ORDER : K. Manmadha Rao, J. 1. Aggrieved by the orders dated 04.01.2018 passed in I.A. No.421 of 2016 in O.S.No. 966 of 2008 on the file of the Court of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, (in short 'the court below) the present revision is filed. 2. The petitioner herein is the defendant; respondent is the plaintiff before the court below. 3. The petitioner/defendant filed an impugned application under Order IX, rule 13 of C.P.C to set aside the ex parte decree passed against him in O.S.No.966 of 2008. The court below dismissed the application, while observing the following, which reads as: "5. Above all, if at all, the argument of the petitioner has to be accepted that the period of limitation runs from the date of knowledge, even then as per the averments of his own affidavit, wherein he stated that, when he was enquiring about his mother's land in the M.R.O's office, he came to know that the respondent obtained pass book in respect of schedule property after obtaining sale deed pursuant to the decree passed by the court and when he came to know about the respondent obtaining a decree is conveniently not mentioned by the petitioner in his affidavit, even otherwise the said contention shows he came to know about the sale deed in favour of the respondent prior to 21.04.2016. However, to suit his contentions he has mentioned the date as 21.04.2016, when he says to have come to know about the suit proceedings for the first time, which inconsistent pleadings of the petitioner with regard to the very factum of he coming to know about the suit proceedings throws any amount of doubt on the bonafides of the petitioner in approaching the court with this application, almost after 8 years of the decree being passed in O.S.No. 966/08, who though tried to convenience the court that the delay is only 15 days, if calculated from the date of knowledge when the petitioner came to know about the suit proceedings, which this court for the reasons assigned above did not believe. Hence, viewed from any corner there are no merits to allow the application. Accordingly petition is dismissed." Assailing the same the present revision came to be filed. 4. Heard Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ravi Teja Padiri, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. Hence, viewed from any corner there are no merits to allow the application. Accordingly petition is dismissed." Assailing the same the present revision came to be filed. 4. Heard Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ravi Teja Padiri, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that after receipt of summons in O.S.No. 298 of 2016, the petitioner came to know about the ex parte decree in O.S.No. 966 of 2008. Hence, without any other alternative the petitioner filed the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree with delay condonation petition; hence the same needs to be allowed. Further the court below failed to appreciate that the petitioner has not at all executed the agreement of sale and the valuable rights of the petitioner are involved. Hence, an opportunity has to be given to the petitioner. It is further contended that the purposefully wrong address has been mentioned in O.S.No. 966 of 2008 and gave correct address in O.S.No. 298 of 2016, hence, it is very clear that there is a fraud played both on the petitioner and also on the court and obtained a fraudulent decree. Hence the revision is liable to be allowed. 6. Per contra, the respondent filed counter-affidavit denying all material averments made in the writ affidavit and mainly contended that the court below has rightly dismissed the application in I.A.No.421 of 2016 as it is devoid of merits. As per own averment of the petitioner in the affidavit in I.A.No.421 of 2016, it was stated about the ex parte decree on 21.04.2016. Be that as it may, the period of limitation runs from there on and the petitioner had to file the petition within 30 days from then. The petitioner claims to have been bed ridden till 02.06.2016, but no medical record was filed in support of her contention. The petitioner tried to misrepresent and mislead the court that the delay is 42 days. Further the petitioner has also filed a criminal complaint on 28.03.2016, so the contention of the petitioner that she had no knowledge of the ex parte decree is erroneous. Therefore, the present revision is liable to be dismissed. 7. The petitioner tried to misrepresent and mislead the court that the delay is 42 days. Further the petitioner has also filed a criminal complaint on 28.03.2016, so the contention of the petitioner that she had no knowledge of the ex parte decree is erroneous. Therefore, the present revision is liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent placed on record the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 INSC 213 : (1962) 2 SCR 762 , wherein it was held as follows:- "5. It is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. 8. He further relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala 1997 INSC 665 : (1997) 7 SCC 556 ", while refusing to condone delay, held that "in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 9. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 9. He further submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project", 2008 INSC 1231 : (2008) 17 SCC 448 wherein it was held that "the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights". In "Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2013 INSC 551 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: "the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts condone instances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of Statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature. 10. So also, in "Majji Sannema v. Reddy Sridevi and Others" 2021 INSC 909, the Hon'ble Apex Court quashed the Judgment of this Court condoning delay of 1011 days without sufficient cause and observed that "The High Court is not at all justified in exercising its discretion to condone such a huge delay. The High Court has not exercised the discretion judiciously. The reasoning given by the High Court while condoning huge delay of 1011 days is not germane. Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - original defendants. Impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts". 11. Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - original defendants. Impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts". 11. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only contemplates that on sufficient cause being shown by the petitioner, the petitioner can be considered. The court below has rightly discussed the facts by considering the facts narrated in the affidavit filed by the petitioner. Since the reasons set out in the affidavit is not convincing, the court below dismissed the application in right perspective. Hence the revision is not maintainable and same is liable to be dismissed. 12. Perused the record. 13. It is the contention of the petitioner that the address of the petitioner is wrongly shown in O.S.No. 966 of 2008, whereas Addressee is shown as correct in O.S. No. 298 of 2016. Hence, the respondent purposely obtained ex parte decree by playing fraud both on petitioner and also on court, which shows his malafide intention to proceed against the petitioner under the guise of the ex parte decree. 14. Whereas, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that notice was sent to the correct address and also published in daily news paper, but the petitioner claiming that the respondent served notice to the incorrect address and also made paper publication, which is not wide circulation in the vicinity, therefore, he did not take steps to contest the suit, which is emphatically incorrect and void. 15. Further, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that as per her own admission of the petitioner that she came to know about the ex parte decree on 21.04.2016. Be that as it may, the period of limitation runs from then onwards and the petitioner has to file within 30 days from then, but the petitioner claims to have been bed ridden till 02.06.2016, for which no medical records was filed in support of her contention. Further, the petitioner has also filed a criminal complaint on 28.03.2016, therefore, the petitioner had knowledge about the ex parte decree is highly erroneous. 16. Further, the petitioner has also filed a criminal complaint on 28.03.2016, therefore, the petitioner had knowledge about the ex parte decree is highly erroneous. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record the decision of Division Bench of composite High Court at Hyderabad in "Maganti Krishna Durga v. Maganti Anil Kumar" 2015 LawSuit(Hyd) 314, wherein it was held as follows: "6.. (a)..... (b) Even as per the Order V Rule 20(i) CPC, for ordering substituted service, it must be shown that the respondent is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. It is only from such averment and on subjective satisfaction of the Court in relation thereto for reason to believe such averment, to order substitute service by affixing a copy of the summons on some conspicuous part of the house in which the respondent is known to have last resided or carries on business or personally works for gain and even for service by an advertisement in a news paper, the notice to the respondent for appearance, further the newspaper shall be a daily newspaper circulating in the locality in which the defendant is last known to have actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. In this case, as can be seen from the Ex.C6 docket order of the Court dated 05.03.2002 in allowing the petitioner for substitute service, that too even earlier ordered for payment of batta to send notice afresh through the Court or by registered post having not even filed and instead of insisting by Court so to file and without assigning any reasons for ordering substitute service, for the mere asking by the petitioner/husband, the Court ordered substitute service that too for publication in Janata of Vijayawada. It did not even mention for circulation in the locality of the address shown in the cause title of the respondent of Musunur Village in Musunur Mandal. Even from Ex. C9 paper publication, it is difficult to conceive, whether it is any popular newspaper much less with circulation in the area of the so called residence of the respondent shown in the divorce petition of Musunur Village in Musunur Mandal. Even from Ex. C9 paper publication, it is difficult to conceive, whether it is any popular newspaper much less with circulation in the area of the so called residence of the respondent shown in the divorce petition of Musunur Village in Musunur Mandal. The Court is entitled to take judicial notice under Section 56 of the Evidence Act of the fact that the said newspaper Janata is not at all in circulation much less within the locality shown in the cause title of the respondent/wife. The trial Court also went wrong in acting upon the said paper publication in ignorance of the mandate of the provisions of order V Rule 20(i) and (la) not only in ordering said paper publication but also in such paper without any circulation much less to the notice of the respondent where she resides in that area." 17. By taking in to consideration of the fact that the news paper which are circulated in less within the locality shown in the cause title of the petitioner herein and that the service of notice is effected as contended by the respondent is not all accepted in view of the ratio laid down by this Court cited supra, which is contrary to the provisions of Order V, Rule 20(1) and (1a) of C.P.C. Therefore, the reasons stated by the petitioner in his affidavit are reasonable with justifiable cause and it can be looked into. But, the court below without looking into aforementioned facts, simply allowed the respondent to take out notice on the petitioner by substituted service in local news papers, which is less circulation in the locality, thereby the petitioner did not notice the same to prosecute the suit. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only contemplates that on sufficient cause being shown by the petitioner, the petitioner can be considered. In the instant case, the petitioner has shown the sufficient cause to set aside the ex parte decree passed against her. 18. Further, the suit is filed for specific performance in between the parties, which has to be decided on merits, but not on technicalities. Therefore, an ample opportunity of equal ratio has to be given to the both parties to arrive at fair conclusion in the suit. 18. Further, the suit is filed for specific performance in between the parties, which has to be decided on merits, but not on technicalities. Therefore, an ample opportunity of equal ratio has to be given to the both parties to arrive at fair conclusion in the suit. No doubt there was delay occurred in preferring the application, which is not much higher side as per contentions of both sides, but calculation of delay was vary with each other. To meet the ends of justice, this Court is inclined to allow the application on payment of costs of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand only) to be credited to the suit account before the court below, within four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which the order shall stands cancelled automatically, without any further reference to this Court. Further, the suit of the year 2008, hence the court below is directed to decide the suit on merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six (06) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 19. With the above direction, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, while setting aside the impugned order of the court below. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.