JUDGMENT : Anish Kumar Gupta, J. 1. A First Information Report was lodged on 11.2.2023, alleging that quiet a number of persons were illegally meeting the already incarcerated person, namely Abbas Ansari in the Jail premises and were trying his escape from lawful custody. The petitioner herein was arrested and was in judicial custody. When the petitioner herein moved an application for his release on bail, the District Magistrate who was delegated powers under Section 3(3) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), apprehending the disturbance of public order by the petitioner herein passed an order dated 6.5.2023 under Section 3(2) of the Act, directing detention of the petitioner. 2. Under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, the State Government on 10.5.2023 approved the detention order. Thereafter, as per Section 3 (5) of National Security Act, the detention order, grounds of detention and all other relevant documents, as were in the possession of the State Government, were sent to the Central Government by a communication dated 11.5.2023. Also, under Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980, on the same date i.e. on 11.5.2023, the matter was referred by the State Government to the U.P. Advisory Board (Detention), Lucknow. The Advisory Board, after allegedly complying with all the provisions under Section 11 of the National Security Act, sent its report (the date of which is not given). However, it was received by the State Government on 31.5.2023. Thereafter, upon considering the report of the Advisory Board on 5.6.2023, an order was passed by the State of U.P. under Section 12 (1) of the National Security Act, as per the affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary, by which the petitioner was to be detained provisionally for a period of three months. This order again, as per the affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary, Sri Pramendra Kumar Gupta, was extended on 21.7.2023 and the petitioner was to be detained provisionally for a period of six months from the initial date of detention. Aggrieved by the initial order of detention, dated 6.5.2023 and the consequential illegal detention, the petitioner has approached this Court. This order again, as per the affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary, Sri Pramendra Kumar Gupta, was extended on 21.7.2023 and the petitioner was to be detained provisionally for a period of six months from the initial date of detention. Aggrieved by the initial order of detention, dated 6.5.2023 and the consequential illegal detention, the petitioner has approached this Court. Essentially, the petitioner's counsel, Sri Dayashankar Mishra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Chandrakesh Mishra and Abhishek Kumar Mishra have made the following submissions: (i) The petitioner had tried to submit his representation through the jailer and when the same was not taken by the Authorities, he submitted the representation by registered post on 26.5.2023. This representation was addressed to the District Magistrate. However, he submits that the hearing was conducted on 26.5.2023 itself by Advisory Board, and therefore, the representation as was required to be placed before the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the National Security Act, was never there before the Advisory Board. (ii) Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that when the petitioner represented through his counsel on 1.6.2023 to the State Government and the Central Government, this representation was never considered. (iii) Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that if the counter-affidavit of Sri Premendra Kumar Gupta, is perused, then, as per paragraph 9' it is evident that Government officials were present and were heard before the U.P. Advisory Board. Learned counsel for the petitioner since has relied upon para 9' of the affidavit of Sri P.K. Gupta, the same is reproduced as under: “That, it is submitted that the U.P. Advisory Board, Lucknow vide its letter dated 22.5.2023, informed the State Government that the case of the petitioner would be taken up for hearing on 26-05-2023 and directed that the petitioner be informed that if he desired to attend the hearing before the U.P. Advisory Board alongwith his next friend (non-advocate), he could do so and be allowed to take his next friend (non-advocate) alongwith him if he had so requested. This fact was accordingly communicated to the petitioner through district authorities by the State Government letter dated 23.5.2023. The petitioner appeared for hearing before the U.P. Advisory Board on the date fixed. This fact was accordingly communicated to the petitioner through district authorities by the State Government letter dated 23.5.2023. The petitioner appeared for hearing before the U.P. Advisory Board on the date fixed. The U.P. Advisory Board heard the petitioner in person and Government officials and sent its report alongwith the opinion that there is sufficient cause for the preventive detention of the petitioner under the National Security Act, 1980. This report and the records of the case were received in the concerned section of the State Government on 31.5.2023 through the letter of Registrar, U.P. Advisory Board (Detentions) dated 31-05-2023 well within seven weeks from the date of detention of the petitioner, as provided in Section 11(1) of the Act.” (iv) Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the judgment of Najar Quraishi v. Superintendent and others, passed on 19.9.2018 in Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 3293 of 2018, has submitted that if the State was being assisted by Legal Advisors in the form of Government officials then as per the law which had been laid down in the judgment of A.K. Roy v. Union of India and another, (1982) 1 SCC 271 and also as per judgment of Choith Nanikram Harchandani v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 403, the petitioner ought to have also been given assistance of legal practitioners. Since, learned counsel for the petitioner relied heavily upon the judgment of A.K Roy (supra), the para 93' of that judgment is being reproduced herein as under: “93. We must therefore hold, regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. It is, however, necessary to add an important caveat. The reason behind the provisions contained in Article 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the Advisory Board for any party. The Constitution does not contemplate that the detaining authority or the Government should have the facility of appearing before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner but that the said facility should be denied to the detenu. In any case, that is not what the Constitution says and it would be wholly inappropriate to read any such meaning into the provisions of Article 22. In any case, that is not what the Constitution says and it would be wholly inappropriate to read any such meaning into the provisions of Article 22. Permitting the detaining authority or the Government to appear before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser would be in breach of Article 14, if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. We must therefore make it clear that if the detaining authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner. We are informed that officers of the Government in the departments concerned often appear before the Board and assist it with a view to justifying the detention orders. If that be so, we must clarify that the Boards should not permit the authorities to do indirectly what they cannot do directly; and no one should be enabled to take shelter behind the excuse that such officers are not 'legal practitioners' or legal advisers. Regard must be had to the substance and not the form since, especially, in matters like the proceedings of Advisory Boards, whosoever assists or advises on facts or law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser. We do hope that Advisory Boards will take care to ensure that the provisions of Article 14 are not violated in any manner in the proceedings before them. Serving or retired Judges of the High Court will have no difficulty in understanding this position. Those who are merely 'qualified to be appointed' as High Court Judges may have to do a little homework in order to appreciate it.” (Emphasis Supplied) Also since the judgment of Choith Nanikram Harchandani v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 403, was relied upon and specifically the paragraph 15' was relied upon and the same is reproduced as under: “15. In our considered view, if the petitioner is a habitual offender and has past criminal record, as alleged by the respondents, it was all the more necessary for the respondents to have followed in letter and spirit the procedure laid down in A.K Roy's case (supra) before passing the impugned order of detention. In our considered view, if the petitioner is a habitual offender and has past criminal record, as alleged by the respondents, it was all the more necessary for the respondents to have followed in letter and spirit the procedure laid down in A.K Roy's case (supra) before passing the impugned order of detention. It was, however, not done.” (v) Learned counsel for the petitioner further states that the order which was passed by the State of U.P., initially on 5.6.2023, was an order which was passed under Section 12(1) of the National Security Act after considering the report of the Advisory Board and this order could not thereafter be reviewed or extended by subsequent orders. He submits that the law as had been laid down in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, (2015) 13 SCC 722 , which had stated that the detention order had to be initially passed for three months and thereafter could be extended after every three months under Section 3(3) of the National Security Act was not a good law. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon Pesala Nookaraju v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2023 SCC Online SC 1003 and on Ameena Begum v. The State of Telangana and others, (2023) 9 SCC 587 , made the above submission. Since, learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon the paragraphs 42', 43' and 44' of the judgment in Pesala Nookaraju (supra), the same are being reproduced herein as under: “42. Hence, Article 22(4)(a) in substance deals with the order of detention and has nothing to do with the delegation of the power of detention by the State Government to an Officer as stipulated under Section 3(2) of the Act. In fact, under Section 9 of the Act, the State Government has to refer the matter to the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention, irrespective of whether the detention order is passed under Section 3(1) or Section 3(2) of the Act and the Advisory Board has to give its opinion within seven weeks from the date of detention. That would totally make it ten weeks. As stipulated in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution, if in a given case, once the Advisory Board gives its opinion within the stipulated period of three months, then in our view, Article 22(4)(a) would no longer be applicable. That would totally make it ten weeks. As stipulated in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution, if in a given case, once the Advisory Board gives its opinion within the stipulated period of three months, then in our view, Article 22(4)(a) would no longer be applicable. Thus, Article 22(4)(a) applies at the initial stage of passing of the order of detention by the State Government or by an officer who has been delegated by the State Government and whose order has been approved by the State Government within a period of twelve days from the date of detention and not at the stage subsequent to the report of the Advisory Board. Depending upon the opinion of the Advisory Board, under Section 12 of the Act, the State Government can revoke the order of detention and release the detenu forthwith or may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for any period not exceeding the maximum period of twelve months, which is stipulated in Section 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the State Government passes a confirmatory order under Section 12 of the Act after receipt of the report from the Advisory Board then, such a confirmatory order need not be restricted to a period of three months only. It can be beyond a period of three months from the date of initial order of detention, but up to a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. 43. We reiterate that the period of three months stipulated in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution is relatable to the initial period of detention up to the stage of receipt of report of the Advisory Board and does not have any bearing on the period of detention, which is continued subsequent to the confirmatory order being passed by the State Government on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board. The continuation of the detention pursuant to the confirmatory order passed by the State Government need not also specify the period of detention; neither is it restricted to a period of three months only. If any period is specified in the confirmatory order, then the period of detention would be upto such period, if no period is specified, then it would be for a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. If any period is specified in the confirmatory order, then the period of detention would be upto such period, if no period is specified, then it would be for a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. The State Government, in our view, need not review the orders of detention every three months after it has passed the confirmatory order 44. Thus, in our view, the period of three months specified in Article 22(4)(a) of Constitution of India is relatable to the period of detention prior to the report of the Advisory Board and not to the period of detention subsequent thereto. Further, the period of detention in terms of Article 22(4)(a) cannot be in force for a period beyond three months, if by then, the Advisory Board has not given its opinion holding that there is sufficient cause for such detention. Therefore, under Article 22(4)(a), the Advisory Board would have to give its opinion within a period of three months from the date of detention and depending upon the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board, the State Government can under Section 12 of the Act, either confirm the order of detention or continue the detention of the person concerned for a maximum period of twelve months as specified in Section 13 of the Act or release the detenu forthwith, as the case may be. If the order of detention is confirmed, then the period of detention can be extended up to the maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. With respect, we observe that it is not necessary that before the expiration of three months, it is necessary for the State Government to review the order of detention as has been expressed by this Court in Cherukuri Mani (supra). The Act does not contemplate a review of the detention order once the Advisory Board has opined that there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned and on that basis, a confirmatory order is passed by the State Government to detain a person for the maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. The Act does not contemplate a review of the detention order once the Advisory Board has opined that there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned and on that basis, a confirmatory order is passed by the State Government to detain a person for the maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. On the other hand, when under Section 3(2) of the Act, the State Government delegates its power to the District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police to exercise its power and pass an order of detention, the delegation in the first instance cannot exceed three months and the extension of the period of delegation cannot also be for a period exceeding three months at any one time. [See: Abdul Razak v. State of Karnataka, ILR 2017 Kar 4608 (FB)]” (Emphasis Supplied) Also, since learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon the paragraphs 71', 72', 73', 76' and 78' of Ameena Begum (supra), the same are being reproduced herein as under: “71. Both Mr. Luthra and Mr. Dave have referred us the recent decision of a 3-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Pesala Nookaraju v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh [Crl. Appeal No. 2304 of 2023, decided on 16th August, 2023 where an order of detention passed in exercise of power conferred by the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangero Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (“1986 Act” hereafter) was upheld despite the detenu having obtained orders of bail upon arrest in connection with investigation of 4 (four) F.I.R. under Sections 7B and 8B of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995. 72. Mr. Luthra intended to rely on the decision in Cherukari Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2015) 13 SCC 722 . According to the appellant, the detention could only be in force for a period of three months in the fir instance and that such order on a periodic assessment was required to be reviewed for continuous detention till the maximum period permissible. The contention was accepted by this Court. 73. While hearing of the appeal was in progress, came the decision in Pesala Nookaraju (supra) overruling Cherukari Mani (supra). It was held that the “State Government need not review the orders of detention every three months after it ha passed the confirmatory order.” Fairly, Mr. The contention was accepted by this Court. 73. While hearing of the appeal was in progress, came the decision in Pesala Nookaraju (supra) overruling Cherukari Mani (supra). It was held that the “State Government need not review the orders of detention every three months after it ha passed the confirmatory order.” Fairly, Mr. Luthra did not seek to rely on Cherukari Mani (supra) further. .................................. .................................. 76. Mr. Dave next relied on the reasons assigned in Pesala Nookaraju (supra) to contend that the impugned Detention Order should be held legal and unexceptionable. .................................. 78. It is indeed true that the appellant had raised a contention before the Court that the Government of Andhra Pradesh had directed detention of the appellant for the maximum period of 12 (twelve) months without any application of mind providing reasons as to why this is necessary.” (vi) Learned counsel for the petitioner in effect, therefore, argued that once when an order confirming the detention under Section 12(1) of the National Security Act had been passed, then, the same could not be reviewed or extended. However, he submitted that for the benefit of the detenue, order could be passed either revoking or modifying the detention in terms of the provisions of Section 14 of the National Security Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner reliying upon the judgment of the Ram Bali Rajbhar v. The State of West Bengal and others, (1975) 4 SCC 47 , has submitted that the State could pass the modification order in favour of the detenue after complying with the provisions of Section 10 & 11 of the National Security Act. Since, learned counsel for the petitioner relied heavily upon paragraph 12' of the judgment of Ram Bali Rajbhar (supra), the same is being reproduced herein as under: “12. We think it will be a reasonable and judicious exercise of the power under Section 14 of the Act to refer a case once again to the Advisory Board for its opinion before a subsequent representation made on fresh materials by a detenu is rejected. It is true that the conditions under which a reference is made for the opinion of the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act cannot be repeated. It is true that the conditions under which a reference is made for the opinion of the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act cannot be repeated. It is also clear that the express and mandatory duty to refer arises only under the conditions laid down by Section 10 of the Act and there is no specific or separate provision for calling for the opinion of the Advisory Board from time to time., Nevertheless, if the power under Sec. 14 of the Act can be exercised “in the like manner and subject to the like sanctions and conditions (if any)”, to use the language employed by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, we can only interpret “like manner” and subjection to “like conditions” to mean similar and not identical manner and conditions. We think that a situation in which a power of revocation or modification of a detention order is invoked by a second or subsequent representation can, after making allowance for intervening events which cannot be wiped out of existence, be compared to and resembles a situation in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is sought after an approval or a preliminary confirmation of a detention order by the State Government under Section 3 (3) of the Act, awaiting the opinion of the Advisory Board, which is expected to function quite impartially and independently before the Government makes a final order under Section 12 of the Act. Section 10 of the Act only provides for the Ist representation. But, it appears to us that the power under Section 14 of the Act, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which is specifically mentioned in Section 14 of the Act, could import or imply a power of the State Government to refer a second representation likewise to the Advisory Board, if the State Government so decides in an analogous situation. And, the Advisory Board can then adopt such, parts of the procedure laid down in Section IT of the Act as could be applied to a second representation. In such a case, the reference would not be under Section 10 of the Act but under Section 14 of the Act read with the necessary implication of preserving the power of the Government to act as laid down in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. In such a case, the reference would not be under Section 10 of the Act but under Section 14 of the Act read with the necessary implication of preserving the power of the Government to act as laid down in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. In other words, the subsequent reference would result from a necessarily implied power of the Government, to act, so far as possible, in a like manner to the one it has to adopt in confirming or revoking the initial detention order under Section 12 of the Act. And, if there is such a power in the Government to refer a subsequent representation on fresh grounds to the Advisory Board for its opinion, there will, we think be a corresponding implied power and obligation of the Advisory Board to give its opinion in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Section II of the Act except that its report will necessarily have to be submitted in such cases beyond ten weeks from the date of detention order but within a reasonable time.” (vii) Learned counsel for the petitioner states that if any order after the order dated 5.6.2023 had to be passed, then fresh reasons ought to have been there and all the machinery which was provided under Sections 3, 8, 10 and 11 of the National Security Act ought to have been followed. (viii) Still further, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there was no finding with regard to the fact as to how “public order” was being disturbed. He submits that in the First Information Report there were seven accused including Abbas Ansari, but only the petitioner-Niyaz Ansari, who was only a driver of Nikhat Ansari, the wife of said Abbas Ansari, had been detained under the provisions of the Act. 3. On 10.1.2024, we had put certain questions and had asked the learned A.G.A. to reply to them today. A Supplementary-affidavit has been filed by Sri Premendra Kumar Gupta, the Deputy Secretary, (Home Department (Confidential), U.P. and with regard to the reply vis-a-vis the representation which the petitioner had submitted, he has stated that the representation in fact, was never there before the Advisory Board. He has submitted that the petitioner had never mentioned before the Advisory Board that the representation was sent. He has submitted that the petitioner had never mentioned before the Advisory Board that the representation was sent. With regard to the subsequent representation which finds mention in the writ petition and was dated 1.6.2023, learned A.G.A. submits that in fact it was not submitted on 1.6.2023 but was signed on 6.6.2023 and on that date the detenue and his counsel had submitted the same. The original of this communication was produced before us. 4. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that as per Cherukuri Mani (supra), the initial confirmity order could not have been passed for more than three months and that it could in fact only be extended every three months. Therefore, he submits that the order dated 5.6.2023 was passed under Section 12(1) readwith 3(3) of the National Security Act for only a period of three months. He submits that in accordance with law as was prevalent at the time of the passing of the order dated 5.6.2023 the subsequent orders dated 21.7.2023 and 27.10.2023 were passed extending the detention by further three months. 5. Learned A.G.A. with regard to the presence of Government officials has stated that in the counter-affidavit it was inadvertently stated that the Government officials were heard. He has stated that the Government official in fact had only visited the office of the Advisory Board and had supplied only events/documents before the Advisory Board and in fact they were never heard. 6. Having heard Sri Dayashankar Mishra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Abhishek Mishra and Sri Chandrakesh Mishra, Advocates; learned Additional Advocate General, Sri P.C. Srivastava, assisted by Sri J.K. Upadhyaya; Vikas Sahai for the State of Uttar Pradesh and the learned counsel for the Union of India Ms. Manjari Singh, we are of the view that that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. The petitioner was at the first place, as per the law laid down in A.K. Roy (supra) and Choith Nanikram Harchandani (supra) as was followed by our High Court in Najar Quraishi (supra) was not given the right to have assistance of Legal Practitioners. 7. In view of the fact that the State was having Government officials i.e., Legal Advisors (as had been interpretted in Choith Nanikram Harchandani), the petitioner also ought to have had the legal assistance on the 26th of May 2023 i.e. the day when he had appeared before the Advisory Board. 7. In view of the fact that the State was having Government officials i.e., Legal Advisors (as had been interpretted in Choith Nanikram Harchandani), the petitioner also ought to have had the legal assistance on the 26th of May 2023 i.e. the day when he had appeared before the Advisory Board. Therefore, we are of the view that the petitioner's valuable right of being properly heard was violated. 8. We also are of the view that once when the order of detention was confirmed on 5.6.2023, after considering the Advisory Board's report, then, the State Government ought to have applied its mind in one go and as per Section 12 of the National Security Act, it ought to have passed an order as to for what period the detention had to be done. Definitely, the detention could not have been done in piecemeal as has been done in the present case by the State Government. If the initial detention was for three months, then it could have been there only for three months. If for any further reasons the Government intended to detain the detenue further then all the machinery as is provided under Sections 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the National Security Act, ought to have been followed. 9. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed. The order by which the initial detention order dated 6.5.2023 was confirmed on 5.6.2023 is quashed. The petitioner though has not challenged in the writ petition the orders dated 21.7.2023 and 27.10.2023 but were brought before us whereby the detention was extended are also hereby quashed and set-aside. Since the confirmation order dated 5.6.2023 by which the detention order dated 6.5.2023 has been set-aside, we are of the view that the order dated 6.5.2023 also goes as it has outlived its life. 10. We, therefore, direct that the petitioner, Niyaz Ansari, (Detenue) be set at liberty, unless he is required in any other case.