ORDER : Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J. 1. The above captioned Writ Petitions are directed against the order of removal issued by the Deputy Registrar, Co-Operative Societies in the month of December, 2023, in the exercise of the power conferred under Rule 43-B (3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Rules, 1962 (for short, the Rules, 1962), whereby the petitioners who were earlier nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers, have been removed from their Office. 2. The petitioners are members of various Co-Operative Societies/Primary Co- Operative Committees and they were appointed as Prescribed Officers at their respective societies pursuant to the order issued by the competent authority. 3. The facts of the present case are that the petitioners were appointed/nominated as Prescribed Officers of their respective Societies in accordance with the provisions contemplated under Section 49(8) of the Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (henceforth ‘Act, 1960’) and sub-rule 4(a) of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 in the year 2022. The petitioners are Prescribed Officers (non-official) of the respective societies. They took charge as Prescribed Officers pursuant to the order issued by the Deputy Registrar, Co-Operative Societies. They were discharging their functions with utmost sincerity and honesty and there were no complaints against them. On 15.12.2023, after the change in the political scenario in the State, a notification was issued by the State Government to cancel all the political appointments/nominations, except the nominations/appointments which cannot be cancelled due to statutory compulsion. The Deputy Registrar of the Co-Operative Societies issued orders for the removal of the petitioners, who were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers. The petitioners have challenged the decision of the State and the orders passed by the Deputy Registrar, Co-Operative Societies. 4. Mr. S.C. Verma, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioners would lead the arguments and submit that no election was held in the Co-Operative Societies/ Primary Co-Operative Committees for the last 6 years and the State Officials were appointed as Prescribed Officers and they did not take any steps to conduct the elections and thereafter, the petitioners were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers of the respective Co-operative Societies/Primary Co-Operative Committees. He would further submit that as no elections were conducted by the State Government, the petitioners could not have been replaced by Official Prescribed Officers from their respective Offices. He would further submit that as no elections were conducted by the State Government, the petitioners could not have been replaced by Official Prescribed Officers from their respective Offices. It is further argued that the respondents have no power to issue an order of removal when no power has been conferred by the Statute to modify, alter, vary or rescind the nominations/appointments of the petitioners. It is also submitted that the petitioners were appointed/nominated as Prescribed Officers after the due scrutiny by the Screening Committee according to the scheme contemplated under Rule 43-B(3) of the Rules, 1962 and no power is vested with the Deputy Registrar, Co-Operative Societies to remove the petitioners. It is argued that according to the language employed under the proviso to Rule 43-B (3) of the Rules, 1962, the Screening Committee has the power to recommend the names of the eligible persons/non- officials to the Registrar for nomination/appointment as Prescribed Officer. He would further argue that according to Rule 43-B (4) of the Rules, 1962, the Screening Committee consists of 3 members and any decision concerning removal can be taken by the Committee which nominated/appointed the petitioners. He would also argue that a conjoint reading of Rule 43-B (2), (3) & (4), would make it clear that no power has been conferred upon the Registrar to pass either the order of appointment/nomination or the order of removal. He would contend that according to the provisions of Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 after the expiry of the term of the elected board, if the elections are not held, all the members of the board shall be deemed to have vacated their seats and the powers of the board shall be deemed to have been vested with the Registrar, and thereafter, the authority shall hold the election within 6 or 12 months. He would further contend that after the deemed vacation of the seats of the board, State officials/prescribed officers were discharging the function of the board, but they did not take any steps to conduct the election, therefore, the orders issued by the Deputy Registrar, Co-Operative Societies are arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the provisions of law. 5. Mr. Verma highlights that the petitioners were appointed as Prescribed Officers in the exercise of the power conferred under the proviso to Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960. 5. Mr. Verma highlights that the petitioners were appointed as Prescribed Officers in the exercise of the power conferred under the proviso to Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960. The petitioners (non-officials) were found experienced in managing the Co- Operative Societies/Primary Co-Operative Committees, thus, they could not have been removed till the elections were held. 6. With regard to Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962, he would submit that qualification is appended for appointment/nomination as Prescribed Officers and after due scrutiny, the names of the petitioners were approved by the Screening Committee and there is no provision with regard to removal. 7. Mr. Verma, learned Senior Advocate, would further contend that on account of change in the political scenario in the State, the petitioners have been removed; therefore, the decision taken by the State or its instrumentalities is mala fide. 8. It is also argued that no notice was issued before taking the decision of removal and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners. He would further argue that in Sanjay Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, WPC No. 1244 of 2023, the relief was sought for issuance of a direction to the State Government to initiate the election proceedings of Co-Operative Societies and vide order dated 15.03.2023, an order was passed whereby the State Co-Operative Election Commission was directed to conduct the election of the societies as early as possible. It is also stated that the State has not commented on their failure part to conduct the election. In support of arguments, reliance has been placed on the judgments rendered in the matters of State Of M.P. & ors. vs Sanjay Nagayach & Ors., ( AIR 2013 SC 1921 ); Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs State Of Kerala, ( AIR 2013 SCW 5683 ); Satya Pal Anand vs State Of M.P. and Anr, ( AIR 2014 SC 2361 ); Veena Kumari Tandon v. Neelam Bhalla, (2007) 12 SCC 764 ; M/S. Ispat Industries Ltd vs Commissioner Of Customs, Mumbai, (2006) 12 SCC 583 ; and orders passed by this Court in the matters of Padma Chandrakar and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No.408 of 2019, and Ramji Bharti vs. State of Chhattisgarh, WPC No.1989 of 2019. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose the submissions advanced by Mr. Verma, learned Senior Advocate. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose the submissions advanced by Mr. Verma, learned Senior Advocate. It is argued that a Writ of Certiorari can be sought for enforcement of substantive rights whereas the petitioners have no substantive rights on the post of Prescribed Officer (non- official), therefore, the petitions are not maintainable. It is stated that the petitioners are not elected members of the Co-Operative Societies or Primary Co-Operative Societies; therefore, they have no substantive right. The petitioners were nominated according to the provisions of Section 49 (8) of the Act, 1960 and Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 and they can be removed according to provisions of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962. 10. It is also submitted by the learned counsels appearing for the respondents that the Registrar includes other Registrars i.e. Joint Registrar, Additional Registrar, Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar, as they are appointed as per the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, 1960. They would further argue that though the petitioners were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers in the month of November- December, 2022, they did not take any steps to conduct the election even though the letters were issued to the petitioners in this regard by the Deputy Registrar, Co- Operative Societies in the month of April, 2023. It is contended that the petitioners, who were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers are still enjoying the office without conducting the election dehors the democratic system. They vehemently argued that the petitioners were not nominated/appointed by the Screening Committee and there is no document to establish this fact, therefore, the contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate in this regard is a fallacy. It is contended that the petitioners who were appointed as Prescribed Officers cannot hold the office without election for an indefinite period. It is argued that the Registrar may remove a person authorized by him under Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 in writing without assigning reasons thereof while exercising the power under proviso to sub-rule 3 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962. It is further stated that no steps were taken by the petitioners for the preparation of a list of members for election according to provisions of Rule 49-CC of the Rules, 1962. It is further stated that no steps were taken by the petitioners for the preparation of a list of members for election according to provisions of Rule 49-CC of the Rules, 1962. It is also argued that the order of removal is not stigmatic and no prejudice is caused to the petitioners, therefore, all these petitions deserve to be dismissed. They would lastly submit that Section 21 of the Chhattisgarh General Clauses Act, 1957, empowers the authority to alter, modify, or rescind the order/notification. In support of their submissions, they placed reliance on the judgments rendered in the matters of Cheviti Venkanna Yadav Vs. State of Telangana & others, AIR 2016 SC 4982 ; Om Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur and others, (1993) 2 SCC 242 ; State of Maharashtra v. Shaikh Mahemud and another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1884; and H. Rajaiah and others v. State of Karnataka and another, (2000) 6 KARLJ 401 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the matter of Som Dutt and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others reported in 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 9456, and the judgment rendered by the Gauhati High Court in the matter of Mahesh Doley and others v. State of Assam, (2007) 2 GLR 7. 11. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above, perused the documents available on the record, and also went through the various provisions of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960 and the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Rules, 1962. 12. Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 would be relevant for the disposal of these cases. It reads thus:- Section 49(8):- [(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or Rules made thereunder the election of a board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board. 12. Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 would be relevant for the disposal of these cases. It reads thus:- Section 49(8):- [(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or Rules made thereunder the election of a board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board. If the elections are not held before the expiry of the term, or board of society ceases to function due to the order of any court or otherwise all the members of the board shall be deemed to have vacated their seats and the powers of the board shall be deemed to have been vested in the Registrar and the State Election Commission shall hold elections within six months, or twelve months in case of the Co-operative Banks: Provided that the Registrar may authorize any officer to exercise the powers of the board vested in him under this sub-section and the officer so authorized shall exercise such powers from the date of such authorization.] 13. Section 49 of the Act, 1960 deals with the annual general meeting, whereas sub- Section (8) says that the election of a board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board. If the elections are not held before the expiry of the term, or the board of society ceases to function due to the order of any court or otherwise, all the members of the board shall be deemed to have vacated their seats and the powers of the board shall be deemed to have been vested in the Registrar and the State Election Commission shall hold elections within six months, or twelve months in case of the Co-operative Banks. The proviso to sub-Section (8) says that the Registrar may authorize any officer to exercise the powers of the board vested in him under this sub-Section and the officer so authorized shall exercise such powers from the date of such authorization for a period specified by Registrar or till the elections are held. 14. Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 deals with authorization by the Registrar to exercise the power of the Board to any society. 14. Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 deals with authorization by the Registrar to exercise the power of the Board to any society. It reads as under:- “43-B. Authorization by the Registrar to exercise the powers of board of any society — (1) Subject to the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 49 of the Act, the Registrar may authorize any Government official to exercise the powers of the board of any society : Provided that the Registrar may by order in writing also authorize any person (non-official) to exercise the powers of the board of any such society. (2) No person (non-official) shall be eligible for such authorization by the Registrar under this sub-section if :— (a) He does not have at least four years experience of working as member of the board of the Co-operative society or bank, as the case may be; (b) He is suffering from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 44; (c) He has been punished in case of corruption by any Court of law, Lok Ayog or the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences 2[:] *[Provided that, in case of the Apex Societies, the State Government may, grant exemption in the said provision of this rule.]” 15. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 deals with the eligibility criteria of non- official person for authorization to exercise the powers of the board of any society. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 says that the Screening Committee shall recommend the name of eligible person (non-official) to the Registrar however the proviso to this rule clearly specifies that the Registrar at any time may by order in writing remove person authorized by him without assigning any reason thereof. Sub-rule 4 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 states about the members of the Screening Committee. 16. Section 21 of the Chhattisgarh General Clauses Act, 1957 deals with the power to make, include or amend the order. For ready reference, the same is reproduced herein below:- 21. Power to make, to include, power to add to, amend, vary or rescind orders, etc. 16. Section 21 of the Chhattisgarh General Clauses Act, 1957 deals with the power to make, include or amend the order. For ready reference, the same is reproduced herein below:- 21. Power to make, to include, power to add to, amend, vary or rescind orders, etc. - Where, by any CXhhattisgarh Act, a power to issue notification, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanctions and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye laws, so issued. 17. Rule 49-CC of the Rules, 1962 deals with the preparation of list of members for election. 18. The order passed in the matter of Smt. Padma Chandrakar (supra) was affirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 375 of 2019, whereby the order of removal of members of the State Women Commission by the State Government was set aside. It was a case where a Social Worker and eminent Advocate, were appointed as members of the Commission according to the provisions of Section 3 of the Rajya Mahila Ayog Adhiniyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1995’). In the Act, 1995, Section 4 deals with the term of office and conditions of the Chairperson and Members, such appointed members can be removed according to sub-Section 3 of Section 4 of the Act, 1995, therefore, the order of removal was set aside by the Writ Court and the same was affirmed by the Division Bench. The relevant para-14 of the order passed by the Writ Court is reproduced herein below:- “14. When the Act governs the appointment and removal under specific legislation then in such case the removal has to be according to the Act itself. The doctrine of pleasure can be given an over riding effect to the statute governing the field. The State is bound to follow its own law and if the Act provides certain things to be done in a particular way, the same is to be done accordingly. Consequently the Annexure P-1 with reference to the petitioners can not be allowed to be sustained. As a result, the same is quashed. The State is bound to follow its own law and if the Act provides certain things to be done in a particular way, the same is to be done accordingly. Consequently the Annexure P-1 with reference to the petitioners can not be allowed to be sustained. As a result, the same is quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to hold the office under Section 4 of the Adhiniyam of 1995 and further shall be entitled to all the consequential reliefs from their date of stoppage.” 19. In the matter of Ramji Bharti (supra), a similar proposition of law has been enunciated by the Coordinate Bench. 20. In the matter of Sanjay Nagayach (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the board was superseded without consultation with RBI and charges levelled against the Board and its Directors were not so grave. The order of supersession was passed years after the issuance of the show cause notice, therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court excluded the period when the board was illegally superseded and set aside the order of supersession. 21. In the matter of Satya Pal Anand (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Section 76-77 of the Act and the power of the government to terminate the chairman where it is held that the power of removal is not an omnibus, unguided and unanalyzed power and it must be within the consonance of principles of natural justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para-15 as under:- “15. In so far as Section 77 (6) of the Act is concerned, it gives power to the State Government to terminate the appointment of the Chairman or a member if, in its opinion, such Chairman or Member is unable or unfit to perform the duty of his office. Thus, this power is given only when the State Government forms such an opinion about the inability or unfitness of such Chairman or Member to perform the duties of his office. This opinion may be subjective but has to be based on objective consideration/material on record. Since the State Government is the appointing authority, power to remove has to necessarily vest in the appointing authority. It is not an omnibus or unguided/uncanalyzed power conferred upon the Government. Further, the decision is always subject to judicial review. This opinion may be subjective but has to be based on objective consideration/material on record. Since the State Government is the appointing authority, power to remove has to necessarily vest in the appointing authority. It is not an omnibus or unguided/uncanalyzed power conferred upon the Government. Further, the decision is always subject to judicial review. In a given case if the power is exercised arbitrarily or without any material on the basis of which such an opinion is formed, it can be remedied by the court of law. It is further significant to mention that proviso to this sub- section (6) of Section 77 provides an additional safeguards which mandates following procedure in consonance with principle of natural justice by giving reasonable opportunity of show cause against such termination. Thus, when such an action is contemplated, the Government is under an obligation to issue show cause notice which would necessarily contain the reasons/material on the basis of which, a belief is nurtured that such Chairman or Member would be unable or unfit to continue to perform the duties of his office. It would be open to the noticee to refute the same by giving suitable reply. Final opinion would be formed only after eliciting and considering the defence. Therefore, we see no reason to hold such a provision as unconstitutional. In fact, in the written submissions filed by the petitioner, there is no plea or ground taken by the petitioner on the basis of which the petitioner seeks to condemn these provisions. We, therefore, reject the prayer of the petitioner qua on Section 77 (3) (b) and Section 77 (6) of the Act as well.” 22. In the matter of Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to deal with principles of natural justice and in paras 27-28 held as under:- “27. It, thus, cannot be denied that the principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decisions and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms. 28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms. 28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not.” 23. In the case of Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a cooperative society registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act was not bound by the country’s Right to Information Act to provide information as society did not fall within the definition of public authority. It is further held that the Cooperative Societies neither met the threshold of control by the Government required under the definition of the State in Article 12 of the Constitution nor were substantially financed by the government. 24. Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon another decision rendered in the case of Veena Kumari Tandon (supra), wherein there was a conflict between the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act and the by-laws of the Society. This decision also has no application to the facts of the present case. 25. In the matter of M/s. Ispat Industries Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 29 and 37 held as under:- “29. The Customs Act falls in the second layer in this hierarchy whereas the rules made under the Act fall in the third layer. Hence, if there is any conflict between the provisions of the Act and the provisions of the Rules, the former will prevail. The Customs Act falls in the second layer in this hierarchy whereas the rules made under the Act fall in the third layer. Hence, if there is any conflict between the provisions of the Act and the provisions of the Rules, the former will prevail. However, every effort should be made to give an interpretation to the Rules to uphold its validity. This can only be possible if the rules can be interpreted in a manner as to be in conformity with the provisions in the Act, which can be done by giving it an interpretation which may be different from the interpretation which the rule could have if it was construed independently of the provisions in the Act. In other words, to uphold the validity of the rule sometimes a strained meaning can be given to it, which may depart from the ordinary meaning, if that is necessary to make the rule in conformity with the provisions of the Act. This is because it is a well settled principle of interpretation that if there two interpretations possible of a rule, one of which would uphold its validity while the other which would invalidate it, the former should be preferred. 37. In our opinion, the Gunapradhan principle is fully applicable to the interpretation of Rule 9(2). Rule 9(2) is subservient to Section 14. We must, therefore, interpret it in such a way as to make it in accordance with the main object that is contained in Section 14 of the Customs Act. It may be that in isolation Rule 9(2) conveys some other meaning, but when it is read along with Section 14 of the Act, it must be given a meaning which is in accordance with the object of Section 14. The object of Section 14 is 'primary' whereas the conditions in Rule 9(2) are the 'accessories'. The 'accessory' must, therefore, serve the 'primary'.” 26. In the matter of M/s. Ispat Industries Ltd (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is well settled legal principle that where there is any inconsistency between the provisions of the statute and the rules framed thereunder, the statutory provisions would prevail and the rules will have to give way to statutory provisions, but in the present case, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the statute and the rules made thereunder, as the petitioners were appointed by the Deputy Registrar. 27. 27. Now dealing with the judgments relied on by the counsel for the respondents. 28. In the matter of Om Narain Agarwal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where nominations/appointments are made on political considerations, even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members and observed thus:- “In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations. In Dr. Rama Mishra's case, the High Court wrongly held that the pleasure doctrine incorporated under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 and Article 15 (3) of the Constitution. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid reasoning of the High Court. Clause (3) of Article 15 is itself an exception to Article 14 and clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Under Article 14, a duty is enjoined on the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15 (1) provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15 (2) provides that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them .be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainments; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. Thereafter Article 15 (3) provides that nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. This means that in case any special provision is made for women, the same would not be violative on the ground of sex which is prohibited under clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Thus, the special provision contained for nominating one or two women members as the case may be provided in Section 9 of the Act would be protected from challenge under clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution. It may also be worthwhile to note that the provision of pleasure doctrine incorporated by adding proviso four does not, in any manner, take away the right of representation of women members in the Board, but it only permits the State Government to keep the nominated women members of its own choice. The High Court in Dr. Rama Mishra's case took a wrong view in holding that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of Article 15 (3) of the Constitution under an erroneous impression that this provision in any manner curtailed the representation of women members in the Board. We are not impressed with the reasoning given by the High Court that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act in any manner deprived the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to enequals. The nominated members of the Board fall in a different class and cannot claim equality with the elected members. We are also not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in the discharge of their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even in the case of highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney General and the Advocate General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to demoralise or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office. Thus, in the circumstances mentioned above, we are clearly of the view that the decision in Dr. Rama Mishra's case does not lay down. the .correct law and is overruled and the view taken by the High Court in Prem Kumar Balmiki's case (supra) is held to be correct. We do not consider it necessary to dwell upon other arguments made before us or made and dealt with by the High Court, as the above appeals can be disposed of on the point already dealt and decided by us. Thus, as a result of the view taken by us, we hold that Smt. Shyama Devi and Smt. Baijanti Devi, the two women. members had been rightly nominated in place of Smt. Abida and Smt. Hazra Khatoon and were entitled to take part in the meeting held on 12.8.1991 for considering the motion of no-confidence against Mohd. Iqbal, the President of Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur. Further, the motion of no-confidence being supported by 20 members which admittedly constituted a majority of the total strength of the members of the Board being 37, the no-confidence motion has been rightly carried out and as a result of which Mohd. Iqbal was not entitled to continue as President of the Board. Similarly, Smt. Abida and Smt. Hazra Khatoon having been rightly removed as nominated members, they are no longer entitled to continue as nominated members of the Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur and in their place Smt. Shyama Devi and Smt. Baijanti Devi shall be entitled to continue as nominated members of the Board.” 29. Similarly, Smt. Abida and Smt. Hazra Khatoon having been rightly removed as nominated members, they are no longer entitled to continue as nominated members of the Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur and in their place Smt. Shyama Devi and Smt. Baijanti Devi shall be entitled to continue as nominated members of the Board.” 29. In the matter of Om Narain Agarwal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of removal of nominated women members observed that there is no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations. It was further observed that it is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to unequals. The nominated members of the Board fall into a different class and cannot claim equality with the elected members. 30. The High Court of Karnataka in the matter of H. Rajaiah (supra), while dealing with a similar issue observed that the nominations are made without following any transparent or objective process of selection of those vying for such nominations. They hold good during the pleasure of the Government and are therefore tenuous lacking certainty or security of tenure. The intensity of review of any decision relating to the making or unmaking of a nomination has thus to be low and broadly speaking limited to finding out whether the impugned decision is vitiated by bad faith, manifest absurdity or improper motive. It was held as under:- “The Doctrine of Pleasure is, as seen above, neither a relic of a feudal age nor a special prerogative of the Crown. It has found acceptability even in modern Democratic set ups on the ground of public good. In India, it has received recognition by incorporation in the provisions of Articles 76(4), 156(1), 165(3) and 311 of the Constitution. It thus remains a dynamic concept that transcends the vicissitudes of time and the changes that have come about since its birth. The doctrine and the amplitude of the power available under the same is not therefore ipso facto arbitrary, irrational or violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Court. It thus remains a dynamic concept that transcends the vicissitudes of time and the changes that have come about since its birth. The doctrine and the amplitude of the power available under the same is not therefore ipso facto arbitrary, irrational or violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Court. In Om Narain Agarwal and Others v Nagar Palika, Shahjahan-pur and Others, the nominations made to the Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur were revoked. The order when challenged was quashed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In an appeal before the Supreme Court, their Lordships held that a removal under 'Pleasure Doctrine' did not cast any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members and that such orders were passed purely on political considerations. The following passage from the decision is noteworthy.- "There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations". "Even in the case of highest functionary in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney General and the Advocate General discharge their duties efficiently, though removal at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to demoralise or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office". (emphasis supplied) Such then is the nature of the nominations. They are made without following any transparent or objective process of selection of those vying for such nominations. They hold good during the pleasure of the Government and are therefore tenuous lacking certainty or security of tenure. The intensity of review of any decision relating to the making or unmaking of a nomination has thus to be low and broadly speaking limited to finding out whether the impugned decision is vitiated by bad faith, manifest absurdity or improper motive.” 31. The intensity of review of any decision relating to the making or unmaking of a nomination has thus to be low and broadly speaking limited to finding out whether the impugned decision is vitiated by bad faith, manifest absurdity or improper motive.” 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shaikh Mahemud (supra), while dealing with the removal of a member of the Maharashtra State Board of Waqfs held that when there is a provision for appointment only and not for removal, the power to appoint would include the power of cancellation of appointment, and held in paras 14 & 15 as under:- “14. It was contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent that the notification of cancellation of appointment was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (9) read with clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 14. Since these provisions deals only with appointment and not with removal, it was contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent that the notification of cancellation was not in accordance with law. 15. But the above contention loses sight of the fact that the power to appoint would include the power of cancellation of appointment. Therefore, the said contention is liable to be rejected. 32. In the matter of Som Dutt and Ors. (supra), wherein the tenure of the Haryana Backward Classes Commission was dissolved and the notification issued in this regard was challenged, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana observed that the power of appointment includes the power of removal, the petitioners had been nominated at the sole discretion of the Government without following any selection procedure or inviting applications from the general public. Such an appointment is not in the nature of an employment or appointment under Part XIV of the Constitution. It has to be treated as one under the pleasure of the Government and conferring no legal or fundamental right on the petitioners. The relevant paras 17, 18, 26 & 27 read as under:- "17. The Commission to which the petitioners were appointed was constituted by notification issued in exercise of executive power of the State. The Commission has been dissolved in the same manner resulting in the petitioners ceasing to be members. Neither the constitution of the Commission nor the appointment of the petitioners had any statutory basis. The Commission to which the petitioners were appointed was constituted by notification issued in exercise of executive power of the State. The Commission has been dissolved in the same manner resulting in the petitioners ceasing to be members. Neither the constitution of the Commission nor the appointment of the petitioners had any statutory basis. In the absence thereof, the petitioners had no legal right to continue as members. It is well settled that the power of appointment includes the power of removal. The petitioners had been nominated at the sole discretion of the Government without following any selection procedure or inviting applications from the general public. Such an appointment is not in the nature of an employment or appointment under Part XIV of the Constitution. It has to be treated as one under the pleasure of the Government and conferring no legal or fundamental right on the petitioners. Thus, we find no illegality in the notification Annexure P-6 dissolving the Commission and the consequential cessation of membership of the petitioners. 18. Similar questions have been considered by different High Courts and it has been held that appointments to high public offices like Chairperson/ Members of Boards/Commissions which are not made by following any competitive selection process, but in the pure discretion and subjective satisfaction of the government and for which no `minimum tenure'' as distinct from a `tenure'' is prescribed, are at the pleasure of the government and can be terminated at any time in exercise of the doctrine of pleasure without any cause shown. In such situation the exercise of the doctrine of pleasure is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional not antithetical to Article 14. 26. Firstly, opining about the nature of their appointments it was observed that the petitioners were not the employees of the Government or of the respective Boards or Corporations, but were holders of high public offices and were appointed by nomination. No specific educational qualifications were prescribed nor was there any age of superannuation. 27. It then referred to a decision of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1993 SC 1440 . In that case the Apex Court was dealing with Section 9 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, which provided for nomination of a person as member of the Municipal Board by the State Government. In that case the Apex Court was dealing with Section 9 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, which provided for nomination of a person as member of the Municipal Board by the State Government. The fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act provided that a member nominated under Section 9 shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government, but not beyond the term of the Board. Two nominated members, challenged the cancellation of their nomination before the expiry of their term. The Hon''ble Supreme Court negatived the challenge by observing as under: "11 The right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body, depends and arises under a statute. The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the Legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. In case of an elected member, the Legislature has provided the grounds in Section 40 of the Act under which the members could be removed. But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the Legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government, it has not been argued from the side of the respondents that the Legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. The attack is based on Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. 12. In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members, it is done purely on political considerations.... .... ... .... ... 13 We are also not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralize the nominated members in the discharge of their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even in the case of highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney General and the Advocate General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to be demoralized or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office." 33. In the matter of Ram Lok & Ors. vs. State of H.P. and Anr., AIR Online 2023 HP 564, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh while dealing with the issue of the doctrine of pleasure observed that “In exercise of the doctrine of pleasure, the principles of natural justice have no application.” In paras 23, 24 and 27 it was held as under:- "23. The "Doctrine of Pleasure" has its genesis under the common law. A public servant could be dismissed from service by the Crown at its pleasure. However, the doctrine lost the said trait when it was applied in India, which is a republic, wedded to the rule of law functioning under a written Constitution. The authoritarian doctrine, though couched in an unfettered manner, is but subject to the rule of law. While considering the justiciability on the exercise of the power of Doctrine of Pleasure, there is no adjudication of any lis. The contours of judicial review is confined to finding out if the exercise of the power was "arbitrary, capricious or malafide". There is no requirement of any notice preceding exercise of the power or to assign any cause for exercise of the power. Though there is no need to assign reasons, the need for a valid and compelling reason, exists. In exercise of the doctrine of pleasure, the principles of natural justice have no application. 24. There is no requirement of any notice preceding exercise of the power or to assign any cause for exercise of the power. Though there is no need to assign reasons, the need for a valid and compelling reason, exists. In exercise of the doctrine of pleasure, the principles of natural justice have no application. 24. The ratio of the above decisions will apply with greater force in the present case, where the appointment/ nomination has no statutory basis whatsoever. 27. We have gone through the aforesaid judgment and find that therein though the doctrine of pleasure was discussed, but the same was only in the context of office of Governor(s), who hold a constitutional post, whereas it was unequivocally held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in exercise of power of doctrine of pleasure, principles of natural justice have no application." 34. In the matter of Mahesh Doley (supra), the High Court of Gauhati observed that once the doctrine of pleasure is applicable, neither the principles of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. In paras 8, 9, 10 & 12 it was held as under:- “8. This court further held that the doctrine of pleasure is duly incorporated and implicit in Section 80 as well as in proviso to it. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 2 SCC 441 the Division Bench took the view that once the doctrine of pleasure is applicable, neither the principles of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. It is also held that the pleasure of the Government is in no way controlled by any of the provisions under the statute with which we are concerned for the present. "There is nothing to suggest excluding from the operation of the absolute doctrine of pleasure. There is no restriction imposed upon the State Government in whatsoever manner and structuring the exercise of pleasure". 9. "There is nothing to suggest excluding from the operation of the absolute doctrine of pleasure. There is no restriction imposed upon the State Government in whatsoever manner and structuring the exercise of pleasure". 9. In the light of the law declared by this court we are constrained to hold that the operative portion of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge that the removal of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 530/ 02 is stigmatic in nature and the same has been resorted to arbitrarily and without adhering to the principles of natural justice is untenable and unsustainable in law. 10. In our considered opinion the expression 'removed and replaced' employed in proviso to Section 80 may have to be understood in proper context. Both the words used convey the same meaning of replacement of nominated members at pleasure. The word 'removed' may perhaps gave rise to an unnecessary debate and had the Legislature not used the said word it would not have resulted in this litigation. It is not any removal as is commonly understood which is always stigmatic and what the Legislature intended is only replacement. 12. Suffice it to hold that the impugned Notification by itself does not cast any stigma on the writ appellant and other nominated members who are replaced by the impugned notification.” 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Cheviti Venkanna Yadav (supra), held that the legislature cannot by way of an enactment declare a decision of the Court as erroneous or nullity. It can rectify, through an amendment, a defect in law noticed in the enactment and even highlighted in the decision of the court. It will have a curative and neutralizing effect. Its purpose is not to overrule the decision of the Court or encroach upon the judicial turf, but simply enact a fresh law with retrospective effect to alter the foundation and meaning of the legislation and to remove the base on which the judgment is founded. In the instant matter, the State Government substituted the word “appointed” with “nominated” in Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets (Amendment) Act, 2015. In the instant matter, the State Government substituted the word “appointed” with “nominated” in Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets (Amendment) Act, 2015. The amendment was challenged before the High Court and it was argued that the Chairmen and the Vice-Chairmen had a fixed term who could be removed after inquiry or under certain conditions and after amendment, the members had ceased to become members prior to the expiry of their tenure. It was also one of the grievances that the period is curtailed and the vested right is affected and the same could not have been done by retrospective amendment of the provision. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh found the classification between the two categories not reasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the term “appointed” used in the earlier provision was really not an appointment which can be equated to a post under the service jurisprudence. It is further held that the competent authority of the State Government still can remove a Member or Vice-Chairman or Chairman by taking recourse to other provisions prior to the expiry of the period. It is further observed that the members were not elected. They were not appointed by any kind of selection and they were chosen by the State Government from certain categories. It was also held that the plea of vested rights is like building a castle in Spain. It has no legs to stand upon and therefore the appeal was dismissed. 36. Now coming to the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that the last elections were conducted in the year 2017 and the 5 years term came to an end in the year 2022. After the deemed vacation of the board of the societies, the Government Officials were appointed as Prescribed Officers and thereafter, the decision was taken to nominate/appoint the non-official members. The Government officials exercised the power of the prescribed Officers for 4-5 months and thereafter, in the month of November-December 2022, the petitioners were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers. 37. The duty was cast with the societies to prepare a list in form G-1 of members for the election of its boards/delegates. The Government officials exercised the power of the prescribed Officers for 4-5 months and thereafter, in the month of November-December 2022, the petitioners were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers. 37. The duty was cast with the societies to prepare a list in form G-1 of members for the election of its boards/delegates. The societies had to submit a true copy of the resolution, a copy of the by-laws, the date of the last election held, and a statement that the date of term of the existing board has expired. 38. In all the petitions, it is nowhere stated that any steps were taken by the petitioners to conduct elections according to provisions of Rule 49-CC of the Rules, 1962, whereas the petitioners remained in office from November 2022 till 15.12.2023, for more than a year. Though an order was passed in WPC No.1244 of 2023, whereby the State was directed to conduct elections of Co-Operative Societies as early as possible, the primary duty was cast on the societies themselves to complete the formalities according to the provisions of Rule 49-CC of the Rules, 1962, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the State cannot be blamed for not conducting the election from November, 2022 till 15.12.2023. 39. The petitioners are Prescribed Officers (non-official) of the respective Societies/Primary Co-Operative Societies and after the expiry of the term of the board of the society, when no election could be held, a decision was taken to hand over the charge of the Prescribed Officer for managing the Co-Operative Societies/ Primary Committees to the petitioners according to the provisions of Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960. The proviso to Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 clearly envisages that the Registrar may authorize any Government Officials or a person, who is in his opinion, has experience to manage the Co-Operative Societies and such person shall exercise power for a period specified by the Registrar or till the elections are held. Thus, the scheme of the proviso makes it amply clear that Government Officials or non-official members may exercise the power of a Prescribed Officer for a period specified by the Registrar. The power has been given to the Registrar to modify, alter or rescind an order issued by it. 40. Thus, the scheme of the proviso makes it amply clear that Government Officials or non-official members may exercise the power of a Prescribed Officer for a period specified by the Registrar. The power has been given to the Registrar to modify, alter or rescind an order issued by it. 40. A conjoint reading of the proviso to Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 and sub-rule 3 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962, would make it clear that the non-official person, appointed as Prescribed Officer, may exercise power for a period specified by the Registrar or till the elections are held and further power is given to authority i.e. the Registrar to remove the person authorized at any time by order in writing without assigning any reason thereof; thus, the power of removal is vested with the Registrar, Co-Operative Societies. Though the eligibility criteria have been enumerated in sub-rule 2 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 for nomination/appointment as Prescribed Officer, it covers eligibility/suitability of candidates; but for removal of the Prescribed Officer, no provision has been prescribed or contemplated in the statute therefore, the contention raised by learned Senior Counsel that the petitioners have been removed contrary to the mandate of the Rules is misplaced. 41. The removal of the petitioners is a decision taken by the authorities in a routine manner and no stigma is attached to the orders of removal, therefore, there was no requirement to issue a notice or to afford any opportunity for hearing. Further, the proviso to sub-rule 3 of Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 gives power to the Registrar to remove the non-official member without assigning any reason, therefore, the contention raised in this regard cannot be accepted. 42. In reply, the State has categorically stated in para-3 that the decision to remove the petitioners has not been taken pursuant to the change in the political scenario. Though an order was issued by the General Administrative Department on 15.12.2023 to remove political appointments, there is no reference to such communication in the orders impugned issued by the Deputy Registrar, therefore, the contention raised by the petitioners is of no help. 43. The petitioners as well as respondents have categorically stated that the petitioners are not elected members and they were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers in the month of November-December, 2022. 43. The petitioners as well as respondents have categorically stated that the petitioners are not elected members and they were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers in the month of November-December, 2022. As the petitioners were not elected through a democratic course, they cannot claim right over the office which they were holding and they cannot be permitted to continue in the Office for an indefinite period. 44. The Co-Operative Societies was inserted in the Constitution of India by the 97th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2011 w.e.f. 15.02.2012. Article 243 (ZJ) deals with the number and term of the members of the board and its office bearer and Article 243 (ZK) deals with the election of members of the board. Article 243(ZL) says that the board cannot be kept under suspension for a period exceeding six months, whereas in the present case, the board of the societies has been kept under suspension for more than a year, and no steps were taken by the Prescribed Officers/petitioners to conduct elections, therefore, the decision taken by the Registrar, Co-Operative Societies to remove the petitioners cannot be faulted with. 45. In the matter of Smt. Padma Chandrakar (supra), the members were appointed according to the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, 1995, and they could have been removed strictly in accordance with Section 4 of the Act, 1995 and not otherwise, therefore, the order of removal was set aside and the same was also affirmed by the Division Bench, but in the present case, the petitioners were nominated according to the provisions of Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 and Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962. In the present case, the power has been given to the Registrar to remove a non-official person without assigning any reason and there is no fixed period in the statute nor any period is specified in the order of appointment, therefore, the facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the case of Smt. Padma Chandrakar (supra). 46. 46. In the case of Sanjay Nagayach (supra), the issue of supersession and illegal exercise of power were involved but the case in hand is not a case of supersession or illegal exercise of power, but it is a case where the Registrar exercised its power conferred by the proviso to Rule 43-B of the Rules, 1962 and removed the petitioners who were nominated/appointed as Prescribed Officers, therefore, the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts of the case cited. 47. In the matter of Satya Pal Anand (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the State Government, who is appointing authority, has equal power to remove but such power is not omnibus, unanalyzed or unguided. It is further held that such a decision is subject to judicial review. In the present case, the petitioners were appointed as the prescribed officers without specifying any tenure. They are not elected members. Rule 43-B itself provides a mechanism for removal without assigning any reason. Further, the authority that has the power to appoint has also the power to remove such persons. The case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is distinguishable as the petitioners have no substantive right and they cannot be permitted to remain in office for an indefinite period. 48. In the matter of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not. However, in the present case, the petitioners/non-official members were appointed as Prescribed Officers till further orders or till the commencement of the election, and they were not appointed for an indefinite period, thus, the argument concerning the principles of natural justice does not arise in the present case. 49. The matter of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. (supra), deals with the principles of natural justice but there would be no question of any violation of the principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine has any application in the facts and circumstances of the case as the orders of removal do not put any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations. It is done purely on political considerations. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Om Narayan (supra) and Cheviti Venkanna Yadav (supra), is relevant to this issue. 50. Though in the case of Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that Cooperative Societies of Kerala State do not come within the purview of the State as per the definition given in Article 12 of the Constitution but in the State of Chhattisgarh, Registrar Cooperative Societies and other Registrars have been empowered to manage and control the Societies. According to provisions of Section 49(8) of the Act, 1960 after the expiry of the term of an elected board of society, it ceases to function and all the members of the board shall be deemed to have vacated their seats and the powers of the board shall be deemed to have been vested in the Registrar. Thus the facts of the case cited are entirely different from the facts of the present case. 51. On the anvil of the above interpretation, relevant provisions of law governing the field and various authoritative pronouncements laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, the findings with regard to present matters can be summed up as under:- I. The petitioners were not selected pursuant to any process; II. The petitioners are not elected members; III. In the statute there is no specific provision regarding the removal of the petitioners; IV. No specific tenure is provided in their appointment orders; V. Though the petitioners were nominated by authorities, they cannot be permitted to continue for an indefinite period; VI. The petitioners did not take any steps to conduct the election; VII. The doctrine of pleasure would not come into play in the absence of statutory right in favour of the petitioners; VIII. There is no question of violation of principles of natural justice as orders of removal have been passed within four corners of the statute and the same are not stigmatic; IX. The appointment of the petitioners cannot be equated to a post under the service jurisprudence therefore the doctrine of pleasure would not attract; X. The authority who appointed the petitioners has equal power to remove them; XI. It is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to unequals. The appointment of the petitioners cannot be equated to a post under the service jurisprudence therefore the doctrine of pleasure would not attract; X. The authority who appointed the petitioners has equal power to remove them; XI. It is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to unequals. The petitioners fall into a different class and cannot claim equality with the elected members; XII. No fundamental right to continue on the said posts is vested in the petitioners; XIII. The petitioners were nominated; such an appointment is not in the nature of an employment/appointment under Part XIV of the Constitution of India; XIV. The nomination/appointment of the petitioners confers no legal or fundamental right in favour of the petitioners; XV. The nomination/appointment of the petitioners was pure discretion and subjective satisfaction of the government and for which no ‘minimum tenure' as distinct from a ‘tenure’ was prescribed; XVI. The petitioners were at the pleasure of the government and can be terminated at any time in the exercise of the doctrine of pleasure without any cause shown. In such a situation, the exercise of the doctrine of pleasure is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional nor antithetical to Article 14. 52. In view of the above, it is held that the authority concerned has not committed any error of law in passing the orders of removal against the petitioners. Consequently, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed without any order as to costs. 53. The issue of alternative remedy is left open as the same has not been contested by either party. It is expected that the State shall endeavour to hold elections as early as possible in accordance with the provisions of the Rules, 1962.