, the findings recorded by the trial court is erroneous, illegal and unjust and the same is required to be quashed and set aside and the present appeal is required to be allowed. 6. Heard learned advocate Ms. Shaili Kapadia for the appellant and perused the material placed on record. 6. Heard learned advocate Ms. Shaili Kapadia for the appellant and perused the material placed on record. It appears from the record that the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal as the appellant was not having any license and it was not a registered company and the certificate produced by the appellant before the trial court was not valid at the time of filing of the complaint and therefore, while dismissing the complaint and acquitting the respondent, in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment and order, the trial court has passed a detailed order by observing the fats of the case in detail and on perusal of the same, I am of the opinion that the trial court has rightly considered the submissions while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and thus, the discussions made by the trial court in paragraph 8 is in consonance with the settled principles of law and there is no any error committed by the trial court and hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court. 6.1 In view of the settled legal principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court, the appellate court has ample power to re-appreciate the evidence, review and also reconsider the evidence and on perusal of the same, if the Court is satisfied that there is any infirmity or any perversity committed by the trial court while passing the impugned order, then the appellate court can certainly reverse the findings recorded by the trial court, however, in the present case, there is no any infirmity or any perversity found in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court and therefore, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. So far as the ambit and scope of entering into an acquittal appeal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court has time and again considered from 2007 onwards in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraphs 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court. 6.2 It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-20 and 21 as under: “Head Note (B) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S.378 - Appeal against acquittal - General principles regarding the power and duty of the appellate court, reiterated-Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, S.419 20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42.......... (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 7. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 31/07/2007 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bharuch in Criminal Case No. 10502 of 2005 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, furnished by the respondent accused stands cancelled. 8. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.