JUDGMENT : 1. This acquittal appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.5.2006 passed in Special Case No.1/2005 by the Special Judge (under the Prevention of Corruption Act), Rajnandgaon, whereby, the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the charges under Section 13(1) d read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that complainant-Chandrabhagabai (PW-1), a resident of Thakurtola and her husband Lakhan Lal had purchased some land in the month of August 1999. The complainant after execution of the sale-deed handed over the papers to the respondent/accused for Pramanikaran. The Revenue Inspector also passed the order for Pramanikaran by the Patwari/Accused on 1.12.1999. The complainant contacted the respondent-accused several times in this regard However, the accused made a demand of Rs.500/- for such work. Since the complainant was not willing to give bribe, she approached the office of Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt on 13.3.2000 and made a written complaint. On such complainant being made, a trap was planned and a micro tape cassette was arranged, which was given to the complainant and its mode of operation was explained to her and a Panchnama in this regard was prepared vide Ex.P/2. On 14.3.2000, the complainant contacted the accused and she recorded his conversation regarding demand of bribe and handed over the cassette to the officials and its transcription was prepared vide Ex.P/14. Thereafter, a trap was laid on 17.3.2000 and for such raid, again, a new micro cassette was provided to her and for which, Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P/5 and the trap proceeding was prepared vide Ex.P/6. As per the plan, the complainant was handed over Rs.400/- in a denomination of Rs.100/- (4 in numbers) as bribe money for giving it to the respondent/accused. On the said notes, Constable Narayan (PW-3) applied Phenolphthalein powder on the notes and the same were handed over to the complainant. The shadow witness - Bhuvandas Kesariya (PW-8) was given instruction that when the respondent-accused would accept the bribe money, he had to give a signal with a gesture by keeping both the hands around the head. On the date of the trap, when the shadow witness – Bhuvandas Kesaria (PW-8) gave the signal in the same manner, Inspector RK Rai (not examined) caught hold of the right hand of the respondent/ accused and constable Shyam Sunder Rao (PW-7) caught hold of his left wrist. On the date of the trap, when the shadow witness – Bhuvandas Kesaria (PW-8) gave the signal in the same manner, Inspector RK Rai (not examined) caught hold of the right hand of the respondent/ accused and constable Shyam Sunder Rao (PW-7) caught hold of his left wrist. The respondent/accused accepted the bribe while he was wearing a full pant and the money was recovered from his pocket which got matched with Baramdagi Panchnama. When the hands of the accused were dipped in the Sodium Carbonate solution, the colour of his hands turned pink. The complainant also handed over the recorded tape cassette to the officers and thereafter, the transcription was prepared by Constable Shyam Sunder Rao (PW-7) vide Ex.P/17. The Prosecution Sanction was obtained vide Ex.P/13 and thereafter, the charge sheet was filed. 3. During trial, the respondent/accused denied the charges under Section 7 read with 13(1) d read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many 12 as witnesses. The accused stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case and he did not adduce any defence evidence. In his statement, the accused further stated that he had not taken any bribe from complainant - Chandrabhagabai (PW-1). The money which was lying on the table and apprehended, was asked to be kept in the pocket, which he did as per the direction of the police party and it was that money which was recovered from him. He stated that he had not accepted any bribe from the complainant. Learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence, acquitted the accused from the charges. Hence, this Appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the State would submit that the trial Court has wrongly acquitted the respondent/accused and the appreciation of the evidence is perverse. There is sufficient evidence, whereby, the prosecution has successfully established the charges. Hence, he prays to allow the appeal and convict the respondent/accused. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence. The present is a case of no evidence. He submits that the complainant herself has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. Even the shadow witness – Bhuvandas Kesaria (PW-8) has also not supported both the transcriptions Ex.P/4 and Ex.P/17 respectively, which were not duly proved. The present is a case of no evidence. He submits that the complainant herself has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. Even the shadow witness – Bhuvandas Kesaria (PW-8) has also not supported both the transcriptions Ex.P/4 and Ex.P/17 respectively, which were not duly proved. Further, it is clarified that in the transcription vide Ex.P/4, the voice was not clear, which has been categorically mentioned in the note therein. The primary witness - Chandrabhagabai (PW-1) - (complainant) negated with regard to demand of bribe by the accused and stated that she herself had kept the money on the table saying that the said money may be needed for official purpose. Thus, the complainant categorically admitted that the respondent/accused had not made any demand. In support of his contentions, he places reliance on the matter of Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC Online SC 280. Therefore, in such circumstances, the findings arrived at by the trial Court is a possible one, which requires no interference by this Court. 6. Heard counsel for the parties and also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 7. In the matter of Neeraj Dutta (supra), the legal position about the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. 8. In the aforesaid matter of Neeraj Dutta (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred the matter to the Constitution Bench, (2023) 4 SCC 731 , and the conclusions of the Constitution Bench have been highlighted vide para 11 & 12 : 11. The Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus: “74. The Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus: “74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1) (d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1) (d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” (emphasis added) 12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “76. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under: In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.” (emphasis added) 9. Thereafter, the Supreme Court by relying on the aforesaid Constitution Bench judgment, further observed in the above matter vide para 13 to 18, which reads as under : 13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of 2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon’ble Judges in the cases of B. Jayaraj 2014 (13) SCC 55 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy 2015 (10) SCC 152 . There is another decision of a three Judges’ bench in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (3) SCC 687 , which follows the view taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj 2014 (13) SCC 55 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy 2015 (10) SCC 152 . In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj 2014 (13) SCC 55 , this Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus: “9. In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj 2014 (13) SCC 55 , this Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus: “9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” (emphasis added) 14. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of gratification. The presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the presumption. 15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar 2021 (3) SCC 687 , another bench of three Hon’ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543. In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.” (emphasis added) 16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26th July 2018, was different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to “any gratification”. The substituted Section 7 does not use the word “gratification”, but it uses a wider term “undue advantage”. When the allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of 26th July 2018, has been quoted earlier. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of 26th July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. 18. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand. 10. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand. 10. Revering back to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that complainant, Chandrabhagabai (PW-1), shadow witness – Bhuvandas Kesariya (PW-8) and the daughter of the complainant – Madhavi (PW-11), who all are the material witnesses, have completely turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. 11. The complainant Chandrabhagabai (PW-1) categorically deposed that the respondent/accused had never made any demand. She further denied that she had made a written complaint-Ex.P/1 to the office of Lokayukt. She categorically deposed that she herself kept the money on the table assuming that the same may be needed officially for preparing the Rin Pustika, however, the accused replied that no such charges are levied for the said work, therefore, the money is not required. When the complainant kept the money on the table, at that time, the Raid Party arrived. As per the evidence of the accused, he was forced to put the money inside his pocket. The complainant categorically deposed that respondent No.1/accused has told her that he had no authority to cut the name of his son from the land records. Another witness PW-2 – Charan Singh vide para 9 of his statement has categorically deposed that he was not able to witness the transaction between the parties inside the office of the Patwari as he was sitting in the jeep, wherefrom, it could not be seen. The other witnesses are related to the prior proceedings of the trap laid against the accused. PW-3 Narayan Prasad and PW-4 – Yogendra Singh are the witnesses who have proved the Prosecution Sanction vide Ex.P/13. 12. Considering the nature of the evidence, I am of the opinion that the trial Court has rightly taken the view that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the view taken is a possible one, as held in the matter of Jafarudheen Vs. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 , which does not require any interference by this Court. 13. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.